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Abstract
In 1998, the Department of Defense in the United States released the first of a series of
seminal policies on Information Operations (IO). Entitled Joint Publication 3-13, this instruction
laid out for the first time, in an unclassified format, how the American military forces could
utilise this particular element of power. As a relative newly defined activity, this publication
proposed to revolutionise the manner in which warfare, diplomacy, business and a number of
other areas are conducted. However, this radical transformation in the United States government
. with regard to IQ has not occurred over the last decade and a significant gap exists in the
9apability of the federal bureaucracy to support operations in this arena. While strategic policy
and doctrine have been developed and promulgated, in most cases only by the Department of
Defense, the actual conduct of IO activities and campaigns across the United States, are normally
performed at a much more tactical level. This delta between theory and reality exists because the
interagency organisations are often unwilling or unable to make the transformational changes
that are. needed to best utilise information as an element. of power. In this research, the author
has developed definitions and models that articulate not only why this delta exists, but also
specific strategies for utilising IO in a manner by the United States federal organisations that best
optiniises the inherent capabilities of this element of power. Specific recommendations are noted
below, and will be laid out in greater detail throughout the paper:
11
11
11
11

Develop an Academic Theoretical Construct for IO
Understand that Different Approaches and Processes are Needed to Support IO
Establish an International IO Standards Effort
Meeting the IO Training Needs
This research is more than just a reflection on the shifting nature of power. As the title of

the research suggests, information is changing in this new era, and how a nation or federal
agency understands that fact, will greatly increase its ability to manipulate power to their
advantage. Thus the overall goal of this paper will be to bring together not only these disparate
themes, but also the different threads of information to show the tremendous changes that are
occurring today, in order to better demonstrate this revolution in power. In this research, key
sources were be drawn on, all of which are relatively recent in origin, to show how the gaps in
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theory with respect to information, are perhaps one reason for the delta that currently exists in
10. Likewise, the author also attempted to review the broad spectrum of published works on 10,
that have become available over the last decade, in order to give a complete assessment of what
needs to be done with respect to the federal bureaucracy in order to continue moving forward.
Feedback from the project participants and the literature review also indicated that there were a
number of areas that were considered deficient when one reviews and analyses these issues
within the United States government with regards to the conduct 10. In addition, it can also be
noticed that a series of common themes from both the literature review and research interviews
that centre on a few key points - namely the desire for strategic goals, the use of standards, as
well as integrated communication systems, tools, 10 metrics and the need for common training
efforts to conduct 10 activities across all federal agencies.
There was also a dichotomy between the stated desires of the interviewees, prominent 10
authors and theorists as far as the 10 capabilities of the United States, the published theory on
this subject and that actual tactical reality. This gap is the crux of this research and can be seen
most clearly in the Conceptual Models, which emphasised a desire by many of the thesis
participants for a more comprehensive series of strategic 10 efforts by the federal government, to
truly maximise the power inherent in 10. However at the same time, there was also a realisation
among many of the participants of this project that these actions would not happen on a timely
basis, and that instead, a more realistic approach was probably more feasible, one that involved a
broader set of criteria which might be more useful to try to solve these tough problems using a
bottom up methodology instead. Likewise, a key concept that also arose in the conduct of this
research is the understanding that the road to success with regard to 10 involved an actual
limiting of the stated objectives, a 'boxing-in' if you will ofiO policy, into a more 'useable' set
of concepts, definitions, theories and capabilities, that are attainable and feasible, with the
resources available to the federal bureaucracy. This 'walking away' from the early 10 rhetoric to
a more pragmatic approach is probably one of the most important items to take away from this
thesis, in that many of the participants have come to understand that in order to succeed in 10,
that they need to lessen their goals. This change can be seen most clearly in the Department of
Defense where the original 10 policy issued in 1998 was deemed too radical and ambitious, and
has since been modified as the federal agencies in the United States understand better what is
truly needed to best utilise this new capability.
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Chapter One ... Introduction: Understanding the
Problem
"The Next World War: Computers are the Weapons, and the Front Line is Everywhere ... "
(Adams, 1998, p.3)
The contemporary world is transforming itself into the Information Age, which has been
called 'an era of networks' (Copeland, 2000; Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1996, 2001). Loudly
proclaimed by many as a revolutionary process throughout the world, it is interesting however to
compare and contrast the differences between rhetoric and reality, especially in the employment
of Information Operations (IO). A relative newly defined activity, this transformation of
traditional uses of power promises to revolutionise the manner in which warfare, diplomacy,
business and a number of other areas are conducted. However the gap between proposed
capability and actual conduct of operations in the United States government is wide and while
strategic doctrine and guidance may exist to best utilise the power of information, in fact, actual
information campaigns are almost always conducted at a tactical level. Inthis thesis, the author
develops definitions and models that articulate not only why this delta exists, but also specific
strategies for utilising 10 in a manner that best optimises the inherent capabilities of this element
of power. These ideas were taken from 100 background and research interviews conducted over
a five-year period from practising mid-level officials of the interagency organisations in the
United States that are involved in conducting information campaigns. It is hoped that these
conclusio.ns developed in this project may be useful for future IQ planners, as well as senior level
decision makers. This research was based on the following hypothesis, and will step through a
rigorous theoretical methodology to develop a coherent set of findings as part of this thesis.
Hypothesis: In the United States government, a significant gap exists in regards to the
conduct of Information Operations. Strategic policy and doctrine have been promulgated, but in
most cases, the actual IO activities and campaigns, are normally performed at a more tactical
level. The delta between theory and reality exists because the federal bureaucracy is unwilling or
unable to make the transformational changes that are needed to best utilise information as an
element of power.

1.1

Information Operations
Information as an element of power is and has always been somewhat of a nebulous term,

but in this new era it possesses a capability that is now considered crucial to the success of

1

American national security. However the ability to best utilise this element of power to support
the requirements of United States government is still unknown. This is because IO crosses so
many boundaries within the interagency process, that it is often·very difficult to quantify exactly
what constitutes an information campaign. One reason for this is that you now have other
organisations within the federal bureaucracy such as the State Department, which while they
have traditionally concentrated on diplomatic efforts to support American interests abroad, are
now instead being asked instead to facilitate strategic IO activities around the world. Not only is
this kind of tasking abnormal for these different cabinet agencies, but it also belies their normal
chains of communication and day-to-day procedures. So more often than not, the most recent
attempts to conduct strategic high-level IO activities in the United States are instead aborted for a
more tactical set of options that are normally conducted by the Department ofDefense as part of
their standard set of operations. A good example of these dichotomies with the capability of IO
is seen in three military activities conducted recently by American forces over the last decade.
Whether it was Kosovo, Afghanistan or Iraq, the primary focus of these campaigns from the
viewpoint of Washington, DC was on the military victory. In none of these operations, did IO
play the transformational role that its advocates have predicted, and while a number of
capabilities and related activities have been utilised, often with good success, at best these efforts
are still almost all concentrated at the localised or tactical level. Nowhere has the strategic
revolution in warfare advocated by informational power enthusiasts in the mid 1990's materialise
as predicted and desired.
This gap between the early theoretical desires for IO and the actual reality of operations
conducted today is the focus of this thesis. For the contemporary world now is now witness to
wholesale onslaughts of manipulated images, where nations, groups and individuals attempt to
manage the messages that are received. Information campaigns have been advocated and
theorised to be conducted in a very similar manner, whether merchandise like a soft drink is
being sold or a threat to national security like weapons of mass destruction. This is the whole
idea to which the acolytes of informational power advocate with respect to IO, namely that the
mind of the consumer or the public needs to be influenced, to get them to believe in a product or
cause. It is all the same in this new era these early IO enthusiasts contend, where the nature of
power has radically changed, with perception management and computer network operations
figuring prominently as new informational capabilities. To date, interviewees involved in this

2

research project have not witnessed this revolution in the use of information, which will
transform the structure of power around the world. In particular, with respect to the specific
American situation, the changes envisioned within the United States federal government,
particularly with respect to influence campaigns, have thus far have not yet occurred as well, and
in many cases foreign policy operations are still conducted using traditional military and
diplomatic methods.

1.2

Emerging 10 Theory
However not withstanding these issues, the transformational ideas inherent in IO are

crucial and must become a reliable capability of the American arsenal, because as the events of
11 September 2001 indicate, military, political or economic power are often simply ineffective in
dealing with these new kinds of threats to the national security of the United States. The
aforementioned terrorist attacks were a blow to the American public and government images that
affected the perceptions of many people in this country. The fear produced by the terrorist acts
can only be defeated by using a comprehensive plan, in which information is a key element. In
this new era, all factors of power must be utilised, for as some academics argue, in the future it
will be 'networks that will be fighting networks' (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1999). Good examples
of this abound in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, where networks in
the form of information campaigns fought networks made up of perceptions, and the side that
will ultimately emerge from this epic conflict as the victor, is the one that can best shape and
influence the minds of not only their adversary, but their allies as well (Advisory Group on
Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, 2003).
Unfortunately the shift from the industrial age to the information environment may not
mean that the United States will forever remain the dominant player in the political arena.
Arquilla and Ronfeldt also write that nation-states are losing power to hybrid structures within
this interconnected architecture, where access and connectivity, including bandwidth will be the
two key pillars of any new organization. They posit that truth and guarded openness are the
recommended approaches to be used in both the private and government sectors to conduct
business, and in their opinion, time zones will be more important than borders. It will be an age
of small groups, using networks to conduct 'swarming' attacks that will force changes in policy
(Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1997a). Key features include:

3

•
•
•
•

Wide open communication links where speed is everything
Little to no censorship, the individual controls his own information flow
Truth and quality will surface, but not initially
Weakening nation-states and strengthening networks (lbid, 1997b)

The changes that are mentioned in their book Noopolitik are truly revolutionary and describe a
profound shift in the nature of power. Unfortunately, this transformation has not been translated
from a strategic concept to tactical actions (Kuusisto, 2004). Thus, the intent of this research is
to fill that void, to describe why the early strategic theory on IO, do not match the current tactical
reality.

1.3

The Day-to-Day Reality of how 10 is conducted by the United States
So while much of the early policy concerning IO stated the need for a more strategic and

centralised execution philosophy of executing a top-down process by the American government,
the day-to-day reality of operations is much different (CJCS MOP 30, 1993; DoDD S3600.1,
1996; DoD JCS JP 3-13, 1998). This early concentration on the development ofhigh level IO
strategy perhaps mirrors the philosophy of doctrine from an earlier era of the nation's history.
During the Cold War, the United States and its allies and the Communist bloc were in a
· psychological confrontation between two competing and essentially incompatible ideologies
emanating from Washington and Moscow (Taylor, 2002). The Soviet Union and the Warsaw
Pact were easily the most recognizable of the 'threats' to the free world, but other nations such as
China, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya were also part of the equation. This bipolar Cold
War era was an arena of 'realist' conflicts, such as Vietnam, Korea, etc with states acting as the
prime actors and anarchy a central theme. This was a 'war' in the real sense, in that nations were
mobilised and armed forces were always at the ready to commit at a moment's notice if needed.
A sense of urgency existed, so high-level doctrine and strategy were developed to meet these
perceived needs; yet ultimately it was not the military or diplomatic efforts that succeeded in
ending this effort, but instead the economic and to some extent the informational might of
America that eventually prevailed. Today the former Soviet Union is a shadow of its past
existence, with a population below the United States, and it has had difficulty deploying a
number ofits forces in Kosovo because of equipment failures, (Clarke, 2000).
In this post ColdWar era, when some of the greatest threats known to mankind such as a
major surprise nuclear attack appear to many academics and politicians aslessened in intensity,
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the fact that the United States is still under attack from a number of different enemies, including
the AI Qaeda terrorist network seems curious. Once again, there are many reasons, but primarily
it is because the perception of enemies has changed. Why is· this? Perhaps it is because the lack
of equilibrium familiar during the Cold War, unrest in the Middle East, conflict in Southwest
Asia are all significant factors in this new era. While there are still 'rogue states' (in United
States terms) that can occupy the politicians and give credence to budget appropriations, other
groups including extremist religious factions are freer to operate and to carry out attacks on the
United States, in this post-:-bipolar period. Most of these Non~Govemment Organizations (NGO)
or terrorist groups are no longer operating undemeath the umbrella of a superpower, and
therefore have much more autonomy than ever before. Over the past 15 years, and especially in
the last decade, there has been an explosion of attacks on the United States, some of which
information has played a key role. While a number of these incidents were conducted by lone
individuals, others were the work of activists, foreign military units, terrorists and even nation
states. Each of these attacks hi-light the vulnerability of America and its population to these new
types of warfare, where information and the integration of the govemment play a key role. For
as mentioned previously, there is a tremendous gap between the theoretical potential of IO and
its day-to-day implementation, and there are many times where the United States federal
govemment is having tremendous difficulty in defending itself from informational attacks in this
new environment.
However, that is not to say, that the interagency organisations of the American
bureaucracy have not recognised this delta and in their defence, many of these officials are
attempting to better utilise information as an element of power. Evidence of this can be seen in
the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, reorganisation changes at the State
Department, and the attempts to train an IO educated workforce in the form of authorised
academic centres of excellence such Naval Post Graduate School, Idaho State University, New
Mexico State University, Capital City College and other academic venues. Likewise, by
managing information and using planning tools to synchronise, synergise, and de-conflict
influence-based activities in an overall plan to affect the adversary, officials in Washington, DC
have also attempted to enable the horizontal integration of these activities across the whole
interagency and coalition environment. A good example of this was the efforts to coordinate the
perception management messages of the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
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and the United Kingdom during the Kosovo conflict in 1999 (ibid). While not perfect, the
collaboration was an improvement over previous efforts.
As part of this research, it was noted that this shift from one era to another is not without
precedent. The United States became a world leader in the industrial age because it could
mobilise the collective might of its population through mass production, automation, economic
incentives and geographic location. To understand this revolutionary change in the role of
information, it must be appreciated that this era of industrial might is in decline, and that the
information revolution is now upon us (Toffler, 1970). However the ability for the United States
government to conduct influence campaigns around the world is under a tremendous amount of
stress and uncertainty. In previous generations, information practitioners could count on a
monolithic enemy (the Soviet Union), and a somewhat static communications technology
throughout the Cold War (broadcast network television and radio). This situation unfortunately
created an erroneous belief that the information that was broadcast to the known adversary could
be controlled; however, this is no longer possible in today's environment. The Internet and other
emerging communication networks (wireless, peer-to-peer, etc) have forever destroyed the
power formerly resident only in the government, and that asymmetry now gives the power of
information to all. This is a good example of the power ofbottom-up execution and control.
Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler alluded to this capability in their book War and Anti-War, where
they talk about the de-massification of the media or the ability to compartmentalise influence
campaigns (Toffler and Toffler, 1993). In addition, while federal bureaucrats could at one time
count on the fact that they owned or could somewhat control the dissemination outlets for
information; this is also increasingly no longer the case. The use of web sites, blogs, streaming
video, portals and other 'alternative' news sources have ended the government's monopoly of
information control, where this new technology is available. Incredible advances in
communications are changing the information environment, and in many cases, this new
technology is supporting the traditional cultural and economic issues of third world communities,
which have given these populations a much greater power in this new dynamic.

1.4

The Relevance of this Research
It is this concept of power and control of information that is the core of this research. In

this thesis, most of the analysis focuses on the key areas of perception management and

6

computer network operations within IO. The former is often referred to by different names
depending on which branch of the United States government that you are referencing to include
psychological operations (Defense), public diplomacy (State), strategic communications
(National Security Council) or influence operations (White House). In essence all of these terms
can be considered analogous and in this text, the author has elected to use these terms somewhat
interchangeably. Likewise computer network operations can also go by different names such as
information assurance, computer security, cyber warfare, computer network attack, etc. Once
again, the author has elected to use these terms interchangeably as well. In addition, while there
are many other capabilities of IO, such as deception, electronic warfare and the like that could
also be examined, this research was narrowed to the two key areas mentioned earlier, namely the
perception management and computer network operations portion of IO. This is because it is the
attempts to conduct these specific kinds of influence campaigns, where the United States
government has had the most difficulties recently, and where the delta is the greatest between
theory and reality, so it is hoped that recommendations from this research will offer the most
potential for change within the federal bureaucracy.
In this research, the use of a modified Soft Systems Methodology approach and active
interviews was deemed most appropriate, as part of a qualitative procedure ... In order to get the
trust from this large group of government and academic participants, the author interviewed
some of them repeatedly over a multi-year period, in what has been labelled as developing a
sustained and intensive experience (Creswell, 2003). Out of the original lOO background
interviews, with 63 different people, a total of 40 key participants were ultimately selected, for a
total 54 separate interviews, to best help the author understand not only the nuances of the
problem, but also so that he could obtain the most current and accurate information about the
current and future state of IO within the federal government. It is therefore the intent of this
thesis to answer not only the research questions listed below, but also to gather and collect the
opinions of these key individuals as to what should occur in the future by the federal bureaucracy
to better utilise this element of power. Thus each of the survey questions used was designed to
flesh out a different perspective of the United States government, to specifically examine the
policy, personnel and organisational modifications that are ongoing within these agencies that
were built in the industrial (second wave) era, as they attempt to tra~sform themselves. So, not
only are the research interviews seeking to answer the 'what is' question from these surveys and
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subsequent analysis, but the author was also attempting to answer the 'what should be' question
as well.

1.5

Research Questions
1. Can a viable model be developed for medium to long-term strategic United States
federal government information campaigns?
2. Within a viable model, what are the essential components?
3. Within a viable model, what is the most appropriate organisational structure?
From these research questions and the subsequent data developed from the participants,

the author was able to develop a comprehensive theoretical model of not only how IO is
currently integrated into the United States government, but also how it could be integrated in the
future to include changes to personnel, policy and organisations. However as mentioned
previously, these efforts are not enough and there still exists a wide gap between rhetoric and
reality with respect to IO. Therefore this research will examine the theory, policy, doctrine and
strategy for IQ in the United States government as well, to determine how information as an
element of power is actually utilised by the federal bureaucracy to conduct operations in the
Information Age. This is achieved by using a systemic, long-term interpretive approach to
collecting data from high profile individuals, who as mentioned earlier have various roles within
the IO and associated government influence and/or perception management and computer
network operations communities. To do this, the author has explored the differences between
current IO theory and operations, which was done by utilising the Soft System Methodology
process to define core concepts such as the environment, worldviews, clients, actors, owners and
the transformation process through an active interview process. From this methodology, the
author then developed two primary conceptual models, with 12 secondary views that attempt to
explain the gap or delta of IO performance by the American government. From this qualitative
data, a number of key themes were developed by the author, which were later verified with the
original interviewees and validated by third-party independent IO academics. It is believed that
this methodology enabled the doctoral process to be completed with sufficient academic rigour
to ensure the accuracy and completeness required.
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1.6

Summary
This paper is an attempt to summarise all of the disparate efforts by the various

components of the federal bureaucracy that have attempted to utilise different portions or
capabilities of IO, with an emphasis on perception management and computer network
operations. In addition, this research has also attempted to investigate how the key agencies of
the United States government can use the inherent power of information, to better conduct
influence or strategic communication campaigns in the future. Likewise, this research also tried
to develop a series of models to better describe a strategy to best utilise IO by the United States.
It is hoped that the outcome of this research will provide a process that can be used to transform

these organisations, in a manner that will better allow them to understand and use the power of
information to meet the threats in the future. For the bottom line is the question as to whether the
federal bureaucracy can conduct an effective information campaign in this changing
environment, while assuring the security of their networks and information systems in this new
architecture? To do this, the United States may need to change its collective interagency
structure that has evolved over the last 200 years, into a more networked organisation that can
master the issues in the information age. This is a crucial issue, as it can be questioned if
America will remain a dominant player during this new era, where industrial capacity is not
nearly as important to a nation as its interconnectivity of information nodes? Thus to conclude
this introductory section, it is the goal of this thesis to answer these questions while producing a
model that better describes and develops a strategy for how the United States can best conduct
information operations in this new era.
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Chapter Two . . A Review of Information Operations in
the United States
"In an age when terrorists move information at the speed of an email,
money at the speed of a wire transfer, and people at the speed of a commercial
jetliner, the Defense Department is bogged down in the micromanagement and
bureaucratic processes of the industrial age - not the information age. Some of our
difficulties are self-imposed, to be sure. Some are the result of law and regulation.
Together they have created a culture that too often stifles innovation....
The point is this: we are fighting the first wars of the 21st century with a
Defense Department that was fashioned to meet the challenges of the mid-20th
century. We have an industrial age organization, yet we are living .in an
information age world, where new threats emerge suddenly, often without
warning, to surprise us. We cannot afford not to change and rapidly, if we hope to
live in that world." (Rumsfield, 2003)
This quote by the for:nler Secretary of Defense emphasises the dichotomy that exists
today within the Department of Defense of the United States government. The need for change
is widely recognised across the bureaucracy but implementation has been slow and uneven. This
condition unfortunately is symptomatic of the federal bureaucracy as a whole. In this next
section, the author will outline the development of IO in America, as it has evolved over the last
60 years and compare it to the available literature, to develop a cogent and coherent argument to
understand the context of this research. While these publications are very diverse and range
over many academic subject areas to include power, information, international relations,
computer security and organisational theory, each will be linked by the author to the evolution of
IO within the United States government to provide an understanding of their context. The reason
for this diversity of literature is due to the incredibly broad nature of IO itself. Because the
definition ofiO covers such a large number of subjects, at once it is everything as well as
nothing, which makes it very difficult to understand where to frame the boundaries of the
discussion. There is no clear line or easy demarcation to determine what clearly is or is not a
part ofiO, so more often than not, the researcher is forced to cast his net far and wide in search
of primary sources that allude to or reference this emerging capability. Therefore the reader will
notice a wide variety of sources cited and alluded to as the author describes the development of
this new warfare capability in the United States.
Information Operations is a formal attempt by the United States government to develop a
set of doctrinal approaches for its military and diplomatic forces to use and operationalise the
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power of information. Per the original primary Department ofDefense policy on IO, the target is
the adversary decision-makers and therefore the primacy of effort will be to coerce that person or
group of people, into doing or not doing a certain action (Joint Publication 3-13, 1998). To
affect the adversary decision-maker, IO attempts to use many different capabilities such as
deception, psychological operations and electronic warfare, to shape and influence the
information environment. This is a very high level and strategic approach to policy within the
United States government but as mentioned in the first chapter, in reality, IO is more often than
not, performed at a much lower or tactical level. Therefore this section of the thesis will be
aimed at studying the available academic literature to evaluate the differences as IO has evolved
into a full-fledged warfare area.

2.1

Literature Review: An Introduction
This research is unique and develops new theoretical concepts with regard to IO, for in

the interviews conducted, few academic works were identified that concentrated on IO and none
were discovered with respect to its conduct by the United States government. The most notable
ones such as Rattray's andDunn's are mentioned and referenced in this chapter, but none of
these previous studies, specifically fills this particular research area based on. the aforementioned
hypothesis (Rattray, 2001; Dunn, 2002). Therefore in this section, the context of what has
already been done and connected or linked to this study is examined. In addition, the need for
this thesis is justified by identifying gaps in the academic literature as compared to operational
reality of IO as it is conducted by the United States government today
In this introductory portion of the literature review, the context is set by defining the key
elements of power, information and information operations, within the construct of the
traditional international relations theory, to show where it fits ... and noticeably, where it does ·
not.. This is done to give a baseline of knowledge from which to understand the concepts which
will later be developed in this thesis. In addition, in this chapter, the overall trends in the
literature with respect to IO, will be traced and developed into a larger picture of this warfare
capability. One interesting aspect that the reader will notice almost immediately is the
preponderance of government publications and official documents utilised in this research.
There are number of reasons for this, most notably the fact that this research is concentrated on
the United States government and therefore directives or instructions that have been issued from
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an 'official' source tend to lend a lot of credence to the authenticity of the information. In
addition, because 10 is an activity that spans multiple federal organisations, the number of
government publications also tends to be high as each activity publishes its 'own' version of how
it will conduct these particular operations.
The literature review is divided into three parts - an introductory or definition section, the
main body that traces the development within the United States government while comparing
and contrasting the key events to the available literature, and a summary section that attempts to
tie all of these publications together into a coherent picture. Therefore each of the articles,
books or directives that were referenced, were done so because they have either contributed or
directly influenced (both positively and negatively) to the evolution ofiO. For example, while
some texts are included on the elements of power, these were done so only where it was in
relation to information and 10. Also the author attempted whenever possible to use primary
sources, so for example internet documents that were unsubstantiated, were not used, unless they
were previously published in approved, vetted, or reliable source material. This included opinion
pieces in blogs, websites or chat rooms and so as alluded to earlier, in this thesis, there will be
extensive use of' official' publications, interviews and recognized journals, books and academic
studies were utilised as the main source of academic literature for this research.

2.2

Theoretical Constructs
One of the challenges in this research is that it does not propose to update, challenge,

adapt or confront any of the traditional theories of international relations. This is because the
changes described in this research represent a profound shift in the nature of power. The thesis
that lies before you discusses a huge transformation regarding power and information that has
not been either fully accepted by academics schooled in the traditional theoretical schools, or has
been part of a vigorous debate within the scholarly journals on these precepts. So in general,
there tends to be is a shortage of ideas and thoughts, that is a comprehensive theoretical construct
to adequately express these new ideas. As Rosenau (1998, p.33) relates, "A new lexicon is
needed for this purpose ... there is a huge gap between our sense ofprofound transformations and
our ability to grasp them from a huge shortage of the tools needed ... our vocabulary and
conceptual equipment for understanding the emergent world lag well behind the changes
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themselves". Therefore there is a gap, a need that exists for a new theoretical construct, one that
can better model and explain events in this new Information Age.
As many analysts realise, the quest for a new academic theory is normally unfulfilled,
because we ask our models to do too much. To begin with, most theories do not predict, but
instead give you ideas of what events are likely or not likely to happen. What theory does in
reality is to help you organise facts, identify variables, and determine which factors are the most
important. The understanding that there is no comprehensive theory of international relations
often can go a long way toward explaining how useful thesemodels really can be. It can take a
while to understand, that there is not one set of assumptions or stmcture that will answer all
political questions of our times, but instead that theory can give you a map of the landscape. For
all of international relations is about perception - the insight that an adversary or ally may have
often comes from observation of the different forms of power that a state or group may have.
Therefore, it was not surprising that in the past, since military power was often the easiest factor
to measure or count that this element of power tended to be given the greatest weight in any sort
of calculation. But as history has demonstrated on numerous occasions, the ownership of a
preponderance of military does not always translate into victory. The fungibility of military
power as expressed in Keohane and Nye's theory on complex interdependence is not nearly as
high as many analysts believe, thereby giving false illusions as to its usability (Keohane and
Nye, 1989). Other forms of power in the form of political, economic, social, religious and
informational all play a role as well, because they are often hard to measure or calculate, their
potential is often neglected or reduced in importance. Thus, it should be noticed in this research
that a theoretical constmct and a proposed methodology has been developed that provide a
hypothesis, a point of departure, a construct, and framework in which to more comfortably view
the events as they occur.
The primary focus of this research is divided into three areas- policy, organisation and
training with respect to information, within the three main government agencies involved with
foreign policy in the United States- namely the White House and the National Security Council;
the Department of Defense and the State Department. The two key areas of IO that are examined
for development are computer network operations and perception management, for as mentioned
earlier, these are the two warfare areas that have changed the most within the last decade.
Computer network operations as noted previously, is an umbrella term that encompasses a wide
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range of cyber-related activities. For the purpose of this thesis, we will divide computer network
operations into three parts:
•
•
•

Offensive - Computer Network Attack
Defensive- Computer Network Defense and/or Infrastructure Assistance
Support- Computer Network Exploitation

Each of these areas has a role to play in this new and exciting warfare arena, with the very term
denoting thoughts of cyber warfare and futuristic technology. While many people have visions
of precision accuracy and war without needless violence, others have a vision of a more kindler
and gentler form of warfare for man to evolve to. As many officials within the federal
bureaucracy have come to realise as part of this study, attitudes about computer network
operations often does not equate to reality. Thus while by definition computer network attack is
a cmrent capability of the United States, some would say that it is so limited by legal, political
and security constraints, as to make it virtually useless to the unified combatant commanders.
Perception management is the other key area of IO that has changed significantly over the
last decade. Through the use of computers, telecommunications, video, the intemet, e-mail and
other technological advances, the ability to shape an image or conduct an influence campaign has
increased greatly. Instances that are mentioned in this research include the use of a video camera
by the Somalia warlord Aideed in 1993, the denial of service attacks by the Electronic
Disturbance Theatre in 1998, and perhaps most influential, the timing of the second explosion at
the World Trade Centre in 2001. All of these events were perception management campaigns
designed to manipulate public opinion. In each case the tools used were all different, but the
goal was the same - to produce an effect, or a perception in the mind of the target. As will be
shown in this research, the ability of the United States government to affect this capability has
also radically changed over the last decade.
Earlier arguments about the growing role of information were set forth by Robert
Keohane and Joseph Nye in their seminal book, Power and Interdependence, which describe in
detail how these academics portrayed the changing role of information with regards to the power
capabilities within the world political structure (Keohane and Nye, 1989, p. 23). Also mentioned
previously were John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, who in a series of books culminating in their
much heralded The Emergence ofNoopolitik: Toward an American Information Strategy,
together recognised that we now live in the information age- an era of networks,
interdependence, international organizations and transnational activities (Arquilla and Ronfeldt,
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1992, 1993, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1999). This latter set of authors stated their belief that nationstates are losing power to hybrid structures such as non-governmental organizations and multinational corporations within this interconnected architecture. Access and connectivity, including
bandwidth are two key pillars of these new organisations, while truth and guarded openness will
be the approach used by both the private and government sector to conduct business. They felt
that time zones were more important than borders, and foretold of an age of small groups, using
networks to conduct swarming attacks that will force changes in policy. Key features as quoted
by these two authors include these important points:
•
•
•
•

Wide open communication links where speed is everything
Little to no censorship, the individual controls his own information flow
Truth and quality will surface but not initially
Weakening nation-states and strengthening networks (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1997, p. 441)

2.3

International Relations Theories
This lack of a defined theoretical construct surrounding IO led the author to first examine

the methodologies that serve as a foundation for the international relations field. Through the
use of theories and models, academics in this area hope to better understand the complicated .
proceedings ofworld politics. Kegley (1995, p. 8) states that the "theory of international
relations needs to perform four principle tasks. It should describe, explain, predict and
prescribe". In this section, the three major categories or classic intemational relations theories liberal;realist and alternative are all examined in detail with respect to IO, to try to determine
how well they can explain the changes brought on by this new element of power, All authors
and theories are reviewed with respect to the four fundamental points outlined below:
•
•
•
•

Object of analysis and scope of enquiry
Purpose of social and political enquiry
Appropriate methodology
Is international relations distinct from, or related to other fields
(Burchill and Linklater, 1996, pp. 16,-21)
The theoretical constructs that comprise international relations are relatively new, with

the field not separating from the larger domain of history until1919. Much of the outgrowth of
international relations can be attributed to the academic reaction of the horrors of World War I.
A need was felt to study the lessons learned from this conflict in an attempt to try to prevent a
war of this magnitude from ever happening again. Thus the majority of the effort in the interwar
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period was conducted by scholars from the United States and United Kingdom to answering the
following three questions:
•
•
•

2.3.1

What had war achieved, other than death and misery for millions?
Were there lessons from the war that could be learnt to prevent a recurrence of conflict on
this scale?
Was the war caused by mistake, misunderstanding or malicious intent?
(Ibid, p.5)
Liberalism
The first ofthese academic theories to evolve within the new field of international

relations was Liberalism, which grew as mentioned above as a reaction to the grim reality of the
Great War. There are many sub-categories within the liberal framework, which include
International Liberalism, Liberal Utopianism, Neo-Liberalism, Complex Interdependence and
International Regimes. By definition, a liberal view of international relations believes human
nature is essentially good or altruistic. There is a prevalent fundamental human concern for the
welfare of others, and liberals believe that bad human behaviour is not a product of evil people,
but rather evil institutions. War is thus not considered inevitable, and the liberals view war as an
international problem, that can be avoided, and that international society must eliminate anarchy
by reorganising itself (Kegley, 1995, p. 4). These beliefs contrast sharply with those from the
realist viewpoint, with the object of analysis and scope of enquiry probably the biggest
differences between liberals and realists. A good example of these differences is the study of
internal state politics as an explanation of a nation's actions. Some liberal academics believe that
it is precisely these internal politics that greatly affected the international economics. One
researcher in particular argued that domestic politics were the overriding concern of the majority
of the policymakers and that any benefits associated with international policies were often
outweighed by the high political price at home (Simmons, 1994, pp. 4-18). The study ofhuman
activity also seems to be a main focus of liberal research, with whole books devoted to the study
of how nations begin wars. One liberal academic assumed that man is intelligent and is somehow
trapped by his decisions. This leads to a discussion of why man starts wars or once in a conflict
yet refuses to get out of one when he knows better (Maoz, 1990, p. xii). This paradox can be
compared to those who attempt to analyse why there are cases of misperception in world politics.
Likewise any avenue of liberal beliefs is often concerned with the study of the causes,
consequences, perceptual errors, beliefs, and images that are used by decision-makers (Jervis,
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1976, p. 3). These academics felt that the "perceptions of the world and of other actors diverge
from reality in patterns that we can detect and for reasons that we can understand." (David, 1991,
p. 235). Thus, one purpose of the liberal enquiry is to demonstrate how we can better understand
man and the factors that affect his political decisions. The anarchy that is so prevalent in the
realist theory is present but within the state system, not at the international level. The states are
not acting as independent units pursuing national interests but rather as vehicle for leaders own
personal gain (Ibid, p. 237).
If the methodology liberals use to study their craft is examined, most will agree that it is .
from a traditional viewpoint with an emphasis on history, law and philosophy. A good example
is analysis of international regimes, where one researcher uses the international aviation regime
to compare and contrast the efficiency of different theories.
The positional of all regime theorists, regardless of whether they are institutionalists or
modified structural realists, can be translated into a single hypothesis: Given the
considerable interdependence in the world, which necessitates cooperation among states,
international regimes are pervasive in the international system-particularly in issue areas
that lie outside the zero-sum realm of security - and once created, they are likely to
persist (Nayar, 1995, p.143).
Do liberals believe that the study of international relations is a separate and distinct academic
field? Yes, because to be effective, they must reach out to other domains and use research
conducted in these different disciplines. For example, Jervis believes that psychologists work
with respect to international relations is important, but he is wary of applying it directly to case
studies. On the other hand, he also believes that "most international regimes scholars have paid
no attention to psychology - that they have failed to recognize the importance of misperception"
(Jervis, 1976, p. 6). Likewise he also understands that if decision-makers recognise the
limitations of their mindsets and if they attempt to try to see the world the way the other sees it,
then they may be able to decrease the cases of misperception. Specifically, he suggested that to
expose implicit assumptions and give a decision-maker more freedom of choice, he should
encourage the formulation and application of alternative images. While this may be
accomplished by the divergence of interests, goals, training and information available within any
large organization, often times this is not enough. It is often difficult, psychologically and
politically, for any one person to examine many alternatives, so instead Jervis suggests they
should employ devil's advocates. There are limits to the utility of a third-party opinion that is not
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truly neutral, but overall Jervis believed that a minority view is needed to guard against cases of
misperception. It is then that these devil's advocate's can ensure that new information, rather
than calling the established sub-goal into question, will not be interpreted within the old
framework (Jervis, 1976, pp. 415-416).

2.3.2

Realism
Liberalism was the first major theory of international relations and it was the

predominant focus during the interwar period. It was not until the late 1930's and the
publication of The Twenty Years' Crisis that a major alternative international relations theory, in
the form of realism, was championed (Carr, 1939). This theory was later refined to neo-realism
by the effects of World War Il, and the onset of the Cold War (Morgenthau, 1967; Waltz, 1990).
The 'realities' of power politics during this period also did much to cement the realist theory's,
into the predominant school Qf thought within international relations for the next 40 years. The
major beliefs of realism start with the idea that man is by nature sinful and wicked. He lusts for
power and you cannot eradicate this instinct, while the struggle for power is an all-consuming
goal, with all other interests subjugated. Therefore nations will define the acquisition of power
as in their best interest and will build military capabilities to maintain and defend themselves.
The military will always be considered the primary source of power, and states will not rely on
allies to protect them plus treaties with other nations are only useful for balancing power. While
these ideas do not constitute all of the concepts of realism, they should give the reader a broad
view of the theory's basic assumptions. Included under the broader category of realism are
additional sub-areas entitled Neo-Realism, Structural Realism, International Political Economy
and Decision Making Theory.
As opposed to liberal theory, the realists are mainly focused on the international system
and the nation states in their research. This is evident in Morganthau (1967), which many
consider the first academic to advocate a realistic theory on international relations. Based on
lectures given at the University of Chicago, he tried to differentiate realist theory by listing its six
principles and defining power, including the many elements and factors. Also, he attempted to
give realism a scientific approach and then conducted a very detailed analysis of the limitations
of power and the problems in world politics. Morgenthau's opus was and still is considered a
magnificent attempt to produce a grand theory of international relations.
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Realism as a theory, has evolved greatly in its social and political enquiry from its initial
development. The change was mainly an attempt to show how the anarchical nature of the
international system is the overriding determinant on man. First expounded by Waltz (1990),
who took the themes from realism that had been espoused by Carr and Morganthau, he later
refined them and developed a new theory which is now known as neo-realism. In his seminal
work, Waltz used philosophers such as St Augustine, Hobbes, Kant and Spinoza, to show that
the root of all evil is man, and thus man is the root of the specific evil of war (Waltz, 1990, p. 3).
Waltz also quotes Rousseau to say that he finds the major causes of war neither in men nor in
states but in the state system itself (Ibid, p. 11 ). These arguments and others are steps on the
road to Waltz's theory that international relations are characterised by the absence of truly
governmental institutions. It is this anarchy that forces states to act the way that they do. This is
because "each state pursues its own interests, however defined, in ways it judges best. Force is a
means of achieving the external ends of states because there exists no consistent, reliable process
of reconciling the conflicts of interest that inevitable arise among similar units in a condition of
anarchy" (Ibid, p. 238). Dessler in his International Organization article What's at Stake in the
Agent-Structure Debate? tries to take Waltz one step further by developing a structural model of
international relations. This transformational structural theory Dessler argues, can better explain
and develop decision-making processes, horizontal linkages and a more comprehensive ontology
(Dessler, 1989, pp. 441-474).
· This development of new international relations theory is the heart of the debate between
neo-realists and neo-liberals. Some of the most contentious ideas are not about theory as much
as the factors that define a theory. For example, power as mentioned earlier, is a major focus in
the study of realist theory. David Baldwin attempts to address these issues by analysing what
exactly power is and how does it relate as a variable. He reviews much of the doctrine in this
area and his general consensus seems to be that power is not as well defined and useful as many
people believe. He thinks the term is too loosely used, that there should be much more defining
or narrowing of its use and the issue of fungability is not nearly as great as many theorists would
desire (Baldwin, 1980, pp. 161-180).
The methodology used by realist's can also be quite traditionalist. Keohane explores the
growth of international organisations and their influence in the international regimes that has
significantly changed the dynamic in the last decade. Some of this is due to the extensive
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amount of international cooperation since World War 11, although Keohane (1984, p.3) warns
that "a rising level of cooperation may be overwhelmed by discord, as increased interdependence
and governmental intervention create more opportunities for policy conflict". He believes that
international regimes "enhance the likelihood of cooperation by reducing the costs of making
transactions that are consistent with the principles of the regimes. They increase the symmetry
and improve the quality of the information that governments receive" (lbid, p. 244).
The study of international regimes by realists is also important in that it shows an
evolving theological methodology to perhaps a closer relationship with liberalism. Nayar (1998
p. 168) shows this aspect in his article on aviation. Although primarily concerning international
regimes, in his conclusion Nayar states that realism is more robust than previously given credit
for. He believes that liberal institutionalism considers international regimes as representing
shared values and norms of an evolving, ifnascent, international community transcending
interstate conflict. N ayar then goes on to state that realism regards international regimes as
related to interests and capabilities of states, and that any cooperation among states is regarded as
contingent and transient. Thus, it is his belief that structural realism emerges with the superior
explanatory power in the case of international regimes. Keohane has a similar argument, namely
that hegemony is not as important as cooperation, and that "cooperation is viewed by
policymakers less as an end in itself than a means to a variety of other objectives" (Keohane,
1984, p. 10). He also states that while hegemony may be used to create cooperation, it is the
willingness of governments to remain within international regimes long after they could have left
which is similar to what Nayar argued in his article.
Also, Realists take, a scientific approach to their study of theory methodologies. In
Lebow and Stein's (April1990, pp. 347-352) article in World Politics, the authors proceeded to
denigrate many of the so-called tests and data that deterrence theorists had used. They
questioned the validity and reliability of the data, the application of the deterrence definition, and
how intent can be verified. Realists tend to address technology issues readily, for example, in an
International Studies Quarterly article, der Derian (1990) addressed some of the problems that
operators are experiencing in conducting business in modern society. The speed at which
decisions are made and information passed often overwhelms the policy-maker. This model
sounds similar to what Jervis was arguing about the rise of misperception by decision-makers.
Der Derian also believes that 'speed is the essence of war' and that time is more important than
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geography for success on the battlefield. In this article, Der Derian tries to bridge differences in
theoretical approaches mainly by arguing that the post-structural ideas ofKeohane "can graspbut never fully capture- the significance of these new forces for international relations" (Der
Derian, September 1990, p. 307).
Thus, the ideas of technology and the use of it in foreign policy is often crucial to realist
mindset, and are also implicit in the development ofiO theory. The factors that der Derian
discusses in his article - simulation, surveillance and speed - can all be summarized by
information technology. This is also the general consensus and thrust of the article by Shapiro
(September 1990, pp 329-339) in International Studies Quarterly. In this paper, Shapiro
basically argues that no longer is foreign policy limited to diplomats and the government but has
instead become available to the masses due to technology. There are more players involved with
a variety of interests and equities that must be met in order for an issue to be resolved. Some of
these new players are multi-national corporations, the media, as well as non-governmental
organizations. Whoever they are, in Shapiro's view the masses are complicating the discourse of
American security policy. The media in particular gain Shapiro's ire, because he believes that
they have altered the ability of the government officials to conduct foreign policy. This is very
interesting, because much of the realist's consternation evolves from the fact. that the nation
states are losing control in this new era,. Politics are becoming more complicated because there
are multiple players with different agendas that all have access to the playing field now due to
the rise of information technology. These factors are exactly what make advocates ofiO so
excited, because the power of the government is being transferred to the people.

2.3.3

Alternative Theories
The final category of international relation theories reviewed as a possible construct for

this thesis includes all of the so-called alternative issues. It has only been in the last two decades,
since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, that a major challenge to the dominance of realism and
liberalism has erupted within the international relations field. Some of these controversies were
caused by the collapse ofbipolarity, others by the perceived eroding stature of the nation-state.
Whatever the reason, a whole host of alternative and competing theories have arisen that have
challenged many sacred assumptions about international relations. These consist of Marxism,
Critical Theory, Feminist Theory, Ecological Theory, Post-Modernism, Institutionalism and
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Constructivism. Because of their diverse backgrounds there is no standard definition for
alternative theories. Instead advocates try to focus more on these types of alternative issues,
bringing them out ofthe margins to ensure that their equities are.adequately addressed.
The object of analysis in alternative international relations theory often addresses subjects
that have been neglected by traditional international relations research. Likewise their social and
political interest areas tend to be vastly different than 'mainstream' academics. This can be seen
in Christine Sylvester's (1994) book Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Post
Modern Era. She argues that all of the great international relations debates would have been
affected by feminist theorising had women been included. This lack of feminist insight Sylvester
argues not only limits the effectiveness of these theories but also shows to the extent that the
international relations field is parochial in its scope of enquiry. The 'typical' methodology
utilised by international relations academics is also attacked by Sylvester in her book, as too
limited and not exclusive enough of all viewpoints (Sylvester, 1994, p. 4).
Alternative theories, more than any other, tend to broaden the field of international
relations. Finnemore (1996) argues that scholars in the international relations field would do
well to look into the academic work being conducted in sociology. Although Jervis had argued
that psychologists were limited in their ability to solve issues within international relations
theory, Finnemore believes the opposite to be true. She states that the institutionalist research
conducted in since the 1970's has done much to provide evidence of global cultural
homogenisation. The growing interdependence that she sees is a product of a 'Westernisation'
of the world in which the notion ofbureaucracies and markets are flourishing. In addition,
because of the idea that a nation-state is the 'only' legitimate unit that can operate in the modem
society, many areas are being pushed into becoming a state, when they are not equipped to do so
(Finnemore, 1996, pp. 328-336). Thus, she argues that it is sociology's work on the individual
and institutionalism that need new emphasis in our current era. Research conducted on
education policy, the cultural awareness that an individual receives from the state is crucial to the
development of the nation's identity. She argues that by understanding the sociologist's research
into the spreading of western values, the international relations scholar may well better
understand some of the factors that they face around the world. Likewise Simmons (1994, p.
283) work on international economics has important comments for adherents to the game theory
model as well. Her research indicated that the internal political situation so overwhelms any
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other thought processes, that many extra conditions are often added on as new factors, making it
is virtually impossible to try to compare and contrast equivalent behaviour.
In conclusion then, the value of an academic theory is based on its usefulness in
adequately assessing world politics. With the dramatic events started by the end of the Cold
War, the liberal ideology has regained much of its former status and has seriously challenged
realism as the pre-eminent theory within the international relations field. This is not so much
because that the liberal theorists predicted all of the events of the preceding decade, but more
importantly that realism as a theory did not! Likewise the alternative theories, while maybe not
representing a grand international relations theory, have nonetheless chipped away at the
importance of realism for not addressing the many factors that these advocates see as important
modifiers. There are many ideas that influence political decisions and all of these must be taken
into account in forming a comprehensive academic theory. For no matter what ideology or
theory a researcher represents, they still must argue and ensure that their model can meet the four
goals described in this paper. This is the basic question that every student must ask - is this
theory relevant and does it describe in adequate terms the events that are being studied. For if a
. theory cannot describe, explain, predict and prescribe accurately the world politics then is it
really a theory at all?

2.4

Definitions of Power, Information and 10
"Traditional measures of military force, gross national product,
population, energy, land, and minerals have continued to dominate discussions
of the balance of power. These power resources still matter, and American
leadership continues to depend on them as well as on the information edge ...
Information power is also hard to categorize because it cuts across all other
military, economic, social, and political power resources, in some cases
diminishing their strength, in others multiplying it ".
(Nye and Owens, 1996, p.22).
After a thorough review of the different academic theories that comprise the International

Relations field, there were none in whole that matched to the issues involved with regard to 10.
So an analysis of power and information was undertaken next. Power can mean many things, to
many people. Generally its use is understood, that is, who has power and who does not. Power
is also one of those ubiquitous terms that everyone seems to understand but few can actually
define. Hans Morgenthau defined the elements of national power as geography, natural
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resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national
morale and the quality of diplomacy and government (Morgenthau, 1967). Nowhere in
Morgenthau's definition is the use of information seen as an element of power. So this begs the
question - have the elements of power changed over the last four decades? A short answer is yes
and no, depending on the sources that one reads. For example, in a recent study by RAND, a
revised view of power was suggested that combined national resources and performance to
create an updated version of military capability as shown below:

National resources
Technology
Enterprise
Human resources
Financial/capital resources
Physical resources

National performance
External constraints
lnfrastrLtctural capacity
Ideational resources

Military capability
Strategic
Conversion
Combat
resources + capability = proficiency

Figure 2.1 -Views of Power (Source: Tellis et al, 2000, p. 8)

Notice in this diagram, that technology is rated as the number one national resource as opposed
to the more traditional concepts such as Morgenthau's that primarily involved physical assets.
This is a huge change from older analyses which concentrated much more on a mere 'counting'
of military assets and industrial plants. This RAND study goes straight to the concept that in
essence symbolises the massive changes inherent in the Information Age, namely that the
traditional power structure of the international community is being radically altered, thereby
allowing nations, non-,governmental organisations, small groups and even individuals to gain an
inordinate amount of power, based solely on their information technology capability. These
ideas are emphasised even more by the RAND researchers as they explore this concept further in
the aforementioned study. These ideas can be seen in greater detail even more in the following
diagram, as the critical areas of technology are analysed, such as in this case, the location of
information and communications. This revised ordering of resources that comprise power is
definitely a change from previous studies in which more traditional emphasis was placed on
natural resources.
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National Resources

• Technology
• Enterprise
• Human
resources
• Financial/capital
resources
• Natural resources

•
•
•
•
•
•

Information and communications
Materials
Manufacturing
Biotechnology and life sciences
Aeronautics and surface transportation
Energy and environmental

Figure 2.2- Revised Reordering of Technologies (Source: Tellis et al, 2000, p. 12)
Not everyone agrees with these concepts, and sometimes they do not even agree from the same
research group! In another conference sponsored by RAND and the Central Intelligence
Agency, analysts attempted to update the definitions and ranking's of nations visa vie power, and
the main elements considered still consisted primarily of military and economic factors, that is,
gross domestic product. Technology was sometimes included in this study, but information per
se, as a separate and discrete stand alone element of power was never elucidated (Treverton,
2001, p. 17).
Taken together then, while there is a general understanding that change is needed in this
new information environment, at what rate or pace is not always agreed upon. There are many
academics that advocate a more gradual view of the changing emphasis of power and
information is appropriate. For example, Tempestilli (1995) made the argument for the greater
emphasis on the military uses of the informational element of power in his Master's thesis,
Waging Information Warfare: Making the Connection between Information and Power in a
Transformed World (Newport, RI, Naval War College). This is a slightly different slant than
advocated by some academics who have called for a separate informational component or
agency in the United States government similar to a cabinet agency. For if one examines the
United States government closely, it is organised in this manner, namely with cabinet agencies
centred around each of the traditional respective areas of power - Department of Defense
(military), State (diplomatic), and Treasury or Commerce (economic), with each having their
own informational component. There are also interagency organisations such as the National
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Security Council or National Economic Council that still favour the concept of these three major
elements of power (military, diplomatic and economic). Nowhere does a Department of
Information exist in the United States government, because this form of power is still viewed by
many as being very different from the more traditional elements, and in fact most of the
participants in this research still did not advocate a separate branch or cabinet agency for
information. Tempestilli agrees with this concept as well, and argues that each of the major three
elements of power- militarily, diplomatic and economic, already in fact have informational
components and that the United States government does not need a new Cabinet agency to focus
solely on this element of power. This horizontal integration of information vice a vertical
division as its own element has both good and bad aspects from an 10 policy perspective.
Tempestilli argues, and the author agrees as well, that the cross fertilisation between the
informational components is better than a single monolithic centre for information. This concept
follows a majority of the participants in this thesis who also advocated for a greater horizontal
integration across the interagency spectrum. From a policy perspective, this can be seen in Joint
Publication 3-13 Information Operations that lists 10 as an 'Integrating Strategy', that is, one
that can bring together these disparate warfare areas (JP 3-13, 1998). Thus as Tempestilli
originally advocated, and has been borne out in countless interviews for this thesis, the use of
informational power tends cuts across the entire United States government structure and is not
easily pigeonholed into a traditional cabinet structure. This is both a strength and weakness for
understanding the power of information, because it cannot be viewed in a traditional manner like
the military or diplomatic elements.
Therefore, it is not surprising that Tempestilli was only one of many authors that were
commenting on the perceived notion of a revolution in military affairs that were occurring in the
mid 1990s. For example, there was a huge emphasis in the 1995-1996 timeframe, where a large
number of articles by various authors highlighted the issues involved with the technological
evolution of information. Cohen (1996) was one of these contributors during this period who
argued for a change in reorganisation of the United States military to coordinate power in the
information age. His concept was an attempt to solve the problems with incorporating
information into the traditional hierarchical government structure, and while his argument was
not answered immediately, there has been over the last decade, a number changes that have
occurred, which in essence completed the reorganisation that Cohen advocated. As will be
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alluded to later in this chapter, the American government, has significantly altered its
organisational structure with respect to the functions ofiO. As the participants stated throughout
the interview process, more still needs to be done, to close the gap between strategic policy and
the tactical reality ofiO. A good analogy that is often used to answer the question about why IO
is taking so long to become established within the United States government is to simply look at
the introduction of aviation into the military services starting with World War I. The fact that it
took a good two decades to realign and transform those military forces into truly utilising the
power inherent in airpower, should not be lost on anyone. The same can perhaps be said of IO,
namely that it will take time and hard work, perhaps on a similar timeframe as aviation for its
potential to be truly realised.

2.4.1

Changing Views of Power
This research was conducted over the first decade after JP 3-13 was published (1999-

2008). Based on the previous analogy, it could be thought that significant changes should have
occurred with respect to these new views of power. For, if information is now accepted as an
element of power, should there not be dramatic changes as well from previous theories? Is the
power of information new or different, as some advocates believe, or has infmmation always
been an element of power, but it could never be properly utilised. Said in another way, has
information always been an element of power and it is only now that technology can manage and
harness this power? Critics of this new view of power have argued that because the world access
to the Internet is not universal, this new technology cannot truly change global politics. Wriston
(1997) notes that while maybe this is true, it is also irrelevant. The standard has been set, and the
benchmark is high, for these new views of information flow must be understood and respected.
In fact, the percentage of overall access and connectivity to the internet are on the verge of
exploding as the combination of cellular technology and cheaper interface devices proliferate.
However, the question is whether access to technology necessarily equates to greater
power to a group or nation. Once again, the short answer is that it depends. As Treverton (200 1)
relates in the report from RAND,
"State power can be conceived at three levels: (1) resources or capabilities, or
power-in-being; (2) how that power is converted through national processes; (3) and
power in outcomes, or which state prevails in particular circumstances. The starting point
for thinking about-and developing metrics for-national power is to view states as

27

"capability containers." Yet those capabilities--demographic, economic, technological,
and the like-only become manifest through a process of conversion. States need to
convert material resources into more usable instruments, such as combat proficiency. In
the end, however, what policymakers care most about is not power as capability or
power-in-being as converted through national ethos, politics, and social cohesion. They
care about power in outcomes. That third level is by far the most elusive, for it is
contingent and relative. It depends on power for what and against whom"
(ibid, 2000, p.ll).
What is interesting about this third concept, is that while it may be the most difficult to achieve,
from an 10 perspective, it may also offer the most promise. One only has to review the four
definitive bombing surveys of World War II or Vietnam, to quickly realize that military power
often does not translate at all into desired outcomes. Clodfelter (1989), a retired Air Force
officer, said as much in his book, The Limits ofAir Power, The American Bombing ofNorth

Vietnam. For as the well-researched and documented official reports from the US Air Force
allude, the massive bombing operations in all of these conflicts did not necessarily and in many
cases, did not at all translate to shifts in the affected government or populations attitudes. As one
veteran (and perhaps jaded) military officer once quipped, "If the only tool you have is a
hammer, ever problem looks like a nail" (Hubbard, 2004). So too is the case of trying to take
military power, in this case aviation assets, and translate them into recognisable outcomes. More
often than not, this is not an easy task, as alluded to by many of the interviewees.
The traditional central concepts of power in the form of national resources, and the need
to convert those resources into power and instruments of power, are solely but surely a key point
of the last few pages as different academics have added and changed the common views of
power. In addition, since 10 as an academic study area crosses many issue lines, the
development of suitable theoretical constructs has not always been easy with respect to power
and information. A series of attempts that should be widely recognised can be attributed to
Alvin and Heidi Toffler, who are probably the most prolific social authors with their three books

Future Shock (1970), The Third Wave (1984) and War and Anti-War (1993). So profound is the
influence of this couple and their publications on the Department ofDefense and United States
government that probably more than any .authors, they have had the greatest effect not only on
the general public, but also on governments around the world. It is their futuristic forecasts more
than anything, of how we as a people are evolving with respect to the power of information, that
have made them most famous. But they are not alone. Similar ideas about how the elements of
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power and information are viewed and used are shown in other literature as well. For example,
Kuehl (1997, 2000) from National Defense University argues that information is an equal
element of power just like its counterparts from the military, diplomatic and economic realms.
In fact in the United States military, the acronym DIME (Defense, Information, Military and
Economic) is often used to express this concept- namely that there are number of elements that
make up power, and that the military aspect is not the only one that should be utilised.

2.4.2

Soft Power
The concept of 'soft power' is not new. Haskell (1980) was an early adopter of this

philosophy, in her discussions on the idea of information as an element of power. In her article
on foreign policy, not only did she advocate the inclusion of information as an element of power
but she also included the social aspects of power. Still others like Nye (1990) have brought forth
the concept of 'Soft Power', which includes informational elements as well. In fact, Nye has
continued an emphasis on this theme over the last 18 years with a number ofbooks and articles
as the world has evolved in the post-Cold War era. An extremely interesting concept, 'Soft
Power' basically argues that one can significantly influence other nations through the cultural .
and informational aspects of its society. As opposed to 'Hard Power' in which analysts can often
'count' or conduct intelligence to determine the potential of a perspective country, 'Soft Power'
instead is a more influential or persuasive type of capability, and can be viewed by some, as a
theoretical construct that span the gap between strategic policy and tactical operations of IO. In
fact, 'Soft Power' may in fact be the one capability that can attain that elusive 'outcomes' that
was mentioned in an aforementioned RAND report (Nye, 1990; Treverton, 2001).
But what is Soft Power? It was originally defined by Joseph Nye as a concept that
emphasises the power of attraction, as opposed to the power of coercion. All forms of power are
extremely hard to measure, and this is no exception. Some ideas that were forwarded in the
second RAND study alluded to earlier, have attempted to develop metrics to measure power as
shown below:
•
•

•

Access to information. The government monopoly has eroded
Speed of reaction. Markets react in seconds, but governments are much slower, so the
information technology (IT) revolution inevitably moved action away from governments
toward nimbler organisations
New voices. The process created new channels of information and new, credible voices.
The loudest voice, that of government, has become less dominant
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•

•
•

Cheaper consultation. Because of nearly unlimited bandwidth, communication costs
began to approach zero. Coordinating large and physically separated groups becomes
much cheaper
Rapid change. Governments, by nature, are more likely. to sustain the status quo than
drive change, and so non-state actors are often the drivers by default
Changed boundaries in time and space. Information Technology again is driving the
change, just as the invention of the printing press undermined the church's role as broker
between people and their God. (Treverton, 2001, p. 13)

Are these the only metrics available? Of course they are not and yet it is these 'outcomes' as
mentioned previously that are most desired by government officials. A recent series of reports
by RAND on the 'Information Revolution' illustrates the growing collection of data that is
becoming available on information technology in particular. These include the number of
internet users, the internet market size and high-technology exports. So there are actually some
metrics that are available, which of course is key because this kind of data as it relates to IO, may
give researchers the ability to measure the factors that are needed to achieve outcomes without
the use of military power. Of course, what is interesting about these concepts is that it is exactly
the ideas that these three aforementioned authors advocate, which while radical in their time,
have been generally accepted today. The problem is, and thus the reason for this research, is that
there still remains a gap between the high level strategic theory of IO, and its actual day-to-day
operations. The inability of the United States government to translate these lofty concepts, the
actualisation of the power of information, still remains elusive as alluded to throughout this
literature review.
Chuck de Caro (2003), a former Cable News Network reporter and Special Forces
member, has taken this concept of 'Soft Power' even further with his idea of 'SoftWar'. In his
view, de Caro argues that conflict in the future can consist mainly of perception management
campaigns with television as the primary medium. He believes that the vast majorities of
populations around the world get their informational news from the television and that influence
operations should be conducted using professionals from the entertainment industry. This
concept is probably one of the more coherent, cogent and perhaps radical argument's that has
evolved out of the IO debate, and Mr de Caro was interviewed on multiple occasions to draw out
further his ideas. It will be interesting as time goes on, to see how far he gets with these concepts
with respect to IO.
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2.5

The Information Age
So from these books and articles, can it be assumed that information to the masses

translates directly into power? 'Perhaps' is the probably once again the answer. When
Gutenberg developed the printing press, it vastly increased the ability of the average person to
access the written word, from what had been an exclusive privilege of the elite. Today the media
is much freer than in the past, but there are still many instances and locations where information
is still rigidly controlled. The RAND studies on the Information Revolution around the world
demonstrate these facts over and over. Throughout this series, questions were asked such as how
has information technology changed political dynamics within the countries of a given region, as
well as how are the respective governments using information technology as a tool to govern. In
their review, the authors from RAND analysed the political dynamics, from a largely 'bottom-up
viewpoint' of the actions and initiatives of citizens, civil society, non-governmental
organisations and political parties, in actions as diverse as organising protests of government
policies to the overthrow of sitting regimes (Hachigian, 2001, p.55). The results of these surveys
are fairly dramatic, with sharply rising access to information technology across a broad segment
of the world's population.
Likewise, in understanding the dichotomy not only between the 'softer' and 'harder'
aspects ofiO, some books offer additional views on the power of information, with regard to the
development ofiO .. For example in The Art ofInformation Warfare, Forno and Baklarz (1999)
closely' examine the perception management aspects of the power of information, and discuss the
specific deficiencies resident in the United States. These authors attempted use the writings of
Sun Tzu as a model to relate to the different aspects of IO, and while they succeeded in some
aspects, in others they were notably short, mainly because they did not address the computer
networks operations aspects of information warfare. In addition, while Forno and Baklarz did
address gaps for the United States government with respect to IO, they did not have realistic list
of corrections or mitigations that could be utilised by the federal bureaucracy.
If all ofthese changes are combined with the capabilities ofinformation technology and
the role of the media with respect to the government, it can be noticed throughout the literature
rev~ew,

the dramatic changes that have occurred with respect to the elements of power in the 60

years since the end of World War II. Felman (1993) notes as much in describing the historical
trends of relationships between these two entities and his belief that media pools were not the
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future answer to 'handling' the press in combat. Written after Operation Desert Storm, it is
interesting to see how the intervening decade leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom allowed the
military an even better understanding of the power of information, and this was reflected in the
press coverage of the latter campaign. However, it is still very difficult to generalise how the
control of the media reflects directly on this element of power. These changes are very
interesting, because in two separate documents published by the US Department of Defense and
State Department, it is readily apparent that both cabinet-level agencies are mutually coming to
the understanding of the need for change in their informational policy in this new environment
(Joint Publication 3-13, 1998; U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 2000). In fact,
both of these documents are great examples, as mentioned earlier of the theoretical disconnect in
10 between strategic policy and tactical reality, mainly because both of these aforementioned

documents were ahead of their time. For as noted by the participants noted over and over in their
interviews, while neither publication has fulfilled its original mandate or promise, they have at
least paved the way for additional intellectual discussion on the relationship between 10 and the
federal government.
From a theoretical and strategic 10 perspective, Joint Publication 3-13 was the seminal
document for not only the United States military but also other organisations across the federal
bureaucracy (ibid). For the first time, the Department o.fDefense issued in an unclassified
format, the definitive concept of how America plans to conduct operations in the information
age. This pamphlet showed just how important the Joint Chiefs ofStaffviews this particular
element of power and how it can be used to affect the world politic. In effect, Joint Publication
3-13 defined for the first tirr1e the strategic vision of what 10 truly could do for the United States
government. But there have been issues and disconnects in this Department ofDefense policy,
from its very inception in 1998 and a number of attempts have been made to rewrite or update
this doctrine to make it more user friendly. As this research was being finished, a new update to
this policy had recently been released, to accommodate all of the changes that are occurring
within the military with respect to 10. The updated 10 policy is more constrained and resembles
the original narrower Command and Control Warfare definition as defined later in this chapter.
The new 10 policy has also tried to substantially narrow the theoretical gap that exists today.
But one has to ask if this is a step back in 10 theory or is it more of an admission of the reality of
how the United States can really conduct operations in this warfare area? While there is no
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definitive answer, the author believes that it is probably the latter, based on the data collected
throughout this thesis interview process.
This 2000 publication by the State Department also echoes the changes reflected in
academic journals, as well as from other military sources by emphasising the need for a new
style of diplomacy, one more akin to the US Department ofDefense's 'Revolution in Military
Affairs'. The areas that are highlighted in all of the publications listed above also continue to
focus on new computer systems, notably information technology, that can be used to better aid
the traditional diplomatic missions of the State Department. Likewise a shift from traditional
secretive diplomacy to a more open public diplomacy role has been advocated as well, with calls
for increases in financial resources and a reformation of the United States foreign affairs
agencies (Brookings Institution, 1997). These were not the only sources that can highlight the
importance of the management of information as a source of power. Another good example is
Taylor's (1999) British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century: Selling Democracy, which is
perhaps the only book that has been dedicated to analysing the power of information with respect
to propaganda, public diplomacy, psychological operations and deception. Taylor ties together
these disparate and obscure missions, in an attempt to understand the role of perception
management in the 20th century (Taylor, 2002).
These views on the changing role of power in the information age are also reflected in
other publications as well. Metzl (200 1) wrote an article that shows the mindset of senior
Clinton Administration officials as far as the potential of perception management, in particular
public diplomacy and international public information with respect the changing role of power.
Entitled ''Network Diplomacy" and published in Georgetown Journal ofInternational Affairs,
what is especially interesting is that much of this article was written while Dr Metzl was serving
in key roles with the development of Presidential Decision Directive 68 International Public

Information at both the National Security Council and the State Department. Interviewed over a
four year period (1999-2003), he was very insightful in his comments about how the United
States government bureaucracy attempted through the implementation of new policy to come to
grips with the power of information (Metzl, 2000). The inability of the White House (both the
Clinton and the second Bush Administrations) to follow-through on Presidential Decision
Directive 68 or really any strategic communications, public diplomacy or international public
information effort on a long-term basis is crucial to the arguments of this thesis. For as noted by
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many participants in this doctoral research, in interview after interview, while it is notable and
laudable that all of these documents are released and that a tremendous amount of effort has gone
into their research and publication, because progress in making these changes has been very
slow, it has and will continue to take a long time to fully realise the true capabilities of IQ. So
unfortunately with respect to power, the general consensus from the literature and interviewees is
that the gap between IO theory and reality may continue to exist for the foreseeable future, and
that a viable theoretical construct does not exist at this time.

2.5.1

Changing Views of Information
Taken together, all of these references help to define the changing evolution of power.

This is advantageous, because it gives a baseline from which to understand the new roles of
information. Taken as a reference term, information can be very perplexing. It can be
technically oriented to mean the packets of data on the internet and a piece of electronic
bandwidth, or it may be more socially oriented to mean human-to-human contact, but in reality,
information is really much more than that. Information in a nutshell is really the glue that binds
the power process together, and without it, there can be no international systematic structure.
Therefore just like power, information also has many meanings to different people. However
this document uses the following current definition articulated by the United States military in
the aforementioned Joint Publication 3-13 (1998, p. 131).
1. Facts, data or instructions in any medium or form
2. The meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in
their representation
Information is more than just a definition. An admirer of the concept of the information
society has stated, "Information exists. It does not need to be perceived to exist. It does not need
to be understood to exist. It requires no intelligence to interpret it. It does not have to have
meaning to exist. It simply exists." (Webster, 1995, p. 27) .. It is concepts such as this, which can
make it difficult for the layman to understand how information can be a source of power, or used
as a weapon. Formerly the control of information could be somewhat restricted to official
government channels. However, this is no longer the case, not only because of the
aforementioned changes in the computer and telecommunications industry, but also because of
the interconnectivity of the world as well. For example, some analysts such as Brown (2002)
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believe that the power of information has now shifted to the masses and away from the
government. "Compared with 10 years ago, the world is a more seamless informational space, as
we move from a world of distinct national informational spaces into a more trans-national
informational sphere" (ibid, p.4). However, there are other academics as eluded to earlier, who
in fact believe that nothing radical has changed with respect to information and power. This
dichotomy was extremely apparent to the author in his research interviews and in fact produced
the two opposing conceptual models shown in Chapter Eight for the use of 10 in the United
States government.

2.5.2

The Role of Information in Warfare
In addition, just like power, with respect to this definition of information, there are· a

number of publications that have appeared over the last decade which seem to address the role of
information in this new environment. For example, Henry and Peartree (1998) argue for a new
political theory based on the power of information. Participants in this research agree with this
need as shown in later chapters. In fact, the search for a suitable theoretical construct was a long
and involved pr~cess, because of the diverse and complicated nature ofinfol1Uation. Not
withstanding these issues, this is not to say that political theorists have not tried to develop new
theoretical constructs with respect to IO. For example, as mentioned earlier, RAND has been
very active in writing proposals for new informational policy for this era. The first of these was
Arquilla and Ronfeldt's (1997a) In Athena 'sCamp, which was quickly followed by another
manuscript, entitled Strategic Information Waifare Rising (Molander, 1998). In both of these
books, the authors argue for a policy shift with an emphasis on the national or strategic level of
war, where the use of information should be able to leverage the most power. Interestingly
enough, it is this call for strategic 10 actions, and the subsequent lack of follow-on examples,
that is really the whole crux of this research, namely that there ~s a delta between tactical 10
activities and strategic policy. A third book published by RAND during this time period, The

Changing Role ofInformation in Warfare, (Khalilzad and White, 1999) also offers a strategic
promise of the utilisation of this new found power. But once again, there is little follow-on
progress from the United States government, as the Department ofDefense did not make the
wholesale changes as proposed in this book. Instead what has happened instead over the last
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decade has instead been a series of small but discrete steps to slowly grow the Department of
Defense's capability with respect to 10, all of which will be laid out later in this chapter.
The next publication byRAND, Noopolitik (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1999) is especially
interesting, because the authors have attempted to redefine political theory with respect to
international relations. They attempted to develop a new international relations strategy based on
the power of information, in the process trying to answer Henry and Peartree's call for a new
political theory for the power of information. Likewise in Noopolitik, Arquilla and Ronfeldt also
argued that there is a gap between perception management and computer network operations in
10 that has not been adequately addressed by the United States government, and that more
strategic analysis must be conducted. These authors believe that since there is no overall 10
policy for the whole of the United States government, that one must indeed be developed, to be
pulled together from disparate pieces, to build a doctrine that can be analysed as a coherent
whole. To quote the authors, "Strategy, at its best, knits together ends and means, no matter how
various or disparate, into a cohesive pattern" (ibid, p. 5). Arquilla and Ronfeldt also stated, that
they believe that these two ideational poles encompassed by perception management and
computer network operations are in fact the keys to developing an overarching 10 theory and
that in order for their new theory to succeed a strategic analysis or linkage should be developed
between these often disparate and insular communities (ibid, p. 3). As will be seen later in this
section, attempts to build this overarching strategy have fallen short. Likewise, the linkages
between the different portions ofiO are not nearly as strong as Arquilla or Ronfeldt advocated.
So unfortunately it appears from the research participants that a lot of the 'promise' of the power
inherent in information and for that matter 10, is still not realised by the United States
government.

2.5.3

The Role of Information on Government Organisations
For a number of years, academics have tried to analyse these changes, with respect to the

power of information. For example, RAND embarked on a three-year long study of the effects
of the information revolution on governmental organisations. Key discussion areas included the
political, governmental, business, financial, social and cultural dimensions. Such changes were
noted by the RAND analysts as occurring for two general reasons:

36

•

•

Traditional mechanisms of governance (e.g., taxation, regulation and licensing, etc.)
are becoming increasingly problematic, as the information revolution allows action
beyond the reach of national governments.
.
The distribution of political power is changing, as new non-state actors are being
empowered by the information revolution, in the business, social, and political realms,
at the sub-national, trans-national, and supra-national levels.

These academics believed that governments will have to find mechanisms to deal with these
changes and with these new actors for different nations often take different approaches. How
this is accomplished will, of course, define the roles of power and information in the nation state,
and especially the United States as it relates to this new environment. Other RAND publications
about information have followed as well, including a study in 2000 entitled, Information and

Biological Revolutions: Global Governance Challenges (Fukuyama and Wagner, 2000). This
text examines the new elements confronting political leaders in the post-Cold War era and
offered suggestions for change. An additional study by Libicki (2000) on the governance and
development of the global information grid was published that same year. In an analogy to this
research, Libicki debates whether the United States Air Force should adopt a top-down
centralised approach to management of these services, or a more decentralised bottom-up
approach. In this particular case, Libicki believes that it is inappropriate for the military branch
to develop an enterprise-wide management control (or a top-down approach) at this time. This
series of thoughts were very similar to data derived from other research participants, but there is
still ·somewhat of a disconnect in all of these RAND studies, because they fail to acknowledge
the large gap between their proposed strategic doctrines of IO and the day-to-day reality of
tactical operations. So there still exists a serious difference between what many academics
believe is possible to do with respect to IO and what in fact the United States government is
willing to do in practice. This delta still exists today as evidenced by the data gained from the .
interviewees in this research project.
However RAND was not the only semi-government agency interested in the power of
information. The Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association was also busy
pu~lishing

a series on Information Warfare over this four year period as shown below:

• CyberWar: Security, Strategy and Conflict in the Information Age (Campen,
Dearth and Goodden, 1996)
• CyberWar 2.0: Myths, Mysteries and Reality (Campen and Dearth, 1998)
• CyberWar 3.0: Human Factors in Information Operations and Future Conflict
(Campen and Dearth, 2000)
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Written as an anthology, these books emphasise the evolution of the strategic and theoretical
analysis of the warfare area since 1996. It is interesting to notice how Armed Forces
Communications and Electronics Association also stressed the same key areas as Arquilla and
Ronfeldt, namely perception management and computer network operations. Two of the editors,
Douglas Dearth and Dr Dan Kuehl, were interviewed on multiple occasions for this research and
contributed valuable insight into the changing role of information with respect to power in the
United States government. Unfortunately for a variety of reasons, this series was discontinued
after the third edition, and no follow-on books are likely to be published. Offering an
opportunity for 20-25 respected practitioners of the tradecraft, to update the general public and
academic community on 10 activities, this series has been sorely missed. It was in the original
Cyber War manuscript, that one can see much of the hope and promise that constituted the
'Revolution in Military Affairs' movement of the mid 1990s. Overall the contributors of this
series appear to be generally optimistic about the future of information warfare, but there was
also cautionary tales, especially with talk about the threat of Cyber War. However that being
said, in all aspects, this was another series of seminal publications, a set of ideas that framed
much of the discussion for 10 when it was only starting to be recognised as a unique warfare
area. The editors of the original Cyber War book were also fortunate to be able to include an
introduction by Thomas Rona, the original creator of the term Information Warfare. Developed
two decades earlier, he recognised the value of information and data within the context of
nuclear war and the bipolar threat that existed at that time. Rona tied in the threats to the civilian
infrastructure from 10, which was quite unique, and led to a nice dialogue among the disparate
commentators in this series. He also understood that changes in information brought threats not
to just the warriors in the field but civilians and society as well.
Therefore from these books, articles and interviews, it can be understood that there are
many factors in the equation of power with respect to the changing role of information. Some of
these scholars believe that information is now the most important element of power, because it is
the most fungible or transferable ofthe different fundamentals of influence, which would relate
to the fundamental shift, alluded to throughout these publications on 10. There are concerns by
some o( these authors that the rise of information as element of power is diminishing other facets
and concepts of power such as sovereignty. As noted by Rosecrance in The Rise of the Virtual
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State, the fungibility inherent in information gives the average citizen much more power than
they had previously in the industrial era (Rosecrance, 1999). At one's fingertips is information
previously only accessible to the rich and powerful. Communication around the world has
increased so much that now country to country dialogue is not solely limited to diplomats but is
instead conducted through millions of other conduits. These immense changes, as noted by
Rosecrance, allude to the difficulty that countries, such as the United States face in this new
environment. Likewise, Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1999) also discuss these same issues, most
specifically the role of information in the conduct foreign policy, as another element of power in
conjunction with military, diplomatic and economic elements. These academics also
acknowledge that it is exactly this ability to manipulate and manage the power of information,
which makes concepts such as IO so useful but also so much a destabilising factor to the status
quo. For what all ofthese authors understand and relate in their publications is how in today's
environment, groups, organizations, nation-states and even individuals can now influence policy
at the systemic level simply by using information. This was not necessarily the case during the
Cold War, but the vast explosion in technology, particularly in telecommunications and media
propagation over the last 15 plus years, has forever changed the control over this power
paradigm (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1997a).
This change and recognition that informational power in the form ofiO, is changing the
way that the United States conducts its military and foreign policy initiatives can also be seen in
other articles and books besides the official publications already mentioned (Joint Publication 313, 1998; US Advisory Commission, 2000). Fulton (1998) stated as much and describes how the
State Department must change to adapt to the influx of informational power. For probably more
than any governmental bureaucracy, the State Department had a near monopoly on control of
communication between governmental leaders, but with the advent of the internet, 24 hours news
channels, satellite television and worldwide newspapers, that is certainly no longer the case
today. Unfortunately, few if any ofFulton's suggestions were followed through because in
2000, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy published a similar follow-on study
entitled A New Diplomacy for the Information Age. Unfortunately again, little was done to
change this federal agency and today, the State Department continues to grapple with these
changes. Per the research participants' comments, few if any of any of these studies or critical
recommendations for changing this cabinet agency have been implemented. But what is also
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interesting, is that these studies all mirror the Defense Department's voluminous output of
publications during the same time period. For instance, Fulton's tome was in effect a corollary
to Joint Publication 3-13 published the same year. The joint publication will be explained in the
next section, but in essence, both of these documents were attempts by their respective federal
organisations to come to grips with the power of information, and incorporate it into their
processes and methodologies.
There are obviously other writers on this subject, with a large number of books talking
about IO, Computer Warfare, Cyber Security and Net War having all been published in the last
decade. For example, Adams (1998) forecasted a multitude of changes in the information world
due to the increased connectivity of the globe. While Adams did not emphasise globalisation as
much as connectivity, there is clearly a linkage between the two as shown by Stephen Flanagan,
Ell en Frost and Richard Kugler in their National Defense University series on globalisation and
national security. Entitled Challenges of the Global Century: Report of the Project on

Globalization and National Security, this two volume set which features 50 chapters on a far
ranging set of topics including strategic implications and emerging priorities for the United
States, as well as the challenges ahead, including both global and regional trends (Flanagan et al,
2001). Both of these books are emphasising the new roles of information around the world and
how it is changing the dynamics of power. In addition, this 18 month project confirmed some of
the key themes with respect to the changing role of power and information as they effect the
United States government, as noted by the interviewees, to include the impact of the media and a
bifurcated world order.
Other authors and social scientists have also examined the effects of information as it has
affected the United States government, and come to their own interesting conclusions as well.
One of these is Gleick (1999; 2002), a journalist, who offered a rather unique perspective on not
only the evolution of the information society, but also its cumulative changes to people and the
way that they live in the American culture. Blending science and cultural journalism, Gleick like
Adams offers different perspectives on the effects of the increased information flow, and how it
is speeding up aspects of life in the United States. Unfortunately Gleick is more of an observer
of the changes brought on by the Information Age and therefore offers no concrete solutions for
improvement by the United States government. Rheingold (2000: 2003) is similar as well; both
of these publications comment on the incredible changes in society around the world as a result

40

of information technology and how this new found power has empowered these citizens to
conduct new initiatives. Once again, there is little useful advice or recommendations for changes
on how to best utilise 10 in this new environment. However from an author's perspective, what
makes these two author's so useful with respect to 10, is their ability to cobble together disparate
ideas that range across a wide spectrum of the information environment and bring them together
in one place, that is commercially available to all. It is exactly these kinds of books that senior
level government leadership can read and try to get a feel for how fast the world is changing
around them. In addition, these real-world examples are incredibly useful to help explain the
paradigm shift that is occurring with the information revolution that may not be readily apparent
to all.

2.6

The Rise of Information Operations
Even with the publication of all of these books and articles, 10 is still not understood very

well. Too many lay people, 10 is simply computer warfare, but as has been emphasised, 10 is
really about much more than that. In the United States, 10 is an attempt by the federal
bureaucracy to develop a strategy to use all of the capabilities of information to affect the many
issues that it deals with in the post-Cold War era. With these changes in the .elements of power,
has come the realisation that militarily the United States could not solve all of its problems
through kinetic means. 10 is therefore an attempt to bring these different facets of power to bear
on a11 adversary in a synergistic manner to achieve our national objectives. For a long time, it
was hard for the Department of Defense to address or even intelligently discuss the concepts of
10. This was because there was no common, or readily available directive or publication
available. This led to questions and confusion regarding definitions and lexicon that could not be
fully addressed until the release of a coherent strategic policy, in the form of Joint Publication 313, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations published in October 1998. For the first time, the
Department of Defense was distributing in an unclassified document, the doctrinal principles
involved in conducting 10, which was obviously was a key milestone in the development and use
of 10 within the United States government .
The real key as emphasised by many participants to making 10 effective across the
federal bureaucracy per Joint Publication 3-13, was to ensure the goal that the horizontal
integration and coordination of the interagency organizations are conducted early on mainly that
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is in the peacetime environment. IO can be a very effective tool for shaping the environment in
the pre-hostilities phase, so that the actual need for hostilities may be avoided or minimised.
However that is not always possible. There are still differences in definitions, notwithstanding
the publication of Joint Publication 3-13. This is due to the fact that while IO was explicitly
defined in 1998 by the Department of Defense, the concepts of information warfare go back
earlier, to two different Department ofDefense directives issued in 1993 and 1996 respectfully.
In addition, there are other subtleties between these two warfare or mission areas as well, with
. the primary doctrinal difference is that information warfare contains six elements and is mostly
involved with the conduct of operations during actual combat, while IO on the other hand,
includes these six capabilities and two sometimes integrated or related activities. Likewise, IO is
not only broader than information warfare, but is also intended to be conducted as a strategic
campaign throughout the full spectrum of conflict from peace to war and back to peace, across
the federal bureaucracy. Thus for all these reasons, IO is considered much more comprehensive
than information warfare, and it is in IO that the full integration across government agencies and
with private industry must occur (Joint Publication 3-13, 1998).

Information Warfare

Information Operations

Elements
Computer Network Attack
Deception
Destruction
Electronic Warfare
Operations Security
Psychological Operations

Capabilities
Computer Network Attack
Deception
Destruction
Electronic Warfare
Operations Security
Psychological Operations

Related Activitie~
Public Affairs
Civil Affairs

The elements, capabilities and related activities of information warfare and IO as listed
above, are separate and discrete warfare elements. Most have very old traditions and longstanding histories that do not necessarily mean that every action conducted in these areas is
always associated with IO. There are elements of destruction that are not part of an IO
campaign, likewise not every public affairs activity has to be tied to information operations. In
reality, all elements and their components of national power, in order to succeed, should be
integrated into a satisfactorily planned, designed and executed information strategy. If this is not
done, than the United States may not attain its national security goals in the new millennium.
The concept of IO is intended to use these different capabilities and related activities to
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produce effects in an integrated fashion. Therefore, while one can try to use all eight capabilities
and related activities to conduct an operation, more often than not, a good 10 plan will probably
only incorporate a few of these warfare areas (Giessler, 2002). The basic idea is that one does
not always have to resort to kinetic means, and instead for 10 to work properly, the operators
must understand the environment, assess their interests and the adversary's pressure points, to
use whichever capability or related activity that will best affect the adversary. 10 is thus much
more of an intensive study of not only your adversary, but also your own forces, which is more
than perhaps many current military commanders have grown accustomed to (Kuehl, 2002).

2.6.1

Information Operations Development in the United States
As mentioned earlier, the use of information to influence foreign audiences is not new.

Throughout this century, the United States has attempted to use information namely in the form
of public diplomacy as a tool to influence foreign audiences around the world. President
Woodrow Wilson created the Creel Committee on Public Information in 1917 and during the
Second World War, President Franklin D. Roosevelt established the Office of War Information,
which included theVoice of America (Campden and Deatih, 2000; Armistead, 2003). This .
agency and its overseas component were the forerun11.er of the United States Jnformation
Agency, which was for almost 50 years was the home to public diplomacy within the federal
structure. Defined as government activities intended to understand, inform and influence foreign
publics, public diplomacy is one ofthe forms ofiO, along with perception management, strategic
communications and influence campaigns that comprise the crux of this thesis. It was this
strategic use of information that became a key factor ofUnited States foreign policy in the Cold
War, where information was disseminated to worldwide audiences by television and radio
broadcasts, in the form of a state-to-state dialogue. And we were not alone. Nations throughout
history and to this present day have tried to use information to influence other countries as well
as their own citizens since time immortal. How successful they were in those attempts often
depended on a number of factors including cultural and psychological biases, as well as their
means and methods of technology used to transmit that information.
These ideas are not new. The Science of Coercion (Simpson, 1994) and Psychological

Operations and Political Warfare in Long-Term Strategic Planning (Radvanyi, 1990) are only
two of the more prominent publications that offer detailed academic examinations of
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psychological operations portion ofiO. Considered the most difficult to execute, and perhaps
hardest to understand, it is these perception management topics or the 'softer' side ofiO which
seems to need the most future research as indicated by the various authors of these tomes. But
there is a big difference between offering future research topics as opposed to concrete solutions
to ensuring the tactical reality ofiO as a mission area. So in many aspects, both of these texts
fall short of offering a viable solution to incorporating IO into the day-to-day operations of IO.
This aspect was also enumerated by a multitude of the research interviewees who suggested that
it was the 'softer' side ofiO, where the greatest gap existed between strategic policy and tactical
reality. So it is good that the perception management or strategic communications portion of IO
policy, appears to be changing the most in the recent version of the new Joint Publication 3-13,
as the Department of Defense comes to the realisation that their doctrine must more closely
match their capabilities.
However, IO in the United States government is not just about perception management
and in fact as mentioned previously, computer network operations play a major role as well.
With the tremendous advances in computers and technology, the nature in which governments
and countries interact has changed dramatically as well. A number of books have attempted to
address these issues, some of which were written by authors previously mentioned. For example
Arquilla and Ronfeldt (200 1) published another book Networks and Netwar in which they
describe the future of terror, crime and militancy. It follows the theme of their earlier work, The
Advent ofNetwar, with a collection of essays from a distinguished collection of authors mainly
written from a social Netwar perspective. A good update to their previous books, it is in this new
publication that Arquilla and Ronfeldt were able to. expand on the emphasis on the importance of
the networks, as an enabling framework for IO. Luckily the editors were also able to add an
afterword, in the months after the events of 9/11 to tie together their themes.
Likewise, Owens and Offley (200 1) presented their ideas on ensuring the adequacy of
United States military power through more cooperative uses of information, joint operations and
more emphasis on flexibility by the respective services in their book, Lifting the Fog of War.
Not a pure IO book, Owens and Offley did however tie in some of the strategic concepts
associated to this warfare area, and highlighted the follow-on efforts from the earlier revolution
in military training efforts that are especially illuminating from an IO perspective. Other authors
have also attempted to write about the development ofiO within the United States government
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as well, including Alberts (i996). Later revised in 2002, this pamphlet, is part of a series funded
by the Department of Defense, fostered a debate and helped to frame the course of changes
within the United States military. In this book, a number of strategies are debated about the right
course to insure that America has the best military for future operations and how IO plays a
major role in much of this debate. The overall consensus from this discussion is that the strategy
of IO must be very closely related to actual conduct of warfare (Alberts, 2002). Likewise, Hall
(2003) generally agrees with both of these assessments in his book Stray Voltage: War in the
Information Age. He also notes the same tendencies in the United States government as in this .
thesis, namely that there is a significant disconnect with regards to the maturation of strategic IO
within the federal bureaucracy. In addition, and this is significant, Hall is knowledgeable enough
from a series of tours within the Department of Defense and United States government to
understand that this new warfare area cuts across many operational boundaries and that it is not
just enough to concentrate on the technical aspects ofiO to be successful, and that the 'softer'
aspects must be understood as well.
Moving on to other 'strategic' aspects ofiO policy within the United States government,
a number of authors have written books on the technical aspects or the 'harder' side of IO.
Denning (1999) fmmerly ofGeorgetown University and now with the NavalPostgraduate
School, linked the computer network operations with IO in her book Information Warfare and
Security In this seminal publication, she addressed a number of information security concerns
including information assurance, and was one of the first authors to lay out in an unclassified
forum, these key aspects of IO. Two other publications that were mentioned earlier, The
Information Revolution and National Security (Copeland, 2000) and Strategic Waifare in
Cyberspace (Ratray, 2001) are similar to Denning' s work in that the authors also compared the
development of current national strategy with efforts to coordinate cyber policy and offered
recommendations for the future. All three of these books analysed the links between power,
information, doctrine and security policy, and are good sources to connect the 'harder' and
'softer' aspects ofiO. In addition, these books are also important because it was during this
period in which the Department of Defense was laying out the current policy on IO in the form
of Joint Publication 3-13, as well as standing up the key IO organisations that will be described
later in this chapter.
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On a final note, a significant development for IO from a theoretical standpoint was a
doctoral dissertation by Dunn (2002) that was published by the Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology in Zurich. Entitled Information Age Conflicts: a Study of the Information Revolution

and a Changing Operating Environment, the prime difference in her approach from this thesis
was the use of structural realism as her theoretical construct. Dunn confronted the dilemma of
the inconsistencies in her theory by trying to build a model that delineated key challenges
associated with the information age. She examined all of the traditional international relations
theory and one by one, dismissed them as inadequate to truly explain the changing environment.
Even her proposed choice of structural realism, she admitted had major flaws in its use as a tool
for modelling the power of information, and so in some aspects Dunn was restricted in her ability
to adequately explain IO. In addition, she also understood the constraints of all forms ofrealism,
which maintain the state as the primary actor. For as noted earlier, because of the radical
changes in the power structure within this new era, the state is no longer the primary player in
the information age. So it was this reason and others that will be delineated in later chapters that
it was decided not to use an international relations type of theory as the backbone for this thesis
and instead the theoretical construct proposed for this dissertation utilised Soft Systems
Methodology, because it was able to accurately model the power of information and how it is
radically changing the traditional power structure around the world.

2.6.2

From Hiroshima to the Berlin Wall- The Cold War Era
As explained earlier, IO is not new and there are great examples of the different parts and

· capabilities of IO with the United States government. Historical data abounds on the capabilities
over the last 60 years, with a good illustration as shown below from the immediate post World
War II era. In this specific case, the Truman Administration wanted to strengthen and coordinate
the foreign information measures in order to attain United States national objectives, specifically
from a perception management perspective. As an attempt to stop the spreading spectre of
Communism, the National Security Council passed an executive directive, National Security
Council4, Coordination ofForeign Information Measures on 17 December 1947 (NSC, 1947).
This policy was expressly designed to combat the extensive propaganda campaign currently
being conducted by the Soviet Union at that time. Written to exploit and promote the message of
economic aid that the United States was delivering to a number of foreign nations, especially in
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Europe, this policy directive was also crucial in the interwar period, for there was no existing
government agency which was tasked to conduct strategic information campaigns for the
American public. Therefore this policy document was meant to serve as an interagency
coordination mechanism, led by the Secretary of State.
Coincident with these efforts by the National Security Council to develop organic
information programs was a concern within Congress about the State Department's ability to
propagandise United States citizens as well as foreign nationals. Therefore new legislation was
enacted to ensure a separation existed between these two capabilities. It is somewhat amazing in
this era of a throw away and disposable society, that much of the government agencies discussed
in this paper are actually constrained by a law more than half a century old. In fact, the SmithMundt Act which was passed in 1948 specifically forbids the United States foreign policy

apparatus and in particular the State Department from conducting propaganda on American
citizens. Much of this concern by Congress was in direct response to the immediate post World
War 11 period, in which the conduct of public affairs and psychological operations within the
United States government security structure was unrestrained. There were operations conducted
by the Office of War Information and the United States Information Service, inside and outside
of the continental United States that quickly raised a number of questions about the propriety of
these activities. Therefore to ultimately coordinate the activities of the foreign affairs
organizations, the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act popularly known as
the Smith-Mundt Act, was enacted as a sweeping legislative bill that directed among other items,
the forbiddance of the State Department from conducting propaganda, psychological operations
or public affairs on the American public. Interestingly enough, today it still stands and is in effect
as a major restraining component on 10 efforts within the United States government.
This new act created a serious dilemma for the State Department in 1948, because it
created a dichotomy between existing policy and operations. The new Assistant Secretary was
supposed to conduct public diplomacy with a target audience of foreign nationals abroad, and
was also supposed to manage a public relations campaign for the State Department, aimed for
domestic consumption. There is an extremely fine line between building information tools on
the same subject for two different audiences (Bernhard, 1997). To make matters worse, the
Smith-Mundt Act actually made it illegal to conduct public diplomacy on the American people
and directed that separate budgets exist for public diplomacy and public affairs. So not only did
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these staffs have to differentiate products between their different audiences, but they also needed
to do so under separate operating authorities and budget tasking. This was too much to ask, and
so a decision was made in 1952 to stand up a new organisation, the United States Information
Agency, whose sole purpose was to create a public diplomacy arm that could in fact conduct
these activities legally, but only abroad and then only to foreign citizens (lbid).
Thus for almost 50 years, the United States Information Agency was the main
organisation responsible for the conduct of public diplomacy and information campaigns by the
. federal government. Formed in 1953 under Reorganization Plan No. 8 of the Smith-Mundt Act,
this new activity encompassed most of the information programs of the State Department at that
time (Armistead, 2003). The lines of authority for this new agency when it was created were
unique, not only because it operated as an independent organization, with the director of United
States Information Agency reporting to the President through the National Security Council, but
also because the director coordinated his own separate budget. These factors and resentment of
their freedom within the agency would become major elements in later reorganisation efforts by
the State Department over the next five decades.
Moving rapidly forward 25 years, we see that the development of IO as a major military
doctrine in the United States government is really a relatively new phenomenon, and while the
first known use of the term information warfare was in 1976 by Dr Tom Rona, much of the
critical thinking about this subject did not begin until the early 1980s (Campden and Dearth,
1998). This was due primarily to the size of the former Soviet Union's military, which greatly
concerned United States military analysts and planners. From 1975-85, the former Soviet Union
often outnumbered United States conventional forces 3: 1, and, while the United States may have
had a qualitative advantage, there are times when only sheer numbers count. In the Pentagon,
military strategists were looking for methods to cut down on the former Soviet Union's
advantage by attempting to counter traditional strengths with asymmetric non-nuclear attacks. In
addition, these analysts noted that the former Soviet Unionrelied heavily on electronic warfare
or radioelectrionyaborba (Radio Electronic Combat) in much of its doctrine, and there was a
feeling that the United States government must combat this threat as well (Munro, 1991). It was
in this era, that some of the early ideas about effects-based planning or IO began to evolve.
In addition, efforts were also underway during this period to strengthen the use of public
diplomacy as a tool for the United States. On 6 March 1984, the Reagan Administration
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published a policy entitled National Security Decision Directive 130, US International

lliformation Policy (NSDD 130, 1984). This document was envisioned to be a strategic
instrument for shaping fundamental political and ideological trends around the world on a longterm basis and ultimately affecting the behaviour of governments (Campden and Dearth, 2000).
Written by the staff of the 'great communicator', it is not surprising that President Reagan would
believe in the transformational power of information. Recognizing that a strong international
interagency capability was needed, National Security Decision Directive 130 was a successor to
National Security Council Directive 4.

2.6.2

The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Global War on Terrorism
These changes during the Reagan Administration were just the beginning of a maturation

of 10 policy in America. It was in the first Bush Administration and the demise of the Soviet
threat to the continental United States in 1989 that the greatest shift in policy with respect to 10
began in the United States government. From the lessons learned during the experiences from
the Cold War, it has became clear to war-fighters that the side that controlled the most
information, and retained the ability to accurately manipulate and conduct an influence campaign
was going to be victorious (Owens and Offley, 2001, p.lOO). This was most apparent
immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union, when strategic planners at the Joint Chiefs of Staff
began to think and write new strategy, most of which was highly classified, on the use of
information as a war fighting tool. In fact, the first document, Department ofDefense Document
TS3600.1 was kept at the Top Secret level throughout its use, due to the restrictive nature of this
new strategy (TS3600.1, 1992).
While this publication started a dialogue on information warfare within the Department
of Defense, its classification ultimately restrained a more general doctrinal exchange. Thus the
need for a strategy to fit these revolutions in technology still existed, so a new concept entitled
Command and Control Warfare was quickly developed. Officially released as a Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum ofPolicy 30 Command and Control Warfare (8 March 1993),
this document laid out for the first time in an unclassified format, the interaction of these
different informational disciplines, which when combined together could give the war-fighters
the information warfare advantage (CJCS MOP 30, 1993). Command and Control Warfare as
originally defined, contained the following five pillars:
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•
•
•
•
•

Destruction
Deception
Psychological Operations
Operations Security
Electronic Warfare

Intelligence supported these five pillars in order to conduct both offensive and defensive aspects
of this capability. While some quarters of the military greeted this new concept of warfare with
enthusiasm, others were wary of any new doctrinal developments. However, the ability to
integrate these different military disciplines to conduct nodal analysis against enemy command
and control targets was also highly lauded as a great improvement (Ibid). Many units and all
four military services in the United States developed command and control warfare cells and
began training in this new doctrine throughout the mid-1990s. But there was a conflict between
the Joint Staff and Defense Secretariat doctrine, since information warfare was a much broader
attempt to tackle the issue of information as a force multiplier, while command and control
warfare was more narrowly defined to apply only to the five pillars mentioned above (CJCS
MOP 30, 1993; S3600.1, 1996; TS3600.1, 1992; JP 3-13, 1998). The fact that the United States
was writing strategy to conduct operations in peacetime against nations was considered very
risky, therefore official information warfare policy remained highly classified throughout much
ofthe 1990s (Pilecki, 2000).
The United States military also recognized the need to develop commands and agencies
to conduct 'these types of warfare in the information age and therefore, even though doctrine was
still in the formative stage, organisational changes began to occur in the early 1990s. The Joint
Electronic Warfare Centre at Kelly AFB in San Antonio, Texas, was renamed the Joint
Command and Control Warfare Centre in 1993, and would later be renamed the Joint
Information Operations Centre in October 1999 and finally the Joint Information Operations
Warfare Centre in 2004. The uniformed services also created a number of other new agencies
beginning in 1995, to include:
•
•
•

U.S. Air Force- Air Force Information Warfare Centre
U.S. Army- Land Information Warfare Activity -later changed to the 1st Information
Operations Command
U.S. Navy- Fleet Information Warfare Centre -renamed the Naval Information
Operations Command and now subordinate to Navy Network Warfare Command
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In addition to organizational changes by the services, new courses and schools were also being
developed to teach new tactics. The National Defense University created a School of
Information Warfare and Strategy in 1994, that was a fulllO-inonth-long academic curriculum
designed to immerse the National War College students in the academic theory ofinformation
warfare. Held for two years, the National Defense University graduated 16 students the first year
and 32 in the second. However, the course was subsequently cancelled in 1996. This may have
been due to a belief that information warfare instruction needed to be disseminated to a wider
audience, so shorter courses and classes were developed instead, to teach a larger audience of
National Defense University students. These existed for several years, including a five-day
intermediate information warfare course for mid-grade officers and a two-day information
warfare overview for senior officers, but by mid-2003 all were eventually cancelled (Giessler,
2004). IO was still taught at the National Defense University as a series of embedded lectures in
different curricula. In 2008, there was also movement to reinstate IO as a major subject topic at
this institute, with the establishment of a Masters level program. The other official Department
ofDefense joint course on information warfare is also taught at National Defense University's
Joint Forces Staff College, formerly the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, VA. Held for
two weeks, seven times a year, the current Joint Information Operations Staff and Operations
Course is aimed primarily at mid-grade officers or civilian equivalent government personnel,
who are serving in an IO cell or billet with a joint agency. A planner's course that takes these
students' to the next level was also developed in 2001 and is still widely taught.
Thus, doctrine continued to develop after the publication of Command and Control
Warfare doctrine in 1993. The formation of information warfare agencies and commands in the
1995- 1996 period, not only filled voids in the services but also helped to resolve the conflict in
the development of information doctrine and policy within the United States government. There
was a concerted push for declassification and better understanding of these concepts within the
Department of Defense during this time frame, which resulted in the publication of Department
ofDefense Directive S3600.1, Information Operations (9 December 1996). By downgrading
this document to the Secret level, Department of Defense opened IO to a wider audience. In a
related effort, the Defense Science Board also published its report on Information Waifare-

Defense in November 1996. Together these two documents attempted to clarify the differences
between this older doctrine, and for the first time introduced the use of computer network attack
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as an IO capability (S3600.1, 1996). However, there were other issue areas that referenced or
alluded to IO in the unclassified arena during this time period as well to include Presidential
Decision Directive 56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations in May 1997. Written after
the debacles in Somalia, Haiti and Rwanda, this directive was developed to integrate political,
military, humanitarian, economic and other dimensions of United States government planning
for complex contingencies, which included the informational aspects. Widely lauded at the time,
subsequent studies and commentary reflect that in fact, little was changed by this Clinton
Administration policy directive (Scarborough, 1999; Hamblet and Kline, 2000).
Thus, the formation of information warfare agencies and commands in the 1995-1996
time frame, also somewhat helped to resolve the conflict in the development of IO doctrine and
policy within the United States government. However, since the Department ofDefense
Directive S3600.1 was still classified Secret, it also limited greater discussion on the differences
between IO and information warfare. But this constraint was somewhat muted because the
Department ofDefense also presented in 1996, a white paper written to establish a vision for
how the United States military will operate in the uncertain future entitled Joint Vision 2010.
For the first time, in an unclassified format, IO was formally defined as 'those actions taken to
affect an adversary's information and information systems while defending one's own
information and information systems' (Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010, 1996, p. 69). To
implement this vision and achieve 'full spectrum dominance,' four operational concepts were
introduced'in this publication.
•
•
•
•

Dominant manoeuvre
Precision engagement
Full dimensional engagement
Focused logistics
The essential enabler for all four of these concepts was doctrinally encapsulated as

information superiority (Ibid). Defined as "the capability to collect, process, disseminate an
uninterrupted flow of information, while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the
same," information superiority consists of three components of which information operations
was a prime factor. In addition to these doctrinal changes, the period of the mid-to-late 1990's
was also a time of early experimentation. In the same time period, the aforementioned Joseph
Nye and retired Admiral Bill Owens were also recognising that the United States should take
advantage of its information superiority in the post Cold War era, and published an article in
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Foreign Affairs, entitled 'America's Information Age'. This piece collaborated much of what
the Department ofDefense was attempting to do with their Revolution in Military Affairs, in this
case by describing the move by the country into a 'Third Wave', away from an industrial nation
and more toward an informational society (Nye and Owens, 1996). But once again, one sees in
this particular article, the advocates for 10 developing a high level strategic policy, but little
information on how to actually achieve these goals. In addition as was noted in this article, with
these perceived advantages came threats as America is most often recognised as the nation with
the most vulnerability from a cyber attack. Other authors followed Nye and Owens beliefs,
advocating a radical change in the manner that the United States government could conduct
warfare. These concepts were cited by authors as diverse as Winn Schwartau' s comments on an
'Electronic Pearl Harbor' to Adams vision on the future of war, and the advent of 'NetWar',
'Strategic Information Warfare' and well as the concept around strategic warfare in cyberspace
(Schwartau, 1996; Adams, 1998; Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1996, 2000; Molander, 1998; Ratray,
2001). However, the theoretical disconnect in all of these articles continued to exist, because the
changes advocated by these authors were often too radical and too fast for the Department of
Defense to can-y out.
For example, Schwartau (1996) is probably at least as well known for his book on IO,

Information Warfare: Cyberterrorism- Protecting Your Personal Security in the Electronic Age,
as opposed to his testimony before Congress, and his annual 10 conference, INFOWARCON,
that was held each September in Washington, DC unti12003. His efforts to heighten awareness
about 10 often seemed over the top, but he believed that he was successful in getting the
American population to understand about this new threat (Schwartau, 1996, 2003). The problem
that resulted though from these methods was once again a disconnect between lofty promises of
new and wonderful capabilities with respect to 10 and the reality of what could actually be done,
especially in the early stages ofiO between 1995-2001. In the author's opinion, this
sensationalism ofiO in that time period actually did .something of a disservice to the emerging
warfare area, because it oversold the reality of what 10 could do. Unfulfilled promises then led
to dissatisfaction, which may have led to disbelief. Ultimately hype needed to be separated from
reality, in order to move ahead with the 'real' capability and the author believes that this has
been accomplished over the last decade as 10 has been 'operationalised' and brought into the
mainstream of Department ofDefense operations.
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Likewise James Adams in his book The Next World War: Computers are the Weapons
and the Front Line is Everywhere, also to an extent oversold the problem (Adams, 1998, 2000).
His publication was more of reflection and observation of trends, much like Rheingold and
Gleick's works, which are mentioned earlier in this chapter. But what Adams did do, which the
author felt was beneficial, was to show that the traditional boundaries of warfare, had been
removed in the information age, and that no longer could the American citizens count on the
military to protect them. While Adams was not the only author to understand this important
point, his book was one of the more useful in explaining the consequences of this new
environment. Likewise, the same can also be said of Arquilla and Ronfeldt' s book The Advent of
Netwar. One of a series of publications by these prolific authors on this topic, what distinguishes
this book from their others, is the emphasis on a new kind of warfare, one fought by networks
against other networks (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1996). Interestingly enough, this concept has also
been adopted by the US military, in particularly the US Navy. Entitled 'Network Centric
Warfare' and championed by retired Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, this idea has gone a long
ways in at least one service towards operationalising IO (Cebrowski, 2003). This is very
. interesting, because in this case, one actually had a concept that was advocated and accepted by .
the Department of Defense, with regard to the utilisation of 10. As noted in his interview with
the author, Vice Admiral Cebrowski echoed many of the key points in these books, when he
discussed these huge changes that were occurring, especially as power shifts from the industrial
age to an information era.
Another of these early advocates of IO was Roger Molander who also expressed similar
thoughts not only in his book, Strategic Information Warfare Rising, but likewise during his
interview with the author (Molander, 1998, 2003). He understood that the threats in this new
environment were not from traditional adversaries but instead from a variety of organisations and
entities that were not previously thought to possess this type of capability. While much of his
book focused on the cyber threat, this author believes that the intervening five years between its
publication and the interview for this research has shifted some ofMolander's views. Obviously
the events of 9/11 had occurred as had the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, all of which may
have contributed to Molander's emphasis on the 'softer' side ofiO, especially strategic
communications during his interview in 2003. It would have been interesting to see if the same
shift had occurred with Greg Rattray as well. The author of Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace,
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this US Air Force officer's PhD dissertation from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology was
also completed as was his interview for the research, before the events of9/11 (Rattray, 2001).
Rattray' s thesis had a huge emphasis on Cyber Warfare, and orie has to wonder how this book
might have been changed if it had been published later, after September 11th, 2001. Rattray
though unlike virtually all of the other authors mentioned earlier, did however get a chance to
operationalise his theory, when he was selected to be a commander for a United States Air Force
10 Squadron in San Antonio, Texas in 2003.

2.7

The Latest 10 Policy Changes: The 10 Road Map
In these next two sections, a very detailed review of the most recent changes in 10 policy

and organisations will be undertaken to compare to the recommendations that constitute the
Conceptual Models developed in the last chapter. To begin this process, undoubtedly the most
significant recent policy change that impacts 10, from an American standpoint, was the
publication of the 10 Road Map (Department ofDefense, 2003). This directive proposes a way
ahead for the United States military forces specifically with regard to the future ofiO. The 2001

Quadrennial Defense Review identified 10 as one of six critical goals supporting Department of
Defense transformation, and it set fotih the objective of making 10 a 'core capability' for future
United States forces. The 10 Roadmap further identified three critical areas in which United
States capabilities must be improved. The first of these was an improved ability to 'fight the
net', and this desire stemmed from the realisation that in an era of 'network centric warfare',
protecting the networks on which the Department ofDefense depends is an essential to United
States military capability. The second of these critical areas was the need to 'improve'
psychological operations in the Department ofDefense. This translated to making it more
integrated with and supportive of national level themes and objectives, as well as to enhance
United States ability to impact adversary decision-making. Finally, the third crucial area that
needed to be improved was the need for the United States forces to conduct offensive operations
in/via the electromagnetic spectrum- to include both computer network attack and electronic
warfare capabilities.
From these three critical areas, the 10 Roadmap further recommended a series of actions
to improve overall offensive 10 capabilities of the Department ofDefense. The first of these was
to develop a common understanding ofiO, and it offered a new definition ofiO that would
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eventually be issued to the joint world doctrinally via a revised Joint Doctrine Publication 3-13
and a revised Department ofDefense Directive 3600 (JP 3-13, 2006; DoD S3600, 2006). The
10 Roadmap also stressed the need to both consolidate oversight ·and advocacy for 10, while

simultaneously delegating capabilities to the Combatant Commanders, and to do this the US
Strategic Command's 10 role was expanded and strengthened, to the point where the Strategic
Command became in effect 'the 10 command'. This need to create a core of trained and
educated 10 personnel, and the requirement to improve the ability to analyse 10 operations and
effects, were both cited in the 10 Roadmap 's recommendations. In addition, there w.ere also
suggestions for the improvement of each of the five 'core competencies' ofiO as defined by the
Roadmap- namely computer network operations (which includes attack, defense and
exploitation), electronic warfare, military deception, operations security and psychological
operations. The need to clarify the 'lanes in the road' between psychological operations, public
affairs, and public diplomacy was also emphasized as well. Finally, IO's place in the budget
process needed increased transparency, to clarify what resources 10 actually had and what would
be needed to provide a stronger, more robust and more comprehensive set of capabilities. All in
all, the full 10 Roadmap laid out 57 specific recommendations designed to develop specific
elements of the overall recommendations as discussed above.
The new definition of 10 published in the 10 Roadmap was very much centred on the
military aspects of information, and was almost a verbatim return to that contained in the early
1990s doctrine for command and control warfare, defining 10 as 'The integrated employment of
the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological
operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and
related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated
decision-making while protecting our own' (U.S. Department ofDefense, 2003, p. 11). This
new definition was a significant narrowing ofiO's scope downward from what had been laid out
in the 1998 Joint Doctrine Publication 3-13, which defined 10 as "actions taken to affect
adversary information and information systems while protecting our own" (JP 3-13, 1998). That
earlier approach was much broader and more inclusive of other federal 10 activities, and tended
to focus on effects rather than means. It was also more difficult to resource. Traditionally the
military services are responsible for 'organising, training, and e~uipping' forces, and they
complained that nothing in the original1998 definition could be directly tied to military
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programs. The new 10 Roadmap definition, on the other hand, could be immediately tied to
several long-standing and well integrated force programs. The new definition also included
several controversial elements, most of which were related to the word 'influence'. The 'lanes in
the road' issue contained in the recommendations was the most controversial element, because it
brought together into one discussion, several activities and communities that traditionally have
viewed each other with great suspicion. The links and relationships between public affairs
(whether Department ofDefense or State), psychological operations, military deception, and
public diplomacy (at State, which viewed the new IQ term 'defense support to public diplomacy'
with scepticism) are undeniable in a theoretical sense, but in the 'real world' of the federal
government where turf battles, organisational cultures, and concerns over roles and
responsibilities, all intermix to create an environment that often does not embrace change.
The 10 Roadmap 's definition of IQ was actively formalised across the military services
as mentioned previously with the release of the newly-revised Joint Doctrine Publication 3-13
(JP 3-13, 2006). The old Joint Publication 3-13 had been in effect for more than seven years,
during which much had changed in the IO environment. While the old doctrine had perhaps
emphasized organisational measures, the new one makes several conceptual advancements as
well. To begin, it described the information environment as a synergistic interaction of three
dimensions: the physical, with the infrastructures and links of information networks; the
informational, representing the actual material being carried by the physical networks; and the
cognitive, of the perceptual element, where the human mind applies meaning to the information
and which was described as the "most important" of the three. It also removes the term
information warfare from the official lexicon, and while most of the rest of the world still uses
information warfare as the most descriptive and commonly understood term for this, the
Department of Defense on the other hand has officially dropped it. The new Joint Publication 313 explicitly links IQ to the Defense Department efforts to 'transform' itself, and it emphasizes

the importance ofiO's multinational and coalition elements. The role ofUnited States Strategic
Command as the chief advocate and proponent for IQ is also emphasised, and its mission of
coordinating IQ across geographic areas of responsibility, such as between combatant commands
in Europe and Asia, and across functional boundaries, is described in greater detail than before.
The relationship between strategic communication and IO is also stressed, and it provides a
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definition, albeit perhaps a misguided one and misleading one for information superiority (Joint

Publication 3-13, 2006).
In addition to these high level strategic changes in 10 policy across the department of
Defense, the American military services have also either published or revised their doctrines for
·10 in the last few years. The Marine Corps published Marine Corps Warfighting Publication

3040.4, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations in July 2003; the Army
published a new Field Manual (FM) 3-13 Information Operations in November 2003; while the
United States .Air Force also published. a new Air Force DoctrineDocument (AFDD) 2-5

Information Operations in January 2005 (US Army War College, January 2006). All of these
new directives reflected their individual Service's perspectives on warfare and 10, and not
surprisingly viewed 10 through the lenses of air, land or naval warfare. The final policy action
with respect to the Department ofDefense to be discussed came in late 2006, with the United
States Air Force's 'claiming' of cyberspace as one of its three core operational environments.
While some saw this as nothing more than a turf grab for new missions and resources, in truth
the Air Force had stated for more than a decade that it operated across three physical
environments: air, outer space, and cyberspace. In December 2005, the United States Air.Force
Chief of Staff, General Michael T. Moseley, and Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne,
issued a new United States Air Force mission statement declaring that cyberspace was a core
mission area for the Air Force, and they followed this policy statement in late summer 2006 with
actions to create an Air Force major command for cyberspace operations that will stand
alongside both the Air Combat Command and Air Force Space Command (Bennett and Munoz,
4 November 2006).

2.7.1

Policy Changes: Offensive 10
Even with the major emphasis by the Department ofDefense on the IO Road Map, the

most radical change with regard to offensive 10 policy changes have not occurred in the
traditional realms ofiO, but instead in the more 'nebulous' regions such as strategic
communications, public diplomacy, international public information, perception management
and psychological operations. A logical place to review the recent 10 policy changes in these
areas, will involve the federal interagency cooperation and coordination efforts. This is because
while no National Security Presidential Directive has been released on strategic communications
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or IO, a significant number of new strategic guidance directives have been published, beginning
with the new National Military Strategy published in 2005, and the new National Military

Strategy on Cyberspace Operations, all of which require significant coordination across the
different federal agencies. Likewise other key National Strategies addressing on cyber security,
homeland security, and critical infrastructure protection have also been approved, which help to
give an overarching framework to IO. As will be addressed later, while the two Policy
Coordination Committees created by National Security Presidential Directive 1 remain in
existence, in April 2006 a new Policy Coordinating Committee for Public Diplomacy and
Strategic Communication was created, chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Ms. Karen Hughes (U.S. Department of State, 2006). What of
course is significant about Ms Hughes is her proximity and close working relationship with
President George W. Bush.
However from the perspective of perception management and strategic communications
policy, a true comparison of doctrine versus requirements desired by the participants instead
begins a decade earlier in 1997 with the publication of the Clinton era Presidential Decision
Directive 56,.Managing Complex Contingency Operations. Unfortunately if one examines the
attempts to develop a more recent and overarching 10 doctrine with respect to interagency
aspects of the "softer" side of IO, particularly psychological operations, international public
information, public diplomacy and strategkcommunications, those efforts have been less than
successful. Even before the events of 11 September 2001, there had been efforts by the White
House to update and rewrite a new National Security Presidential Directive to focus on influence
at the strategic level, specifically with the release of a Defense Science Board report on Managed

Information Dissemination in 2001. Written by public diplomacy professionals and led by its
Chairman Vince Vitto during the transition period between the Clinton and Bush
administrations, it laid the groundwork for the 2004 Defense Science Board Report on Strategic
Communications, but because it did not come from the Executive Branch, much of its
effectiveness appears to have been lost. In addition, a new National Security Council Policy
directive on Strategic Communications, which was to rely on the three earlier National Security
Council directives (NSC 4 (1947), NSDD 130 (1984), and Presidential Decision Directive 68
(1999), was were supposed to be issued in 2002. However that did not occur, for a variety of
reasons, mostly political as cited in the research interview process (Jones, 2003). Some of this
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may have been due to the debacle concerning the Office of Strategic Influence in February 2002,
which in effect hamstrung the Bush administration in its attempts to develop a cohesive strategic
communication effort, however there were a number of other reasons as well that are cited
throughout this thesis. Thus the ultimate failure of the executive branch to promulgate a strategic
policy in this area of 10 probably occurred more as a case of general inertia and political
unwillingness, than any other factor.
These failures are not totally representative of all efforts on the offensive aspects ofiO.
In fact a number of significant changes have occurred within the U.S. government with respect to
broader policy area of public diplomacy. For example, the term Strategic Influence has
disappeared in lieu of the term Strategic Communications, and since April 2002, the Department
ofDefense has regrouped and pressed on to conduct strategic influence operations under this
new name (Parker, 2004). However even then, progress has been somewhat slow, and in many
cases very sporadic. For example, the current structure of the new Policy Coordinating
Committee for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication within the National Security
Council constitutes an attempt by the Bush administration to develop a strategic communications
. capability. Under the chairmanship of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and
Public Affairs, Karen Hughes, attempted to oversee an overarching United States government
strategy for Strategic Communications, but early gaffes and missteps spelled to its loss of
prestige with her departure in 2007.
This is very ironic, because it was only in late 1999 that the United States Information
Agency was dismantled, and its functions shifted under the greater umbrella of the State
Department in what many saw as a hostile takeover. In fact, in three successive years (2002,
2003, and 2004) Representative Henry Hyde (R-NY) proposed the reconstitution of the United
States Information Agency, in a number oflegislation attempts such as Information Protection

Act of2002- HR 3969 (Kovach, 2004). None of these legislative efforts were successful, nor
have the recommendations in either Defense Science Board on Managed Information

Dissemination ever been accepted, which means that in the last decade, little has been done to
rebuild a United States Information Agency like capability.
However other changes are also still occurring with respect to the relationship between
10 and the larger issue of strategic communication and influence. As the military conflicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq have continued, more recommendations continue to come from various
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independent and quasi-government efforts regarding the need for a greater perception
management capability by the United States government , to combat the adversary in the Global
War on Terrorism, as shown by some of the these documents-cited below:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Building America's Public Diplomacy Through a Reformed Structure and additional
Resources, U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (2002),
U.S. Public Diplomacy, U.S. General Accounting Office (2003),
Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy,
Council on Foreign Relations (2003),
Strengthening U.S.-Muslim Communications, Center for the Study ofthe Presidency
(2003),
How to Reinvigorate U.S. Public Diplomacy, Heritage Foundation (2003),
The Youth Factor: The New Demographics of the Middle East and the Implications
for U.S. Policy, The Brookings Institution (2003),
Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy
in the Arab and Muslim World, U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy
(2003).

All of these publications, as do many of this research's participants in particular emphasise the
need for a greater perception management capability within the federal bureauqracy. This idea is
crucial because as the events of September 11, 2001 indicate, military, political, or economic
power is often ineffective in dealing with these new kinds of threats to the national security of
the United States. These attacks were a blow to the American public and its perception of the
government, and the fear produced by the terrorist acts can only be defeated by using a
comprehensive plan in which information is a key element, or as John Arquilla and David
Ronfeldt argued, the concept of networks fighting networks (Armistead, 2007). Both Operation
Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom represent campaigns fought about perceptions,
and the side that will ultimately emerge as the victor is the one that can best shape and influence
the minds of not only their adversary, but their allies and even neutrals and uncommitted parties
as well. The changes are truly revolutionary and describe a profound shift in the nature of
power. Unfortunately, this transformation has not been translated from a strategic concept to
·tactical actions (Kuusisto, Kuusisto and Armistead, 2004).

2.7.2

Policy Changes: Defensive 10
Not all interviewee's on this project focused solely on offensive 10 policy, and indeed

much of the energy and enthusiasm by the participants also centred around defensive 10 policy
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as well. In the last decade, good examples of the development of 10 defensive policy can be
seen primarily in the Information Assurance and Critical Infrastructure Protection operational
areas. In the next section, all of the updates to federal 10 policy' in these areas will be discussed
and their relationship to the desires of the interviewees analysed as well.

2.7.2.1

Critical Infrastructure Protection
Critical Infrastructure Protection as a discrete issue within 10 began with the 1998

issuance of Presidential Decision Directive 63 by the Clinton Administration. In addition, the
events of 9/11 affected this area greatly, and the Bush Administration has followed this initial
effort with several policy and organisational changes of its own. Although the National Strategy

to Secure Cyberspace was issued after the terrorist attacks, the strategy was written and
coordinated before that date, and reflected the efforts of the Bush Administration's then-advisor
for infrastructure protection, Richard Clarke, who had also had the major hand in the Clinton
Administration's efforts in this area. In 2003, the Bush Administration also issued two further
strategies, namely the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures

and Key Assets, and the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, Critical Infrastructure
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection. All of these strategy and guidance documents
reflected the same basic philosophy of the earlier Presidential Decision Directive 63, namely that
the task of conducting Information Assurance and Critical Infrastructure Protection at the
national level was too difficult a task for unilateral government or business-sector solutions and
thus required a partnership between all parties: owners, users, and the national security
apparatus. The Defense Department had recognised the importance of this issue earlier, and
indeed the Department ofDefense was one of the principal instigators of a series of nationallevel studies that began in the early 1990s on these issues, and within the Joint Staff, which is
responsible for Department ofDefense wide communications, the J-6 directorate has been one of
the central players in this area. In early 2006, the J-6 created a new office, the J-6X, and
assigned it the responsibility of developing a National Military Strategy to Secure Cyberspace,
the name being chosen to obviously parallel the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, written
in the 2001-2002 timeframe. Although this effort was unable to meet its initial and overlyambitious timeline of 120 days from start to finish, by the end of2006, the new National
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Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations had been signed by the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
Likewise in 2001 under Executive Order 13 231, Critical Infrastructure Protection in the

Information Age, the Bush administration re-designated the Committee for National Security
Standards, as the primary group to provide a forum for the discussion of policy issues, sets
national policy, and promulgates direction, operational procedures, and guidance for the security
of national security systems through the Committee for National Security Standards Issuance
System as shown in the Committee for National Security Standards documents 4011-4016. Also
from a Critical Infrastructure Protection standpoint, there has been an equally prodigious output
of directives and memorandum from the Clinton and Bush Administrations over an eight year
period including as an example, three Executive Orders (13010, 13064 and 13231), a Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 7, and three Government Accountability Office Reports all issued
in close proximity (March, April, and May 2004), to support this area of Information Assurance.
What all of these disparate elements of the business and governmental interests did was to move
forward Critical Infrastructure Protection as a vital and useful component of 10. However,
because most of the infrastmcture portion of Critical Infrastructure Protection is predominantly
owned and operated as a function of the commercial sector, progress has been uneven, with some
segments, notably banking and finance, advancing more rapidly than others. This disparate
focus is especially noted in the three General Accountability Office reports that highlight
deficiencies in not only the efforts of the business sector but the federal government as well.

2.7.2.2

Computer Network Defense
In addition to Critical Infrastructure Protection, the development of additional policy with

regard to Computer Network Defense has been a major component as part of a broader
discussion by the Department of Defense on the alignment of IO into offensive and defensive
capabilities that match better to their functional organizations. For if International Public
Information (Clinton Administration) or Strategic Communication (Bush Administration) is
normally considered the "offensive" aspects of this warfare area, and then Information
Assurance with its related functions of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Computer Network
Defense are more in the defensive realm. In fact the foremnners of lA in the form of
Information Security and Computer Security have long and distinguished histories within the
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defense bureaucracy. A good example of this regards a portion of information assurance that
centres on computer security assessments plus the certification and accreditation process. The
original methodology for information assurance was known as the Department ofDefense
Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process (DITSCAP Department ofDefense Instruction 5200.40, which was in existence for 10 years and was
replaced in late 2007, by a new certification and accreditation policy entitled the Department of
Defense Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP). What this
new process does is to force the program managers to evaluate their system from a
confidentiality, integrity and availability standpoint on the value of the information protected.
To do this, the program managers must determine the confidentiality, robustness and mission
assurance category of their architecture by discussing and analysing the system with key
personnel, such as the user representatives, system administrators, information system security
managers and certification agent. This doctrine was a concerted attempt by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense to lay out a new methodology for ensuring the security of its networks and
applications, by standardizing the process through well-recognized lA controls. This is
important because this new policy tightens the protection of the government and Department of
Defense by enforcing standards across the enterprise.
There have also been other directives on computer network defense such as The National
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, which ties into critical infrastructure protection as part of a larger
effort to protect America. An implementing component of The National Strategy for Homeland
Security and complemented by a National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical
Infrastructures and Key Assets, all of these documents were developed to allow the American
public and commercial industries to secure the portions of cyberspace that they own, operate,
control, or with which they interact. Once again, these documents reiterate one of the key
lessons of this process, namely that 10 does not have to be a top-down effort, because power has
been shifted to the masses as part of the information age, but the protection of America must now
be disseminated as well. Citizens of the United States are very accustomed to having the
military or armed forces act as their protector against adversaries, but in the information age that
is not always possible or practical.
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2.8

Defensive 10 Policy that led to the Stand up of the Department of Homeland
Security
As noted above, securing the population is a difficult strategic challenge that requires

coordinated and focused effort from our entire society, the federal government, state and local
governments, the private sector, and the American people. That is what is different about this
current era and what must be accepted in order to truly understand the power inherent in
information. The final new policy and organizational initiative from a defensive IO perspective,
has actually been the creation and development of a Department of Homeland Security. During
the fall of2000 and the spring of2001, a 14-member bipartisan commission headed by former
Senators Gary Hart (D-CO) and Warren Rudman (R-NH) released a three part series on the new
threats to national security. Entitled the 'United States Commission on National
Security/Twenty-First Century', their initial report Road Map for National Security: Imperative

for Change, attempted to summarise, based upon the changing environment, the new threats to
the United States, especially with respect to information (United States Commission on National
Security I 21st Century, 15 February 2001). These reports proposed radical changes in the
structures and baseline processes of the governmental apparatus to ensure that America did not
lose its global influence or leadership role.
In an eerie coincidence (or perhaps not), the recommendations provided by this group
provided much of the foundation for the changes that occurred after the attacks of September
11th, 2001. While initially scoffed at by academia and the federal bureaucracy, the suggestions
of this commission on national security in fact foreshadowed much of the changes that have
occurred over the last five years. Equally as disturbing with regard to threats to national security
and the role of information was a series of comments made by then Central Intelligence Agency
Director George J. Tenant before the United States Senate select Committee on Intelligence on 7
February 2001. In this testimony, Tenant stated that "the threat from terrorism is real, it is
immediate, and it is evolving.... Terrorists are also becoming more operationally adept and
more technically sophisticated ... for example, as we have increased security around
government and military facilities, terrorists are seeking out "softer" targets that provide
opportunities for mass casualties."

2.8.1

United States 10 Policy Problems and Successes
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Even with all of these official documents and changes in the 10 policy and organisation
within the United States government, there have still been a number of issues that have proved
difficult to resolve with regard to 10. The problem, as aclrnowledged by many 10 authors and
theorists, as well as the participants in this study, is that the building of the actual respective
steps of the day-to-day tactical operations of 10 from the lofty aspirations of 10 theory down to
is very difficult. A number of participants alluded to need for centralised authority and the
requisite will power from the federal authorities that were needed to make these dreams come
true, yet there were also a significant number that advocated a bottom up approach which could
work just as well. To a person, most interviewees aclrnowledged that it may indeed be a long
time before the United States government organisational, personnel and doctrinal changes catch
up to the conceptual power of information, which was lauded nearly a decade ago as the term 10
first became popular. So in the broadest sense a disconnect still exists between 10 theory and
reality. This can be seen in the initial rush of excitement about information warfare and the
Revolution in Military Affairs in the 1995-1996 timeframe. While the development of this
relatively new concept continued unabated; and a number of exercises were conducted during
this period, yet there was still a gap in the performance of IQ as noted by the research
participants. The computer network attack operations conducted during the 1996 and 1997
exercises were particularly effective and drew attention to the fact that the Department of
Defense was vulnerable to this type of operation (Pilecki, 2000). But as the next two case
studies will demonstrate, there is still much work to be done. While. some areas of IO have
progressed well, there are other areas, which for a variety of reasons over the last decade have
not progressed as satisfactorily as one would have hoped.
For example, much has been written on the potential threat posed for the targeting of
computer networks and related infrastructures by individuals or groups for terrorist purposes.
However a substantial portion of this literature has been sensationalist, focusing narrowly on
technical computer security issues, and has failed to link the discussion of 'cyber-terrorism' with
the broader issues relating to either terrorism or policy responses to it (Devost, 2003). It is
precisely because of this interdependence between the changing nature of global terrorism, and
the increasing vulnerability of the critical infrastructures, that makes this topic and issue so
important. In this next section, the author will examine the development and role of critical
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infrastructure protection within the United States government as it relates to 10 and compare and
contrast its success to other areas, specifically perception management.

2.8.2

United States Critical Infrastructure Protection Policies prior to 9/11
During the Cold War, United States national security policy was focused on minimising

the possibility of strategic nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. There was a general
understanding of the nature of the threat posed by the Soviet Union, and most of the international
security efforts of the United States (and the West in general) were directed at countering it. But
with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and with it the relatively static bipolar world
order, the strategic certainty provided by this structured threat disappeared. The spectre of
global nuclear war was replaced by a wide range of diffuse unstructured threats and challenges.
The reality of this new security environment was brought home to the United States with the
bombing of the World Trade Center in February 1993. A little over two years later, the scene
was replayed when domestic terrorism struck at the nation's heartland on the morning of 19
April1995 at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.
These events raised awareness of the threat posed by terrorism to the United States, but
tangible policy outcomes took a little longer to emerge. The first key Clinton Administration
response to the evolving terrorist threat was to promulgate Presidential Decision Directive 39 US

Policy on Counter-Terrorism. This new doctrine articulated a four-point strategy that sought to
reduce· vulnerability to terrorist acts, to deter terrorism, to respond to terrorist acts when they
occur, and measures to deny terrorists access to weapons of mass destruction, while integrating
both domestic and international measures to combat terrorism. Presidential Decision Directive
39 was novel in that it specifically identified the vulnerability of critical infrastructures and
potential terrorist attacks as issues for concern. But in general, this new policy generally lacked
sufficient bureaucratic teeth to achieve meaningful outcomes. What the doctrine did accomplish
however was to raise the profile in the United States government, because previous critical
infrastructure protection policy had tended to be overshadowed by other elements of United
States national security policy (Cordesman & Cordesman, 2002: pp. 1-2).
Part of the reason for this rising awareness, was the increasing interconnectedness of the
information age, which has created a range of dependencies and vulnerabilities that were
historically unprecedented. Following the terrorist attacks on the Alfred Murrah Federal
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Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, the Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection was established by Executive Order 13010. While this group was a natural follow-on
to Presidential Decision Directive 39, in an informal sense, it also consolidated a range of
uncoordinated critical infrastructure protection policy development activities occurring across
government (Ratray, 2001, pp. 339-340). Likewise Executive Order 13010 also directed the
establishment of an interim Infrastructure Protection Task Force within the Department of
Justice, chaired by the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation (FBI) (Vatis, 1998). The purpose of this
task force at the FBI was to facilitate coordination of existing Critical Infrastructure Protection
efforts under the broad umbrella of the Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection. The Infrastructure Protection Task Force was chaired by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, so that it could draw upon the resources of the Computer Investigations and
Infrastructure Threat Assessment Center, which had been set up there in 1996 (Ibid.). So in
essence, the Infrastructure Protection Task Force represented the first clear effort to establish
coordinating arrangements across different government agencies and within the private sector for
Critical Infrastructure Protection.
In the final report by the Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection in
· 1997, this group produced a document entitled Critical Foundations, whose key finding noted
that while there was no immediate overwhelming.threat to the critical infrastructures, there was
in fact a need for action, particularly with respect to the protection of the national information
infrastructure. The report also recommended a national critical infrastructure protection plan,
with clarification of legal and regulatory issues that might arise out of such a plan and a greater
overall level of public-private cooperation for critical infrastructure protection (PCCIP, 1997).
To follow through on these findings, from late 1997 to early 1998, the Presidential Commission
on Critical Infrastructure Protection underwent an interagency review to determine the Clinton
Administration's overall response to this policy initiative (Moteff, 2003, p. 4). Even as that was
underway, concrete outcomes were already beginning to emerge by February 1998, as the
interim Infrastructure Protection Task Force was amalgamated with the Computer Investigations
and Infrastructure Threat Assessment Center, and made permanent within the Federal Bureau of
Investigation under a new title, that is, the National Infrastructure Protection Center (Vatis,
1998).
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The recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection were also given practical expression on 22 May 1998 with the release of two policy
documents: Presidential Decision Directive 62 Counter Terrorism and Presidential Decision
Directive 63 Critical Infrastructure Protection. These two documents were the culmination of
the ClintonAdministration's efforts at policy development for Counter Terrorism and Critical
Infrastructure Protection, and in a sense, Presidential Decision Directive 62 was a direct
successor to Presidential Decision Directive 39. However, this new directive by the Clinton
Administration provided a more defined structure for counter terrorism operations, and presented
a focused effort to weave the core competencies of several agencies into a comprehensive
program. Also in common with Presidential Decision Directive 39, Presidential Decision
Directive 62 sought to integrate the domestic and international elements of United States counter
terrorism policy into a coherent whole structure.
Presidential Decision Directive 63 was also the document that implemented the
recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection report, as
interpreted through the prism of that inter-agency review panel. Identifying twelve sectors of
Critical Infrastructure Protection that needed.additional support, this directive appointed
government lead agencies for each of these sectors, and established coordination mechanisms for
the implementation of these measures across the public and private sector. In particular,
Presidential Decision Directive 63 vested principle responsibility for aligning these activities in
the Office of the National Coordinator, which had been set up under Presidential Decision
Directive 62. Presidential Decision Directive 63 also established the high level National
Infrastructure Assurance Council, to advise the President on enhancing the public/private
partnership for Critical Infrastructure Protection.

In addition, this directive called for a National

Infrastructure Assurance Plan, which would mesh together individual sector plans into a national
framework. Finally this document also authorised increased resources for the National
Information Protection Center, and approved the establishment of sector Information Sharing and
Analysis Centers to act as partners to the National Information Protection Center.
There were also additional updates in the last year of the Clinton Administration, with
minor changes to Critical Infrastructure Protection policies. Version 1.0 of a National Plan for
Information Systems Protection was released in January 2000, as a direct result of the call in

Presidential Decision Directive 63 for a National Infrastructure Assurance Plan (Defending
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America's Cyberspace, 2000; Moteff, 2003, p. 19). It is interesting that given the priority
reflected to cyber security issues by the Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection, that the National Plan primarily addressed the national infrastructure protection rather
than Critical Infrastructure Protection as whole (Defending America's Cyberspace, 2000). This
is interesting because as noted in Presidential Decision Directive 63, Critical Infrastructure
Protection cannot be limited to just the federal infrastructure because in today's information
environment, one cannot separate the public from the private sector. Other changes also
occurred in the waning days of the Clinton Administration, when in June 2000, the Terrorism

Preparedness Act established the Office of Terrorism Preparedness within the Executive Office
of the President. It role was to coordinate Counter Terrorism training and response programs
across federal agencies and departments. Like the Office of the National Coordinator established
by Presidential Decision Directive 62, the Office of Terrorism Preparedness was not granted
budgetary authority, and often had to rely on persuasion rather than a formal chain of command
to achieve its objectives.
When the second Bush Administration came to power in early 2001, there was some
consolidation .of existing Critical Infrastructure Protection arrangements. The collection of
senior Critical Infrastructure Protection groups was consolidated.into one Counter-Terrorism and
National Preparedness Policy Coordination Committee reporting to the National Security
Council (Moteff, 2003, p. 8). And while some debate occurred on future directions for Counter
Terrorism and Critical Infrastructure Protection policy, these bore no fruit prior to the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11th, 2001 (Ibid.). So in practice, during the first nine months
of the second Bush Administration, the bulk of the Counter Terrorism and Critical Infrastructure
Protection arrangements in place in the United States were largely a legacy of the previous
Clinton Administration.
Thus to summarise, in the decade prior to the September 11th, 2001 attacks, with the
international aspect of the terrorist threat to the United States becoming more evident, significant
policy updates were being promulgated by the White House. These terrorist incidents which
demonstrated the international character of the terrorist threat included the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing, the June 1996 attack on the Khobar Towers complex in Saudi Arabia, the plans
to attack United States airliners in Southeast Asia in 1996, the attacks on United States embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania, and the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000. In response to all of
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these incidents, Presidential Decision Directive 39, Presidential Decision Directive 62 and
Presidential Decision Directive 63 were all incorporated as measures to combat terrorism abroad
and Critical Infrastructure Protection domestically. But while the international dimension of the
evolving terrorist threat was acknowledged directly in policy, they were in actuality largely
overshadowed by the domestic aspects of United States Counter Terrorism and Critical
Infrastructure Protection policies which were implemented during this period.

2.8.3

United States Critical Infrastructure Prote.ction Policies after 9/11
The terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 led to fundamental changes to the United

States government's approach to Critical Infrastructure Protection issues. On 8 October 2001,
Executive Order 13228 established the Office of Homeland Security, to be headed by the
Advisor to the President for Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, the former Governor ofNew
Jersey. The purpose of the Office of Homeland Security was to develop and coordinate a
national strategy to protect the United States against tenorist attack, in light of the new threat
posed by 'global terrorism. This directive also established a high level Homeland Security
Council, which was responsible for advising the President on all aspects of homeland security
(Executive Order 13228, 2001). The following day, appointments were made for the National
Director for Combating Terrorism, General Wayne Downing and the Special Advisor to the
President for Cyberspace Security, Richard Clarke via Executive Order 13231. What is
significant about these appointments is that Downing had previously been the Commander-inChief of the United States Special Operations Command, so his appointment reflected a greater
prominence for the international and overtly military dimension of United States Counter
Terrorism policy. In addition, this directive also created the President's Critical Infrastructure
Protection Board, whose duty was to recommend policies and strategies for the protection of
critical information systems. The same Executive Order also established the high level National
Infrastructure Advisory Council to provide advice to the President on these key issues (Moteff,
2003, p. 10).
These efforts were not the end of new policy development with regard to Critical
Infrastructure Protection in the aftermath of 9/11. In July 2002, the Office of Homeland Security
released the National Strategy for Homeland Security, whose purpose was to integrate all
government efforts for the protection of the nation against terrorist attacks of all kinds (Ibid, p.
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11 ). In effect, the strategy updated the measures enacted under Presidential Decision Directive
63 in light ofthe post September 11 1h, 2001 environment. This new strategy did not create any
additional organisations, but assumed that a Department of Homeland Security would be
established in the near future (Ibid.). This document was updated in September 2002, when the
President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board released for comment, the draft National

Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. In effect,.this document was the proposed successor to the
Clinton Administration National Plan for Information Systems Protection as illuminated in the

National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. But while the issue of the draft plan was welcomed,
concerns were expressed that it lacked the regulatory teeth to prompt action by the private sector,
which of course goes back to the some of the original faults embedded in Presidential Decision
Directive 63, namely that there must be a tight coordination between the public and private
sector.
The most obvious consequence of the revised United States approach to Critical
Infrastructure Protection in the aftermath of9/11, occurred in November 2002, with the creation
of the Department of Homeland Security (lbid, p. 11 ). This new agency consolidated the bulk of
United States federal government agencies dealing with homeland security, consisting of over
170,000 employees, into one department headed by a cabinet-level official (Ibid.). Representing
the most fundamental change to United States national security arrangements since their
inception in 1947, the Department of Homeland Security is comprised of five directorates:
•
•
111

•
111

Management, Science and Technology
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Border
Transportation Security
Emergency Response and Preparedness (Department of Homeland Security Organisation,
2003)

What is very interesting and significant, as was noted earlier in this section, is that the
Department of Homeland Security closely resembled some of the measures that had been
proposed by the US Commission on National Security/21st Century (Moteff, 2003, p. 8-9). But
as also mentioned earlier, it was only after the events of September 11th' 2001, that the political
imperative for significant organisational change for Critical Infrastructure Protection emerged.
Further action with regard to this IO warfare area was also continued within the Bush
Administration in 2003, with the release of three more policy documents as shown below:
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11
11
111

National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace
National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism

At the same time, the release of Executive Order 13286 abolished the President's Critical
Infrastructure Protection Board and the position of Special Adviser on Cyberspace Security
(Ibid, p. 10). The National Infrastructure Advisory Council was retained, but now reported to the
President via the Department of Homeland Security. Combined with the departure of key staff
associated with cyber-security issues, these measures raised concerns that cyber-security issues
were being marginalised in the new arrangements (Ibid, p. 23-24).
Taken together, what this section lays out is the evolution of Critical Infrastructure
Protection within the United States government. Conducted in fits and starts, it is often only
with the tremendous political pressure brought' on by the terrible acts of9/11, that many of the
changes recommended by these different blue ribbon committees and groups have been adopted.
However, there is still more to do, as most of the authors of these panels and staffs understand.
This is because so much of Critical Infrastructure Protection is tied to the partnership between
the public and private sector, and no matter what is promulgated on the federal side, until the
corporate executives are convinced of the return on investment from these initiatives, then the
true potential of these directives may never be realised. For that is a key point missing from
some of these publications and emphasised by the research interviews; namely, that Critical
Infrastruqture Protection cannot be mandated to the business world, but instead an education
campaign must be conducted, to show why these efforts are justified. To date, the author does
not believe, nor does the literature show, that this training has occurred.

2.8.4

PDD-68 International Public Information
It was also during this timeframe of Critical Infrastructure Protection development, that a

major effort by the United States government to improve its perception management capability
was also begun. Not listed in the original Joint Publication 3-13 policy, perception management
is generally considered to be comprised of a number of sub-elements including public affairs,
influence campaigns, public diplomacy, psychological operations, deception and covert action.
In reality, perception management is simply the ability to shape an image or conduct an influence
campaign. Defined by the Department of Defense as shown below, perception management is
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also seen as a key focus of change within the United States government.
"Actions to convey and/or deny selected information and indicators to
foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives and objective reasoning;
and to intelligence systems and leaders at all levels to influence official
estimates, ultimately resulting in foreign behavior and official actions favorable
to the originators objectives" (Joint Publication 1-02, 1998, p. 340).
In addition to the publication of the seminal doctrine of Joint Publication 3-13, the White House
and the Department of Defense have also realised that they needed better coordination with
regard to IO, since these influence campaigns are often conducted long before the traditional
beginning of active hostilities (Metzl, 2003). This interaction between federal agencies within
the executive branch also brought about a renewed emphasis on developing the correct IO
organisational structure. As alluded to earlier in this chapter, the State Department was engaged
in a major organisational shift, as the United States Information Agency component was brought
within the greater cabinet agency. The actual legislation that amended the structure of the State
Department is known as H.R. 1757 Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998.
Divided into three parts, it is in Division A, Title III-V where the abolition of the different State
Department functions are discussed in detail (U.S. Department of State, 1998). What is very
· interesting is that the actual language of the bill states that its purpose is to strengthen and
coordinate United States foreign policy, by giving the Secretary of State a leading role in the
formulation and articulation of foreign policy through the consolidation and reinvigoration of
foreign affairs functions (Ibid). To do this, the writers ofthis bill proposed the elimination of the
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, United States Information Agency and
the United States International Development Cooperation Agency. By definition, the State
Department's mission is to advance and protect the worldwide interests of the United States
(Armistead, 2002). The United States Information Agency on the other hand was designed to
understand, inform and influence foreign publics as a means of promoting US national interests
and dialogue between Americans and their institutions and counterparts abroad with its 7,000
employees (Ibid). The United States International Development Cooperation Agency and Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency were smaller agencies with very specialised missions, but
under this proposal, all of the functions, personnel and funding from these organizations as well,
would be transferred to the State Department to increase the power of the cabinet level agency.
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The Department of Defense and State Department were not alone in the organisational
changes with respect to the power of information and perception management. In late 1997 and
throughout 1998, the National Security Agency under the leadership of Richard Clarke, the
aforementioned Special Adviser on Cyberspace Security as well as the director of the Transnational Affairs working group, began to develop the framework for what eventually became 18
months later, the Presidential DecisionDirective 68 International Public Information policy
(Metzl, 2003). Originally not all executive level organizations agreed on the need for an
information policy and so not only did they need to be convinced of its importance but also about
the timeliness of this issue (Ibid). To do this, the National Security Council integrated this new
information concept into the larger reorganisation effort of the State Department. In addition,
Department ofDefense officials were also meeting in November of 1997 to build a sub-group to
support the larger construct of Presidential Decision Directive 56, Managing Complex

Contingencies (Dorflein, 2000). This earlier policy document had been signed as a tool to help
the interagency process cope with complex contingencies as mentioned earlier and its main
output was the development of an executive committee, one that would meet and help make
executive decisions during a crisis. The problem, as laid out by National Security Council
Director Richard Clarke in his 'Terms of Reference', was that if one waits until a crisis has
occurred to get together and form a committee, then one cannot use the power of information to
help shape the environment (Metzl, 2003). Instead, Clarke suggested at this 25 November 1997
meeting, that there was a need for the group to develop a process to build a construct that would
allow the United States to plan much earlier for an information campaign. Thus, the primary
task of this interagency group was to study the issue of how the United States government used
information over the next six months and conduct an assessment of United States and multilateral for planning, coordinating and conducting perception management activities within the
context of the Presidential Decision Directive 56 construct (ibid).
What is especially interesting when you compare the combining of public diplomacy and
public affairs under the mantle of International Public Information is that the decision made in
1997, is exactly the opposite conclusion that the Truman Administration came up with nearly 50
years earlier. In 1948, the State Department officials dealing with these same two issue areas,
thought it was too difficult to coordinate under one office and so they were split, and the United
States Information Agency was formed (Armistead, 2002). In fact, as mentioned earlier,
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Congress was so concerned about the possible propagandising of the American public that they
passed the Smith-Mundt Act, which legislated that the State ;Department could only conduct
public diplomacy abroad and only then to foreign nationals. Obviously technology has changed
much over the last five decades, and the ability to segregate or separate access to information is
much more difficult today. For example, how does one ensure that an Internet-based web-site is
only viewed by a foreign audience, especially given the fact that video and audio-streaming
technology, radio and television broadcasts can now be sent around the world? Are the changes
to information and perception management affecting the nature of public diplomacy? It is these
types of questions and many others that had to be answered by this interagency working group as
they struggled to find consensus on their new policy.
However, change does not come from just the development of policy alone. As most
bureaucrats understand, the real power of an organisational change and especially a large one
such as at the State Department, often only results from funding and personnel moves (Kovach,
2004). Thus it was not until August 2000, more than 16 months after the original signing of the
Presidential Decision Directive 68, that the first uniformed military officer was stationed at State
Department and it was only at that time that true progress. began to occur in moving forward on
·this initiative (Ward, 2001). For while former State Department officials lik~ Jamie Metzl, Peter
Kovach and Joe Johnson had all done an incredible job of keeping the flame and spirit of
International Public Information alive, their job was not to function as planners. Therefore what
was truly needed to make this program work, was an action officer and staff who could be
assigned to run a program. As one of the participants stated, the biggest problem with
International Public Information early on was that there were no operators (i.e., no one or no
group to operationalise the process), and until they were brought onboard, little overall progress
was made (Ibid).

2.9

United States Federal Organisational Changes
The changes or the lack of alluded to at the US State Department in the section above are

symptomatic of an overall trend within the federal government toward IO. To assume that over
the last decade, that there have only been major changes to IO in the form of public policy by the
federal bureaucracy, would be a mistake, for organisationally the landscape of IO has shifted
dramatically as well. One analogy often used to describe the changing role ofiO from an
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organisational perspective, has been 'suburbanisation' of this warfare area. Ten years ago, with
the huge emphasis on the revolution in military affairs, and the introduction of information
warfare, grand themes and terrible scenarios were described in great detail to the public and
Congress alike. These included the like of 'Electronic Pearl Harbor,' 'CyberWar,' and other
similar threats that provided a degree of 'hyped emphasis', which while helping to introduce the
vulnerabilities associated with 10, often distracted from the overall goal as well. This was
because these sensationalistic briefs tended to bring about an alarmist type of atmosphere, which
also had the unfortunate effect of desensitising personnel
to the real dangers
inherent in 10,
.
.
which often tended to be more mundane and technologically complex. For example, early
descriptions of cyber attacks often foretold of massive panic as hackers brought down the power
grids in the United States. However when this actually happened on the 14th of August 2003 in
the northeast portion of the United States due to a fault in a power plant, it was not panic that
ensued, but instead millions of people who were relieved that it was in fact only a technical hitch
and not a terrorist attack instead. What followed was not pandemonium, but instead with a
bemused attitude and perhaps predictable New York spirit, a long walk home in a hot and
powerless day, which more than anything was a perhaps refreshing demonstration of peoples'
resilience.
So in fact, the Electronic Pearl Harbor did occur as predicted, however not due to a cyber
attack, but instead more to a mechanical error. And it is this movement from the Wild West
attitude surrounding 10 to a more operational or 'suburbanised' effort that probably best reflects
the overall theme ofthis section in particular and this research as a whole. For no longer can
federal agencies develop 10 solutions alone or in a vacuum, and so what will become
increasingly apparent to the reader is that the changes to 10 policy and organisations in the
United States tend to become less profound but more detailed and with more depth and substance
as time passes. What has changed specifically is the awareness that when integrated planning is
conducted, its results can synchronise the efforts of many different commands, Services, and
agencies, so that the value-added benefits of an information campaign quickly become apparent.
In addition, because information efforts are often conducted long before the traditional beginning
of active hostilities, the need for the White House and the Department of Defense to coordinate
between themselves and other government agencies and departments has brought about a
renewed emphasis on the information organisational architecture.

77

2.9.1

The Effects of 9/11 on IO Organisations
The events of September 11th, 2001 were a tremendous wake-up call for the Bush

administration and how it conducted IO at the executive level. In the days immediately after
these attacks, the State Department was looking to the executive branch and the National
Security Council for guidance on building an organisation to support a strategic information
campaign. Unfortunately however, leadership was slow in forming, for in the period after the
terrorists' strikes, there was a significant amount of confusion within the government, and this
paralysis carried over to the conduct of IO as well. For these first five to six weeks at the
National Security Council, there was an absence of knowledgeable, experienced people to deal
with strategic influence campaigns, as well as the normal intra-organisational discontent and turf
battles (Jones, 2003). At that time, the Clinton-era National Security Council document,
Presidential Decision Directive 68 International Public Information had been effectively muted,
so there was no office dedicated at National Security Council to conduct a strategic perception
management effort. The Joint Staff ended up during major portions of this crucial period simply
contracting out their. perception management campaign to the Rendon Group, a civilian company
that specialises in strategic communications, under a contract with the Department ofDefense
(Jones, 2004). Gradually, as the campaign on terrorism continued throughout the fall of2001, a
number of influence plans and strategies were developed to create a working operational group,
yet the hoped-for National Security Presidential Directive still remained in a holding pattern
within the interagency process.
In November 2001, in accordance with National Security Presidential Directive 8, which
established the Office of Combating Terrotism and outlined General Wayne Downing's roles as
Deputy Assistant to the President and National Director and Deputy National Security Advisor
for Combating Terrotism, a new position of Senior Director for Strategic Communications and
Information was stood up and filled by a very expetienced Army psychological operations
officer, which helped to bting a level of competence to the staff (Jones, 2003). Likewise duting
the immediate aftermath of the terrotist attacks, Alistair Campbell, the Communications Director
for Btitish Prime Minister Tony Blair had suggested to Karen Hughes, Communications Director
for the Bush administration, to form a seties of Coalition Information Centers to concentrate on
getting the pro-Ametican message to the world media. Eventually three of these centres were set
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up, in Washington, D.C., London, and Islamabad, with the facility in Pakistan actually occupying
an old United States Information Agency building. All together, these groups perform
admirably, focusing on public affairs and public diplomacy, however some critics argued that
these organisations concentrated on U.S. domestic partisan politics instead of focusing on the set
of global audiences now accessible via a 24-7 news environment (Armistead, 2003). Other
critics have argued however, that these Coalition Information Centers generally worked well, by
informing domestic and foreign press within their time cycles during the early phases of ·
Operation Enduring Freedom, and they also eventually utilised a United States government
spokesman who could speak Arabic and thus appear live on the Al Jazeera television station. Of
course looking back, one cannot be sure that this really was a success story, because one must
ask the question of why it took so long for Ambassador Christopher Ross to appear on AI
Jazeera? This may have been because the White House was slow to see the need for United
States' presence on AI Jazeera until external pressure became so bad that it actually forced Colin
Powell and Condoleezza Rice to appear on this Arabic TV station using translators. In fact, AI
Jazeera constantly invited them for interviews early on, but these invitations were rebuffed and
AI Jazeera was actually blacklisted from early White House press conferences. Eventually the
response was changed, but the delays in addressing this crucial audience, and it should have been
recognized much earlier (Rendon, 2003). Foreign media always needs to be addressed in this
Global War on Terrorism and the fact that it took so long to make key United States. government
personnel available to these media sites was rather depressing and was perhaps an indication that
at the highest levels the United States Government did not understand the true nature of this new
battle-space.
Yet all was not totally bleak. Before she left the Bush administration in its first term,
Karen Hughes formed the Office of Global Communications, ostensibly to force the public
diplomacy community resident within the Department of State and in the field, to do a better job
of explaining overall United States policies (Armistead, 2003). Created out of frustration with
the perceived lack of effort at Foggy Bottom, this office coordinated with the interagency Global
Communication Strategy Council. An evolutionary process and a follow up to the Coalition
Information Center, this White House staff also coordinated with the National Security Center, in
a quid pro quo relationship. The departure ofHughes and later General Downing from the Bush
administration probably spelled the ultimate demise ofthe Office of Global Communications and
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further White House Strategic Communication efforts, in the early post-9/11 timeframe (Alter, 6
May 2002, p. 49). There are those however, who don't believe this was Office of Global
Communications mission at all, and instead its real task was to be the influence arm of the White
House and to get the President's message out as an element of his re-election campaign for 2004.
While this would be a normal and understandable objective of any White House-based
communications effort, suspicions remain that the then-director of White House
communications, Karen Hughes, quickly acted in early 2002 to put the new strategic
communications Policy. Coordinating Committee on hold because of fears that
. it would interfere.
with this mission (Jones, 2003). The fact that shortly after the election ofNovember 2004 this
Office of Global Communication quickly and quietly ceased operations could be a support for
this interpretation.
This emphasis on the domestic audience can also have negative effects in other ways too.
To begin with, there is a lack of understanding about what words or phrases mean to other
audiences, for example some may be instantly hostile to an Islamic audience, while others may
have an impact poorly understood by Westerners. 'Axis of Evil', 'Infinite Justice', and
'Crusade' are great examples of Bush administration's public diplomacy missteps. In addition,
the White House did not collaborate well with State Depaltment specialists who understand the
implications of such pl1rases and their misuse of these actions and words have seriously hurt the
Bush administration in its global war on terrorism. Some quip that a serious review of Samuel
Huntington's Clash of Civilization's is not out of the question. Likewise the use of commonly
used Islamic terms to label our adversaries may have a negative and unintended consequence.
For example, including suicide bombers and terrorists under the label 'jihadists' may have
actually be seen as legitimising them and their actions. Labels and terms are used in many cases
because they are easy and in the common lexicon, yet it often not understood how they appear
and what they mean in other cultural contexts. For in a 'war of ideas', words cannot only serve
as ammunition, but are often the main weapon (Armistead, 2007, p. 158).
The IO organisational changes at the interagency level got more convoluted
as the Global War on Terrorism continued (Foer, 2002). The J-3 Director of Operations on the
Joint Staff formed the Information Operations Task Force, led by the J-39, to be responsible for
IO, but that group was more technically oriented, so there was still a role for the Department of
State in the diplomatic arena (Pilecki, 2002). A Strategic Information Core Group was also
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formed within the interagency structure, but overall, the general consensus was that not much
was accomplished with this organisation because they were never empowered or recognised by
the major departments to possess the ability to get things done: In this atmosphere of Operation
Enduring Freedom and the ongoing war in Afghanistan, the Office of Strategic fufluence was
established by the Department ofDefense in November 2001, in an effort to coordinate its
strategic perception management campaign and because of a perceived leadership void, with the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict in the lead. The
Office of Strategic Influence organization was comprised mostly of personnel with psychological
operations and civil affairs backgrounds, with a mission to respond to and negate hostile
propaganda, using mostly human factors and a little technology (Timmes, 2002). It appeared to
be placed to work well, because it had financial resources, and it was also a Department of
Defense organisation, yet it quickly ran foul of two critical interagency IO organisations (Rotzer,
2002c ). This is because the Office of Strategic Influence group had been placed at Department
ofDefense, not at State Department's Bureau for International Information Programs, because
some believed that it's more operational tasks may have been more easily accomplished from
within the Department of Defense. By doing this, the Department of Defense gave the ultimate
rejection to the Presidential Decision Directive 68, which may have stemmed from the overall
belief that the strategic perception management campaign had been wrongly placed by the
Clinton administration, and that instead, an office should have gone to the Department of
Defense· or National Security Council instead.
At a meeting on 16 February 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld approved the
office, however the senior Department ofDefense Public Affairs official Victoria Clarke did not
concur, and her opposition manifested itself almost instantly. On 19 February, the first article
critical of the new organisation appeared in the New York Times, was released while both
Rumsfeld and Clarke were in Salt Lake City, Utah at the Winter Olympics. It was reported that
Rumsfeld was livid but could not do much due the political concerns created by the allegations
that the Office of Strategic Influence would lie to the media to conduct disinformation
campaigns. As satirically reported by Mark Rodriguez in the Washington Post electronic journal

Insight, the demise of this Department of Defense office was a political turf-battle with Clarke
leading her own disinformation campaign to retain control of all public affairs efforts, exactly the
charge she made to the press about Office of Strategic Influence, which was later investigated
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and proven unfounded (Ricks, 2002). Politically embarrassing to Secretary of Defense and the
President, it was very comical to watch the government officials deny the need for an office in
the United States to conduct strategic perception management campaigns. Every nation
participates in these activities, but almost all deny their existence. Even foreign news agencies
put a satirical touch on their reporting as they watched the American officials attempt to explain
away the obvious (Woodward and Balz, 2002; Rotzer, 2002a; Creveld, 2002).
All of these organizational shifts with regard to strategic communications allude to a
question that has arisen over the last 10 years, namely where should a strategic perception
management campaign office be located? Presidential Decision Directive 68 put the
International Public Information activities at the State Department in 1998 where it foundered for
two years due to lack of budgetary authority, manning, and empowerment. In addition, the
International Public Information group was also hampered by the interagency process. While the
draft National Security Presidential Directive on Strategic Communications has repeatedly
recommended the need to embed the strategic perception management capability in an office in
the National Security Council, the Defense Science Board for Managed Information
Dissemination in 2001 reiterated the desire to keep the authority at the State Department
· (Gregory, 2003). This argument for keeping the Policy Coordinating Committee at National
Security Council was centred on the desire to keep this organisation in a steady state. The
National Security Council is by definition, the single organisation within the United States
government responsible for turning interagency positions into recommendations to the President.
It looks at international affairs and foreign audiences in an operational manner, which was
greatly missing from the International Public Information way of doing business. So there is
strong logic behind this argument as well. The counter-prevailing suggestion for putting the
Policy Coordinating Committee in Department of State was led by David Abshire, who believed
that a Tom Ridge-like figure was needed to drive the program (Fulton, 2003). However, there is
also a concern that any strategic communications effort led by the Department of State will be
focused more at public diplomacy I public affairs rather than strategic influence issues.
All of this effort was eventually overcome by events. With the initial departure of Karen
Hughes from the White House in 2002, most of these activities lost their momentum. For it was,
after all, Karen Hughes who made the Coalition Information Centers happen during the early
stages of Operation Enduring Freedom. She understood how effective public diplomacy could
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be on the War on Terrorism. The Coalition Information Centers were so successful during the
fall of2001, mainly because ofthe President's influence, and also because there were effectively
no constraints. In effect, they didn't have to filter information· through a number of layers of
bureaucracy, because normally, Congress is very concerned with the Smith-Mundt Act, an early
Cold War-era piece oflegislation that prohibited the delivery to the domestic American populace
of any foreign-targeted information (Gregory, 2003).
As the events surrounding the Office of Strategic Influence debacle of early 2002
indicated, the widespread concern towards activities of the State and Defense Departments may
have not been the case when it comes to the White House. With the creation of the Office of
Global Communications and its assigned mission of explaining the United States policies, the
White House felt a great need during Operation Enduring Freedom to expand their frame of
reference, for example to influence those Islamic nations and populations that reject out of hand
any information coming from western sources. This theme was emphasised Hoffman (2002) of
Internews Network in his Foreign Affairs article, "Beyond Public Diplomacy," in asking the
quintessential question "How can a man in a cave- out-communicate the world's leading
communications society?" In doing so, he thus strikes a chord for more concerted strategic
communication efforts by the United States government. Therefore, the Department of State still
needs to enlist moderate Arabic nations to help in this project, but this desire runs into the
roadblock of how current American efforts in Israel/Palestine conflict are seen across the Islamic
world and exploited by Islamic radicals, sometimes via overt disinformation, as clear evidence of
a 'United States-Zionist alliance'. The conflict in southern Lebanon in summer 2006 merely
added fuel to this fire. Often the United States government does not necessarily see the
connection between the Palestinian conflict and events in Iraq, but the entire Arabic world
instantly does. So now the White House is even losing out on trying to get the moderates to push
our message. Plus the debacle concerning the Office of Strategic Influence in February 2002
also stalled any of the subsequent Bush administration's attempts to develop a strategic
communication effort, and essentially this controversy put the National Security Council
Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee on hold, until the creation in April
2006 of the new Public Diplomacy/Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee,
chaired by Karen Hughes as discussed previously (Armistead, 2007).
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Thus the mission and structure of the new Policy Coordinating Committee constitutes an
attempt by the Bush administration to develop a long-term capability to conduct public
diplomacy and strategic communication. While there is still no overarching United States
government strategy for Strategic Communication, despite the fact that the White House has had
a Counterterrorism Information Strategy since December 2001, there can be little doubt that the
proposed strategy circulated for coordination by Karen Hughes in late 2006 was an attempt to
answer this long-sought government-wide effort. The irony is that it was over a decade ago that
the United States Information Agency was dismantled, and its functions shifted under the greater
umbrella of the Department of State. In fact, as mentioned previously, Representative Henry
Hyde (R-NY) proposed numerous times the reconstitution of that agency, in his legislation to
bring back capabilities that had so recently been diminished, for much ofthis legislative proposal
mirrors efforts by the Defense Science Board for Managed Information Dissemination working
group. While the State Department did not agree with this concept, the new structure suggested
by the Karen Hughes-chaired Policy Coordinating Committee may go even beyond what existed
previously in terms of a strong centrally influence and communication program. Therefore, the
demise of the United States Information Agency may have contributed more to the failing of
· Presidential Decision Directive 68, and thus the need for a new structure and capability to
conduct global influence than any other action to date (Ward, 2001).
For in the end, it is not a new organisation that will drive a strategic communications
effort, but instead a shift in the mindset of the White House and the National Security Council.
The need to push senior officials to conduct briefings at 0700 Eastern Standard Time, to match
Middle Eastern news cycles, or to ensure United States Arabic speakers are available on AI
Jazeera, are becoming much more accepted and understood methods of doing business. These
ideas are now conventional wisdom as the value of strategic communications rise within the
Bush administration. To be effective, one cannot just think in news cycles (24/7 around the
world), but instead also in decades, for example, expanding exchange programs such as the
Fulbright Scholarship program, so that the United States government can be much more effective
in a strategic management campaign. This latter example could be an example of one of Karen
Hughes' "Four Es" of Public Diplomacy: engage, exchange, educate and empower. In effect,
there needs to be an issues agenda versus a value agenda. Input from this research indicated the
need to take a short- and long-term approach to these problems, but it must also be led from the
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top down, with full White House and National Security Council leadership to ensure full
interagency participation (Jones, 2004). The second Bush Administration has repeatedly tried 'to
talk the talk' of public diplomacy and strategic communications, and at all levels, from Vice
President Cheney through Secretary of State Rice to Under Secretary Hughes, quotes and sound
bites referring to the need to do these tasks better abound. But, what is really needed now is real
evidence of resources, organisations, people and operations that enable an effectivelong-term
strategic communications campaign. It is only then that a true strategic perception management
campaign will succeed, and the power of IO be realised by the. United States.

2.9.2

Case Study in Organisational Changes regarding Translating Power into
Outcomes - Kosovo (1999)
The next section demonstrates a good case study during this same time period on the

effects of perception management and the United States government, with the associated
successes and failures per the military operations in Kosovo. This was a massive air campaign
conducted by a coalition of United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation air forces
against the former Yugoslavia over its policies of genocide in the Serbian province ofKosovo.
The allied coalition flew over 34,000 combat sorties in a 78-day period of bombing, inflicting
massive destruction on Serbia's economic infrastructure in early 1999. Rather than bringing
stability to the region, as IO doctrine dictates, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's operation
actually-created greater regional instability and the potential for future conflicts.
The strategic bombing campaigns first described by the renowned Italian air power
theorist General Giulio Douhet and executed by the Allies against Germany in World War II are
supposed to be a thing of the past for the United States. Douhet envisioned a total warfare where
a nation's military, industry, and population were attacked to bring about a swift and total defeat.
IO doctrine, on the other hand, does not advocate attrition bombing attacks and wholesale
destruction against an adversary. Indeed, the advent of precision-guided munitions and effectsbased targeting has added a whole new dimension to using physical destruction as an information
weapon. The mere ability to destroy one of an adversary's high value targets while leaving the
surrounding area virtually unscathed sends a very potent psychological message. First, it
demonstrates the precision, lethality, and superiority of American weapons technology. More
importantly from an IO perspective, limiting collateral damage and physical destruction gives the
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adversary less ammunition for hostile propaganda directed against the United States. Second,
the United States military has now so conditioned the international media to low collateral
damage and precision engagement, that when the occasional accident occurs and a non-military
target is hit, the media will tend to amplify the effects of the accident. By its sheer excellence,
the United States' recent aerial campaigns have inadvertently set an inescapable standard for
minimising collateral damage. However, there is much more to IO than just a targeting or
destruction campaign.
Therefore, both the domestic and foreign publics expect United States to avoid inflicting
massive collateral damage and civilian casualties since it has the technological means to do so.
Failure to accomplish this strategy makes the United States a target of criticism by domestic and
foreign media and politicians alike. The very manner in which the United States uses physical
destruction may in fact provide an information tool for an adversary. When the United States
uses physical destruction to manipulate the behaviour of an adversary, it must defend itself
against the hostile propaganda of that adversary and strive to maintain absolute credibility.
Therefore, it is critical that the public affairs and psychological operations messages describing
the use of physical destruction be absolutely accurate. While sounding impressive, this lofty list
· of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation achievements later proved fairly inaccurate. In what may
have been an overzealous desire to demonstrate positive results from a two-month-old air
campaign that was beginning to draw considerable international criticism, North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation put its credibility on the line with statements like this the Serbian military knew to
be inaccurate. Given that the National Army force in Kosovo was the target of United States
international public information and psychological operations efforts, any loss of credibility with
the target audience ultimately only harmed these operations.
Therefore although the original premise from the allied leadership was that this would be
a short strategic bombing operation, in reality, the war quickly began to drag on, as the effects of
the strikes did not faze the Serbians. In fact, it was not until almost eight weeks into this
campaign that IO type strategies were developed to try to use new methods to bring pressure on
Milosevic himself. The bombing didn't bring about the desired results, and so other tactics were
needed against the dictator. Some of these specific attempts to conduct an information campaign
were aimed at discrediting his policies, while at the same time undermining Milosevic's
economic means to continue the conduct of the war (Arkin, 2001). To do this, high-level
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diplomats from the allied coalition conducted near simultaneous press briefings emphasising the
fact the Serbia as a nation was condoning Milosevic's genocide actions. In the meantime,
bombing missions were conducted against specific factories and industries that were funding the
upper leadership. Detailed and tailored messages were also sent to these same Serbian
government officials, trying to influence them to shift away their allegiance from Milosevic.
Together all of these actions taken together, along with the military, diplomatic and economic
pressure are what many people believe helped to bring an end to this conflict. One may not
know for sure, because much of the details are still classified, but reports are starting to leak out
slowly, that it was the infmmation campaign rather than the bombing campaign that was
ultimately successful as a perception management tool that ultimately outed Milosevic from
Serbia (lbid).
To summarise, Kosovo will probably rank as the Second Information War. Through the
use of advanced information dissemination including faxes, e-mail and web pages, as well as
perception management campaigns, this conflict was fought for the hearts and minds of a
worldwide audience. Where the ultimate changes were actually made, was the detailed, tailored
targeting of the key.individuals that could affect the decision-makers. That is what was different
about this operation and the use of information. In was key that in this conflict information was
recognised as the primary weapon that was used to bring about a decisive end to a conflict.

2.10'

Summary
What all of these reports emphasise is the need for a much greater capability with regard

to perception management and strategic communications within the United States government.
The mere fact that these publications continued to be released means that the progress envisioned
by these various advocates of IO has simply not materialised. In examining these studies and
recommendations of the official United States government IO efforts with respect to the global
war on terrorism, it is interesting to compare these reports to a series of articles compiled by the
Washington Quarterly, and edited by Alexander Lennon entitled, The Battle for Hearts and
Minds: Using Soft Power to Undermine Terrorist Networks. Published in 2003, these articles

attempt to show how useful information can be to the United States for campaigns such as
Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. While it will be interesting to see if
any of the recommendations of either the semi -official or commercial publication make it into
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the next version of Joint Publication 3-13 or other official 10 policy, it is fascinating that a
number of these articles in Lennon's book advocate the potential of perception management for
future operations, and that its proper conduct will be key to success in the future. It was also
noted by Lennon that in the greater umbrella ofiO, it is the area of perception management
which is the most rife with confusion and misinterpretation, because there is such a fine line
between psychological operations, public affairs, influence campaigns, public diplomacy,
intemational public information, strategic communications and propaganda (Lennon, 2003).
From a different perspective with regard to perception management in the United States
govemment, Nancy Snow in her two books, Propaganda, !ne and Information War actually
argues that the United States govemment has too much power with respect to information, and
uses that power to control society by limiting dissenting opinions and free speech, especially in
the Bush Administration after the events of9/11 (Snow, 1998; Snow, 2003). This opinion is not
widely shared by the participants of this research, but that being said, all views are valid and
should be taken into consideration as part of the methodology of this thesis. In addition, as noted
in later sections, while the author attempted to select a diverse group of interviewees for his
. research, in some cases, that is not always possible, because a high-level of knowledge about 10.
·was a key factor. So it is very interesting to get totally different opinions on the use of 10 within
the United States govemment from authors such as Nancy Snow.

To summarise this section, of

the two areas ofiO policy of the United States govemment that were selected to analyse in
detail as part of this research, namely computer network operations and perception management,
it has been the former that has been more successful in its implementation over the last decade.
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Chapter 3 - Philosophical Frameworks and Research
Methodologies
3.1

Introduction
This chapter discusses the methodology utilised in this research, as well as the rationale

for this selection. Methodology is normally considered the study of methods and is often
regarded as a 'structured approach' with which a researcher 'thinks' about a problem. It is a set
of guidelines which helps to stimulate the intellectual process of analysis, while focusing the
process on reality (Wilson, 1984, p. 6). Methodology can also be considered the study of
principles of method used, or a higher-order term for methods (Jackson, 2000, p. 11). Likewise
methodology can also help to solve a paradigm, which is an entire constellation of beliefs, or a
'basic' set ofbeliefs that guide action (Kuhn, 1970, p. 146; Guba, 1992). Some academics have
also stated that "methodologies are simply meaningless congeries of mindless choices and
procedures unless they are rooted in the paradigms" (Guba & Lincoln, 1988, p. 114). By this
definition, a paradigm must therefore imply a choice of methodology, which can be defined as
'the fundamental or regulative practice' which guides the research process (Seale, 1998, p. 8).
Therefore, by implication from these definitions listed above, methodologies and paradigms are
normally linked together. As will be seen in these next few chapters, methodologies do not have
to imply an individual method, although some do tend to favour certain processes, however, it is
not ordained that one follows another.
From these concepts, methodology is also related to theory, although often in a
subordinate role (Jackson, 2000, p. 16). Theory is sometimes described as an internally
consistent set of empirical propositions that help us to explain and predict, as well as describing
relationships between variables, which in turn have attributes or values. Attributes are thus
characteristics or qualities that describe an object, while variables are logical groupings of
attributes. Together these two concepts and their respective relationship lie at the heart of theory
(Babbie, 2001, pp. 29-32). In addition to the study of methods and theory, methodology is also
about processes, and how a particular problem can be solved. There are different ways to do
this, and some of the choices are outlined in this chapter. For example, the researcher may
choose to use inductive reasoning (particular to general), vice deductive (general to specific)
because the researcher's observations lead in that direction. Perhaps the data itself may describe
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the approach taken apd lead the methodology in a qualitative or quantitative direction, thereby
determining for the researcher the actual process utilised (Ibid, p. 37). Of course, the overall
goal of any research is to ensure that no matter what methodology is chosen, the approach itself
is one that can adequately ensure a systematic process is utilised - one that provides a theoretical
construct tied to reality with sufficient academic rigor.

3.2

A Frameworkfor Design- Elements of Inquiry
So in essence, methodology is also a framework in which the research can be explained

and unaerstood. The study must be able to relate to the broader and common body of knowledge
(that is, the paradigm) and the goal for methodology is the use of a disciplined approach to
research independent of the personal biases of the researcher. For all quality research efforts
must use some sort of framework for design, or 'ideas' in which knowledge about the situation
being researched is expressed. These relevant elements can be seen in Figure 3.1:
Framework of Ideas
~

Methodology
I
I

I

+~

I

Yields
Learning

Embodied in

Applied to

•oo~----++

Area of Concern

Figure 3.1 -Elements Relevant to any piece of research
(Checkland and Howells, 1998, p.13)
In general these methodologies can be divided into three different approaches-

qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods. Each of these structures in turn has three elements
consisting of philosophical assumptions (knowledge claims), general processes (strategies of
inquiries) and detailed procedures (methods), that can all be used to help frame the problem
.(Creswell, 2003, p. 3). Sometimes referred to as elements of inquiry, this structure or
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framework is the most basic unit of analysis, which makes it an essential part of any research
project. Therefore in this thesis, a standardised process, as described above, is utilised as part of
this project, with a section described below for each of the different elements of inquiry. For
example, Chapter Two consisted of an extensive literature review which constitutes a series of
knowledge claims or philosophical assumptions of the state of IO in the United States
government. In this chapter, the different prospective strategies of inquiry are examined and
analysed to determine the best methodology that should be utilised. Finally, in Chapters Four
and Five, the actual method used in this thesis is delineated as a set of detailed procedures which
includes data collection, as well as how the research analysis was conducted.
As mentioned previously, there are three main choices or approaches of methodologies
which include quantitative, qualitative or mixed methods. In this chapter, all of these will be
reviewed and analysed to determine the one most suited for this particular thesis. For in any
research project, the elements of inquiry are needed help to 'frame' or 'structure' the process.
The use of a planned approach also helps the researcher to determine the philosophical stance of
project, to develop a strategy or plan of action that links methods to outcomes, and finally to
. decide on the actual series of techniques and procedures to use (Ibid, p. 4). It is this process of
conceptualising these elements of inquiry, which helps to determine what kind of 'approach' will
be used in a particular research effort. These sociological paradigms are documented by Burrell
and Morgan in their classification framework, as shown in Figure 3 .2. This grid allows an
academic to relate different methodologies, from a societal and system viewpoint to build a
framework in which to conduct their research.
The Sociology of Radical Change

Radical
Humanism

Radical
Structuralism

Interpretative

Functionalist

The Sociology of Regulation

Figure 3.2 - Analysis of Social Theory
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979)
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However, it is not just the theoretical lens that are the most important factor in deciding on a
particular methodology, there are also other features that play a crucial role as well. While
academic studies tend to gravitate to certain types of research into categories that have proven
over time to best frame a particular set of data or theoretical constructs, it is not always a strict
rule or formal law. Likewise, the hard line that formally existed between qualitative and
quantitative studies has changed, with the rise of the mixed methods as a research methodology
in its own right. These changes have led more to more of a consensus on the need for a
continuum of practices, which range the gamut of the available approaches (Ibid, p. 4). The use
of a dynamic approach to the selection of the research process will be seen in this thesis as well.
This is because the selection of a methodology ultimately determines the whole nature of data
collection and philosophical assumptions that the researcher makes about their thesis, and so the
choices that are eventually made are crucial to the overall success of the project.

3.3

Knowledge Claims
Often considered a set of assumptions, knowledge claims are based on the orientation of

the researcher. This can be affected by a number of factors, including epistemology, ontology, .
positivism, post-positivism, idiographic, and nomothetic issues, as well as inductive or deductive
reasoning. Taken together, these concerns build a framework for the methodology based upon
the data and the pre-conceived 'views' of the researcher. For example, the term epistemology is
of Greek origin and means knowledge. Often concerned with the philosophy of how one learns,
epistemology is also related to methodology, since the latter involves the method of
understanding knowledge. Another term that is important concerns ontology, or the branch of
metaphysics concerning with nature and relations of being. As opposed to epistemology which
is concerned with knowledge issues, ontological arguments are more related to being or
existence. Therefore, the stating of a knowledge claim simply means that the researcher starts a
project with certain assumptions about how they will learn and what they expect to learn during a
particular inquiry (Creswell, 2003, p. 6). This is in essence, the development by the researcher
of a theory that describes their reality or the 'what is' state, which relates to the overall original
need for a methodology. Theory does not determine 'what should be', nor can it settle debates
about values (Babbie, 2001, p. 25). Instead theory can be a search for reality which often
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depends on a viewpoint taken- in a broadest sense, the 'framework' which ultimately provides a
philosophical background for the research. These philosophical views can be divided into two
main areas - modem (positivism) or post-modem (post-positivism), and the decision on which
one to use will strongly influence the sense of reality that a researcher may possess (Ibid, p. 21 ).
The post-positivism approach has been expanded recently to include a number of additional sets
of alternate post-positivism knowledge claims, which will be examined later in this chapter to
include constructivism, advocacy or participatory and pragmatism viewpoints (Creswell, 2003, p.
6).

In addition, these views or 'orientation' can also be expressed as dialectics or
explanations of research conducted. For example, the question of whether this research is
concerned with a single or unique event (idiographic) or is it more interested in explaining a
class of situations (nomothetic) also needs to be determined. Some theorists believe that
Aristotle may have been the original source for the distinction between nomothetic and
idiographic sciences (Nagel, 1961, p.547). Both words have their origin in ancient Greek, with
nomos equating to laws and idios meaning private or personal. Although not labelled as such,
Aristotle did describe the difference between seeking to establish abstract general laws for
indefinitely repeatable events or processes as compared to understanding the. unique and nonrecurrent. These terms themselves while first noted by Levin in 1835 and Windelband in 1915,
were not widely used until the advent ofBrunswickian research (Brunswick, 1956). However,
since that time, their concepts have become generally accepted in academic research, and play a
major role in helping the researcher understand the definition of their studies. For example, in
general a nomothetic approach is most often associated with the use of quantitative methods such
as statistical averaging. In this manner, large groups of people can be investigated in order to
find general rules of behaviour that apply to everyone. Likewise the idiographic approach is
normally best suited for qualitative methods such as case studies or individual interviews, where
a personal, in-depth understanding of a subject can be achieved. These methods are often very
flexible and conducted over a long-term with good examples being Freud in 1909 and Piaget in
1953 (Jackson, 2000). In the case of this particular research, an idiographic approach was
followed, due to the long-term active interview phase that allowed understanding and
comprehension of the complexity of the interviewee's thoughts.
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In developing the research methodology, the type of reasoning or logic used is also
crucial. The two major systems as mentioned previously include deductive and inductive, which
together form a system oflogic. The former is a level of thinking that moves from the general to
the specific while the latter works in the opposite manner. Deductive reasoning often follows the
steps of first developing a theory and hypothesis, then using observation and experimentation to
confirm or deny the original theory. It is more restrictive in nature and is focused on proving a
hypothesis. Inductive reasoning on the other hand, normally begins with specific observations in
which patterns or similarities are noted and from that structure a tentative hypothesis is proposed,
which in turn often evolves into a set of theories. In the case of this particular research, a
combination ofboth types of reasoning was ultimately utilised. This can be seen early in the
research, where theories and hypothesis were proposed based on knowledge claims and literature
reviews by the author. However from the observations and actual interviews, it quickly became
apparent that in fact, the early conclusions did not support the original hypothesis. This is
because 'other' patterns had emerged from the data, and from these similarities, an updated
hypothesis was finally developed that resulted in the theoretical construct for this research. Thus,
it was a combination ofboth deductive and .inductive reasoning that was finally utilised in this
research.
Of course whether an inductive or deductive theoretical construct is used with a
positivistic or post-positivistic viewpoint, and idiographic or nomothetic reasoning, it is
sometimes a combination of these approaches working together as a framework or paradigm, that
serve as a fundamental model or frames of reference for a researcher to organise their
observations (Babbie, 2001, p. 42). It is the latter which tend more than any other areas, to truly
define the selection of a methodology, so in essence more emphasis should be placed on the
reason for its selection. In the next few pages, descriptions of the dissimilarity between the
'viewpoints' available for the choice of research methodology will also be described. This is
because the differences between positivistic and post-positivistic often lead to a very different
ontological and epistemological perspective. The positivistic outlook tends to have more of a
realist perspective and utilises singular reality ontology, with a very objective and dualist
epistemological viewpoint. This methodology also tends to be more experimental, with a
manipulation of the data to verify a hypothesis. Therefore, this approach contrasts with the postpositivistic standpoint which possesses a critical realistic ontological perspective and a modified
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objectivistic epistemology. That methodology is often modified to be experimental as well,
which still tends to manipulate data to verify a hypothesis, yet there is also an element of
discovery. Thus in summary, for knowledge claims, the philosophy used by a researcher often
depends on the 'view' or paradigm utilised. Therefore, all research is based on assumptions
about how the world is perceived and can best be understood as part of an epistemology, or
knowledge claim. In the next section, the two main philosophical schools of thought- positivism
and post-positivism, of which there are several variants, will be discussed to show how the
particular methodological approach for this research project was developed.

3.3.1

Positivism
This particular study of society is normally attributed to Auguste Comte (1822), from his

observations which formed much of the foundation of what is now considered the philosophy of
Positivism (Babbie, 2001, p. 44). Scientific rationale was the basis ofhis research, with
optimism as a main characteristic (hence the term positivism). This knowledge claim's central
thesis is that all of society can be observed and explained in a logical and rational manner to
determine the absolute truth, which was also a key attribute. What this approach often translates
·to is a rejection of meta-physics and a focus on empiricism, in the fact that science should only
concentrate on that which one can measure or observe. Deductive reasoning, with the
development of testable theories and a heavy focus on scientific experiments were all central to
the positivistic view of the world. The backbone of much of modern-day social research,
positivism was considered the primary philosophic knowledge claim for over 150 years and was
not seriously challenged until the advent of post-positivism of the 1980s. It was only with the
inability of many researchers to fully explain human nature in a positivistic manner which
eventually drove the development of a whole range of alternate knowledge claims such as postpositivism and others.

3.3.2

Post-Positivism
The first of these different viewpoints to emerge is entitled post-positivism and this

knowledge claim position challenges the traditional notion of 'absolute' truth of knowledge
(Phillips and Burbules, 2000, p. 29). In fact, this philosophy is a wholesale rejection of the
central tenants of positivism, namely the idea that any individual can see the world perfectly as it
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really is. Post-positivism recognises that one cannot be 'positive' unless one proves
scientifically a particular outcome, and it is also considered deterministic in that causes are the
factors that probably determine effects or outcomes. In additfon to being reductionist, postpositivism also relies on the need to test small and discrete sets of ideas. Relying heavily on
empirical observation and measurements, the normal outcome to this scientific approach is to
support or refute a theory (Creswell, 2003, p. 7). In the post-positivism world, the following
assumptions are always key:
•
•
•
•
•

"Knowledge is conjectural and absolute truth can never be found
Research is a process of making claims and then refining/abandoning them
Data, evidence and rational considerations shape knowledge
Research seeks to develop relevant true statements
Being objective is an essential aspect of competent inquiry"
(Phillips and Burbules, 2000, p. 29)

The ultimate conclusion in a post-positivistic view, is that an individual begins with a theory,
collects data to support or refute that theory and then makes revisions and conducts more tests
(Creswell, 2003, p. 7).

3.3.3

Constructivism
Constructivism - also called Interpretivism or Social Constructivism, is an alternate

knowledge claim that seeks to understand the world, through a number of different views. The
basic premise is that the individual must actively 'build' knowledge and skills while information
exists within these built constructs, rather than in the external environment (Bruner, 1990;
Ullman, 1980; Gibson, 1979). However, most advocates of constructivism agree that it is the
individual's processing of stimuli from the environment and the resulting cognitive structures
that produce adaptive behaviour, rather than the stimuli itself (Harnard, 1982). Meanings are
normally considered complex and varied, with the belief that the knowable world is that of the
meaning attributed by individuals, and reductionism is not a normal practice. This latter
assumption comes from the fact that when most people are faced with complex, real-world
problems set in social systems, problems occur with the use of reductionism and the natural
scientific method (Checkland, 1981). Therefore, the goal ofConstructivism is to rely on the
views of the participants themselves, so in essence the research questions become very broad and
general in type. This practice allows the interviewees to 'construct' the meaning of a situation,
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through 'social' interactions that maximises the participant's ability to interpret the interactions

c

themselves (Creswell, 2003, p. 8). Interpretative researchers understand their role in the process,
namely that "any research on human or social systems will inevitably change them and make a
virtue ofthis fact" (Jackson, 2000, p. 15). In addition, the use ofconstructivism and active
interviews often presents "rich, descriptive narratives at a micro level, to provide detailed
descriptions, which allow readers to make sufficient contextual judgments to transfer outcomes,
themes and emerging understanding from the case studies to alternative settings" (Pickard, 2002,
p. 2). Consisting of a number of assumptions, such as shown below, constructivism as a theory
is often considered part of the interpretivism school and a qualitative methodology as shown
below:
•

•

•

"Meanings are constructed by human beings as they engage with the world they are
interpreting. Qualitative researchers tend to use open-ended questions so that participants
can express their views.
Humans engage with their world and make sense of it based on their historical and social
perspective -everyone is born into a world of meaning bestowed by our culture. Thus,
qualitative researchers seek to understand the context or setting of the participants
through visiting this context and gathering information personally. They also make an
interpretation of what they find; an interpretation shaped by the researcher's own
·
·
experiences and backgrounds.
The basic generation of meaning is always social, arising in and out of interaction with a
human community. The process of qualitative research is largely inductive, with the
inquirer generating meaning from the data collected in the field."
(Crotty, 1998,p.43)

A key point for the academic utilising this alternate knowledge claim, is that they must recognise
that their own view 'shapes' their perspective. Therefore, they must be particularly cognisant of
their own actions during the active research phase, particularly during the interviews and data
collection portion. It is the development of 'rich pictures' of the individual realities, which gives
constructivism it's most useable factors in the rich narratives and detail, but this of course, is also
its greatest limitations. The validity of these 'rich pictures' and how their applicability can be
transferred to create credible research with rigor-, is a crucial point for any academic proposing
the use of constructivism as a methodological approach. Attempts have been made to develop a
framework in which these 'rich pictures' could be 'fitted' from one context to another
(Erlandson, 1993; Lincoln, 1992; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). From these findings, what in
essence normally happens is that researchers must 'position' themselves, or actively
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acknowledge their role, prior to understanding their interpretation of the research. Therefore
unlike post.,positivism, the start is not a theory to prove or disprove, but instead the use of
Constructivism tends to lead to the development of a theory from the data of the research
(Creswell, 2003, p. 9). In comparing and contrasting constructivism to positivism or postpositivism, a more relativist ontology is normally seen, namely one that possesses multiple
realities and is more holistic in nature. Likewise the epistemology in a Constructivism
methodology is often subjective or interactive with the researcher as part of the subject, with
more interpretation and interaction between the researcher and subject, which will tend to lend
an outcome which is dependent on context and time, with a working hypothesis that will
ultimately lead to a better understanding of the problem (Pickard and Dixon, 2004, p. 2).

3.3.4

Advocacy/Participatory
This knowledge claim takes social constructivism even further to ensure that

marginalised or disadvantaged people are still included in the process. To do this, a political
agenda of reform is included as part of the research, and in fact the ability to actually change the
lives of participants can be a factor as well. Social issues are critical to this area, and typically
form the basis or focal point of the research. Because this is a participatory strategy,
collaboration between the researcher and interviewees often is very high. The participants tend
to play a very active role in the research, and the results are often seen as their 'voice' for reform
and change (Creswell, 2003, p. 10). Key features that are often seen in an advocacy or
participatory knowledge claim include:
•
•
•
•

3.3.5

"Participatory action is recursive or dialectical and is focused on bringing about change
in practices
These studies often begin with an important issue about the problems in society
The aim is to create a political debate so that change will occur
This knowledge claim engages the participants as active collaborators."
(Kemmis and Wilkinson, 1998, p.21-22)
Pragmatism
The final alternative knowledge claim examined is the pragmatism, which focuses on

actions, situations and conditions rather than antecedent issues as in post-positivism (Creswell,
2003, p. 11 ). The focus is on solutions to problems, not on the method or process and so any
approach can be utilised. Therefore, the consequences of actions, lead researchers to a problem-
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centred, real-world orientation in the pragmatic knowledge claim. Often used by mixed methods
researchers, the pluralistic strategy has the following key characteristics:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

3.3.6

"Pragmatism is not committed to any one system of philosophy or reality
Individual researchers have a freedom of choice in their methods, techniques and
procedures
Pragmatists do not see the world as an absolute unity
Truth is what works at the time - investigators can use both quantitative and qualitative
data
Researchers look to the 'what' and the 'how' to research based on their intended
consequences
Agree that research always occurs in social, historical, political and other contexts
Pragmatists believe that we should stop asking questions about reality and the laws of
nature."
(Cherryholmes, 1992, p. 14)

Knowledge Claim Methodology Selected for tb.is Thesis
Knowledge claims are basically philosophical assumptions which are recognised as part

of the basis to begin any research project. Using one of these aforementioned knowledge claims,
a paradigm or viewpoint can be determined by each academic toward their subject. In this
. particular research, the use idiographic logic, to study a series of unique events, coordinated with
a combination of deductive and inductive reasoning and the use of a constructivist approach, was
deemed the best process to address the particular problem. In the next section, the different
strategies of inquiry will be examined to determine the best methodological approach for this
particular thesis.

3.4

Strategies of Inquiry
The determination of a methodology that best 'fits' a particular problem, often involves

the analysis of the theoretical perspective stance. In order to derive a philosophical assumptions
or knowledge claim for this project from a large number of interviews conducted over a long
time period, a part of both the background and research phases of the research were used to
determine the philosophical assumptions of a selected panel of experts or interviewees. This
kind of field research in the form of active interviews is often considered well suited to the study
of social processes over time. Ultimately the results of this type of open-ended questioning are
delineated later in the form of a general set of requirements and research questions that emerged
from information gathered (Babbie, 2001, p. 276). Thus, developing an overall theory is a
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complex activity and time consuming activity, far more than just a mere set of findings, and in
the end, research is therefore supposed to offer an explanation about phenomena (Strauss and
Corbin, 1998, p. 22). In this case, it was the structure of the problem that drove the author
toward a particular approach. By its very nature, IO can be characterised as an 'immature'
concept due to lack of or inaccurate theory and research, which closely in some instances
resembles the current state of this issue area within the United States government.
From the aforementioned sections on alternate knowledge claims, the researcher can
of a particular research
normally ascertain
the theoretical perspective or philosophical stance,
.
.
.
project, by studying the information gathered during the process. In addition, the data developed
from the participants can normally lead to a particular plan of action or strategy, that is, a method
or process. Therefore, the decision on the use of a particular methodology often results from the
information and participants' availability, as well as the nature of the problem itself, in addition
to the customer's needs, which can drive the researcher toward a particular approach. For like
the knowledge claims, strategies of inquiries can be divided into three general areas, with a
number of subsets delineated as well:
•

•

•

Quantitative
• Experimental Designs
• Surveys
Qualitative
• Narratives
• Phenomenology
• Ethnographies
• Grounded Theory
• Case Studies
Mixed Methods
• Sequential
• Concurrent
• Transformative

In later sections, each of these three main approaches will be examined, with a number of
specific methods identified. The intent is to not reinterpret these various approaches but instead
to compare and contrast them, so that an appropriate methodology can be selected for this
particular research. Likewise an overview of the qualities of each of these main approaches or
methodologies is reviewed below, with an attempt to differentiate the main features of each.

100

3.4.1

Quantitative
In a quantitative approach, the hypothesis and research questions are often based on

theories that the researcher seeks to test. A theory is considered ··a set of interrelated constructs
(variables), definitions and propositions that presents a systematic view of phenomena by
specifying relations among variables, with the purpose of explaining natural phenomena
(Kerlinger, 1979, p. 64). Theory is therefore often used in a deductive manner and placed toward
the beginning of the plan for a study. In doing so, theory in effect becomes a framework for the
entire study: an organising model for the research questions or hypotheses and for the data
collection procedure (Creswell, 2003, p. 125). In fact, these types of studies tend to operate
more within the deductive model methodology of fixed and set research objectives, including an
extensive set of definitions early in the research proposal. So in a quantitative approach, an
entire section of the research proposal is thus devoted toward explaining the theory for a
particular study, as opposed to letting the theory emerge from the data (Ibid, p. 119, 144). Based
on this type of process, this methodology is normally considered more 'measurable' than other
strategies of inquiry because of the widespread use of metrics and definable features. This is not
always the case and the continuum of data between quantitative and qualitative methods is
becoming ever more ill-defined as more integration occurs in the fields of research. However, it
is probably safe to say that the use of a hypotheses and research questions based on the testing of
theories tends to lead toward a 'sense' that this methodology is more quantifiable or measurable.
Typically, a quantitative method consists of experimental designs and eo-relational
studies or surveys, in which metrics can be obtained, but they can also include elaborate
structural equation models (Ibid, p. 13). A survey design provides a quantitative or numeric
description of trends, attitudes or opinions of a population by studying a sample of that
population. In general, the components of the survey include a design or purpose, the population
and sample, the instrumentation, any variables and the data analysis (Ibid, p. 154). General
quantitative procedures can also be seen as pre-determined, utilising instrument based questions
that collect discrete data to conduct statistical analysis (Ibid, p. 17). In an experiment,
investigators may also identify a sample and generalise to a population, with a basic intent to test
the impact of a treatment on an outcome, controlling for all other factors that might influence an
outcome. In addition, an experimental method normally follows a standard form to include
participants or subjects, variables (independent or dependent), instrumentation and materials,
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procedures and measures (Ibid, p. 172). The intent of a quantitative approach is thus to reduce
the unknown factors to a minimum to make the test as 'scientific' as possible. This
reductionistic analysis is a key feature of the quantitative methodology. Thus to summarise, the
typical features of a quantitative methodology is the overall emphasis on the post-positivist
perspective, with its associated deterministic and reductionistic attitude combined with empirical
observation and measurement portions generally leading to the verification of a postulated
theory.

3.4.2

Qualitative
In this approach, the typical strategies include ethnographies, grounded theory, case

studies, in addition to phenomenological as well as narrative research (Ibid, p. 15). Inquirers
typically state questions as opposed to objectives or hypotheses, and these research questions
often assume two forms - a central question and associated sub-questions (Ibid, p. 105). In turn,
these questions also generally become more like 'working guidelines' rather than 'truths' to be
proven later (Thomas, 1993, p. 35). So in reality, often a qualitative approach is considered
more of an exploratory type of research, where a topic, variables and theory base are unknown at
the beginning of the project (Creswell, 2003, p. 75). Janice Morse states that the characteristics
of a qualitative research problem are often centred around the fact that: (a) the concept is
'immature' due to a conspicuous lack of theory and previous research; (b) a notion that the
available theory may be inaccurate, inappropriate, incorrect, or biased; (c) a need exists to
explore and describe the phenomena and to develop theory; or (d) the nature of the phenomenon
may not be suited to quantitative measures (Morse, 1991, p. 120).
Therefore qualitative researchers often use a 'lens' or perspective to guide their study. It
is an inductive or evolving methodological design, in which inquirers define fewer terms in the
proposal, and the theory or hypothesis is allowed to evolve over time (Creswell, 2003, p. 144).
Characteristics of qualitative research often include the following items:
•
•
•
•
•

Review the needs of potential audiences for the proposal.
If there is some question about their knowledge, present the basic characteristics to use as
an example.
Takes place in a natural setting.
Uses multiple methods that are interactive and humanistic.
The methods of data collection are growing and increasingly involve active participation
by the interviewees and sensitivity to the participants in the study.
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•
•
•
•
•
•

Qualitative research is emergent rather than tightly prefigured.
Qualitative research is fundamentally interpretative.
The researcher views social phenomena holistically.
Systematically reflects on who the researchers are in the inquiry and is sensitive to their
lmowledge claims.
Uses complex reasoning that is multi-faceted, iterative and simultaneous.
The researcher adopts and uses one or more strategies as a guide for procedure.
(Ibid, p. 144, 183)

Qualitative research is therefore normally considered more interpretative than a quantitative
approach, with the inquirer typically involved in a sustained and intensive experience with
participants, in which theories are not formulated at the beginning of the study, but instead are
allowed to emerge as part of the research process (Ibid, p. 184). Based on the qualities defined
above, and the need to deal with 'messy' issues, in this thesis, it is this type of strategies of
inquiry, namely a qualitative approach, which is followed.

3.4.3

Mixed Methods
There are significant differences between quantitative and qualitative research as

indicated earlier. In fact two different research cultures have arisen from these paradigms with
"one professing the superiority of deep rich observational data" and the other the virtues of
"hard, general ... data" (Sieber, 1973, p. 1335). These purists on each side have suggested an
'incompatible thesis' that these two paradigms cannot and should not be mixed. In today's
world, academic research is becoming increasingly interdisciplinary, with a more complex and
dynamic nature, and therefore methodologies that tend to complement one another are gaining in
attractiveness. If a continuum with qualitative research anchored at one pole, and a quantitative
research can be visualised as anchored at the other, the mixed methods research covers the larger
set of points in the middle (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 15). Based on the fact that all
methods have limitations, the mixing of these different strategies has been suggested as a way to
neutralise or cancel the inherent biases of the two dominant methodologies. This is because
mixed methods studies have both a qualitative and quantitative foci, and they will bring in both
questions and hypotheses in the development of a purpose statement (Creswell, 2003, p. 114).
Likewise the use of a mixed method combination approach to research allows the academic in
the definition phase of research, to include a separate section for theory development if the study
begins with quantitative data collection. If the study begins with qualitative data collection, then
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the theoretical terms will probably emerge during the research and will be defined later in the
findings or results section of the final research study (Ibid, p. 144). Either way, this approach
allows flexibility to the investigative methods, by not limiting the researcher to one prescribed
methodology over another.
The three typical procedures often ascribed to this type of mixed method methodology
include sequential, concurrent and transformative. The first of these seeks to elaborate on or to
expand the findings of one method with another method. This is opposed to the second type of
mixed method methodology (concurrent) in which the researcher brings together both
quantitative and qualitative data to provide a comprehensive analysis. Finally in the latter
procedure (transformative), the researcher uses a theoretical lens as an overarching perspective
within a design that contains both quantitative and qualitative data (Ibid, p. 16). Together these
strategies give a wider array of options to the researcher, which they can then use to build their
approach, design process of research, to ultimately develop a set of actual procedures or methods
to conduct their academic studies.

3.5

Methods
The third stage to the theoretical construct or :framework for design is the determination

of the actual research methods that will to be utilised for the study. While this topic will be
discussed in much greater detail in Chapters Four and Five, suffice it to say that the actual
method used tends to be driven by a combination of the researcher and data available for the
project. In general, any of the three methodologies documented to date (quantitative, qualitative
and mixed method) could be used on any academic study, for it is a combination of the
knowledge claims and strategies employed as part of the research, as well as the data received,
that will ultimately lead the researcher to employ a particular approach. For example, if
experiments and surveys are primarily being used as part of their data collection, a quantitative
approach may work best. This is because these approaches often attempt to determine the cause
and effect of a hypothesis, while reducing the number of variables, all the while trying to prove
or disprove a theory. This type of method could fit best with a post-positivist type of knowledge
claim, as opposed to a constructive or participatory one. In another example, the researcher
maintains multiple meanings from the information gathered in their interviews, using open-ended
emerging data, to develop themes, which emerge in the form of narratives or case studies. This
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methodology is typical of a qualitative approach, and while normally considered as interpretative
(constructive), it can also have an advocacy perspective, that has a social or historical
background. The final method discussed is the mixed approach; which tends to be the most
pragmatic of the three. Employing procedures borrowed from both quantitative and qualitative
methods, it is considered a consequence-orientated, problem-centred and pluralistic approach
(Ibid, p. 16). Thus the actual method utilised, whether a survey, interviews or case studies, is
often determined by the knowledge claims and strategies of inquiries that best fit a particular
researcher's needs and data.
If the knowledge claims are the theoretical perspective of a research project, and the
strategies of inquiries are the approach, then the final element is the design process or the method
of data collection and analysis (Ibid, p. 5). These latter tasks are the actual techniques and
procedures utilised in a project, and the decision on which to use, often just as the data itself,
drive the research toward a particular methodology or approach. For example, the difference
between closed or open-ended questions, can lead to a pre-determined or emerging approach.
Likewise the data itself, whether it is text, image or numeric, often lays constraints on the
researcher that could ultimately determine the theoretical outcome of a particular study. So the
· method with which data are collected and analysed also plays a very important role in the
determination of the methodology used by a researcher. Obviously, there must be a match
between the original problem and methodology and certain types of social research often call for
specific approaches as described below (Ibid, p. 21 ).

3.6

Summary- The Reasons for Selection of a Qualitative (Interpretative)

Methodology
In this chapter, the options for the selection of a certain particular methodology for a
research approach have been laid out in detail, and in this particular project, the design
framework that was eventually chosen is a qualitative (interpretative) approach. This departure
from using an established theory (post-positivism or post-modernism), advocating an action
agenda (participatory) or focusing on results (pragmatic), all tends to lead to the examination of
the constructive knowledge claim position (Creswell, 2003, p. 6). In this particular framework,
multiple and varied subjective meanings and experiences are crucial as the researcher attempted
to understand the complexity of the subject (10) vice utilise a m~re reductionist attitude. For as
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noted by Jackson (2000, p.2) attempts to apply reductionism and the natural scientific method
generally, to social and organizational problems, have not been a happy one and have yielded
only limited success. Likewise Ashby wrote in a similar vein when he stated that the way not to
proceed in approaching an exceedingly complex system is by reductionist analysis (Ashby,
1956). Constructivism is therefore an attempt to help the researcher make sense of, or interpret,
the meanings that other's have about the world, where theories are generated or developed to
. follow a pattern of meaning (Creswell, 2003, p. 9). To reiterate, the following are key
assumptions normally associated with social constructivism or interpretivism:
•
•
•

"Meanings are constructed by human beings as they engage with the world they are
interpreting
Humans engage with the world and make sense of it based on their historical and social
perspective
The basic generation of meaning is always social, arising in and out interaction with the
human community"
(Crotty, 1998, p.43).

It is from the reasons stated above, namely the use of a philosophical approach in a
constructivism know ledge claim, with a strategy of inquiry that allowed the use of a

a

collaborative and change.oriented focus by the participants, to collect open-ended emerging
data from the interviews. All of which ultimately determined the best and primary methodology
for use in this particular research (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 18). That is because this research
was not begun with any pre-conceived theories in mind, but rather an open-minded approach to
an area of study, which allowed a qualitative approach to ultimately emerge from the data.
Therefore, based on these parameters and the data available, the decision was made to use
an interpretative (qualitative) methodology in this research. Conducted under the general
heading of constructivism research, this methodology allowed the study and comprehension of
the subtle nuances in attitudes and behaviours of the participants with regard to the conduct of IO
in the United States government as a whole. In addition, these procedures using interviews and
in-depth questions also allowed for a greater depth of understanding under a qualitative
approach. This is due to the inherent flexibility of open-ended and multi-threaded questions,
which allowed the ability to modify and change the framework design at any time. From that
perspective, a methodology grounded in the constructivism knowledge claim, which is part of
the interpretivist school, appeared to offer the best approach in which to gain insight,
understanding and hopefully a meaningful guide to future action. Thus, the use of general
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procedures or methodology in the form of a qualitative approach, utilising emerging methods,
with open-ended questions, and a variety of data (interview, observation and documental), which
allowed themes and theories to develop and emerge, was deemed to be more effective than other
methodologies. Finally, the detailed procedures actually used ensured the inclusion of multiple
and varied opinions necessary for dealing with the 'messy' issues involved with IO in the United
States government. Taken together, it was this selection then of a constructivism approach, as
part of the qualitative field as the overall methodology for this research based on the criteria that
were available.
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Chapter 4 - Methodological Approaches
This research focuses on gaps in the performance by the United States government during
IO campaigns and activities with regard perception management and computer network
operations. These aspects were chosen, as an attempt to narrow the research focus to relevant
issues in this large and diverse topic area. Arquilla and Ronfeldt recognised the divergent nature
IO in their book Noopolitik, where they discussed the dichotomy that existed between the
different elements. The key to research success as related by these authors "was to develop the
connection between the two poles, which define opposite ends of a spectrum of security
concerns ... " and to ensure that "the technological and ideational aspects should be linked by
strategic analysis" (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1999, p.ix).
Thus a primary goal of this chapter is to investigate a number of philosophies of the
qualitative (constructive/interpretative) framework that are appropriate to this investigation. This
section illustrates the basic paradigms or traditions that exist and ultimately to justify the actual
methodological approach taken in this research. The philosophical background or strategy of
inqtiiry that was thought best suited to this problem was then selected to match the respective
issue area. For a research methodology is not only a process, but it is also a way of thinking
about and studying social reality (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 3). It is not a 'guaranteed
solution', but instead more of a 'structured approach' or a "set of guidelines which stimulate the
intellectual process" (Wilson, 2001, p. 6). This is opposed to a method or coding which can be
thought of as the specific tasks or steps in a research project. This approach to research was
outlined earlier with a format of knowledge claims (Chapter 2), strategies of inquiry (Chapter 3)
and detailed procedures (Chapter 4). Therefore in this chapter, the analysis of different
methodologies is conducted and the actual method utilised will be laid out in great detail.

4.1

A Review of Qualitative (Constructive) Approaches
In the examination of quantitative and mixed methods options, it was the use of

qualitative procedures involving open-ended questions and interview data, which became the
more appropriate approach to this 'complex' issue of IO, after this academic area was thoroughly
reviewed. IO is considered a 'messy' problem, and so it is difficult to quantify or analyse in a
reductionist format. Specifically as described in Chapter 3, the constructivist position was
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selected because it promoted a better understanding of this particular problem set. Likewise the
use of multiple participant interviews with different 'weltanschauung' (roughly translated this
means 'worldview') and the generation of theory from data was seen as a better 'fit' to the
conduct of 10 research. This is opposed to a more post-positivism approach with its reductionist
and deterministic nature, or an advocacy approach that is ch:::mge or issue oriented, or a
pragmatic approach which tends to focus too much on problem solving and reality. None of
these other types of qualitative approaches 'fit' this particular research problem as well as, the
constructive framework which was outlined in the preceding chapter. In addition, because
constructivism is part of the interpretative (qualitative) school, it falls into the category that some
analysts believe might provide data richer in meaning, than similar quantitative types especially
when dealing with perception management type issues and human emotions (Strauss and Corbin,
1998; Stem, 1980).

4.1.1

Analysing Research Traditions
Qualitative research is often represented by an interpretative or natural approach,

grounded in philosophical assumptions, with multiple sources of information and a narrative text
utilised by the researcher (Creswell, 1998, p. 15). The types or 'varieties' of research traditions
were examined previously with a qualitative (constructive or interpretative) approach selected
from the available options (Tesch, 1990). Some of the qualitative strategies that could have been
used include Ethnographies, Case Studies, Phenomenological, Biography or a Narrative
Research such as Grounded Theory. These traditions are derived from a wide variety of
disciplines including the humanities, social sciences, psychology, philosophy, sociology and
anthropology (Creswell, 1998, p. 5).

These approaches can also be grouped together as action

research, which is an iterative process that combines theory and practice through change and
reflection with a mutually acceptable framework (Avison et al, 1999, p. 94). Likewise
qualitative strategies can also be analysed in a number of ways. For example, in this research,
the traditions were examined by foci or manner in which data is collected, their central purpose
or foci and method of collecting data, as well as the theoretical perspective, including their
relationship to social science theory (Creswell, 1998, p. 37, 112). Finally, the organisational
structure itself must be examined, if it involves people in multiple hierarchical layers, which tend
to be 'messy' or 'fuzzy', because of different and conflicting objectives, perceptions and
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attitudes (Avison et al, 1999, p. 95). In the following paragraphs, each ofthese approaches to
differentiating research methodologies will be evaluated and investigated to determine their
suitability for this research.
The analysis of these different qualitative approaches is crucial to the successful selection
of a research tradition, as shown in Figure 4.1. For example, a biography or biographical study
can be defined as the "studied use and collection oflife documents that describe turning-point
moments in an individual's life" (Denzin, 1989, p. 69). This is opposed to phenomenological
approach which is derived from the concept of 'lived experiences', 'phenomenon' or
'consciousness of human experiences' (Polkinghorne, 1989). First developed by Husserl, in the
late 19th century, the phenomenological approach emphasised a philosophy on 'meaning', rather
than causal explanation of human behaviour (Jackson, 2000, p. 46). For if phenomenology
emphasises the meaning of an experience for a number of individuals, then the process of
studying their reaction to that phenomenon, is called grounded theory. This tradition attempts to
develop hypotheses to the way humans react to these phenomena, which in turn generate the01ies
based on these primary interviews. This is an empirical approach to the study of social life
through qualitative research and analysis that codes the data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). By
relying on fieldwork to generate interview and ethnographic data from which to analyse human
actions, the conventional grounded theory has focused on generating the 'basic social processes'
(Clarke, 2003, p. 557). This is different to a biographical project that often involves a single
individual as opposed to a phenomenological or grounded theory investigation, which typically
utilises multiple interviewees. Likewise Ethnography, which describes and interprets a cultural
or social group as a whole, is based on their learned patterns of behaviour and customs (Harris,
1968). An even more rigidly bound system is the Case Study, which can have multiple
constraints, all of which affect the data (Creswell, 1998, p. 112). In addition, the prolonged time
period involved in an ethnographical investigation differentiates it from a case study, which is
bounded by time and place as part of a system (Stake, 1995; Merriam, 1988). Finally, to further
differentiate these different traditions, grounded theory and case study based projects require the
researcher to locate the 'right' people from a larger sample as opposed to an ethnographical
project which studies the group or culture as a whole. In the case of this particular research, the
interviewees were a diverse group, located around the world, and were not necessarily confined
by their positional, authoritative or regulatory occupation. These factors tended to point to a
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grounded theory or a modification of a grounded theory as the best approach with regards to the
collection of data or foci.
A Case Study
A Portrait

A Case
Individual

Cultural
Group
An Ethnography

A Biography

A Concept or
Phenomenon
A Phenomenology

8I

A Grounded Theory

Figure 4.1 - Differentiating Traditions by Foci
Likewise, qualitative approaches can also be approached from a theoretical perspective.
Related to the discussions of knowledge claims and strategies of inquiry in Chapters Two and
Three, these are philosophical assumptions or paradigms that tend to guide the researcher toward
a particular methodology. These include the ontological, epistemological, axiological, rhetorical
and methodological approaches, each of which will be described below. For as stated in chapter
3, a methodology is a description of how to think about the process of analysis prior to doing it,
that is "thinking about how to think. .. which for many an unnatural process is" (Wilson, 2001, p.
8). Knowledge claims can then simply mean that the researcher starts a project with certain
assumptions about how they will learn and what they expect to learn during a particular inquiry
(Creswell, 2003, p. 6). The reality of the researcher depends on their viewpoint taken, or the
'framework', methodological approach or paradigm, any of which can ultimately provide a
philosophical background for the research. One of these frameworks that can be used to serve as
a viewpoint is the ontological approach, where the researcher often asks questions, such as What is the nature of reality? (Moustakas, 1994). This is more of a post-positivistic approach as
opposed to epistemology, in which the researcher attempts to minimise the 'objective
separateness' between themselves and the research. For instance, in an epistemological
framework, the researcher often becomes in effect an 'insider' (Guba and Lincoln, 1988, p. 94);
It is these methods, that utilise epistemologically and ontologically based approaches in the

pragmatic mode, which have the ability to use grounded theory as a perspective so that in fact
that the researcher can be an 'acknowledged participant' from their knowledge claim background
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(Clarke, 2003, p. 555); On the other hand, Axiological approaches expose the biases inherent in
research, to question the role of values and will often include the researcher's own interpretation
as part of the final analysis. This type ofweltanschauung (worldview) is followed even more
dramatically in a rhetorical philosophical type of assumption, which is a more generalised study
that focuses on the use of metaphors, with much of the writing done in the first person and
including personal stories from the interViewees in the research narrative (Lincoln and Guba,
1985; Stake, 1995). This is opposed to the methodological approach, which is a
conceptualisation of the research as a process. fu this tradition, the researcher works from detail
to general,_using inductive logic to allow a methodology to emerge from the data. This type of
paradigm or framework was mentioned earlier in Chapter Two, with the acknowledgement that
in this particular research, a combination of both types of reasoning (inductive and deductive)
was ultimately utilised.
The researcher can also decide on the type of qualitative methodology based on how their
research fits into general social science theory. In this traditional process, a research project
attempts to frame the study or develop a theoretical lens to explain, predict and generalise about
how the world operates (Creswell, 1998, p. 84; Flinders and Mills, 1993). This classic process
has a continuum of study that advances from an early research phase of gathering data and
asking questions (before) to the data collation and ultimately examination and analysis phase
(after). As shown in Figure 4.2, the five traditional approaches of a qualitative methodology
mentioned earlier in this chapter all fit on this continuum in a variety of different areas, based on
the method with which they are conducted. For example, in an ethnographical or
phenomenological approach, researchers tend to begin their studies with strong views or
frameworks on how they will conduct their research. All of these methodologies centre on some
type of theoretical construct wherein the individual 'voice' and the interpretative nature of the
research. This as opposed to biographies and the case studies that tend to vary considerably in
their use of theoretical constructs, hence a position more toward the middle of the
methodological construct. At the other extreme is grounded theory, where a tremendous amount
of data is collected and analysed before a construct begins to emerge, with more recent work
shifting toward more constructive assumptions and epistemologies (Charmaz, 1995; 2000). With
deep roots in symbolic sociology and pragmatic philosophy, the grounded theory method can
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also be viewed as a total theory and methodology package with an interpretative, constructionist
epistemology (Clarke, 2003, p. 559).
BEFORE

AFTER

Ethnography
Phenomenology
Biography
Case Study
Grounded Theor y

Figure 4.2 - Extent of Theory Use in Qualitative Approaches
4.1.2

Narrowing the Selection Criteria
The path in this thesis to a qualitative approach and a specific research method was not a

straight-forward one. The subject topic and research material tended to favour an interpretative
methodology, one that could effectively model the effects ofiO in the United States government.
This need to 'consh·uct' theory and develop themes and hypotheses as the research was
conducted, tended to lead toward qualitative h·aditions such as intemational relations,
organisational, decision-making and systems methods. Because the researcher had an extensive
background in international relations theories, it was only natural that the fi rst analysis of the
problems associated with IO began here. The inability of this particular type of theoretical
consh·uct to answer the demands of information revolution, however eventually meant that all
types of international relations theories were ultimately abandoned in the course of this research.
Likewise, research was also conducted in organisational or decision-making theory on the same
premise, namely that this methodology could help to understand or model the use ofiO in the
United States govemment. Unfortunately, this was not to be the case and this type of
methodology was abandoned as well. Finally systems approaches were also examined as a
means to finding an appropriate process to utilise for the study of IO. In the next several
sections, each of these researcq processes is laid out in detail to document the decisions made
toward finding the best interpretative approach to conduct this research.
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4.2

International Relations Theories
Obviously from these discussions, developing a possible methodology in which to frame

and conduct this research on IO was very difficult. All three major approaches including
quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods were examined, to determine the appropriate
theoretical construct that would best apply to the role of this research area in the United States
government. In general, theories are considered as internally consistent sets of empirical
prepositions that allow situation to be explained and predicted, or in other words, theory allows
the researcher to describe, explain, predict and prescribe. The traditional international relations
theories such as Realism, Neo-Realism, Liberal Internationalism, Complex Interdependence
Theory, Social Constructivism or Collective Security have together not been able to adequately
model the complex changes that are occurring in the Information Age. At first glance, this
would not seem the case and in fact, IO would seem a natural area for the advancement of the
use of these types of common international relations political theories. There are elements of all
of the major categories (liberal, realism and alternate) in IO, and it could be thought that one of
these constructs would certainly 'fit' and encompass their attributes. However, after careful
analysis, it appeared that this is not the case. Each of these 'new' concepts, which are the core of
the information revolution, are compared in this chapter to the basic philosophical ideas of these
classic international relations constructs and in the end, these theories were considered
inadequate as will explained in greater detail in this chapter.
One of the reasons for this is that a number of these traditions revolve around the use of
the nation-state or regimes, which typically incorporate a tacit or explicit set of norms and/or
rules around which actors expectations converge. Of course, this is the opposite of anarchy, in
which no government or policing occurs at or above the nation-state level, so there are no
developed sets of laws or sense of community. The problem with these concepts and the
growing power inherent in the information revolution is that the authority that is normally
focused at a centralised and hierarchical manner for the 'traditional' international relations types
of scenarios is being upended by the rapidly growing influence inherent in the new information
age. Thus, from the research process, and the results obtained from the interviewees, it is the
democratisation of power and the 'flattening' of communications and networks as well as
organisations, that makes this issue area so difficult to place in a classical international relations
theoretical context.'
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liberalism
Liberal Internationalism
Neo-Liberalism
Utilitarism
International Regimes
Complex Interdependence
International Political Economy

Alternate Theories
Marxism
Critial Theory
Feminist Theory
Green Theory
JJI
Functionalism
Post-Modernism
Neo-Functionalism Constructivism

Reall$m
Neo-Realism
Decision-Making

Table 4.1 - Categories of International Relations Theories
Typically divided into three broad categories - Liberalism, Realism and Alternate
Theories, Figure 4.3 shows. those different categories that comprise international relations
theories as well as a number of sub-theories branched off from the dominant themes. While this
table is not a list of all of the possible international relations theories available, this chart and the
subsequent discussion, will cover some of the major options and gives the reasons why these
constmcts were not considered the best methodologies to use in this study.

4.2.1

Liberalism
To begin this analysis of traditional constructs, the first 'recognised' international

relations theory in the form of liberalism will be examined. Arising from the Treaty of
W estphalia in 1648 and the development of the interstate system, Liberalism also can be
attributed to philosophers and scholars of this period, when mankind shifted to a period of
enlightenment and scientific discovery in the Middle Ages (Zacher and Mathew, 1995, p. 111).
For with the rise of nation-states came sovereignty and a centralised power in a federated
structure. Therefore, the advent of the modern systemic structure, aligned with the rise of
Liberalism and what many academics consider the 'original' international relations theory that
developed from classic foreign policy development and diplomatic interactions (Owen, 1998, p.
145). In addition, as the nation-states evolved in Europe, a balance of power also developed as
the different leaders and monarchies attempt to expand their influence. Early 'mles' were set as
these kings attempted to limit their 'wars' to a restricted nature, designed more to readdress
differences within the constraints of the system, rather than incorporate drastic changes.
Likewise, colonies were founded as technology developed the need for new markets, and
commerce expanded beyond the continent.
While Liberalism is often considered the original international relations theoretical
construct, in fact all three of the major streams of international relations- realism, liberalism and
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alternate theories can in fact be traced to key philosophers of this period, namely Hobbes, Kant
and Grotius respectively (Doyle, 1986, p. 1164). These philosophies developed concepts which
are still studied and considered essential to the focus of international relations today. In fact, all
of these high-level doctrines and diplomatic theories were attempts to link together the nascent
and evolving nation-states in Europe, to reduce the then constant state of warfare in that region
(Zacher and Mathew, 1995, p. 113). Key concepts li}ce the balance of power were emerging that
allowed the nations and their leaders to eventually develop a full spectrum of choices that range
from transitory alliances to permanent alliances and regimes. The rise ofnation-states in
Western Europe was not a smooth or predictable transition, as evidenced by the French
Revolution, with the evolution of nation states drastically changing the political landscape as
well (Ibid, 112). No longer were kingdoms ruled on the whims of the monarchy and instead the
leadership of these nations began to appraise the power of the masses. Wars were no longer
fought for limited gains and instead the beginnings of total war were felt (Owen, 1998, p. 143).·
The ability of a nation to mobilise its people, and the industrial base to prepare for conflict were
rapidly becoming dominant factors in the international arena. However, order was still preserved
in Europe after the Napoleonic Wars as the Concert of Europe is founded in 1820.
Masterminded by Metternich of Austria, as well as his diplomatic colleagues from the Great
Powers, this system of alliances and collective security was to last almost a century until World
War I. France was once again brought back into the fold of nations, while Liberalism survived
as the pre-eminent international relations theory based on the balance of power principles
(Doyle, 1986, p. 1157).
Nevertheless, there were challenges to this predominant theoretical construct because of
the particular environment of diplomatic activity and military operations of this era. The
'international' character of these ideas is obviously evident, but what is probably more
interesting is the fact that much of this diplomatic activity tended to be very insular and
conducted in a closed environment. One of the major factors of the balance ofpower construct
often included the 'linking' together of nations in alliances or ententes to mitigate the possibility
of armed conflict (Zacher and Mathew, 1995, p. 114). Therefore, international relations during
this period was in fact much more of a 'closed' relationship of the principals and the general
willingness to never take any action 'too far.' Likewise another factor was the consensus that
leaders of these nascent nation states would ultimately work for the 'good of mankind' (Kegley,
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1995, p. 4). This attitude pervaded much of what is considered classic liberalism, liberal
internationalism and liberal utopianism. As will be examined in follow-on sections, some
academics have found the general liberalism construct wanting when there is an examination of
actions from a 'selfish' or realist viewpoint thus, the emergence of Realist and Neo-Realism
theories, as will be shown in the section 4.2.2 ..

4.2.2

Realism
Realism arose from significant international events such as the revolts in the Germanic

States in 1848 and the Crimean War in 1856, which were major conflicts that threatened the
peace developed by the Concert of Europe, and hence the limitations of Liberalism (Holsti, 1995,
p. 37). Both of these disruptions were very important because in the end, virtually every Great
Power was involved in one way or another in these wars (Terriff et al, 1999, p. 33). Other
threats to Liberal Internationalism also occurred as the once feudal lands of Germany began to
coalesce under the leadership of Bismarck with two wars of German secession in 1867 and 1871,
in which this dynamic leader once and forever brought together the principalities of the German
nation. In doing so, Bismarck revolutionised regional politics by creating a very strong nation in
central Europe that in essence could threaten any of the other Great Powers. The advent of
'RealPolitik' by Bismarck forever changed the balance of power within Europe in the 1870's as
well as ultimately forming the basis the Realism movement (Evera, 1998, p. 79). This theory
was later' given acade~ic rigor by Carr and Morganthau, who publisheq their academic tomes in
1939 and 1948 respectively (Terriffet al, 1999, p. 11). This major portion of international
relations theories has been instrumental in shaping and changing the emphasis away from
Liberalism, because realists focused on the states, with a cyclical approach to world affairs.
These academics doubted the ability of the nation-states to maintain sustained cooperation
because they believed in the concepts of anarchy, mistrust, conflict and the use offorce (Waltz,
1990, p. 25). These beliefs however ran contrary to prevailing Liberalism theories and over
time, counter-arguments arose in the form ofNeo-Liberalism and Alternate theories as
mentioned earlier. For one of the problems with Realism, has always been its lack of predictive
powers, especially with regard to the demise of Communism and the Cold War (Kegley, 1995, p.
5). Thus it is natural that other theories would arise as challenges to this theoretical construct in
the late 1970s and 1980s, such as Complex Interdependence, International Regimes, etc., as
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mentioned previously.
Of course, the Realists countered with new theoretical constructs of their own in the form
ofNeo-Realism. The prime advocate of this update to Realism was Kenneth Waltz, who
published two seminal books, Man, the State and War in 1959 and the Theory ofInternational
Politics in 1979, both of which stressed anarchy and its consequences on the fundamental reality
of world affairs (Terriff et al, 1999, p. 14). Because Neo-Realists believe that anarchy shapes the
nation states, this deterministic viewpoint advocates that countries and their leaders do not have
much freedom of movement or choice. Neo-Realism focuses as does Realism on nation-states,
with anarchy as a central component, from a systemic perspective, and Waltz believed that
anarchy socialises nation-states to be similar in their actions (Ibid, p. 36). This is key and forms
the basis ofNeo-Realism, in the fact that Waltz argued that anarchy socialises units to be
functionally similar. Interesting enough, but this leads to the question that if the power of
information is also not a socialising force as well, would it not force nations to act in a standard
manner? These arguments by Waltz were spread over both books, with a' focus in the first book,
on the three levels of interaction between nation-states and the latter book, on the systemic level,
in which he advocated that'anarchy is a key and central theme. A final potiion of the NeoRealist theory concerned the distribution of power. Because these academics argued that
anarchy is constant, and that it socialises nation-states, the only change can ultimately arise in
their mind, is one that will only come from the redistribution of power (Holsti, 1995, p. 39).
Neo-Realism has not proven to be an adequate theory to explain the changing role of
international relations, especially in the information environment. This dichotomy was noted as
well by Myriam Dunn, where she examined all of the traditional international relations theories
as a methodological basis for her dissertation, and in turn dismissed each of them except for one
(Dunn, 2002). In the end, she reluctantly settled on a newer version of Realism (Structural), but
still regarded this theory as somewhat inadequate to truly explain the changing environment of
IO. Other academics have agreed, that Neo- Realism has its inconsistencies, and ultimately
major flaws in its use as a tool for modelling the power of information (Glaser, 1994, p. 60).
This last section on neo-realism also emphasises the true constraints of this international
relations theory, and some academics felt that it was best situated for those political constraints
and factors of the Cold War (Kegley, 1995, p. 8).
For in reviewing the primary themes of this research and its emphasis on information
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with regard to international relations, the distribution of power and how it is changing is a major
factor that needed to be considered. It must be understood within the whole concept ofiO, is
that power has been transferred to the people in a more horizontal structure. It can be asked if it
is true, that if there are really no alternate choices available to nations as advocated by N eoRealism, are leaders constrained in their actions, and ultimately, is anarchy relevant to the
information revolution (Ibid)? Once again, IO does not limit choices and in fact it is just the
opposite, with the information revolution broadening the number of selections available. A final
question that of course must be answered is that if the power of nation-states is distributed to the
masses as emphasised in Chapter One, does that mean that the Neo-Realist theories are still
current or were they rendered obsolete by the end of the Cold War (Ray, 1995, p. 341)?
For a careful examination of the aforementioned international relations type of constructs
such as Liberalism or Realism, or any of the Alternative Theories, brings forth the conclusion
that none of these theories were adequate for this study because they do not accurately reflect the
changes that have occurred in the new political environment. They do not meet the criteria of an
interpretative approach, with a grounded theory, that uses inductive and deductive reasoning. So
in the end, an international relations type of theoretical construct was ultimately not selected.

4.3

Organisational or Decision-Making Theory
International relations theories are not the only types of methodologies or processes that

are available to examine for this thesis, because the development and evolution ofiO within the
United States government also demonstrates many of the classic examples of decision-making
theory. From the 1930s onward, three different models of management competed for precedence
in the academic fields of organisational theory: specifically the traditional approach, human
relations theory and systems thinking (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1981 ). Other quantitative methods
such as surveys, experimental test plans, statistical analysis, and sampling are also available as a
methodology. However, based on the pre-existing knowledge philosophical assumptions, an
interpretative or qualitative approach was determined to be the best methodology for this
hypothesis. In addition, upon examination of these three elements of inquiry (knowledge claims,
strategies of inquiry and methods), the area of decision making theory was also determined to be
a possible source for a methodology for this thesis. For as Wheatley summarised in his writings
on organisational theory, the role that chaos plays with leadership and relations between people
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and their environmental settings is very important (Wheatley, 1992, p. 20). He felt that
enterprises can be managed through broad concepts and only a few guiding principles, and not
rely on elaborate rules, task definitions or structures, but instead to trust in chaos and selforganisation (Ibid, p. 21). Capra noted similar relationships in his three theoretical concepts
which brought in an ecological viewpoint, specifically around the beliefs that the 'pattern of
organisation, structure of systems and process' were all important (Capra, 1996, p. 153). He
believed that these three concepts are interdependent and when taken together, create what Capra
calls the "key criteria of a living system" (Ibid, p. 156). Therefore based on these concepts and
further analysis, the following organisational theories models and decision-making theories will
be defined and analysed as to the applicability to the hypothesis of this thesis centred on the use
of 10 in the United States government.

4.3.1

Rational Actor Model
With regard to Decision-Making Theory, most of these will be classified into two types:

classical and behavioural. Often the classical model can also be called the rational actor,
normative or utilitarian approach because it assumes that .events are well controlled and certain
(Loke, 1996, p: 5). The Rational Actor Model attempts to explain international events by
recounting the aims and calculations ofnations or governments (Allison, 1971, p. 10). The
emphasis in this model is on the nations and how they will act in a prescribed manner that can be
. studied and analysed by academics. Under this theory, the state's actions are considered
unanimous and constitute that particular units posture toward a unique dilemma. The Rational
Actor Model generally speaking also believes that the nation state is the only player on the world
stage. This is a very important fact, in the idea that the state is the sole actor in the world politic.
So firmly entrenched is this idea in international relations theory that it was not until relatively
recently that other models have begun to arise and gain prominence. Understandably the
Rational Actor Model is a very general approach to looking at state's actions and academics in
the international relations field have long recognised the inherent limitations in this model.
However if a theory is to be understandable it must be somewhat simple and normally this may
mean smaller or more uniform type of units. Therefore while theorists have understood the
deficiencies associated with Rational Actor Mode, for a variety of reasons it is still being used
because it can explain many concepts. That is because in this theory, actors understand their
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goals and objectives, they know that for each action, consequences will result and they as
rational actors will be able to rank these in order of preference. The actor's also understand the
alternatives that are available and these can be ranked within their respective categories for
consequences and results. The variations that arise from these consequences will often affect the
accuracy of a decision-maker's choice, but normally the actor will select their choice as to which
action ranks highest in the listing of attributes.
Thus the Rational Actor Model theory assumes a lot of facts are known, and those
involved in large bureaucracies understand that that is not always the case. There are many
factors that are not going to be known, so it will be very difficult for the actor to rationally 'rack
and stack' his alternatives, which often instead forces decision-makers will often make choices
based on incomplete or non-existent data. For example Selznick in his analysis of organisations,
found that he diverged considerably from the traditional view that they were instruments of
rational action (Selznick, 1948, p. 13). He saw that organisations instead were cooperative
systems with both formal and informal aspects, and that rational action embodied in the formal
structure was modified by the social needs of individuals (Jackson, 2000, p. 64). Such
cooperative systems were also subject to the pressure of their environments,.to which some
adjustment had to be made. Organisations were therefore more often found themselves acting as
'adaptive structures' that had to modify themselves to their goals and change themselves in
response to environmental circumstances (Ibid). In addition, as mentioned earlier, the state does
not always act in a unified manner. There are many factors that can affect a nation's policy and
one of the primary issues is the nature of organisational processes. The famous speaker of the
United States House ofRepresentatives Tip O'Neil once said "that all politics is local," and he
was correct. This logic applies just as well to bureaucratic policies. The United States
government is not one monolithic organised bureaucracy but instead a sprawling mass of
different departments, agencies and activities all competing for the same budget dollars. Each
organisation has its own distinct culture and in fact, it is very much like pre-Westphalia
Germany, with a number of loose federations and kingdoms existing somewhat peacefully.
While nominally the President is in charge of the government, in fact it has often been noted that
the power of the administration has become much diluted compared to a century ago. While
many people may think that this is a recent phenomenon, look at what President Franklin D.
Roosevelt said about his dealings with the government bureaucracy over 60 years ago.
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The Treasury is so large and far-flung and ingrained in its practices that I
find it impossible to get the actions and results that I want ... But the Treasury is
not to be compared with the State Department. You should go through the
experience of trying to get any changes in the thinking; policy, and action of the
career diplomats and then you know what a real problem was. But the Treasury
and the State Department put together are nothing as compared with the Na-avy ..• To change anything in the Na-a-vy is like punching a feather bed. You
punch it with your right and you punch it with your left until you are finally
exhausted, and then you find the damn bed just as it was before you started
punching ... (Allison, 1971, p. 86).

4.3.2

·Organisational Process Model
Hopefully, these analogies lead to the consideration of the fact that bureaucratic politics

are not all that rational and that there are many other factors to consider in determining what
makes a state act the way that it does. Kenneth Waltz in his seminal books, The Man, the State
and War as well as Theory of International Politics, also emphasised that states were forced to
act the way that they do, because of the international systemic factors. If you substitute
individual bureaucrats for nation-states and the interagency process for the world politics system,
then as stated earlier, portions of Waltz's theories could apply with regard to IO. Likewise, if
organisations are viewed as systems, a much richer picture of these groups is provided than
supplied by the traditional and human relations model (Jackson, 2000, p.l25). So in effect, these
government officials are affected by the overall bureaucratic process at the systemic level that
constrains their ability to act in an independent manner. However, this analogy notwithstanding,
individual bureaucrats can often make decisions that, once completed, will override national or
even strategic concerns. This idea is what Allison has referred to as the Organisational Process
Model. He believed that governmental behaviour can therefore be understood less as deliberate
choices and more as outputs of large organisations functioning according to standards of
behaviour (Allison, 1967, p. 67). This portion of decision-making theory often refers to the
second category of models as the descriptive type. Also called behavioural, cognitive or
heuristic, these approaches usually try to take more elements of decision making into
consideration (Loke, 1996, p. 6). This line of thinking often fits well with organisational politics
and bureaucratic operations because they tend to be very complicated, simply because they are
not monolithic entities. Organisations have routines, and most behavioural patterns are
determined by previously established procedures. In addition, they can be represented as, or
primarily geared to, ensuring survival and continuity of themselves as systems. So like
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organisms, organisations were only acting and reacting to influences upon them in ways best
designed to ensure their own survival (Jackson, 2000, p. 63-64). While it may be interesting to
watch politicians talk about change or initiate a new focus iti a particular area, more often than
not, that revolution will be overcome by the bureaucratic process. These routines normally
consist of:
•
•
•

Standard Operating Procedures
Programs
Repertoires

Each of these processes can and do contribute to the method in which decisions are made. Thus
although it still cannot explain everything, often the Organisational Process Model can be very
effective in determining the outcome of a particular scenario if the dynamics of the organisations
involved is understood.

4.3.3

Bureaucratic Politics Model
Organisations, just like the government are also not a monolithic group. There are

individuals
within activities and. agencies that have agendas,
and these have to be. considered
.
.
when developing models for decision-making. This model is referred to as the Bureaucratic
Politics Model, where bargaining is a central tool. It is this emphasis on coalition building
within the Bureaucratic Politics Model that is important, because it often explains why decisions
that seem to be made rationally at the time, may later when viewed from a distance seem
inconsistent with a nation or organisation's goal (Peterson, 1996, p. 23). So even though it would
be nice to try to discount these factors in constructing models for international relations theory,
often it cannot be done because that decision is reached as a result of the actions of a number of
players. These bureaucrats are acting and making decisions on many different issu~s based not
on a strategic objective but mainly by the results from politics and how it affects them personally
(Ibid, p. 21). The organisation as a system approach views survival rather than goal attainment
as their raison d'etre (Jackson, 2000, p. 126). Interestingly enough, much of the research in this
area focuses on the individualistic societies like North America or Australia, where it is perfectly
normal for an individual to not only make decisions, but to also be responsible for the
consequences as well This is a very complex arena and much more study is required. Typically
though in order to satisfy all of the stakeholders, decisions are often watered down or are
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compromised so much .Sometimes as to be virtually useless. Selznick recognised this when he
noted that organisations made adjustments in response to both internal and external factors,
independent of the individuals involved, so in fact organisations ·were acting like organisms,
reacting to influences in ways best designed to ensure their own survival. Katz and Kahn also
noted as much, namely that organisations are systems with their own goals, and their main
purpose is to maintain a steady state and to survive (Jackson, 2000, p. 65).
Governments are huge bureaucratic machines and they need professionals to make things
happen efficiently within this environment. Some excel better than others do, but nonetheless all
must operate in the same arena. Power is shared and in a zero sum game, differences will occur
and it is within this construct that decisions are made and politics is at its most important role.
When it comes to international politics, many of these rules would be overcome by the sway of
presidential pressure, however, that is not always the case. For not all bureaucrats owe their
position or authority to the President, and therefore unless a decision affects them directly,
presidential pressure usually is not a factor in the bureaucratic process.
In describing the mindset of interagency bureaucrats, the analyst must be very careful
about which cultural biases are present during that analysis. A number of incremental key
decisions that seem totally logical at the time may over the long-term lead to. disastrous results
(Fisher, 1997, p 14). Therefore, no matter what theory is used to analyse a situation, care must
be taken about reading too much into its utility. However for the sake of this discussion,
Rational Actor Model, Organisational Process Model and Bureaucratic Process Model are good
models to analyse the decision-making process within the governmental hierarchy, but they do
not necessarily reflect a good theoretical construct for understanding the role ofiO across the
United States government. This is because, while the decision making models may be good at
attempting to explain the way that federal bureaucracies operate, the role of information is
drastically 'flattened' hierarchies even more, with power being rapidly pushed away from
centralised governmental entities. In addition, organisational theories also do not meet the
criteria of an interpretative approach, with a grounded theory, that uses inductive and deductive
reasoning, as discussed earlier. So as a theoretical process, in the end, neither decision making
nor organisational theory was deemed suitable for use as methodology as part of the theoretical
construct or framework for this research.

124

4.4

Systems Theory
The scientific revolution as mentioned in Chapter Three spawned the positivist

movement and with it the development of scientific theory and the use of reductionism to
understand and analyse problems. However, not all issues can be resolved by breaking them into
smaller parts, and in fact, many problems can only be resolved if they are examined as a whole
or in a 'holistic' manner. "Problems occur with the use ofreductionism and the natural scientific
method ... when we are faced with complex, real world problems set in social systems ... which
are the very problems we encounter in abundance today and which most threaten our
organizations and societies" (Jackson, 2000, p. 10). Therefore a reaction to the failure of natural
sciences and to these complex issues was the growth of post-positivist or systems thinking.
Central to this change was a similar increase in the use of the term 'holism' or the need to review
a subject as a whole vice a series of parts. This latter idea is the crux of systems thinking, for
those academics, who advocate system approaches, who will want to understand the problem as
a whole, and to do so, they may often want to use models rather than laboratory experiments to
determine their solutions. This is because "models are used most often whenever we reach value
judgements about a particular situation though frequently they are implicit and unquestioned
(Wilson, 2001, p. 1)." In addition "models of any kind are not descriptions of the real world,
they are descriptions of ways of thinking about the real world" as shown in Figure 4.4 (Wilson,
2001, p. 4).
Unique, Valid, Non-Contentious
Descriptions of Reality
Are NOT Possible

n

...t}

Leads
to

The Need to Distinguish Between
Reality

and

ways of describing how
to think about it

Ways of Thinking about the
Real World (Concepts, Models)
-Complex
-Messy
• Contains People

-

-Simple
·Precise
• Defensible

Figure 4.3- A Necessary Distinction for the Analysis of Organisational Problems
(Wilson, 2001, p.5)
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Utilising ideas from Aristotle and Plato, the systems tradition later grew from
philosophers such as Spinoza, Kant, Hegel and Mane Spinoza for example, advocated against
reductionism with concepts such as the illogicality of trying to break the universe into smaller
parts (Honderich, 1995). Likewise Kant, the philosopher par excellence of the Enlightenment,
was eager to push rational thought to the limit, but he was also aware of limitations imposed by
human themselves on reductionism (Jackson, 2000, p. 35, 44). Hegel on the other hand, believed
that nothing was real except the whole and that reductionism was not a substitute (Russell,
1961 ). So while separate items may exist, they were in reality only aspects of the whole, a
notion which eventually became Hegel's famous dialectic. In relation to this research, Hegel's
dialectic also tends to lend itself to the notion of deriving a process from inquiry, which matches
quite well to the interpretative approach. The final philosopher who contributed to the
development of systems thinking was Marx, who is considered by many to be a 'dialectical
materialist'. In his classic writings, he tackled the complex issue of class struggle in a holistic
manner. As attributed to Althusser, Marx's best known interpreter, social totality is the
interrelation between "relatively autonomous" instances, and that history is not pre-determined.
Taken together, these philosophers have contributed to a view that encompasses the
totality of the system, or a holistic viewpoint, which can be considered to be very systems
oriented, and has served as an influential backdrop to the growth of this theoretical methodology
(Jackson, 2000, p. 45). These academics were searching for an interpretative outcome or a series
of emergent properties that would arise in their research as it evolves in a holistic manner (Ibid,
p. 1). Systems thinking can therefore also be seen as a reaction to the failure of natural science,
or the scientific revolution that attempted to solve complex 'messes' or real-world problems that
were set in social systems (Ackoff, 1981; Checkland, 1981). Systems thinking is different
because it is committed as part ofholism, to looking at the world in terms of 'whales' that
exhibit emergent properties, rather than in believing in a reductionist fashion (Jackson, 2000, p.
18). Likewise, the addition of people into the problem adds complexity to the situation, when
they play multiple roles, each with their own interpretation of the system, and what they are
trying to achieve (Wilson, 2001, p. xiv). Finally, in addition to the holistic viewpoint, the
'problem-solving' applicability of systems thinking to real world problems is also seen as a
benefit.
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The recent history of this holistic approach started with publications on cybernetics and
the General System Theory, which gained huge popularity in the·1950s through the 1970s, as
systems thinking became a major influence on a number of academic fields including the
management sciences (von Bertalanffy, 1950, 1968; Wiener, 1948; Jackson, 2000, p. 2).
Conceived as a new scientific doctrine which applies to systems behaviour, cybernetics is
derived from the Greek word kybemetes, which means the art of steermanship, but has also been
applied to the term 'governor', in both its technical and political forms (Jackson, 2000, p. 67).
Made famous by Norbert Wiener in 1948, where he stated that Cybernetics was a true
interdisciplinary science, it was based on the general laws on control and communication. It is
similar to General System Theory as both are considered a general science of 'wholeness', for
they enabled scientists in different and specialised disciplines to communicate with each other, as
well as providing models capable of being utilised across a variety of academic research areas
(von Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 37). These two disciplines, while only representing a small portion of
the overall growth of systems thinking in the 1940s and 1950s, did however significantly
enhance this methodology to become a true trans-discipline, one that combines a variety of
research backgrounds including philosophy, biology, sociology, management and organisation
theory, control engineering and the physical sciences (Jackson, 2000, p. 43) .. So while there are
many influences for the development of systems thinking during this time period, in general it
can be said that much of the emphasis by the academics associated with the rise of systems
thinking, was focussed on the process of finding methods and processes that they could model
and provide solutions for 'complex problems' from a holistic viewpoint.
From these different historical influences, four general types of approaches have evolved
within the greater tradition of system research. These include the Functionalist, Interpretative,
Emancipatory and Post-Modem methods, all of which share the overall systemic background,
but differ significantly in their specific methodology. However the Functionalist School was,
especially at the beginning of this period, still dominated by positivism, as would be expected
from a process derived initially from the scientific method. Originally composed mainly ofhard
systems approaches, over time, a number of academics including Ackoff, Checkland,
Churchman, Hoos, Lilienfeld and Rosenhead compiled a catalogue of criticisms that
demonstrated the limited domain of applicability (Jackson, 2000, p. 136). The biggest limitation
is that hard approaches must have their objectives clearly defined at the beginning of the
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methodological process. This is very difficult to do in a complex issue area and the limitations
ofhard approaches are realised where multiple weltanschauung exist (Ibid, p. 137). In addition,
since hard systems models are normally constructed according to the positivist method, their
inability to be more flexible, in order to tackle problems of greater complexity, often render them
incapable of capturing the subjective intentions of human beings (Ibid, p. 154). This is shown in
the inability of hard systems models to change or modify their worldviews, which limit their
objectivity. The fact that traditional hard systems thinking is unable to deal with ill-structured or
strategic issues, slowed the development of the Functionalist school in the 1970s and 1980s,
which eventually led to the rise of other methodologies within the system tradition as mentioned
above.
The functionalist tradition was, for a long time, the only approach to systems thinking
and it is only recently that other approaches have evolved. Of course, the problem with the
functionalist system approaches, from the interpretative and emancipatory perspectives, is that
they do not restrict their advocacy of instrumental reason to where it might be more appropriate,
that is, to deal only with 'technical issues' (Jackson, 2000, p. 209). Thus it is not surprising that
there would be a rise in a number of other approaches, included the interpretative school, which
can be considered the 'softer' side of the system methodologies. The interpretative systems
approach is frequently referred to as 'soft systems thinking,' because it places emphasis on
people rather than technology, structure or organizations. Key areas of concern include
perceptions, values, beliefs and interests, accepting multiple perceptions of reality (Jackson,
2000, p. 211). Likewise "soft" is also another word for ill-defined, that is, a system that is not
hard or rigidly defined (Wilson, 2001, p. xiv). Examples of these types of interpretative
approaches include Ackoffs Social System Sciences, Checkland's Soft Systems Methodology,
and Senge's Soft Systems Thinking (Senge, 1990). By using different definitions for 'systems',
academics such as Checkland, Flood, Senge and others, matured the overall tradition of system
research and grew it in different areas by resting it upon alternative philosophical and
sociological assumptions. Checkland for example noticed himself in 1981, the similarities
between his research and social theory, and in doing so, believed that the interpretative tradition
to be more relevant than the functionalist model in solving the difficult problems (Jackson, 2000,
p. 59). This shift in thinking would ultimately result in the development by Checkland of Soft
Systems Methodology, where systems are seen as the mental constructs of observers rather than
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entities. In this manner, an objective existence in the world and systems is transferred 'from the
world to the process of inquiry into the world' resting on the interpretative 'sociological
paradigm' (Checkland, 1983, p. 34; Jackson, 2000, p. 101). What this means is that the actual
methodology of 'thinking' about the process is the most important component, vice the problem
itself. The key point as noted by Jackson (2000) in his book on system approaches, are that the
interpretative paradigm provides the theoretical home for soft systems thinking (Ibid, p. 41 ).
Checkland also found similar affinities between Soft System Methodology and social theory,
with the interpretative tradition more relevant than functionalism (Checkland, 1981; Weber,
1964, p. 88).
Interpretative sociology provided significant theoretical assistance to Soft System
Methodology, while Marxist sociology as a representative approach likewise played a similar
role for emancipatory and critical systems thinking (Johnson, 2000, p. 61 ). Brocklesby and
Cummings noted as much, when they suggested that two competing philosophical backgrounds
support emancipatory systems thinking (Brocklesby and Cummings, 1996). The first begins
with Kant and then stretches through Hegel, Marx and Habermas and as mentioned previously,
primarily concerns human beings. The second is more concerned with self-emancipation and
derives from Kant, Nietzche, Heidigger and Foucault (Ibid, p. 741). Overall, this tradition of
systems thinking focuses on the fact that the current social order is seen as suspicious and reform
is desired. Similar in some aspects to the advocacy or participatory methodologies as discussed
in Chapter Three, emancipatory systems can be divided into two types, namely 'modern' and
'post-modern'. Good examples of the former include Habermas, Capra and Ulrich, all of which
were reviewed for applicability to this research (Habermas, 1974; Capra, 1996; Ulrich, 1983).
From these approaches, a set of generic rules for an emancipatory systems methodology could
consist of the following statements:
•
•
•
•
•
•

A structured way of thinking, that is focused on improving real-world problem situations
Uses systems ideas as the basis for its intervention strategy
Understanding that the real-world can be systemic in alienating individuals or groups
The use of models to enlighten the alienated and oppressed about their situation
The process of intervention is systemic and aimed at improving the problem situation
Exhibit conscious thought on how to adapt to particular circumstances
(Jackson, 2000, p. 329)
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Thus stated, functional and interpretative system approaches rest on a belief in social order and
consensus that aim to promote integration so as to improve existing social systems - that is, they
help to buttress the status quo. These approaches specialise in identifying contradictions in
social systems, the existence of conflict and the domination of some groups over others (Ibid, p.
330). In general, the emancipatory tradition is not one that could support this research. There are
however, some ideas that could have applicability, namely the three central and interdependent
concepts that are central to Capra's theory, which consist of 'patterns of organisation, structure
of the system and process.' These discrete concepts align quite nicely with the approach of this
research, namely on the personnel, policy and organizational focus of IO within the United States
government (Capra, 1996, p. 153).
The final category is the Post-Modern Systems approach which is a method unto itself.
In fact it cannot fit into Burrell and Morgan's (1979) four paradigms, which is shown in Figure

3.2, because the post-modernism stance is very much in opposition to all of these ideals. This
method seeks through "deconstruction and critical thinking, to reclaim conflict and ensure that
marginalised voices are recognized and heard. It adopts an ironic and playful disposition in
order to ensure diversity and encourage creativity ... " (Jackson, 2000, p. 333). For if positivism
is more behavioralist, sharing much of common beliefs of intemational relations theories, than
post-modernism on the other hand, accepts the centrality of relativism and ideation (Terriff at al,
1999, p. 111). Shown below are generic rules of this type of approach:
•
•
•
•

The focus is on disrupting real-world problem situations by critically questioning all
opinions and accepted methods
Using systemic and anti-systemic ideas as the basis for its intervention strategy
Exhibit conscious thought and emotional response for each particular circumstance
Findings may change the real-world problem situation, including the underlying
theoretical rationale
(Jackson, 2000, p. 348)

A relatively new approach to theoretical constructs in both the international relations and
systems thinking traditions, post-positivism or post-modernism has evoked controversy from the
more traditional academics. Much ofthis debate stems fi·om the 'supposed' lack of empirical
content, where "participants dispute each other's terminology and methodology without
addressing common issues" (Mearsheimer, 1995, p.92). It is these later points, where nothing is
'real' in the post-modernism approach, that probably more than any factor, rules out this tradition
of systems thinking as a method for this research (Wallace, 1996, p. 311 ). For in the end, the
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problems with the evolution and development of 10 within the United States government are in
fact real and cannot go away with discussions of abstract concepts or theory.

4.5

The Choice of a Methodology
The selection of a method for this research was thus as noted, a continuing series of

efforts to find the best process. Methodology looks at the principles behind the use of models,
methods, tools and techniques that can help to provide understanding and usually in the case of
systems thinking, to bring about change (Jackson, 2000, p. 91). As stated previously, the
purpose of the original background research, was to help focus and mould a concept for the
enhanced utilisation or the 'to be state' of 10 by the United States government in this new era.
Based on these observation's and the comments and critiques of a 100 interviews conducted over
a five year period, it became apparent as shown in Chapter Three, that a qualitative approach was
the best methodology to utilise in an analytical fashion to the problems associated with 10. As a
methodology, a qualitative approach as mentioned in Chapter Two, also allows the use of the
interviewees or subject principals who are embedded into the system being researched to help
derive the hypothesis from the data. This is similar in effect to the use of' grounded theory', in
which models are typically derived or systematically generated from data and analysed through
the research process (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 12). "One of the most developed inductive
research methods is that of grounded theory ... where the researcher starts with minimalist a
priori constructs, inquires deeply into organisational behaviour and events while gradually
testing and forming theoretical constructs" (Leonard and McAdam, 2001, p. 180). As stated,
grounded theory allows a researcher to begin a project without a preconceived theory in mind,
and instead theory is allowed to emerge from the data itself, as it does in soft system
methodology. Both Strauss and Corbin agree that theory derived from data is more likely to
resemble 'reality', which is similar to the verification and validation steps devised by Peter
Checkland when he developed Soft System Methodology (SSM). Patton had similar comments
when he stated, "Qualitative evaluation inquiry draws on both critical and creative thinking ... "
(Patton, 1990, p. 434).
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the origin, foci, philosophical and
theoretical frameworks, as well as the data itself of a particular research area, all play an
important role in the determination of the methodological approach. In this particular case, the
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origin of the change in the power of information and IO in the United States government is an
analysis of a social change. Combined with ingredients of the humanities, social sciences and
sociology all mixed together, this research tends to point to the use of a biography, ethnography
or grounded study. In addition, the foci of the research was also to understand the development
of IO in the United States government, which many interviewees expressed as a concept more
than a single phenomenon, one that affects a group, which can be modelled toward a theory of
change. Therefore, the qualitative approaches of grounded theory, ethnography and
phenomenology were considered the most important factors in this particular analysis. Likewise
from a philosophical perspective, the process in this project was one of active research, which
utilised multiple interviews, to constantly bring in new and unique perspectives which is more an
ontological or methodological approach. Also in reviewing the research methodology from a
social science theoretical perspective, the thesis problem and area of interest, tended to lend itself
more to a collection of data and analysis first, which reflects a biography, case study and
grounded theory approach. Finally, the data collection method lent themselves more toward a
grounded theory approach because the interviewees were individuals who had taken an action or
participated in a process that was central to the development of IO in the United States
government.
Taken all together, it becomes apparent, that a grounded theory or modified version
appeared to be the best type of qualitative approach in which to conduct the actual research. In
addition, 'after numerous interview sessions, it also became apparent that open-ended questions,
when used properly, best allowed the collection of participant meanings and nuances, as well as
personal values which were extremely valuable in this effort (Babbie, 2001, p. 240). So in
general, the basic characteristics in his research method followed were similar to those advocated
by the noted grounded theorists (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 7):
411
411

•
411

•
•

The ability to step back and critically analyse situations
The ability to recognize the tendency toward bias
The ability to think abstractly
The ability to be flexible and open to helpful criticism
Sensitivity to the words and actions of respondents
A sense of absorption and devotion to the work process

The use of the initial exploratory interviews and questions, not only helped to conceptualise the
meaning of variables to be studied, but also allowed the interviewer and participants to be open
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to further interpretation and change. This open dialogue also allowed the path of the interview to
be continually open to change. It was also useful for drawing out multiple meanings and varied
viewpoints with regard to IO, and this approach also drove this research to ultimately follow a
qualitative approach to include attributes such as appropriateness, authenticity, credibility,
intuitiveness, receptivity, reciprocity and sensitivity (Rew, Bechtel and Sapp, 1993). Based on
these attributes, the traditional international relations or decision making theory were as noted
previously deemed inappropriate for use as a theoretical construct for this research. In
examining the alternative approaches available,. if appears from the systems
framework that
.
problems viewed from within the interpretative paradigm (subjective, sociological or regulatory);
seem to be much 'softer' than the more traditional functionalistic or hard systems approach, and
therefore more useful in this case. In essence, this interpretative paradigm is thus in many
senses, the theoretical 'home' for much of soft systems thinking, which was deemed most useful
in researching IO (Ibid, p. 24, 41). In addition, systems thinking are also considered a
transdiscipline, because its theories, models and methods add value to a variety of fields.
Likewise, there is also a resonance between systems thinking and real-world practice, so there
was a sense that these methodologies could be of use in this research (Jackson, 2000, p. 100).
From these knowledge claims, a philosophical approach to research began to develop in
the form of a qualitative methodology as a version of modified grounded theory to be
implemented through specific procedures of SSM (Crewell, 2003, p. 4). For a methodology, or
in this case a theoretical construct, often provides a sense of vision of where the analyst wants to
go with their research, Likewise, because of the amount of background research previously
conducted, this project could be started with a constructivist view of the knowledge claim
positions, as opposed to a more post-positivist, advocacy or pragmatic approach. By doing this,
the research was open to analysing multiple methods, with different weltanschauung and
assumptions through this interpretivist stance (Ibid, p. 12). As developed by Peter Checkland at
the University of Lancaster in the 1970s, SSM is particularly effective in analysing 'vague' or
'unstructured' problem situations at the strategic level (Jackson, 2000). It does so by defining
not a problem but instead a situation that is problematic (Wilson, 2001, p. 7). In addition, this
theoretical construct of SSM also questions the privileged role of experts, and instead explores
different values to ensure that they are included in this theory, with the overall aim to encourage
learning by examining a number of viewpoints.
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There is an incredible amount of flexibility inherent in SSM, and this process has been
recognised as a 'practitioner's' methodology, namely one that provides the professional with
'relatively' solid reference points (Checkland, 2000, p. 800). These anchors allow the SSM
practitioners the ability to 'allow' their theories and frames to come apart, so that they can
recognise and engage that which is shifting and turbulent in their practice (Schon, 1983, p. 270).
This 'coming apart' is expected and it is a rich source oflearning, because SSM is both flexible
and dependent on the user for input (Checkland, 2000, p. 801). Of course this flexibility and
useability of SSM is also what makes it difficult to generalise about, however, proper use will
allow the practitioners to internalise the principles to a high-degree of capability. Soft System
Methodology is also a methodology for action learning and each facet is interconnected and
important on its own right (Ibid, p. 802). These 'cycles oflearning' promote ideas about what
could or should be used to attack those messy or unstructured problem situations. Because SSM
practitioners think in layers or on multiple levels simultaneously, they have the ability to bring
clarity to confusing situations. So in essence, what makes SSM different and unique from other
variants of system thinking is that it provides a framework, or a 'hearing methodology' in the
form of weltanschauung (lbid, p. 807) .. This ability to define what is important in the problem,
. and addresses it from different viewpoints through weltsanschauung so that alternative
perspectives can be compared and contrasted is crucial to the success of SSM in these complex
or 'messy problems (Jackson, 2000, p. 98).
Based on these multiple data points and in depth analysis of the different theoretical
constructs, SSM was selected as the method for this research because it allows for the use of
political, issue-oriented, collaborative and a change oriented research questions, to collect openended emerging data from the participants, with a primary intent of developing themes within the
methodology construct (Creswell, 2003, p. 18). In addition, SSM rests upon the interpretative
sociological (constructive) paradigm, which was also deemed best suited for this research study,
because by its very nature, 10 can be characterised as an 'immature' concept due to lack of or
inaccurate theory and research, which closely resembles the current state of this new idea within
the United States government (Jackson, 2000, p. 99).

4.6

Summary
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After careful review and analysis, a decision was made to use an alternative process that
was based in the interpretative (constructive) school, related to grounded theory, and housed
within the greater systemic tradition. From the factors mentioned above, SSM was selected as a
method for this research with active research as a qualitative methodology that incorporated
portions of grounded theory. This process was chosen after analysing the alternatives and
understanding that the 'open-ended or messy' nature of the problem ultimately drove the
research in this particular direction as shown in Chapter Three. This is because the primary goal
of this research was to conceptualise the current state of IO within the United States government
and, if possible, formulate a reason for the delta or gap in strategic policy and tactical day-to-day
operations. In addition, a subset of that objective was to specifically address these emerging
issues from a policy, personnel and organisational perspective. From these many factors, SSM
appeared to be the 'best' theoretical construct to utilise in this thesis, namely because as a
methodology, it best matched the decision matrix criteria from Chapter Three. In addition, SSM
was also selected due to its inherent ability to problem solve 'messy' issues, its use of multiple
viewpoints, its cyclical nature, and finally, the fact that SSM generated root definition and
conc.eptual models that could show the status of IO within the United States government.
As many analysts recognise, information is changing the way in which the United States
conducts business around the world, which includes military deterrence and peace-keeping
operations, foreign policy and as well as world-wide economic development. The interviews
conducted for this research tended to confirm this perception, namely that the power of
information is being recognised for what it really is and that governments as well as other nongovernmental organizations around the world are beginning to address the issues involved with
using information. However, the data that were developed from the interviews also recognised
that the full power of information is not yet a full-blown reality, but instead the capabilities of
this nascent element of power is being implemented in different manners within the power
structure of the United States. Ultimately, the theoretical construct of SSM was utilised because
in conjunction with the viewpoints of the participants, a consensus arose between the
interviewees that a large amount of input was needed from a diverse group to help in ensuring
that in this process the key aspects and importance of IO was emphasised in a very systemic
manner~

In conclusion, there were many different research methodologies that could have been

used. Early proposals that centred around international relations theories such as Complex
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Interdependence and Noopolitik were eventually discarded as not being rigorous enough to meet
the demands of this concept, as well as in some cases these theories are not processes but instead
mere viewpoints of the affected academics. Likewise the inability of decision-making or
organisational theories to meet the needs of this research, also led to their non-adoption.
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Chapter 5 - Research Method
In this research, SSM was used by IO practitioners in real situations using a series of
collaborative approaches. As the basis for the series of research questions developed for this
thesis project, the use of SSM is thus considered a part of the interpretative or constructive
school of research. Normally regarded as a tradition within systems thinking, SSM was
developed in the 1970s from the failure of the established methods of systems engineering to
solve difficult or messy complex problem situations (Chec,kland and Sholes, 1989, p. xiii). As a
methodology, SSM is derived from the research by Peter Checkland, as well as other academics
including Davies, Howell, Sholes and Ulrich (Checkland, 1981; Checkland and Davies, 1985;
Checkland and Howell, 1993; Checkland and Sholes, 1989/1990; Flood and Jackson, 1991; and
Ulrich, 1994). This intepretivist process assumes that everyone's opinion or weltanschauung is
valid and each should be incorporated into the overall problem solution. In addition, this
tradition also assumes that researchers are producing their own mental constructs of the system.
"In essence, SSM supports the derivation of a roadmap from the 'what is' to the 'what might be'
by engaging the organisation in a structured and logical debate about itself and what it should be
doing" (Wilson, 2001, p. x). It is different, because it is not objective, nor democratic, but
instead SSM attempts to take into account each and everyone's opinion, so that these individual
or different viewpoints are not left out from the majority opinion. This is shown in "the fact that
the research which produced SSM started out from a base in systems engineering indicates that it
was part of the strand of research which concentrates on situations in which people are trying to
take action" (Checkland and Sholes, 1989, p. A39). In other words, it is an organised method of
tackling 'messy' situations in the real world, because it is based on systems thinking, which
enables SSM to be highly defined but still very flexible in its use as well as broad in scope (Ibid,
1999, p. 1). "SSM certainly brings clarity to confused situations, because it encourages thinking
in layers" (Jackson, 2000, p. 807).

5.1

The SSM Approach
As outlined in Chapter Three and Four, the SSM process is an appropriate methodology

to use on this issue area, because it allows the use of political, issue-oriented, collaborative and a
change oriented research questions, to collect open-ended emerging data from the participants,
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with a primary intent of developing themes within the methodology construct{Wilson, 2001, p
18). In addition, because a qualitative approach was deemed best suited for this research study,
(see Chapter Three), the use of SSM was also considered appropriate because by its very nature,
IO can be characterised as an 'immature' concept due to lack of or inaccurate theory and
research, which, in some instances, resembles the current state of this issue within the United
States government. Thus, the problem situation tracks well to the steps of SSM, as shown later,
which attempts to explain how IO is actually conducted by the United States government today
('as is state') and how in theory it could accomplished in the future ('what might be'). The
actual goal or aim of SSM is shown below in this quote, which lays out in a broad context, the
concept behind SSM.
SSM is a methodology that aims to bring about improvement in areas of social
concern by activating in the people involved in the situation a learning cycle which is
ideally never ending. The learning takes place through the iterative process of using
system concepts to reflect upon and debate perceptions of the real world, taking action in
the real world, and again reflecting on the happenings using system concepts. The
reflection and debate is structured by a number of systemic models. These are conceived
as holistic ideal types of certain aspects of a problem situation rather than an account of
it. It is taken as given that no objective and complete account of a problem situation can
be provided (von Bulow, 1989, 16, p. 38).
Soft System Methodology is a not positivist or materialistic approach, which would not suit this
problem because the particular emphasis of this research deals with influence aspects ofiO.
" ... SSM as a methodology, starts by defining not a problem, but instead as in this case, a
situation that is problematic" (Wilson, 2001, p. 7). Soft System Methodology is well suited to
situations where organisational stakeholders can have input into the management output, which
was the case in this research effort. There can also be a quandary in the fact that SSM is
normally considered a methodology rather than a series of techniques. However, SSM can be
used as a method but it will never be independent of the user (Checkland and Sholes, 1999, p.
285). In addition, as an analytical technique, SSM possess a number of key features which are
quite useful in the study of IO to include:
•
•
•

Strategic approach that is fotward looking
Rule-based and intellectually rigorous, yet although flexible enough to apply to all types
and sizes of organizations
Defensible so that conclusions could be confidently justified to in a way that anyone can
understand
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•

Consensus building so as to achieve the essential ingredient aka 'buy in' (Wilson, 2001,
p. ix).

The basic design of SSM was first developed by Peter Checkland in 1981, which in its first
iteration was developed as a seven-stage process of enquiry, entitled Model1, as illustrated in
Figure 5 .1. While this approach was later updated and is often called Model 2, it was decided
that the original version (Model 1) as shown below was the best methodology for this research
project, because of its simplicity and transparency to the stakeholders (Checkland and Sholes,
1999, p. Al3). Although Figure 5.1 shows a circular or serial approach, SSM can also be
accomplished in a less lineal progression, which was the case in this research.

5.1.1

SSM - Steps and Procedures
It is from this standard methodology and the steps as described above, which make up the

most common process actions that were used throughout the timeline of this project. The stages,
which are recursive, produce the following four outcomes, as will be described later in this
chapter.
Rich Picture: The research began with a series of interviews that produced data about the
problem situation. This data is the core of this process, because it allows the researcher to find
out about a problem situation, including its cultural and political aspects. This is the phase, in
which the Clients, Actors, Transformation, Worldview, Owners and Environment (CATWOE)
elements are all defined by the interviewees. Separated into sections based on the CATWOE
areas, this· data is then aggregated and collated into categories that could be compared and
contrasted throughout the project. From these categories, a series of figures or Rich Pictures
were developed, that described an overall view of what the problem is, and in the case of this
research, what is acquired from the information received during the interview process.
Root Definition(s): From the data correlated in the CATWOE categories, and described in the
Rich Pictures, a series of Root Definitions are extracted from these collated answers. Formulated
as the relevant purposeful activity models, the Root Definitions also serve as a characterisation
of the 'ideal' solution formed during the interview process. If there are differences of philosophy
or incompatibilities, this is not a problem because more than one Root Definition can be utilised.
In addition, just because the Root Definition may be incompatible, that does not mean that they
are mutually exclusive. Ultimately, the Root Definitions serve as a basis for the further
development of the research in the form of Conceptual Models, with the data directly linked to
CATWOE and the interviewees.
Conceptual Models: In this phase, the participants in the study debate the situation, using
models, to seek changes which would improve the situation and are regarded as both desirable
and culturally feasible, as well as the accommodations between conflicting interests which will
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enable improvement actions to be taken. These are defined as high-level task models and are
derived solely from the ideal Root Definitions. Normally developed from the interview process,
these Conceptual Models represent processes or methods of achieving a goal, which may not be
the typical method of doing business in reality.
Verification and Validation Phase: It is in this stage, where the models are challenged to see if
they are both 'Feasible' and 'Desirable', in a validation stage. In essence, it is this portion of
SSM, where the research is examining the Root Definitions and Conceptual Models to determine
the correct action in the problem situation that could possibly bring about improvement. Finally
the models are also verified by the interviewees, to ensure that they include the opinions and
weltanschauung of all ofthe interviewees (Checkland and Sholes, 1999, p. A15).
In addition, because SSM uses an inductive research method in which the researcher starts with
minimalist a priori constructs, and then begins to inquire deeply into organisational behaviour
and events, it is only natural that as the research is conducted, 'theoretical constructs' are
gradually tested and formed (Leonard and McAdam, 2001, 78, 2, p. 181).

1. The Problem
Situation: unstructured

Real World.

c

Systems Thinking

A

T

w

4.

Conceptual
Models

0
E

Figure 5.1- Soft Systems Methodology: Source: Checkland Scholes (1999)

5.1.2

Soft System Methodology - Its Limitations, and its Benefits
While SSM is the methodology of choice for this particular research that does not mean

that it is without its own limitations. However, based on the comments of the interviewees, as
well as the criteria that was reviewed for narrowing down of the possible alternatives for a
research methodology in the selection process as shown in Chapter Three and Chapter Four, the
benefits of this approach appear to outweigh the limitations. This is the case even with the
modifications made to this methodology, particular the lack of group setting of all interviewees.
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For within the United States government, it is hard to have a very large group of important
stakeholders to meet together or gather in such a consensual manner for an academic experiment.
In addition, the physical and chronological separation between these important government
officials often makes it impractical to have them all together to conduct research by the normal
SSM methods proposed (Checkland and Sholes, 1999, p. 280). Likewise, the participants are
often involved in real-world operations and so a 'virtual' method of bringing the participants
together was the primary method utilised in this research by having each participant interviewed
in the same way using the same methodology (Babbie, 2001, p. 268). In addition, since the
interviewees were spread all over the world, an attempt to build a 'Rich Picture' of the problem
situation was utilised by conducting 100 interviews independently and using a standard set of
survey questions, to collate the data.
However, there are drawbacks to this approach. Because of the lack of interaction
between participants, there is not the normal give-and-take between the thesis interviewees that
would occur in a group setting. Of course there can be downfalls with any approach, and this
one like others has its own unique flaws. "In action research, the researcher wants to try out
theory with practitioners in real situations, gain feedback from this experience, modify the theory
as a result of this feedback, and try again, with each iterative session of the action research
process adding to the theory" (Ibid, p. 95). So for this project, theory was instead developed
through a comparative methodology looking at the same problem situation in different settings
(Easterby-Smith et al, 1993, p. 35). Studies have shown that group dynamics for academic
research have their own drawbacks as well. This is important because there are many factors
that would inhibit a government official from being totally frank and honest in a larger grouptype environment. Thus the use of one-on-one questioning also allows those people that tend to
defer to more 'dominant' personalities to actually speak their mind and have their opinions
heard. For it would be enormously difficult to have all of these people in the same room and all
be contributing 'equally' to a discussion. This is why the formal interview process is actually
considered better in some aspects, because it allows the author to 'draw' out valuable
information from the participants in a more comfortable setting. This was done not only for the
comfort of the government official that was participating, but also develop a level of detail and
trust that may not have occurred in a less familiar environment (Babbie, 2001, p. 181). In
addition, using the interviews as working guidelines, rather than as settings for so-called 'truths'
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to be proven, allowed instead for a dialogue that utilised words such as 'what' or 'how' to
suggest an open or more emerging design as opposed to closed.words like 'why' which are more
consistent with a quantitative approach (Creswell, p. 106). Thus it was from these decisions and
analysis, it was the use of open-ended type questions as part of the field research, with the
participants in their natural settings that was considered crucial to the overall success of the
effort (Babbie, 2001 , p. 240).
So in essence, the benefits of SSM far outweigh any limitations imposed by the interview
process, because it is a qualitative approach, using open ended questions to understand the
conduct of IO in the United States government (Creswell, 2003, p. 182). The selection of SSM
as a methodology was not a fast or straight-fotward process, as alluded to in Chapter Four, and
there was initial difficulty in developing a framework for IO in the United States government.
Overall, it took about three years ofbackground interviews to truly understand the magnitude of
the problem and it was only during the third set of formal interviews, that an adequate process
was developed by the patticipants themselves. It was at that point, where it finally became clear
that an interpretative approach was needed and once SSM was selected, that the Rich Pictures,
Root Definitions and Conceptual Models were all developed from the formal interview data to
better understand the issue area.

Initial Interviewee Weltanschauung
United
Kingdom1
0%

Corporate

1~--==---T---==---~
44%
Military
20%

Other

8%
Government
18%

Quarter Interviewed

United
States

82%

82%

Figure 5.2- Initial Interviewee Weltanschauung
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5.2

The Interview Process: Use of Selected People to build up a Rich Picture
As part of the research methodology, active interviews with key personnel were used as

an attempt to build up a series of Rich Picture and ultimately Root Definitions as well as
Conceptual Models. A number of primary interviews were conducted with key personnel since
1999, and a variety of government officials were repeatedly met to discuss the role and evolution
of IO within the USG. Of these key participants, 40 were selected for this study due to their
positional and institutional knowledge, breadth of information and willingness to undergo
repeated interviews.
These interviewees are part of the overall global IO community and were either involved
with computer network operations, strategic communications, perception management, cyber
security, critical infrastructure protection or homeland security efforts of the United States
government at the present time, or were recently employed in that capacity in the past. These
people ranged from academics and Department of Defence officers, to State Department and
National Security Council directors, legislative assistants, congressionally appointed staffers and
bureaucratic officials (see Figure 5.2). In addition, these participants worked at all different
levels of the government, and some of them are very high-level government personnel, that are
not always very easily accessible. However the overall consensus was that all of the personnel
interviewed had valuable insight on the conduct of IO in some aspects within the federal
bureaucracy. The nationalities and professions of the interviewees included Americans and
citizens of other nations, inside the government, military and academics. Each participant had a
different worldview, and each in their own way was able to give critical information for use in
this thesis. This is important, because the interviewer was the only constant in the interview
process, there is a possibility that some bias could be introduced in this grouping from the
interviewee's responses. It was felt that some of that bias was overcome by the fact that all
interviews were conducted by the same person, in the same manner, with the same questions
(Babbie, 2001, p. 280). This reasoning (discussed in Chapter 4) was that an
advocacy/participatory stance, using with an SSM methodology, would hopefully eliminate
extreme bias. It is generally observed that when conducting interviews, especially when using an
advocacy or participatory framework that the analyst always views the data through a filter or
lens based on their education, social and historical context. This is unavoidable, but can be
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minimised if the researcher takes care to understand that this phenomena is occurring. Termed
the Hawthome Effect, this problem can be alleviated if there is sensitivity to the issue, so that a
researcher can avoid most of the major issues (Babbie, 2001, p. 278).

5.2.1

Why Was This Group Chosen?
The final40 interviewees were chosen using a number ofvarious factors. Many were

considered as experts in the various fields field of IO such as influence campaigns, strategic
communications, perception management, psychological operations, computer network
operations and information assurance that were also familiar with the operations of the United
States government. Many of the government officials, who held key positions in IO staffs or
commands, were names that were added to this list. In addition, other IQ personnel who were
supporting organisations in the United States government were also used to add more
participants to the initial interview matrix. An additional strategy that was enlisted to flesh out
the participant pool was to use references from other interviewees and try to 'spiral' closer to the
more prominent officials. For example, the first person to be interviewed promised to get time
with a prominent futurist. Likewise, a mid-grade Department of Defense civil servant helped to
coordinate an appointment with a member of the Joint Staff. Also included on the list, were a
number of academics who have studied this issue and while their background is varied, they all
have one thing in common, namely that they have either worked with some part of the broad
continuum of information operations in the government or business world or have studied it as
an academic.

5.2.2

The Range of Weltanschauung Expressed - Why this is Relevant to the
Research Questions
The demographics ofthe formal interviews as shown in Figure 5.2 and Table 5.1 denote a

significant number of federal officials, military personnel and academics that met the criteria.
The federal bureaucracy is a very complicated set of organisations and while an incredibly
eclectic group of people could have been interviewed about the IO capabilities in order to obtain
diversity, the goal of this research to develop a series of models to answer the study question. So
if a prospective participant has no understanding of IO policy, training or agencies, if they do not
know the doctrine, procedures, operations, or any of these other detailed facets of this thesis,
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then they probably cannot give an educated and useful series of answers that will further
contribute to the body of knowledge, and thus were not ultimately chosen to participate in this
project. All together, after a number of background sessions that were conducted as early as
May 1999, the final round of formal interviews began on 13 February 2003 and ran for 14
months to finish on 1 April2004, with 40 participants over multiple meetings as shown below.

# Firstlrtterview Second Interview
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

19-Feb-03
19-Feb-03
14-Apr-03
15-Apr-03
16-Apr-03
16-Apr-03
16-Apr-03
17-Apr-03
17-Apr-03
18-Apr-03
21-Apr-03
21-Apr-03
21-Apr-03
22-Apr-03
22-Apr-03
22-Apr-03
23-Apr-03
23-Apr-03
24-AQT-03
25-Apr-03
13-May-03
10-Jun-03
10-Jun-03
10-Jun-03
10-Jun-03
10-Jun-03
2-Jul-03
2-Jul-03
3-Jul-03
3-Jul-03
3-Jul-03
4-Jul-03
4-Jul-03
4-Jul-03
4-Jul-03
6-Aug-03
7-Aug-03
12-Aug-03
13-Aug.-03
13-Aug-03

26-Apr-04

24-Nov-03
25-Mar-04
25-Mar-04
1-Apr-04

31-Mar-04
1-Apr-04

1-A_j)f-04

1-Apr-04

19-Nov-03
1-A_QI'-04
24-Mar-04

Third Interview

Affiliation
NPGS
NPGS
Aerobureau Corp
DoD
CFR
Highlands Forum
26-Mar-04 State Department
Consultant
Consultant
The Rendon Group
RAND Institute
Ctr Naval Analysis
Consultant
NDU
RAND Institute
State Department
DoD ·
GWU
OGC
RAND Institute
RAND Institute
DoD
State Department
DoD
DoD
GWU
TRC
FCO
University of Leeds
Consultant
SNDC
ADF
Deacon University
Kings College
NDU
Monash University
JFSC
23-Apr-04
C4ISR
NSC
State Department
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Table 5.1- Formal Interviewee Schedule
Continuing the discussion on why particular people were chosen, knowledge of IO was a
higher criterion, and was more often chosen for potential interviewees rather than their divergent
background. For example, to determine the weltanschauung of each participant, the following
two questions were asked first as part of the standard interview process: What is your
background? What are your beliefs with respect to information and power? From this
background data, the graphs and tables shown in Figure 5.2 were created to show the overall
demographic representation of the interviewees as a group. As yol! can also see in Table 5.1, the
interviewees consisted not only of personnel holding key IO related positions in the United
States government, but also those academics from around the world who have written and
studied the topic for a· significant period. The ultimate goal was to always get knowledgeable
input from the participants who were closest to the subject as part of this process to ensure the
best data possible. Major efforts were made to widen the interviewee pool, and as will be noted,
a diversity of opinion was indeed gained, as shown in the dichotomy in the two Root Definitions
and 14 Conceptual Models. In effect, these results were total opposite of each other with one
group ofinterviewees proposing a top-down solution, while the other favoured a more bottom-up
approach. So to conclude and summarise the questions about the interviewee pool for this
research- all of the participants of this study were involved in the IO community from some
aspect or the other, and yet they encompass very divergent and radically different views on the
subject:

5.3

Formal Research Phase: The SSM Process in Use
From the formal interview process, very basic ideas began to emerge in the form of Rich

Pictures. A number of diagrams were developed that helped to categorise the 63 different
CATWOE elements, all of which were aligned with the answers provided by the thesis
participants, and from these six CATWOE categories, the interviewee data plus the Rich Pictures
- two separate and distinct Root Definitions emerged. From this step, two primary and 12
secondary Conceptual Models were formed to expand on the themes delin~ated by the
interviewees. All of these SSM steps were then verified by 16 of the original 40 participants in
the spring of2005, when another set of interviews conducted. Also during this validation
process, data was cross checked with the interviewees to make sure that what they said was
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indeed correct and that the nuances imparted during their individual sessions was updated, with
any changes noted in updated CATWOE and Root Definitions. Gaining feedback from this
experience, the original theories encapsulated in the SSM devices as shown above, were then
modified as part of the process therefore adding value to the theory (Avison et al, 1999, p. 95).
The final step was the use of an independent third party set of IQ professionals to validate the
whole process. Conducted as part of the 4th Annual European Conference on Information
Warfare (July 2005) at the University of Glamorgan, in Pontyphidd, Wales, this last group was
very useful in their ability to discem that this entire process and methodology had been rigorous
and academic in nature.

5.3.1

Finding out about a Problem Situation: The Gathering of the Interviewee
Data
From the very beginning of this research project, there was a sense of unease among the

participants caused by an overriding concern that a problem existed in the IO community.
Problem situations were considered vague and unstructured, and without precise terms. Thus,
any analysis of this issue area had to consist ofbuilding a series of diagrams with the richest
possible data in the picture of the problem situation (Jackson, 2000, p. 247). For example, the IO
policy and doctrine that has been evolving since the 1990s in the United States, shows clearly the
dichotomy between what the theorists thought or wanted with respect to the American military
forces. In addition, the organisation of the national security apparatus to accomplish the
missions and tasking associated with IO are also drastically different than the perceived and
actual capabilities of the overall organisation or system. The system in this case, is an entity
such as a federal agency, which receives inputs and produces some outputs, that is, the system
itselftransforms the inputs into the outputs (Checkland, 1981, p. 9). In the United States
government, because the actors are.from disparate organizations, services, commands and even
cabinet agencies, the interview data was thus used to bring the disparate thoughts together, to
conceptualise the feeling that there was indeed a 'problem', in the conduct of IO in the United
States government.

5.3.2

Developing Rich Pictures from the Interviewee Data
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A useful way of starting this process is though what is !mown as a 'Rich Picture'. This is
literally a picture of what the situation is taken to be (Wilson, 2001, p. 35). Humans are always
making use of models whenever we reach value judgements about a particular situation though
frequently they are implicit and unquestioned. This is because, models of any kind are not
descriptions of the real world, but instead they are descriptions of ways of thinking about the real
world (Ibid, p. 1, 4).
Making drawings to indicate the many elements in any human situation is
something which has characterised SSM from the start. Its rationale lie in the fact that
the complexity ofhuman affairs is always a complexity of multiple interacting
relationships, and pictures are a better medium than linear prose for expressing
relationships. Pictures can be taken in as a whole and help to encourage holistic rather
than reductionist thinking about a situation" (Checkland and Sholes, 1999, p. A16).
The following three 'pictures' shows how some of these ideas coalesced as the interviews were
conducted and are the first attempts as part of the SSM process, to collect the thoughts of the
interviewees. The "W" stands for 'world view' or 'weltanschauung' and as seen in the figure
5.3, the initial thought was a division centred on three primary groups. All of the data from this
research is also available in the Appendices.

Wl - Government

W1Mt mJSt the Unit«[ Statts fidem/
burouuacy aa:onplish ftuma pdicy,
pe!Sonrxi atd orgmizatioml t/fort,
to lxtter utilize irfanmtWnas an
dm1!l1t iffXJW!r to mH the thrmts
ifthej'tttunf

W2 - Academic

W3- Public

Figure 5.3 - Rich Picture #1
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In the first Rich Picture, it was generally recognised by most participants that there were a
number of different views that could affect the power of information within the United States
government. It was also felt that that these three broad categories represented most of the more
notable interests; however a number of comments were directed from a constructivism approach
- such as can a person be in more than one group at the same time? Of course this is true, so in a
follow-on iteration (#2), the next Rich Picture evolved to try to give more granularity and
transparency to the differences in the attitudes of the representative groups.

US Politicians Official
USG

us
Opinion?

~

us

Citizens

~

~

. . . . . . . . . . . . x.........
World Opinion
& Events?

~

Media
••

10 ",.,.

111111

~

~

Academiac;fovemment

~

Religious
Leaders

Media

Figure 5.4 - Rich Picture #2

While there was more information added to this second diagram, in the end, the
participants of this study thought that it was still not enough and that the picture should be
expanded even more. The resultant figure is shown below in Figure 5.5 and while it contains
basically the same list of characters or groups that can affect the body politic as in Figure 5.4,
what is different is the changes wrought by the information age, namely the greatly increased
connectivity. For in today's environment, almost all the participants agree that the ability for
small groups or even individuals to affect world opinion has increased greatly. So the resultant
effect in the evolution of the Rich Picture in Figure 5.5 is to grow a virtual spider-web of
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integration, as the Internet, Satellite television, cellular telephones and other forms of technology
drastically alter the forms and methods in which people around the world communicate with
each other. In addition, what this has also done as alluded to in Chapter One, is to hasten the
transfer of power from 'official' government organisations to other centres of influence, as
information has grown as an element of power. A number of entities have recognised this trend
and attempted to use this growing capability inherent in IO to their advantage, as shown in later
chapters of this thesis. It is this drawing out of the interviews and analysis, with a range of ideas
to improve the problem situation, that is expressed by each interviewee from a different
viewpoint that makes SSM so unique (Jackson, 2000, p. 247). Therefore it was these types of
perceptions and others like these that led to the maturation of the Rich Picture and the eventual
development of the Root Definitions and Conceptual Models, in the form of what the 'system is'
and what the 'system must do'. Of course what was most interesting was the incredible amount
of cross communication or the 'horizontal' sharing of power, which is an inherent characteristic
of the traits of the new information age .

••••

....... ............
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Figure 5.5 - Rich Picture #3

5.3.3

Categorising the Data through CATWOE Analysis
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The process that was followed for this research eventually produced two diametrically
different concepts from a larger body of material drawn from the background and formal
research questions and interview process. To do this, the SSM process identified the six main
issues that need to be defined using the CATWOE acronym- customers, actors, transformation
process, weltanschauung, owners, as well as environmental constraints. The purpose of the
CATWOE mnemonic is to ensure that the Root Definition is'well formulated and to ensure that
the Conceptual Model produced is a defensible model. In addition, the CATWOE mnemonic is
also a test of the structure and words chosen in the Root Definition (Wilson, 2001, p. xvii, 23).
These CATWOE elements were pulled from the 54 final interviews by the author with 40
participants that were grouped into a rough or draft CATWOE. While this initial inventory was
good, it was also rather unwieldy, so after further discussion and interviews with the research
participants, this original list was pared down to a more manageable level to build final
CATWOE elements as well as the final Root Definitions. For the real key and the core of the
CATWOE methodology, is the pairing together of the transformation process with the
weltanschauung of the different interviewees (Checkland and Sholes, 1999, p. 35). ''This is
because SSM provides a structured way of identifying and capturing different points of view,
distilling those differences through the use ofCATWOE and Root Definitions" (Checkland,
2000, 13, 6, p. 804). This importance of identifying the correct elements ofCATWOE, has been
alluded to throughout this section, and later in this chapter, the author will define these terms and
give them meaning and context

Customers
Customers are the victims or beneficiaries of the transformation process. For this study,
the customers of current and potential future updates to the 10 capabilities of the United States
government are numerous and varied. While some participants indicated that the 'message' was
aimed at foreign populations and governments, others stated instead that many of these influence
campaigns were intended instead for the American people. The victims or beneficiaries of the
transformation process were also named as the federal bureaucracy itself, the Department of
Defense and also military organisations from other countries. The following definitions are
described for the term of customer within the context of this thesis:
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United States government- This included the executive, legislative and judicial
branches, the 15 Cabinet Departments to include the Department of State, Department of
Homeland Security, Department of Commerce, Department of Justice plus Department of
Defense and all combatant military forces
Federal bureaucracy- The level of government that includes the interagency cabinet
departments alone
American Public - The average citizen, one who does not work for the United States
government, nor is a consultant or lobbyist employed to support the federal bureaucracy
Foreign citizens -The population of other nations that are not employed by their
governments or military forces

Actors

Those who would do the transformation process, however the actual people who would
qualify varied widely among the interviewees. There did seem to be a broad consensus that
while individuals could conduct IO on their own, by and large for this study, it was primarily IO
conducted by the government at the interagency level and in the military services that were the
primary focus. In the opinion of the participants, this is where in actuality the vast majority of
IO actions and operations were conducted:
•

Interagency- The 15 different cabinet level organizations and other federal agencies that
are above the State and local levels.

•

The National Security Council, including all offices in the Executive Branch and White
House that work with this directorate.

•

White House- The Presidential Administration and the Executive Branch.

•

The Department ofDefense, including all military agencies and affiliated services and
organisations.

•

The State Department- The cabinet agency, all of its different embassies and missions
located around the world and its associated dependent departments.

•

The former United States Information Agency that was absorbed by the State Department
in 1999. Now known as the "I" Branch of that agency.

Transformation Process
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The conversion of input to output is often referred to as the transformation process. The
diagram below (Figure 5.6) shows a model that the author developed from the interview process
to describe this translation effort by bringing together the key different elements. For example,
data is the combination of input through a specific user interface. Likewise the context of the
message is developed from the environment and specific time period. Taken together, data in a
certain context can be described as.information, and when combined with real-world events, this
becomes knowledge as shown below. The knowledge is then used as a form of output to
complete the circle. In addition, as will be covered in other portions of this thesis, the ultimate
success of this transformation is to ensure the efficacy, efficiency and effectiveness of this
methodology, through the process as described above.

Environment

Data

Context

Figure 5.6 - Information and Knowledge Flow

Weltanschauung
This is the weltanschauung of the interviewees, which makes the transformation process
meaningful in the context of the problem (Checkland and Sholes, 1999, p. 35). As referenced in
Jackson (2000, p. 60), this concept was originally developed by Dilthey, as well as Checkland
who utilised it to demonstrate that in order to understand human behaviour, we must interpret it
according to people's actual intentions (Ibid). "One of the most obvious characteristics of
human beings is their readiness to attribute meaning to what they observe and experience.
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Indeed, human beings are not simply ready to attribute meanings, they cannot abide
meaningless" (Checkland and Sholes, 1999, p. 2). In addition, what marks SSM different than
other systems thinking processes or interpretative approaches, is that it provides a framework,
which can use the clues from the participants to gather information. In reality then, it is a
'hearing methodology' which takes all inputs available in the form ofweltanschuung or your
world view (Jackson, 2000, p. 6, 13, 807). Because the sample for this research project consisted
ofknowledgeable individuals that could give meaningful input and advice on the status of the
conduct of IO in the federal bureaucracy, in the final data it is not surprising that there was
something of a consistency in the weltanschuung of a portion of the participants. An attempt
was made, somewhat successfully, in gathering a set of divergent views and opinions from this
same group of interviewees. A significant ~ffort to diversify the pool of individuals to give a
more varied perspective was made, with interviewees coming from not only within the federal
bureaucracy but also from outside not only the United States government but America as well.
So beyond serving government officials, there were also academics, retired military officers and
even foreign nationals who were knowledgeable on this subject, and thus became part of this
study .. All of these personnel were included to ensure that valid input from all different aspects
of the opinion spectrum was received, a varied weltanschuung if you will.

Owner or Owners

These are the people who could stop the transformation process. Within the United
States government, this may refer to those bureaucrats or officials who perceive that the changes
brought on by the Information Age, will diminish their power base. In addition, owners are also
personnel who control the process, who are directly involved in the day-to-day activities of the
United States government and IO missions. It is these personnel, who also manage the
tremendous amounts of appropriation issues involved, that can be affected when organisations
are flattened or the architecture is changed.

Environmental Constraints

These are elements outside the evaluated system, which are taken as a given or a
standard. Good examples of these include information systems, networks, connectivity, video
and teleconferencing capabilities, as well as the media, Internet, television and radio. It can also
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include social perceptions, fiscal controls, cultural issues and historical biases. These constraints
can limit the ability in some cases for the free and unfettered flow on information which is often
a necessary ingredient for the success ofiO. Finally it is this combination of the transformation
process and weltanschauung that gives the critical understanding of the viewpoint of the
participant, as noted earlier in this chapter. These are nuances of the participants thinking, to
truly understand why they feel and believe the way that they do .. Therefore in the author's
opinion, it is crucial to go back to the key interviewees multiple times if necessary, using a
constructive approach to ensure that the true meanings of ~heir statements can be obtained, In
addition, through the use of a verification process as shown later in this thesis, the author was
able to confirm with the original interviewees their intentions and opinions with written
feedback. Finally, as mentioned earlier in this paper, for any transformation process to be
successful, it must be judged on the three counts~ namely efficacy, efficiency and effectiveness.
These are the criteria for which the Root Definitions and Conceptual Models were created, and
which a validation procedure was followed.

5.3.4

Building Purposeful Activity Models: The Root Definition
A 'Root Definition' should be a concise description of an ideal system, and it expresses

the core purpose of purposeful activity system, as well as a condensed representation of a system
in its most fundamental form (Checkland and Sholes, 1999, p. 33; Jackson, 2000, p. 254).
The purposeful activity models in SSM are devices -intellectual devices -whose
role is to help structure an exploration of the problem situation being addressed ... They
do not purport to be representations of anything in the real situation. They are accounts
of concepts of pure purposeful activity, based on declared worldviews ... They are thus
not models of anything, instead they are models relevant to debate about the situation ... "
(Checkland and Sholes, 1999, p. A21).
Root Definitions are therefore often derived from pictures or diagrams, because they are a better
means of recording relationships and connections then prose. Therefore representing Root
Definitions via the development of Rich Pictures is a standard process for depicting the problem
situation (Checkland and Sholes, 1999, p. 45). In addition, because the basic building block of
the intellectual constructs of SSM is the Root Definition and Conceptual Model assembly, the
proper development of the Root Definition is thus crucial to the overall success of the SSM
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process (Wilson, 2001, p. xv). Finally, the Root Definition defines what the 'system is' and the
Conceptual Model describes what the system 'must do' (Ibid).

5.4

Building the Conceptual Models
From the two Root Definitions, a total of two major and 12 minor Conceptual Models

were built from the data gathered in the initial set of interviews. "Conceptual Models do not
seek to describe the real world or some ideal system to be engineered, but are merely accentuated
one-sided views of possible relevant human activity systems'' (Jackson, 2000, p. 254). So it is
crucial that they are derived primarily from the Root Definitions, because they describe what the
system 'is', while the Conceptual model will describe what the system 'does', because each of
these major figures were 'fleshed' out with ~ix subsets, that used the information in the
embedded as pmt of the 63 different CATWOE elements. The idea of each model was to try to
take the Rich Pictures and Root Definitions of SSM, and develop figures or diagrams that would
help to build examples or prototypes that would ultimately answer the research questions. In
other words, "different descriptions of reality, based on different worldviews, embodied in Root
Definitions; are then turned into Conceptual Models, which are in effect, one-sided
representations ofweltanschauung" (Jackson, 2000, p. 249) All of these stages are part of the
systems portion, mentioned earlier in Chapter Four, which is an example of the theoretical
construct. For as noted throughout this study, it is in the development of these Conceptual
Models, where the interviewees inevitably played a major role, with their input and their core
ideas involving IO policy, personnel and organisation with respect to IO in the United States
government. Taken together, the Root Definition and Conceptual Model develop a standard
method or an explicit audit trail, in which both tools are used as part of the overall thinking
process. This is because human activity is much more complex and requires a richer language to
cope with the 'ill-defined' and 'messy' aspects of these 'soft' situations (Wilson, 2000, p. 187).
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Mode2

Mode1

F~
fl1ethoq,
O/o{)Jt

Area of
Concern

System Ideas

SSM as in the seven
stages or two streams
version

SSM as in the seven
stages or two streams
version (intervention)

Reflection upon the
everyday flux of
events and ideas
using SSM to make
sense of it (interaction)

Some part of the real
Wor1d e.g. NHS, a
Company, the civil
service, etc.

The learning of
whoever does the
reflection noted above

Table 5.2 - Mode 1 and 2 SSM Defined
(Checkland and Scholes, 1990, p. 283-284)

Another interesting experience occurred with the development of the Conceptual Models,
in that the SSM process began to become more 'internalised' for the participants. The issues
became more situation-driven than problem oriented, and with it, a framework began to develop,
which could be employed to enable rigorous but systematic use of this methodology in everyday
events (Jackson, 2000, p. 257). In essence, users of SSM were transitioning to more of a Mode 2
type of use of SSM, as they became more comfortable with its capabilities. These participants
were coming to 'own' the study from the constant interviews and discussions over the years.
This is a crucial aspect of SSM in its internalised form, when the participants feel comfortable
enough to allow the process to 'come apart'- that is, to evolve into an experience with the
greatest source ofleaming. Flexibility in use begins to appear as the practitioner begins to
internalise its principles (Checkland, 2000, 13, 6, p. 800-801).
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A structured debate about
desireable and feasible change

Figure 5.7 - The Current '~Preferred" Representation of SSM
(Checkland and Scholes, 1999, p. A9)

5.5

Exploring the Situation and Taking Action: The Verification and Validation
Process
From the Conceptual Models, the next step then of the SSMtheory is to try to compare

the prototypes developed from interviewee data with the reality of how IO is conducted and
utilised in the United States government today. This is not always as easy as it appears. To start,
the Conceptual Models are not models about the 'real-world,' but instead there are 'models
relevant to the debate about the real world' (Checkland, 1995, 12, p. 50). Therefore, the validity
of a model comes from two factors - whether the model is 'relevant' and whether the model is
competently built. The question of relevance and validity must then be answered by the process
itself. With respect to the verification process, a series of follow-up interviews were conducted
starting on 1 March 2005 and extending until1 June 2005. All40 ofthe final group of
interviewees were sent a follow-up detailed questionnaire, which included a request to them to
respond to in a timely basis. As mentioned previously, all of these participants were selected for
their in depth knowledge of the thesis subject, as well as their acceptance to continue to help with
this project. In this step of the process, the follow-on questionnaires asked the interviewees to
decide if they agreed on the aggregated personnel, policy and organisational issues gathered from
the original set of interviews. This was done in a survey letter sent out and each participant was
also asked to answer whether they agreed or not with the initial Root Definitions. In addition,
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these participants were also asked to look at the Conceptual Models developed by the author and
to comment on whether they agreed or disagreed with these ideas and to comment on as well.
The basic concept of the verification letter was to ensure that the. Conceptual Models were built
correctly from the data gained from the original interview process.
The ultimate goal ofthese follow-on interviews was then to validate whether these
Conceptual Models reflect the Root Definitions, using theCATWOE elements to ultimately tie
back to the information received from the original participants. In addition, it was also desired to
use the verified data to ensure tha~ the Conceptual Models. as developed are as accurate as
possible. Finally of course, the aim of these questions was to compare and contrast the
Conceptual Models to the actual structures that exist in reality, especially within the United
States government. Once the follow-on interviewees returned their questionnaire forms, step
five of the SSM process was initiated, namely to compare the Conceptual Models to reality. In
each of the two models sent out for consideration, considerable comments were returned by the
participants. Changes to the Conceptual Models were then made based on an amalgamation of
the data from the survey letters to form the final diagrams. These new models represent concepts
that most optimally describe the current and desired state of IO within the United States
· government as reflected by the interviewees' statements.
The verification of the Conceptual Models by the follow-on questionnaires allowed the
surfacing of those features that were desirable and feasible from a realistic viewpoint. If there
were ideas or attributes that were part of the original representation, that ultimately proved to be
unrealistic in the reality of tactical operations ofiO, then it was this part of the methodology that
brought those disconnects to light. This is step six of the SSM process, and it is at this point, that
the data starts to form a final series of recommendations that ultimately attempt to answer the
research questions. So it is obvious that the ability of this methodology to affect transformation
ultimately depends on the accurate input from all participants in the process. Thus, throughout
this entire methodology, there was need for constant feedback from the participants, to ensure the
accuracy of their data.
The validation session was conducted at the 4th Annual European Conference on
International Warfare at the University of Glamorgan in Wales in 2005. This review was an
important part of the thesis procedure because it ensures a direct link by the author to the
theoretical construct, as well as ensuring that the entire procedure is correct from a methodology
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aspect. Paper or electronic copies were kept of the data and referred to thfoughout this project,
and the information from those conversations ultimately found its way not only into the Root
Definitions. Efforts were made to be able to trace the data up and down the chain of evidence.
In this matrix, portions of the CATWOE elements in the respective two Root Definitions were
matched up to comments made by the various participants. It represents the best attempt that can
be made to triangulate the data, to present the most effective and efficient match of interviewee
comments to eventual Conceptual Model.

5.6

Summary ofMethods used in this Research
Overall, there was a concerted attempt to be consistent in his use of interviews and SSM

to present a rigorous and academic approach to this 'messy issue. The use of IO by the United
States government is easy to understand or explain, and so a qualitative approach such as utilized
in this study appeared after much research to be the best methodology. Using a tailored process,
that included the author as the central integrator of the data was also key, because it allowed a
much greater mix of participants, weltanschauung and overall knowledge gain in the procedure.
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Chapter 6 - Results
6.1

Introduction
In this chapter, the results from all of the interviewees are illustrated and analysed within

the SSM construct. This data was derived from the participants through a set of the original
survey questions, which tended to focus on three areas, namely the development and
improvement of Information Operations policy, the organisation and the personnel within the
United States government. The answers and information obtained from these participants was
rough and incoherent, often without form or a method to analyse in detail. Thus a theoretical
construct or methodology was needed to draw from the interviewee data, patterns, concepts and a
cohesive explanation for what these participants in the thesis were attempting to understand and
explain. The ultimate goal of this analysis of the data within the SSM process is to derive a set
of Root Definitions, which are crucial to precisely describing a definition of the ideal situation
that exists in the minds of the practitioners. From there, a set of Conceptual Models can then be
developed to graphically portray the 'ideal' solution in order to improve the conduct ofiO within
the United States government. In this case, the raw data was categorised and aggregated into a
form that fits within this theoretical construct. That is, the tasks detailed later in this chapter was
assimilated from these disparate interview sessions, conducted over a multi-year period, and
were parsed and reformatted to fit into a coherent format utilizing the CATWOE mnemonic.
From these initial answers to the research questions, all of the data was divided into themes in
the CATWOE structure as an initial draft of the aggregated response.

6.2

An Example of the Dichotomy of Weltanschauung in the Interviewee's
Responses
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the answers to these survey questions and alternate

queries that originated from these interviews, were often wide ranging and far-sighted but were
not necessarily consistent across the spectrum of individuals. In fact, the input from the thesis
participants tended to vary widely, with the dichotomy between some of the responses as very
interesting and showing the truth depth and breadth of the weltanschauung of the participants.
To demonstrate the varied participants' opinions, a number of examples are shown with respect
to the questions that were discussed on the policy issue and probably the most contested of all of

161

the survey questions, namely is a comprehensive top-down national information strategy
required? It was the first two of these survey answers that indicated the greatest dichotomy
among the participants, where answers were split into radically different opinions. For example,
interviewee #24 stated absolutely that a top-down national information strategy was needed. He
believed this because a mandate was desired to: "sell United States values and to counter anti-US
propaganda," but regretted that often the actions and funding of the federal government does not
follow policy guidelines. In addition, this same participant stated as an example that in
"Operation Iraqi Freedom, the .coalition had a strategic information campaign, yet the same
cannot be said for the larger Global War on Terrorism", where he believed that ... "we do not
have an information/campaign strategy." So in summary, his belief was that while there is a
need for a long-term top down national information strategy for the United States that capability
does not exist today. Interviewee #39 agreed that the United States needs a comprehensive
Information Strategy, and he stated that "A Strategic Communication Policy is still a requirement
in the interagency process to get the implementing strategies." He thought that there needed to
be an information component to feed into the Theatre Engagement Plan's to drive the cascading
strategies, as part of a full spectrum National Information Strategy that is more thanjust a
communication plan, with a number of holistic and inclusive components.
With regard to federal and coalition operations in an IO environment, Interviewee #38
thought that the pie analogy is very good, a spin-off of Presidential Decision Directive 56,
however in the end, he thought that the United States government did not follow the process of
this Executive Committee in Operation Iraqi Freedom, that is: "we need to do what we say."
This same participant stated that at the Interagency Deputies' and Principals' level, "everybody
agreed that deputies needed to get information on the Operation Iraqi Freedom IO campaign on a
weekly basis, "with an acknowledgement at the Interagency Principals level, that beyond war in
Iraq, that sometime there ought to be dedicated at their meetings to talk big picture IO issues".
The interviewee then described how the United States government interagency organisations
should conduct strategic communications, but he acknowledged that with very few exceptions,
this has not occurred. He thought that these senior level agencies mostly tended to deal with
policy issues but in terms of a logical sequence that gives IO guidance, real world examples are
virtually non-existent, and in fact it was a major achievement to recognize that IO is important.
Finally, as an example of dichotomy among dissertation participants, interviewee #39 stated that
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the State Department has International Information Programs, but that capability is not
physically located at the Main State complex brit instead at another facility in Washington, DC
(Building SA-44). He was adamant that these IO type functions. must instead be shifted back to
the Main State building, with a communications and physical connectivity that is not technology
and mentally separated. The concept that IO Policy is fragmented was also lamented by
interviewee #3 5. He thought that the Department of Defense was trying to pull back perspective
from everything to narrow it down to a lane, "not trying to strap on others, which is okay if other
departments are stepping up to the plate, but Department of State and Dep1;1rtment of Homeland
security are not." He thought that "Cyber Security is the red headed step child since Clarke and
Schmidt left, plus public diplomacy is on shaky ground with the departure of Charlotte Beers."
This same participant believed that "there needs to be an overarching policy, that the Office of
Global Communications cannot do this, and that they can barely supervise, so there is nothing
that brings together information as an element of power.

6.3

Summary of Initial Responses from Interviewees from each Question
As shown above, the wide variety of answers and world views from the interviewees, all

tended to lead to large range of data points from which to begin the analysis process. Likewise
of the answers provided in the interviews, which were collected over a long time period, the goal
of this process was to compare and contrast to each other. However it rapidly became apparent
during this process, that there was much duplication in the responses and so these 'extra' answers
were culled out, in order for the discrete opinions to be represented only once. The CATWOE
tool was then used to break these aggregated answers from the survey questions into discrete
themes or definable areas that could be compared and contrasted. To do this, as the initial
aggregated data were reviewed the CATWOE elements were then pulled out, identified and
labelled. In this particular case, after reviewing all of the aggregated answers from all
participants, a total of 63 subcategories were created under the six different CATWOE element
categories. Thus each interviewee's data about the conduct ofiO in the United States
government was ultimately funnelled into one of these 63 different CATWOE elements. For
example, in one of the first analyses of participant data, interviewee #24 cited opinions about the
clients, which relate to the development of three different types of clients, cited as C 1, C2 and
C3, which relate to Foreign Audiences, key decision makers and United States citizens
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respectfully. Likewise another interviewee developed thoughts on the Actors involved, which
equated to CATWOE element A 7, specifically that the two political coordinating committees at
the State Department and the National Security Council had no decision making authority. This
detailed analysis of each and all of the individual description of a participant's thoughts, which
are considered as standalone data points were then labelled with each particular CATWOE
element number. Ultimately then, all of aggregated answers from the thesis participants are
fleshed out into these 63 individual CATWOE elements, which will then be linked explicitly
back to the original data in the next chapter. This refinement or grouping of elements will allow
as mentioned previously, the development of a series of Root Definitions. The 63 aggregated
CATWOE answers as shown below are therefore the result of the initial analysis of the
interviewee data. These responses are reviewed in much greater detail throughout this chapter,
with the areas highlighted including the different CATWOE elements that were cited the most by
the respective participants. The outcome of this first analysis is shown below in Diagrams 6.1 6.19, with explanatory language describing in much greater detail the meaning behind
interviewee data.

164

Table 6-1: Aggregated CATWOE Answers
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The CATWOE elements highlighted were the number one issue in each category that was cited
by the participants as part of the interviews. The entire reordering of these elements will be
delineated in much greater detail below, as each of the six CATWOE areas are analysed further.
What is also important to recognize is that while the number of times a particular CATWOE
element was mentioned are counted, overall, EVERY data point is accounted for and utilised as
. part of this research effort.

6.4

Clients
As shown in Table 6.2, there were six different clients in the initial list developed from

the interviewee's comments. These correspond to the general categories shown earlier in the
Rich Picture process.

Clients
C-1
C-2
C-3
C-4
C-5
C-6

Foreign Audiences
Key decision makers (foreign and domestic)
US Citizens (general public)
US Government including military
Academia (foreign and domestic)
Media including Hollywood

Table 6.2 - Initial Data on Prospective Clients
From this initial analysis, a tabulation of the clients given by the interviewees' responses was
conducted as shown below. This kind ofbreakdown of the data was conducted in each of the six
different CATWOE element areas to show which topics were cited the most frequently by the
participants as part of the research process. The left column indicates the interview number and
the six columns to the right correspond to one ofthe named Client$ in Diagrams 6.1 or 6. 2. The
second to the bottom row, shows the actual number of citations, while the bottom row shows the
numerical order of the Clients after the answers are tabulated.
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Interviewee IC 1 C2 ICJ I

7
8
9
10
17
21
22
_2~

24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1

1
1

1
1

1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1

J~

34
35
37
38
39
40

:5 IC6

1
1
1
1
16
3

1
1
1
1
1
17
2

1
1
1

8
5

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

1

1
1

1

1

1
1

1
1
1
10
4

5
6

Table 6.3 -Tabulated Data on Prospective Clients
As you can see from the data C4, C2 and Cl were the most commonly mentioned clients from
the interviewees. From this analysis, the final reordered version of the Clients with respect to
this thesis is shown below.

C-4
C-2
C-1
C-5
C-3
C-6

Clients
US Govemment including military
Key decision makers (foreign and domestic)
Foreign Audiences
Academia (foreign and domestic)
US Citizens (general public)
Media including Hollywood

Table 6.4- Final Ordering of Client's based on Interviewees Cited Response
What came through very prominently from the participants in their responses was in that order to
change the way in which IO is conducted by the federal bureaucracy, then obviously you needed
to affect or target the key decision-makers in the United States government. Foreign audiences
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also ranked high as there was a large difference in the data between the top three clients as
opposed to the rest of the available choices. These three top choices were mentioned by over
65% of all participants with the number one client, the federal bureaucracy mentioned with
almost 88% of the respondents citing this factor as important.

6.5

Actors
Likewise, the actors were derived from the participants themselves as shown below:

A-1
A-2
A-3
A-4
A-5
A-6
A-7
A-8
A-9
A-10
A-ll
A-12
A-13
A-14
A-15

Actors
Media/Hollywood - reservists or liasion personnel needed?
Planners and operators need to work together
TRG and consultants - volunteers aka like civil defense?
How many actors have been trained in IO?
Standalone IO cells- have they worked well?
Old USIA types/ State Department, are they integrated?
DoS PCC and NSC PCC - no decision making authority
4th POG - too tactical , to low on CoC
International IO Operators - corporate IO
Information Czar? What about an IO Corps or a CinC IO/Standing JHQ?
NSC OGC and WH/DoD - relate to a National Information Council?
Clearances and language skills are essential
Do we need a surge capability?
Senior level USG training & awareness is needed
Alistair Campbell or KarenHuges h'Q_e of influence is desired
Table 6.5 - Initial Data on Prospective Actors

The same analysis was conducted on the actor data, with a tabulated count conducted of the
number of times a partic'ular data point was cited by the participants.
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Table 6.6- Tabulated Data on Prospective Actors
As can be seen, the most common Actors were A2, A4, Al 4, and A6, with a large discrepancy
between these first six data elements and the other nine. Both of the top two choices tied at 63%
citation rate, with a tie again as well for positions three and four at 54% citation rate. After the
top four positions, the choice of prospective Actors by the pati icipants expands rapidly with no
individual selection receiving more than 33% of the citations noted.
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A-2
A-4
A-14
A-6
A-7
A-5
A-9
A-ll
A-15
A-12
A-1
A-3
A-10
A-13
A-8

Actors
Planners and operators need to work together
How many actors have been trained in IO?
Senior level USG training & awareness is needed
Old USIA types/ State Department, are they integrated?
DoS PCC and NSC PCC - no decision making authority
Standalone IO cells - have they worked well?
. futernational IO Operators - corporate IO
NSC OGC and WH/DoD -relate to a National fuformation Council?
Alistair Campbell or Karen Huges type of influence is desired
. Clearances and language skills are essential
Media/Hollywood - reservists or liasion personnel needed?
TRG and consultants - volunteers aka like civil defense?
fuformation Czar? What about an IO Corps or a CinC 10/Standing JHQ?
Do we need a surge capability? ·
4th POG - too tactical , to low on CoC

Table 6.7- Final Ordering of Actor's based on Interviewees Cited Response
For the analysis of the Actors as shown above it was the need for integration among the
government organisations, the overall lack of training, the need for greater decision making
authority and an inadequate structure for conducting IO which were most frequently cited as the
key findings. These issues will also be found in other areas of the CATWOE analysis, but they
were especially prevalent here, when the data is compared to al115 possible choices.

6.6

Transformation
With regard to the transformation process, the 13 aggregated answers are listed below.

These were the methodological activities that were deemed the most appropriate to improve the
conduct of IO by the United States government.
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Transformation
T-1 Strategic Information Campaign, ie strategic PSYOP,
integrating strategy which is coherent is very importimt
T-2 hmovation occurs at the margins
T-3 Flatten the process - integrate - dynamic
T-4 Structure is bad - disorganized
T-5 Hiring practives for military civilians dates from industrial era
T-6 We need continuous training and education
T-7 Effects based operations (EBO)
T-8 Target analysis
T-9 IORM- major reconnnendations for training
T-10 Acccess to top leadership - overall guidance
T-11 What are the overall goals? .
T-12 Set ouftop-level nodes and missions- goals and o~jectives
T-13 Cyber Security and PD related?
Table 6.8 - Initial Data on the Prospective Transformation Process
Similar to the first two CATWOE elements, the answers to the transformation process were
tabulated and counted below.
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Table 6.9 - Tabulated Data on Prospective Transformation Process
Per this an.alysis, T6 was the number one response, with Tl, Tll and Tl2 all tied for second
place. All of these data points received at least 50% of the citations recorded, and below these
top four answers, no CATWOE element received more than 38% of the citations recorded, with
most of the answers six of the 13, receiving 25% or less commonality. This diffuse spread of
concepts demonstrates that the actual transformation process suggested by the participants is not
as certain or clear to the interviewees. All of the answers for Transfmmation are displayed in
their respective order below.
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Transformation
T-6 We need continuous training and education
T-1 Strategic Information Campaign, ie strategic.PSYOP,
integrating strategy which is coherent is verv important
T-11 What are the overall goals?
T-12 Set out top-level nodes and missions- goals and objectives
T-4 Structure is bad - disorganized
T~10 Acccess to top leadership - overall guidance
T-3 Flatten the process - integrate - dynamic
T-13 Cyber Security and PD related?
T-8 Target analysis
T-7 Effects based operations (EBO)
T-9 IORM -major recommendations for training
T-2 Innovation occurs at the margins
T-5 Hiring practives for military civilians dates from industrial era
Table 6.10- Final Ordering of the Transformation Process based on Interviewees Cited
Response
What this data emphasizes is the need once again for continuous training integrated with policy
changes that are tied to the overall goals set out at the executive level. This emphasis on topdown guidance and centralised process was very prevalent among the interviewees with a
significant distribution of the data focused on the first four elements listed above.

6.7

Weltanschauung (Worldviews)
As mentioned earlier, attempts were made to find participants with divergent set of

worldviews. The initial aggregated answers are shown below, which indicate that in some sense
this effort was successful.

W-1
W-2
W-3
W-4
W-5
W-6

World View
Political, military, USG, engineers, IR professors
Many practitioniers do not understand IO
IORM almost reverting back to C2W - why?
Is their difference between IO and PD lane?
Do we need a National Information Policy?
Or should we just update the NSS?

Table 6.11 -Initial Data on Prospective World Views
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The tabulated answers for Weltanschauung are shown below.
J.lll<'l V IC:WC:C:
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Table 6.12 - Tabulated Data on Prospective World Views
As seen in the numerical analysis, the most common world view was W2, followed by W5 and
Wl as shown below. Note that by far, a large majority of the patticipants (almost 80%) cited
CATWOE element W2, and that there is a significant gap to the next element, W5 with only
45% of the citations noted.

W-2
W-5
W-1
W-4
W-3
W-6

World View
Many practitioniers do not understand IO
Do we need a National Information Policy?
Political, military, USG, engineers, IRprofessors
Is their difference between IO and PD lane?
IORM almost reverting back to C2W - why?
Or should we just update the NSS?

Table 6.13- Final Ordering of World View based on Interviewees Cited Response
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The data from the participants emphasised that across the spectrum, most participants and
practitioners do not understand IO and that more training is needed. This near universal
acknowledgement of the requirement for greater education in this capability across the board for
all personnel associated with this thesis is a constant theme that will be noted in the next chapter
with the development of the Root Definitions.

6.8

Owners
The owners of the process were also examined in particular in relation to their ability to

control the evolution of IO within the United States government.

0-1
0-2
0-3
0-4
0-5
0-6
0-7
0-8
0-9

Owners
futeragency to include the Dos, DoD, NSC and WH - need more coord?
Two PCCs are redundant
Is their trust in the PM efforts ofthese organizations? USIA?
fu the OSD, oversight ofiO is everywhere
How many of the above have been trained in IO?
DoD is building PD capability because it believes State is not doing enough
WH is good at political domestic message and spin but often reacts to foreign events
Need to quickly get decisions on PD from on high
State needs a bigger role - bring back
Table 6.14- Initial Data on Prospective Owners

The tabulated responses for the owners are shown below.
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8 10 10

3 8
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4

1

Table 6.15- Tabulated Data on Prospective Owner s
In this analysis, 09 was selected most frequently with 01 and 0 5 trailing respectfull y in
second and third place, and the rest of the elements as shown below. What is interesting. to note
from the data is that the nearly all of the data elements are centred in a relatively small band
between 33-58% as shown here: 0 9 (58% of the citations), 01 (54%), 0 5 (45%), 0 7 and 08 tied
at (4 1%), 0 2 (37%) and 0 6 (33%). None of the elements enjoyed an overwhelming majority
and one in particular (04), was only cited once by one patticipant in the entire thesis research.
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Owners
0-9 State needs a bigger role - bring back
0-1 futeragency to include the Dos, DoD, NSC and WH
need more coord?
0-5 How many of the above have been trained in IO?
0-3 Is their trust in the PM efforts of these
organizations? USIA?
0-:-7 WH is good at political domestic message and spin
but often reacts to foreign events
0-8 Need to quickly get decisions on PD from on high
0-2 Two PCCs are redundant
0-6 DoD is building PD capability because it believes
State is not doing enough
0-4 fu the OSD, oversight ofiO is everywhere
Table 6.16- Final Ordering of Owner's ·based on Interviewees Cited Response
Thus to continue the analysis of the data, what is interesting about this information is the tight
variation (within a 25% band) of different phrases of similar themes by the participants. There is
a very heavy emphasis on the need for a stronger State Department, with more trained officials,
and the integration of the White House into Information Operations as part of a foreign policy.
All of these themes come together to give a sense that while the Department ofDefense may be
playing a major role today, a large majority of the interviewees desire to bring back capability to
the State Department that was formerly resident in the United States Information Agency and to
integrate that more tightly via the interagency process with the White House.

6.9

Environment
The final element of the CATWOE tool that was examined included the environment. In

this area, a large number of divergent responses were recorded.
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E-1
E-2
E-3
E-4
E-5

Environment
Time is crucial, computers have increased change "!Jut products should be
Key US values - freedom,_ Dol, Constitution, a nation of immi.e:rants
Information is like terrain cannot leave unoccupied
Money and resources drive capabilities
US DOS liP has no directive voice for PD - spread PD officers everywhere?

E-6 Interagency bureaucracies - will org change work?
E-7 Need a 24/7 capability? Modeled on a campaign headquarters? Around the
world (USIUK/AU) ie follow the sun
E-8 US PD must be faster, more reactive
E-9 Truth is essential but being first is better
E-10 10 is not new
E-ll IW and Psyop are not good terms for interagency, 10 and SC are much better
but EBO may be the best?
E-12 Eat your own dog food (US)
E-13 Training_ or lack of is badly needed for PD
E-14 Themes need to be tied to_g_ether
E-15 Top to bottom or bottom to top?
E-16 What are we trying to protect?
Table 6.17 - Initial Data on the Prospective Environment
The tabulated results from the environmental data are shown below.
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Table 6.18- Tabulated Data on the Prospective Environment
The results from the numerical analysis are shown below with the top three including E8, E6 and
E lO, and the rest as delineated below. Only E8 broke out with more than 50% of the citations
recorded, yet there was a relatively tight group of answers in the 45-58% range, with the top six
environmental elements selected all recorded in that region. After those six citations, there was a
significant gap down to 33% for any of the rest of the data points, with the last 10 answers
ranging between 8-33% of the respondents.

179

Environment
E-8 US PD must be faster, more reactive
E-6 lnteragency bureaucracies - will org change work?
E-10 IO is not new
E-3 Information is like terrain cannot leave unoccupied
E-13 Training or lack of is badly needed for PD
E-14 Themes need to be tied together
E-15 Top to bottom or bottom to top?
E-4 Money and resources drive capabilities
E-16 What are we trying to protect?
E-2 Key US values - freedom, Dol, .Constitution, a nation of
immigrants
E-ll IW and Psyop are not good terms for interagency, IO and
SC are much better but EBO ma_y_be the best?
E-5 US DOS liP has no directive voice for PD - spread PD
officers everywhere?
E-1 Time is crucial, computers have increased change but
!products should be checked
E-12 Eat your own dog food (US)
E-7 Need a 24/7 capability? Modeled on a campaign
headquarters? Around the world (USIUK/AU) ie follow the sun
E-9 Truth is essential but being first is better
Table 6.19 - Final Ordering of Environmental Data based on Interviewees Cited Response
This last category brings together many of the key ideas into one of the CATWOE elements.
Namely in this issue area, there is a heavy emphasis on decision making skills, integration, the
fact that IO is not new, and the environment must be understood as labelled by the participants,
the importance of training and finally the need to develop coherent themes that are tied together.
These data points which were noted in section were also set apart in the data by the participants
with a wide discrepancy (too vague) or gap between the top six environmental elements selected
and the bottom 10.
In addition, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, the actual priority and ordering of
the interviewee data as shown earlier, is derived directly from the participants themselves. What
this section demonstrates, is the first of three steps, where the input can be easily traced from a
specific interview to a CATWOE element and eventually as shown in the next two chapters,
where the Root Definitions and Conceptual Models are later developed. It is the direct
applicability of the data, through the mnemonic tool, and then onto other portions of the SSM
process, that allows the reader to follow the key points and ideas of the themes uncovered
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6.10

Conclusion

A general set of three primary survey questions were asked to the thesis participants over
a wide variety of settings and a long period of time. The answers to these queries were then
synopsised and correlated, where duplicates were culled to produce aggregated responses. These
responses were then translated to match the CATWOE mnemonic tool and the 63 elements were
reduced from this data per Diagram 6-1. The results of these individual elements were then
. counted and tabulated across all interviewees, and elements were reordered as shown in
Diagrams 6.4, 6.7, 6.10, 6.13, 6.16 and 6.19. It was these steps that prioritised the data collected
from the participants in a meaningful way, so that in the next chapter, the top six selections of
each category were selected and nmmalised in order that a series of Root Definitions could be
developed.
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Chapter 7- Root Definitions
7.1

Introduction
In Chapter Six, final versions of the aggregated CATWOE elements were derived from

the multiple and varied responses of the thesis participants. As shown in the figure below, an
initial ranking ofthe data was tabulated but as alluded to in Chapter Five, numerical priority is
not the 'true' or ultimate value of a CATWOE element, and in fact the SSM process assumes that
everyone's opinion or weltanschauung are valid and each should be incorporated into the overall
problem solution. Therefore, in order to develop valid Root Definitions, using the precepts of
SSM, all the data from the weltanschauungs of the participants, namely the 63 CATWOE
elements were incorporated into the model. This process of including all the interview data is
the main thrust of this chapter, with the reader having the ability to trace the raw data from its
initial collection to the final disposition as part of the Root Definition. As mentioned in Chapter
Six and reiterated here, the ability to ultimately group this disparate information into a set of
coherent Root Definitions was not a straight-forward process with a number of steps taken in
order to make the interviewee data useful from a conceptual standpoint.

c

A

1 C4 A2

2
3
4
5

C2
Cl
CS
C3
6 C6

7
8
9

10
11

12
13
14
15
16

A4
Al4
A6
A7
AS
A9
All
AlS
A12
Al
A3
AlO
Al3
AS

T
T6
T1
Tll
T12
T4
TlO
T3
T13
TB
T7
T9
T2
TS

w

0

W2 09
ws 01
Wl os
W4 03
W3 07
W6 08
02
06
04

E
E8
E6
ElO
E3
El3
El4
ElS
E4
El6
E2
Ell
ES
El
El2
E7
E9

Table 7.1- Aggregated Tabulated Data on CATWOE Elements

7.2

Tailoring CATWOE Elements into Thematic Ideas
As noted in Chapter Six, the CATWOE elements were tabulated and reordered as shown

above, and colour coded based on 12 thematic ideas, to tailor the data into a useable format, as
shown below.
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Key US values li'eedom, Dol, a land

Table 7.2- Aggregated Answers with Collated Information
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From this phase, the actual answers to these elements were then inserted in the figure above
(Table 7.2). This was a straight-fotward methodology, with each cel1 in Table 7.2 conesponding
to the same cell in Table 7 .1. For example, the first column equates to the Clients, and so forth
from left to tight until the last column equals the Environmental

data~

so in Table 7 .2, the

answers are colour-coded. In addition as shown in Table 7.3, the reduction of these 63
CATWOE elements was conducted to nanow the data to accurately reflect all weltanschauungs
of the participants, so as patt of this additional analysis, 12 broader thematic ideas ofiO were
utilised as shown below to ensure all interviewt;:es infmmation was accurately reflected in this
thesis.
I

!•

~·~ .

~~~--

tlon
Goals

Themes
Training

Table 7.3- Colour Coded Themes for CATWOE Elements
To do that, the research and data has been tailored from the original 63 CATWOE
elements into 12 broader categories as shm~n above in Table 7.3, which reflect the overall intent
and direction of !the patiicipants. This narrowing of the participant data was conducted by
evaluating the actual information provided by the interviewees and then comparing as well as
contrasting these specific CATWOE elements to look for similatities that could be grouped
together. The goal of this tailoring of the data to_broader thematic ideas was conducted to not
only allow the research to move fmward in a methodical manner but also with regard to SSM, to
retain and bting fotih the actual meaning that the patiicipants imparted to the data. Colour codes
will thus used throughout this chapter to show these new groupings, as this analysis moves
toward developing a set of Root Definitions. For example all CATWOE elements that
referenced IQ personnel were coloured "dark purple", IO integration "light blue", IQ policy
"gray", broad IO themes as "dark orange", IO decision making processes as "medium blue", and
the tactical versus strategic issues as "dark blue." Similarly, the fact that IQ is not a new warfare
area was colour coded "light green", the need for overall IQ goals "light orange", IQ
organizational structure, and IQ training (or the lack thereof) were coloured ''yellow". A good
example of this is shown in the fact that the clients were divided into two broad categories that
included the US govemment personnel "purple" and All Others as "green." These 12 different
thematic areas are then represented in each ofthe six CATWOE elements of Clients, Actors,
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Transformation, Worldview, Owners and Environment, as shown in Table 7.3, and ultimately it
will be these colour coded blocks that will be utilised for the development of the Root
Definitions throughout this chapter, as the data.is analysed to draw out the key information from
the participants.

7.2.1

Clients
These steps to colour code each respective CATWOE element will be repeated, so that all

viewpointsofthe data will be the sa,rne for each ofthe six different areas. For example, with
regard to the Clients CATWOE elements, table 7.4 is a combination of Tables 6.3 and 6.4 from
the last chapter, which show a large dichotomy in the data mentioned by the participants, with
most of interviewees citing US Government personnel as the key clients, with a large spread of
data to the lowest cited element of the media. So after further analysis and review of the six
CATWOE informational cells, the interviewee's concepts can be reduced down to two broad
themes- namely "US Government" and "All Others". Colour-coded light purple and brown as
shown in Table 7.1 - 7.3, these two categories effectively cover all ofthe participants that
participate in the conduct of Information Operations in the United States government, as noted in
Table 7.4 below
One of the goals of the SSM process is to be able to trace the data from the original
interview, though the CATWOE methodology and then to the final Root Definitions. This has
been done systematically through the development of the raw data in Chapters Six, and the Root
Definitions in Chapter Seven. In each case, the data can be traced through each thematic
CATWOE element from the original ordering of Table 7.1, to the colour coded version of Table
7 .2, and ultimately to the final two Thematic ideas for the Root Definitions as shown in Table 7.4
below. Tracing this data from the original participant interview information, can be achieved by
starting in the top left corner with the two themes that fit the Clients CATWOE elements are "US
Government" in light purple and "All Others". Data can then be traced to the copy of Table 7.2
in the top right category, and while the US Government theme was most often cited. Likewise, it
can be noticed that the other CATWOE elements are also well represented as shown in the
bottom left corner of Table 7.4, from the interviewee's responses. Finally the two final key
inputs are represented in the oval (s) at the bottom of the chart as shown below, which will
eventually be utilised, later in this chapter to develop the final Root Definitions. This
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methodology will be followed for the other five CATWOE elements to ensure that all data is
tracked accordingly.

Clients
Cl Foreign Audiences
C2 Key decision makers
''foreign and domestic)

CJ US Citizens (general
loublic)

C4 US Govemment including
military

CS Academia (foreign and
domestic)

C6 Media including
Hollvwood

Table 7.4 - Tracing of Client CATWOE Data from Interviews to Root Definitions
7.2.2

Actors
As mentioned previously, the process of parsing the data and then tracing the elements

was continued for all five remaining CATWOE elements, with analysis on the Actors data
conducted next. As shown in Tables 6.6 and 6.7 in Chapter Six, the data for each of the 15
categories are shown below in Table 7.5. These 15 responses match to six different themes ofiO
Personnel (Purple), Integration ofiO Organizations (Light Blue), IO Training (Yellow) or the
lack thereof, Tactical IO vs. Strategic IO (Dark Blue), IO Decision Making (Medium Blue) and
the Structure ofiO (Dark Green). A key idea that emerged for the Actor CATWOE element
included the need for better integration across the interagency spectrum. This concept shows up
in numerous locations and discussions with the participants, and was cited throughout the
interviews as shown in Table 7 .2. Training or the lack thereof was also crucial and will be cited
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over and over throughout the analysis ofthe data, with vi1tually all of the thesis respondents in
one f01m or the other, mentioning the need for more training and education in the IO realm.
Al
A2
A3
A4
AS
A6
A7

Actors
Media/Hollywood- reservists or liasion
[personnel needed?
Planners and operators need to work t ogether
TRG and consultants- volunteers aka like
civil defense?
How many actors have been trained in IO?
Standalone IO cells - worked well?
Old USIA types/ State Depattment, are they
integrated?
DoS PCC and NSC PCC - no decision
making authority

A8

4th POG - too tactical to low on CoC
International IO Operators - corporate IO
AlO Clearances and language skills are essential
All NSC OGC and WH/DoD - relate to a
National Infotmation Council?
A12 Inf01mation Czar? What about an 10 Corps
or a CinC 10/Standing JHQ?
A13 Do we need a surge capability?
Al4 Senior level USG trainjng & awareness is
needed
AlS Alistair Camp bell or Karen Huges type of
influence is desired

A9

Table 7.5- Tracing of Actor CATWOE Data from Interviews to Root Defmitions
What is interesting from the analysis of these 15 CATWOE elements is the diverse
spread of data and themes, with six different thematic ideas noted. In tracing the data from the
participants as shown below in Table 7.5, once the results were reordered as in Table 7.1 in the
top right corner of the diagram, it would appear that the need for better integration and IQ
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training were the most important aspects to apply to the Actor elements. However, when on
further examination of the participant data, the differences between Tactical versus Strategic IO
and IO Personnel issues, also rose in prominence, as shown in the ovals in the left lower corner
ofTable 7.5. Thus, based on the tracing ofthe data from the original participants, tailoring it and
then analysing the information, it became clear that the two aforementioned categories of IO
.Personnel as well as Tactical versus Strategic were better suited to be used to develop "Actor"
portion of the draft Root Definitions. However that being stated, the other four themes were
. noted as well, and were. all eventually utilised as part of the development of Root Definitions for.
other CATWOE 9ategories.

7.2.3

Transformation
Likewise for the Transformation CATWOE elements, the same methodology from

Tables 6.9 and 6.10 from Chapter Six were used, which shows that the need for overall goals and
more training are the two key areas that can do the most to change the way in which Information
Operations is conducted across the United States government. The analysis of the
Transformation category was an interesting portion of the CATWOE elements, because the fact
that three areas, namely the "Need for overall goals" or top-down guidance, "IO Integration,; and
the fact that "IO is not a New" were cited frequently as shown in Table 7.6, but they were not the
CATWOE element that received the most citations.
The diversity of the 13 different Transformation data points was also very interesting.
Six different CATWOE elements were noted to include IO Integration (Light Blue), IO is not
New (Light Green), IO Personnel (Purple), IO Training (Yellow), IO Goals (Gold) and IO Policy
(Gray). Similar themes were echoed in all of these interviewee comments with the training and
integration of IO personnel with top-down goals in coherent organizational structures as clear
desires for many thesis participants. Half of the six responses alluded to this theme, with some
form of citation alluding to the need for greater training of the Information Operations personnel.
Over and over again, examples were given by the research participants of untrained staff
conducting operations and missions without truly understanding what they were supposed to be
doing. However, on further analysis it was not only training that was needed as the most
important Transformational element but a combination of integration and overall goals that arose
from the tracing of the data as shown in Table 7.6 below. Consistently in the top right hand
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comer of this diagram, the Light Blue (Integration) and Gold (Overall goals) colours were noted
over and over in the CATWOE category. Therefore for the de~elopment of the draft Root
Definition for Transformation, the two themes that will be utilised include "Overall Goals" and
"IO Integration", while the other four noted will be used elsewhere in the CATWOE analysis.
T1

T2
T3
T4
TS
T6

T7
TS
T9

TlO
Tll
T 12

T13

Transformation
Strategic Information Campaign, ie
strategic PSYOP, integrating
strategy which is coherent is very
imoortant
Innovation.occurs at the margins
Flatten the process - integrate dynamic
Structure is bad - disorganized
Hiring practives for military
civi lians dates from industrial era
We need continuous training and
education
Effects based operations (EBO)
!Target analysis
IORM - major recommendations for
training
Acccess to top leadership - overall
guidance
What are the overall goals?
Set out top-level nodes and missions
- goals and objectives
C_yber Security and PD related?

Table 7.6 - Tracing of Transformation CATWOE Data from Interviews to Root
Definitions
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7.2.4

Weltanschauung

As noted in Chapter Six, the weltanschauung among the interviewees was nearly
universal in their need for a greater understanding of IO policy and the broader themes inherent
in this area. This focus was brought out in the data from Tables 6.12 and 6.13 from Chapter Six,
which drove the analysis to broader issues of the understanding of these Information Operations
policy and themes as final Root Definition concepts. This emphasis can be seen in the statistics
in Table 7.7, where the most often cited view is that IO is not understood by most practitioners
who are often equated to a training issue. A significant gap exists between this.issue and the
second rated citation (IO Policy) of the CATWOE elements which only received a third or less
input from the participants. This disparate weltanshauung is also reflected in the four different
thematic areas - IO Integration, IO Training, IO Policy and Overall Goals that were all cited by
the participants.
From this analysis, it would appear that the need for greater IO training (yellow) is the
highest need, with a coherent national policy on Information Operations (gray) as another clear
answer fi·om the participants. In particular, these two issues were emphasised over and over in
the interviews as an item that needed to be applied across. the interagency spectrum. Likewise
the need for coherent and consistent IO themes (gold) that are developed and coordinated at the
interagency level were cited as well with the need for greater integration as well (light blue).
However when the final tracing of the data in Table 7.7, it becomes apparent that IO policy and
IO training were the key world view elements of importance to the participants of this study, as
shown below.
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World View
Wl Political, military, USG, engineers,
IR professors
W2 Many practioniers do not understand
10
W3 IORM almost reverting back to C2W
-whv?
W4 Is their difference between IO and
PD lane?
ws Do we need a National Information
Policv?
W6 Or should we just update the NSS?

Table 7.7- Tracing of Weltanschauung CATWOE Data from Interviews to Root
Definitions
7.2.5

Owners
The data for the owners as shown in Tables 6.15 and 6.16 are very different than the

other CATWOE elements as it showed a very tight spectmm (except for one outlier) ofthe
number of citations by the participants. In this category, five discreet themes emerged including
10 Structure (dark green), Integration (light blue), and the differences between Tactical versus
Strategic (dark blue), IO Training (yellow) and 10 Decision Making (medium blue). While the
.·
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individual inf01mation is discreet, when analysed at a higher level, the overall themes can be
reduced to broader concepts of ensuring that the proper decision - making authority is available
w ithin the con·ect organizational structure.
Owners
01 Interagency to include the Dos, DoD,
02
03
04

os
06

NSC and WH - need more coord?
Two PCCs are redundant
Is their trust in the PM efforts of these
organizations? USIA?
In the OSD, oversight of 10 is
everywhere
How many of the above have been
trained in IO?
DoD is building PD capability because
it believes State is not doing enough

07 WH is good at political domestic
message and spin but often reacts to
foreign events
08 Need to quickly get decisions on PD
from on high
09 State needs a bigger role- bring back

Table 7.8 - Tracing of Owners CATWOE Data from Interviews to Root Definitions
These key themes are refl ected above in Diagram 7.8, and as the final versions of the O wners
CATWOE elements. In addition, as noted earlier, one of the key ideas to emerge from the
analysis of the Owners CATWOE elements was a consensus among the thesis participants that
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,
Decision Making was a key capability for the Owners. The need for more and better organized
structure to conduct Information Operations was also readily apparent to these participants.
Cited in five CATWOE element areas and across four of the six categories, this lack of
coordinated structure was very apparent to the interviewees. This analysis can be traced in Table
7.8 below, where these two issues are noted in each of the upper two boxes and then in the
bottom left diagram.

7.2.6

Environment
The sixth area for CATWOE analysis was the environment. As shown in both Tables

6.18 and 6.19 there was a real dichotomy among the data points. Previous categories such as
decision making (medium blue), organizational structure (dark green) were mentioned as well as
training (yellow), with seven different thematic elements cited overall as part of this research.
Thus from further analysis, the overarching areas of tying together IO themes at the interagency
level to be more reactive, in an environment that is not new, were developed from the data
received from the thesis participants. These were the two key areas or issues that encompassed
the majority of the participants input toward the overall environment of how IO is conducted by
the United States government. The need for coherent Information Operations themes is also
readily apparent, with multiple citations across the CATWOE categories. Likewise the fact that
IO is not a new phenomenon was also a key thematic issue. Both of these ideas can be traced as
part of the participant data in Table 7.9 below, overall analysis shows that the interviewees were
consistent in how many different ways or methods that they discussed these two key issues. For
example the need for IO Themes alluded to·five different times in CATWOE elements E2, E3,
E9, E12 and E14. Likewise as mentioned earlier in Chapter One, a number of thesis participants
also reiterated that Information Operations was not a new concept, but instead one that was
finally being recognised through the improvement in technology to be able to reach its true
potential, and this theme was noted three times as well in El, E4 and ElO.

193

Environment
Time is cmcial, computers have
increased change but products should
be checked
E2 Key US values - freedom, Dol,
Constitution, a nation of immigrants

El

Information is like ten·ain, cannot
leave unoccupied
E4 Money and resources drive
capabilities
ES US DOS IIP has no directive voice for
IPD - spread PD officers everywhere?
E3

E6
E7

ES
E9
ElO
Ell

E12
E13

E14
ElS
E16

Jnteragency bureaucracies- will org
change work?
Need a 2417 capability? Modeled on 2
campaign headquarters? Around the
world (USIUK/AU) ie follow the sun
US PD must be faster, more reactive
Tmth is essential but being first is
better
ro is not new
IW and Psyop are not good terms for
interagency, 10 and se are much
better but EBO may be the best?
Eat your own dog food (US)
Training or lack of is badly needed for
PD
Themes need to be tied together
Top to bottom or bottom to top?
What are we trying to protect?

Table 7.9- Tracing of Environment CATWOE Data from Interviews to Root Definitions
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In summary, all of the 63 CATWOE elements were eventually utilised in the Root
Definitions, as patt of the tailored 12 thematic issues described above. This is because the
information data was parsed and mapped together in one chart that lays out the selected final
versions of the CATWOE elements as shown in Diagram 7.3. Also as was noted earlier, there
are overlaps and redundancy in certain areas such as the lack of training and the need to
coordinate themes were cited multiple times, in multiple categories, by a large number of
interviewees. But overall, the research indicated a relative large scale of coherence to the data
obtained from the thesis patticipants. Therefore in this next section, the final two Root
Defmitions will be developed, with detailed explanations. This is done using all63 CATWOE
elements, reduced to 12 thematic ideas, whose goal is to build the Root Definitions and then the
Conceptual Models in Chapter Eight.

7.3

Final Root Definitions
Much of the SSM literature and research indicates that there is a practicality to the

realistic number of Root Definitions that can or should be utilised in any particular academic
eff011. In most cases, 2-3 is the recommended limit to adequately model the altematives to the
appropriate decision-maker. Thus to reduce the 63 CATWOE elements into the 12
aforementioned themes, the patticipant data was analysed in detail and aggregated into broader
categories, from which ultimately two distinct and different final Root Definitions emerged at the
end of this chapter. When these 12 thematic ideas are reananged per their respective CATWOE
elements, a new diagram is produced as shown in Table 7 .10 below. It is from thjs chart, that the
draft Root definitions were developed as patt of an initial cut of the top six CATWOE elements,
from which a series of coherent final Root Definitions are drafted as shown below.

Table 7.10- Thematic Ideas arranged per CATWOE Elements
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The same format will be followed for each of the draft Root definitions, with each of the
CATWOE elements utilized as part of an attempt to develop a coherent statement of the data
derived from the interviewees.

The first final Root Definition is shown: below:

Information Operations in the United States government needs to be differentiated between the
tactical and strategic operations by key decision makers of the United States government for
better integration and more IO training across the interagency spectrum, in an understanding
that IO is not a new phenomenon.

System
Client
Actors
Transformation
Worldview
Owners
Environment

Information Operations in the United States government
·
United States government
Tactical versus Strategic
Better Integration
More IQ Training
Key decision makers
IQ is not new

The second final Root Definition is shown below:

Information Operations in the United States government needs personnel and a better
organizational infrastructure, to reach overall IO goals, focused at coordinated themes towards
its targeted audience with coherent IO policy.
System
Client
Actors
Transformation
Worldview
Owners
Environment
7.4

Information Operations in the United States government
All Others
Personnel
Overall Goals
IQ Policy
Better IQ structure needed
IO Themes

Summary
In this chapter, the raw data from the CATWOE elements were reduced to key thematic

issues which were used to develop a set of Root Definitions. As was demonstrated in this
section, the evolution of these two final Root Definitions, can be traced directly back to the raw
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data from the participant's interviews. This information was collated and tabulated, and then
based on the interviewees' responses, the 63 CATWOE elements were tailored to a number (12)
of thematic issues that were cited by the interviewees themselves. All data points were included
in these thematic issues that were chosen by the participants, so in essence all participants'
weltanschauung were included to ensure completeness with regard to the operation of IO within
the United States government. Once these results were analysed and duplicates eliminated,
further aggregation and collation resulted in the formation of two distinct and different Root
Definitions as shown above. It will be these established parameters that will then be used in
Chapter Eight to articulate a set Conceptual Models for this issue area.
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Chapter 8 - Conceptual Models
In Chapter Five under Research Methods, the preferred methodology of Soft Systems
was outlined for the reader see Figure 5.1, which brought together the combination of Root
Definitions and Conceptual Models that were considered the key to this process. ''The Root
Definition defines what the system is and the Conceptual Model describes what the system must
do" (Wilson, 2001, p. xv). This is because, it is in these two steps of SSM, where the thesis
participants are able to debate the given situation, in this case the status ofiO in the United
States government, with the vital exchanges occurring through the use of these Conceptual
Models. For example, Checkland cited these models as "intellectual devices", whose role is to
help structure an exploration of the problem situation being addressed (Checkland and Scholes,
1999, p. A21). These academics do this in order to seek changes which would improve the
situation by moving from the systems thinking view of Conceptual Models to the real-world,
where comparisons can be made. Likewise Jackson states that the use of SSM will lead to the
construction of a number of models to be compared with the real world, as opposed to one that
would result from the use of a hard methodology (Jackson, 2000, p.247). It is these changes to
the models which are typically regarded as both desirable and culturally feasible, with
accommodations made between conflicting interests, which makes the SSM process so useful in
the final actions to improve the problem situation, with a positive effect as shown in Figure 8.1
below.

8.1

The SSM Process in Use
The initial theoretical frameworks that are used at the beginning of this process are

defined as high-level task models and are derived solely from the ideal Root Definitions.
Normally developed from the interview process, these Conceptual Models represent processes or
methods of achieving a goal as defined in Chapter Five (Appendix E). To show the
conceptualisation of this methodology, in Chapter Seven, two Root Definitions were developed
from the interview data using the CATWOE elements and thematic areas. In this Chapter, two
primary Conceptual Models and 12 sub Conceptual Models (for a total of 14 in all), were
developed from the data gathered in the initial set of interviews. As noted earlier, Conceptual
Models are not describing reality, but instead, they should describe what the system 'does'. This
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is seen in the use of main models and subsidiary figures to 'broaden' the data, which in essence
'fleshed' out the ideas from the interviewees with six subsets for each Conceptual Model, all of
which was original information in the CATWOE elements. The goal of each model was
therefore to trace the 'ideas' and 'concepts' of the thesis participants from the Rich Pictures and
Root Definitions of SSM, to ultimately develop figures or diagrams that would help to build
examples or prototypes to in theory, answer the original research questions.
The situation as
a Culture

sttuatiQM

0
0
0

Analysis of the
Intervention
"Social System"
Analysis

D
D
0

D1lferWicaa batwalen models
and,.world
STREAM OF
CULTURAL
ANALYSIS

Would-be improvers
of the problem
situation

L~SlREAM

History

OF ANALYSIS

Figure 8.1 -The Process of SSM (Checldand and Scholes, 1990)

8.2

The Development of Conceptual Models
In the next two sections, a total of two major and 12 minor Conceptual Models were

developed from the Root Definitions and the data gathered in the initial set of interviews. A
process to show how these models were developed in shown in Figure 8.2, and this methodology
was carried throughout this Chapter for all 14 models. From a macro level view, these
Conceptual Models are generally divided into two broad categ01ies- the first seven are more of
a top down, centralised process, while the second seven are more of a bottom up, or
decentralised version of the actions required to conduct IO across the United States government.
The input for these models came from the thesis interviews, as they desctibed processes and
methodologies desired to better accomplish this mission within the federal bureaucracy. In each
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instance, a master model was developed - for example Conceptual Mode (CM) 1.0 (Table 8.3)
and CM 2.0 in Table 8. 11. From these overarching themes, sub-models were constructed for
each of the six individual tasks, which matched to the respective CATWOE Elements via the
Root Definitions, as shown for the first model in Tables 8.4 through 8.1 0, and the second model
in Tables 8.1 2 through 8.1 8. The colour coded scheme developed in Chapters Six and Seven is
also carried throughout this section as well to denote the respective CATWOE Categories and
main areas of focus.
Given: A Definition ofT, multiple "E 's", CATWOE and Root Definition

(1) Using verbs in the imperative, write down activities necessary to carry out T
(2) Select activities wblch could be done at once (ie not dependent on others)

(3) Write these out on a line, then those dependents
on these first activities on a line below,
until all activities are accounted for
- indicate the dependencies

(4) Redraw to avoid overlapping arrows
where possible and add monitoting I control

Figure 8.2 -A Logical Process for Building CM's (Checkland and Scholes, 1999)

8.2.1

Conceptual Modcll.O
The relationship of the Conceptual Models to the Root Definitions will also be described

in this chapter. In essence, the two main Conceptual Models milTor their respective Root
Definitions and are diametrically opposite of each other. In this first master model, Conceptual
Model 1.0, IQ in the United States govemment - A Top Down (Centralised) View as shown in
Figure 8.3, is derived from the first Root Definition and interview data, where an enterptise wide
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construct emerged with centralised authority to coordinate and conductIO campaigns utilising a
number of federal agencies and capabilities in a timed and orchestrated manner. It is symbolised
by the use of strategic goals, coordinating systems, 'that determine requirements early in the
process, and then measure the effects afterwards are symptomatic of an overarching program.
Many participants advocated a single interagency organisation with the authority and financial
backing to execute these actions for the United States govemment. These interviewees believed
that in order to get the best effect from IO, these disparate actions needed to be cenn:aUy
managed and ~oordinated across functional agencies, to give a single coherent message to the
world.

CM 1.2- Set up
coordinating systems
between WH, DoS and DoD

Goals:
Develops a
coordinated and
integrated strategic
USG 10 campaign

1

CM 1.3 ·Investigate
needs of

Information Operations in the United States government is derived from the perspective
of the overall 10 themes to produce better integration implemented and run by tactical
versus strategic 10 personnel for the benefit of the USG and under the control of key
decision makers within the constraints of the fact that 10 is not a new warfare area.
Weltanschauung 10 Themes
Owners
Environment

Table 8.1 - Conceptual Modell.O 10 in the United States government: A Top Down
(Centralised) View

The key to understanding this first master Conceptual Model is to view the expressed
opinion of the interviewees for a centralised, controlled and coordinated system. These
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partic-ipants modelled a desire where key decision makers in the United States government were
able through increased integration to execute 10 campaigns on a systemic and sustainable basis.
They believed that if the cotTect governing structures were put into place that success could be
achieved in the operation ofiO across the interagency structure. This can be seen in the actual
CATWOE elements and categories that are matched up to the original data cells to develop
specific Conceptual Models in which all info1mation from the research participants is coded to
not only the final models but also the earlier Root Definitions. In this way, the data can be traced
directly from a specific interviewee to a final Conceptual Model. An example for Conceptual
Model 1.0 is shown below:

..,c..a.-.te~o-..._ _ _ El

t

-

--

-

....

--

Data Cells

CM

AS, AS, A12
Tl, T3
W3, W4
01, 02, 06, 09
El, E4, ElO

1.4
1.1
1.2
1.5
1.3
1.6

. C4

-..,....~

.
Clients
.
:Actors
Transformation Better Inte atlon of 10 actions
10 Tbemes
Worldview
Owners
Ke Decision Makers

-:l

Table 8.2 - The Relationship of Root Definition 1.0 to Conceptual Model 1.0
Overall strategic goals, using integrated policies, training and coordinated systems was
also considered key to this approach. This hierarchical view is seen in the next six tables, where
Conceptual Models 1.1 -1.6 are examined, with further details provided about how these tactical
actions could be undertaken in a centralised fashion, as shown where the following concepts
were key:

•
•

•
•
•
•

CM
CM
CM
CM
CM
CM

l. l
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6

Tactical versus Strategic
Coordinating systems between WH, DoS and DoD
Investigate needs of stakeholders
Set up an 1nteragency IO campaign bureaucracy
Execute IO Campaigns
Measure 10 Campaign's success

Moving on to Conceptual Model 1.1 (Figure 8.3), the focus is on the development of a
series of strategic vice tactical goals for an enterprise-wide system for the conduct of IO in the
United States government. From a top-down v-iew of the participants, the fo1mulation of a set of
overarching themes or issues was often considered the most crucial step in this project, and this
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attitude is reflected in the development of this conceptual model. Reviewing the interviewee
data, a number of discrete tasks were listed below, that even further emphasise the need to focus
on the strategic vice tactical element of implementing IO. These include:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Analyse government agencies plans with respect to IO
Develop similar type of IO plans and goals in each United States government agency
Develop a centralised series of committees and groups to monitor and adjust plans as
needed
Ensure sh·ategic goals match interagency IO plans
Ensure that these IO plans are synchronised across the organizations
Match agency plans to sh·ategic IO goals for United States government

Ensure strategic
goals match
interagency 10 plans

Analyse agencies
plans wrt 10

Develop a centralised series
of committees and groups to
monitor and adjust plans as
needed

Develop similar
type of 10 plans
and goals in each
USG agency

~--,

Goals:
Ensures a top-down,
centrally executed plan
that is integrated across
the USG

Ensure that these 10 plans
are synchronised across the
organisations

Match agency plans
to strategic 10 goals
for USG

Monitoring
system needs
links through-out
interagency

Figure 8.3- Conceptual Modell.l: Tactical vs. Strategic Goals for United States
government IO Systems
By doing this, the ability to meet the primary goal of ensuring a top-down, centrally executed
plan that is integrated across the United States government that targets an improved
understanding of objectives by the key decision-makers. It was emphasised by the participants
that a monitoring system was needed who contained links through-out the interagency system in

203

order to ensure the enterprise wide view of these goals. This is seen primarily in the major
CATWOE elements that were emphasised in this sub-model of Tactical versus Strategic, as part
of the Actor CATWOE Category:
•
•
•

A5
A8
A12

Standalone IO cells - worked well?
4th POG - too tactical , to low on Chain of Command
Information Czar? What about an IO Corps or a Commander in Chief
IO/Standing Joint Force Headquarters

In addition, there were other CATWOE Elements in this category that were scattered throughout

the data, that also alluded to the need to understand whether the system was tactically oi·
sh·ategically miented.

•

04

•

E15

In the Office of Secretary of Defense, oversight of IO is everywhere
Top to bottom or bottom to top? .

Better Integration of 10 Actions

Develop a coherent and
integrate<! set of coordinating
systems between all three
organisations

Ensure coordinating
systems utilise similar
standards

Goals:
Real-time integrated 10
systems that are
coordin ated both
vertically and horizontally
across the interagency

Need buy-in, resources and
commitment from top
leadership

Operations
should be 24/7constant and
continuous

Utilise same SW and
HW to communicate,
operate and plan

Targets:
Instill a belief in
effectiveness of USG
10 plans, systems and
operations

Systems should
provide metrics
for analysis
Monitoring
system that can
transfer data
seamlessly across
all levels of USG

Figure 8.4- Conceptual Model1.2: Coordinating systems between White House,
Department of State and Department of Defense
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In the next sub-model, a centralised coordinating system was deemed necessary as the
second component of a top-down model. This interlacing of the three key Information
Operations components - namely the White House, the State Department and the Department of
Defense was seen as crucial by the participants of this thesis. They believed and stated on
numerous occasions that in order to effectively conduct an IO campaign, that the integration of
these three agencies, using similar themes, ideas, methods, etc, were all crucial to the overall
success. This need to develop this centralised coordinating system was a key issue for many
interviewees, as shown in the f)Ub-model tasks, as shown below:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Ensure coordinating systems utilise similar standards
Operations should be 24/7 constant and continuous
Need buy-in, resources and commitment from top leadership
Develop a coherent and integrated set of coordinating systems between all three
organisations
Utilise same software and hardware to communicate, operate and plan
Systems should provide metrics for analysis

These tasks equate quite well to the overall goal of a standardised and real-time integrated IO
systems that are coordinated both vertically and horizontally across the interagency agencies.
This theme was stated a number of times in the interviews, as they targeted the need to instil a
belief in effectiveness of United States government IO plans, systems and operations. This
desire for an overarching system was also expressed in the need for a monitoring system that can
transfer data seamlessly across all levels of the federal agencies. This is seen primarily in the
major CATWOE elements that were emphasised in this sub-model of Better Integration ofiO
Actions as part of the Transformation CATWOE Category:
•

Tl

•
•

T3
T4

Strategic Campaign, that is, strategic psychological operations I IO, integrating
coherent strategy - important
Flatten the process - integrate - dynamic
Integrate top-level nodes and missions- goals and objectives

In addition, there were other CATWOE Elements in this category that were scattered throughout
the data, which also alluded to the need to understand whether the system was oriented toward
the integration of IO activities:
•
•

A2
A6

Planners and operators need to work together
Old United States Information Agency types/ State Department, are they
integrated?

205

•

All

•

Wl

•

03

National Security Council Office Global Communications and White House I
Department ofDefense- relate to a National Intelligence Council?
Political, military, United States governments, engineers, intemational relations
professors
Is their trust in the perception management effmis of these organizations? United
States Information Agency?
Key Decision Makers

Ensure that key USG
agencies understand
users needs and desires

Define key decision
· makers in the USG

Develop overall guidance
for key USG organisations

Execute system on a
consistent and
repeatable basis

Develop system to
understand
stake holders
needs and desires

Goals:
Ensure Stakeholders
needs are met

Targets:
Users defined as USG
personnel and key
decision makers

Measure the
needs of
stakeholders
Monitoring system
feedback through
interagency
bureaucracy

Figure 8.5- Conceptual Model1.3: Investigate Needs of Stakeholders
As pa1i of the development of a series of goals and overarching systems for the execution
of IO within the United States govemment, there is a need as expressed by the data of this thesis
that the needs of the stakeholders must be researched and analysed. This was amplified in the
third sub-model as shown above. Key themes that emerge from the information provided in this
study include the belief that a deep and thorough understanding of the desires of these key
decision-makers will be the fundamental concepts in the proper development of a centralised
top-down system, as shown below:
•
•

Define key decision makers in the United States government
Develop system to understand stakeholders needs and desires

206

•
•
•
•

Develop overall guidance for key United States government organisations
Ensure that key United States government agencies understand users needs and desires
Execute system on a consistent and repeatable basis
Measure the needs of stakeholders

These tasks are desired to ensure that the stakeholders needs are met, which meant for many
interviewees that the system users were defined as United States government personnel and key
decision makers. A desirable feature of this monitoring of stakeholders was a monitoring system
that produced feedback through interagency bureaucracy to ensure that the stakeholder's needs
were met. This is seen primarily in the major CATWOE elements that were emphasised in this.
sub-model of Key Decision Makers from the Owners CATWOE Category:

•
•

07
08

White House - good political domestic message and spin -reacts to foreign events
Need to quickly get decisions on public diplomacy from on high

In addition, there were other CATWOE Elements in this category that were scattered throughout
the data, that also alluded to the need to understand whether the system was oriented to
understand the importance of key decision makers in this process:
•

A7

•
•

Al5
E5

•

E8

Department of State Political Coordinating Committee and the National Security
Council Political Coordinating Committee - no deCision making authority ·
Alistair Campbell or Karen Hughes type of influence is desired
Information Warfare- Psychological Operations not good terms for interagency,
IO, Strategic Communications and effects based operations- better?
United States public diplomacy must be faster, more reactive
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Goals:
Ensure all USG personnel
are well trained and know
the policy and system
developed to conduct
strategic 10.

Ensure adequate training of
personnel across USG to
man this bureaucracy

is consistent, to execute a
top-down system

Develop consistent 10
policy across the USG
organisations

.,..

_.,-_ ·---:.

Develop 10
planning
system for all
of the USG

Execute sirategic
10 plans from
~-~, single system
key agencies plus
other key USG
decision makers

Use 10 standards
recog nised across
USG
Monitoring
system uses
recognised 10
standards and
systems

Figure 8.6- Conceptual Model1.4: Set up an Interagency 10 Campaign Bureaucracy
As part of top-down view of many of the thesis participants, an interagency bureaucracy
was

desir~d

to organise and execute this enterprise-wide IO campaign. It was the opinion of

these interviewees, that only a centrally coordinated office could be effective in conducting these
tasks across the disparate federal offices and agencies. These beliefs from the personnel
involved in the study led as shown in this fourth sub-model of Conceptual Model # 1, was a series
of overarching tasks, that all strive to develop coherent and consistent actions by the United
States government, with regard to the conduct of IO, as shown below:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Develop consistent IO policy across the United States govemment organisations
Develop IO planning system for all of the United States government
Ensure adequate training of personnel across United States government to man this
bureaucracy
Ensure that IO architecture is consistent, to execute a top-down system
Execute strategic IO plans from single system
Use IO standards recognised across United States govemment
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The obvious overall goal of these effmis was to ensure all United States government personnel
involved with the conduct of strategic level IO missions were well trained, lmew the current
policy as well as system parameters.

Central to this centralised execution was coherent support

by the staffs of the three key agencies plus other key United States government decision makers,
who utilised a monitoring system comprised of recognised IO standards. This is seen primarily
in the major CATWOE elements that were emphasised in this sub-model of the United States
government personnel as part of the Client CATWOE Category:
•

C4

US Government including miUtary

IIOThemes

Execute standard 10
plans and operations
24/7 across the USG

Ensure compatibility of
interagency 10
processes

I

Goals:
A well-run and timely
series of 10
campaigns

Ensure USG bureaucracy is
capable of executing 10
plans and operations

Incorporate 10 into
DoD, NSC and DoS's,
normal operational
capability

Execute 10
campaigns 24/7
around the world

Targets: Key decision
makers and
audiences in USG

Develop feedback
mechanisms for 10
campaigns
Monitoring
system through
USG sources

Figure 8.7- Conceptual Modell.S: Execute 10 Campaigns
From this overarching IO bureaucracy, many interviewees felt that they could execute
well-organised and successful Information Operations campaigns, on a world-wide basis. The
participants desired to deconflict the missions between federal agencies, in order to bring about
to the greatest extent the power of information in this new era, where IO was seen as a new tool
for conducting foreign policy. This vision of the power available and the ability to harness, all
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depended in these interviewees minds on the coherent and coordinated use of Information
Operation campaigns by the United· States government as shown below:
•
•

Ensure compatibility of interagency IO processes
Incorporate IO into Department ofDefense, National Security Council and the State
Department's normal operational capability
• Ensure United States government bureaucracy is capable of executing IO plans and
operations
.
.
.
• · Execute standard IO plans and operations 24/7 across the United States government
• Execute IO campaigns 24/7 around the world
• Develop feedback mechanisms for IO campaigns ·
This ability to conduct well-run and timely series of IO campaigns was of course dependent on
key decision makers and audiences in federal bureaucracy agreeing with these concepts and
understanding the need for this enterprise-wide system. In order to be successful, this
bureaucracy should have tight links into existing organizations, with a monitoring system that
utilised normal government metrics and processes. This is seen primarily in the major
CATWOE elements that were emphasised in this sub-model ofiO Themes aspart of the
Weltanschauung CATWOE Category:
•
•

W3
W4

IO Road Map almost reverting back to Command and Control Warfare- why?
Is their difference between IO and public diplomacy lane?

In addition, there were other CATWOE Elements in this category that were scattered throughout
the data that also alluded to the need to understand whether the system was oriented to
understand IO Themes:
•
•

E9
E12

•

E14

Eat your own dog food (United States)
Key United States values- freedom, Declaration oflndependence, a land of
immigrants Constitution
Information is like terrain, cannot leave unoccupied
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A comprehensive and
integrated set of
measures of evaluate an
10 Campaign

Develop metrics
that can utilised
across USG

Utilise global edia
and ·usG to measure
10 plans and
strategy

Ensure 10 standards, policies
and procedures are developed
and adhered to by the three
key USG agencies

Develop standard
methodology to measure
success of an 10
campaign

Goals:
Match strategic 10
plans to resources
and capabilities

Targets:
Key USG decision
makers and
organisations

Incorporate 10 training, resources,
planning and operations into one set
of metrics for USG

Figure 8.8- Conceptual Model1.6: Measure 10 Campaign's Success
The ability to measure and validate success is always a crucial metric in the performance
of a task, and in this case the conduct of IO campaigns is no different. The participants who
advocated this top-down approach also believed in a strong feedback mechanism, one that
enabled them to learn lessons from their actions and to apply changes to the system as deemed
appropriate. This methodology is shown in the last sub-model of Conceptual Model One, where
a standardised process for measuring success is advocated for development as shown here:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Develop metrics that can be utilised across United States government
Utilise global media and United States government to measure IO plans and strategy
Ensure IO standards, policies and procedures are developed and adhered to by the three
key United States government agencies
A comprehensive and integrated set of measures of evaluate an IO Campaign
Develop standard methodology to measure success of an IO campaign
Incorporate IO training, resources, planning and operations into one set of metrics for
United States government

This need for reliable metrics equates for the need in the minds of the thesis interviewees to
match the strategic IO plans to the actual resources and capabilities of the federal government,
_.
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based on the desires of the key United States government decision makers and organizations. On
multiple occasions, the need for a comprehensive monitoring system using feedback from a
multitude of sources was mentioned as a desirable trait for the future developments of IO by the
United States. This is seen primarily in the major CATWOE elements which were emphasised
in this sub-model of the fact that IO is not a New Warfare Area as part of the Environment
CATWOE Category:.
•
•
•

E1
E4
E10

Time is crucial, computers have increased change
Money and resources drive capabilities
IO is not new

In addition, there were other CATWOE Elements in this category that were scattered throughout
the data, that also alluded to the need to understand whether the system was oriented to the fact
that IO is not a New Warfare Area:
•
•
•

. 8.2.2

T2
T7
TS

Innovation occurs at the margins
Effects based operations
Target analysis

Conceptual Model 2.0
Ifthe first Conceptual Model is more of a top-down or enterprise-wide view ofhow IO

should be conducted in the United States, then the second Conceptual Model was radically
different .:tnd was developed from comments made by many of participants, who advocated a
much more unstructured or bottom-up approach. This attitude advocated a less cumbersome or a
more market-based structure, one that was less controlled, but more open to interpretation, to
give the system more flexibility in today's globalised world. Consistent in the comments from
these interviews, was the belief that all information could not be controlled, and that a flattened
set of interrelated groups, processes, policies and standards was a better method of trying to
conduct IO in a disorganized environment.
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CM 2.1 -Accept any and all
CM 2.2- UUIIIIe• _..
10 actions conducted for the ~~-- • variety of 10 tfalnlng
United States government
courses and Instruction

CM 2.3 - Develop an
10 policy broad
enough to encompass
all key US values

CM 2.4 - Develop a
decentralised
communications and
networking procedures
to facilitate 10

Goals:
Conduct 10 in a
decen trali sed

CM 2.5 - Provide

Information Operations in the United States government from the perspective of the
development of 10 Policy to produce overall 10 goals implemented and run by 10
Personnel for the benefit of all other personnel that are affected by 10 under the need for
a better 10 structure within the constraints of the overall 10 training available.
Weltanschauung 10 Policy
Owne rs
10 Structure
Envi ronment
10 Training

Figure 8.9 - Conceptual Model2.0: 10 in the United States Government, a Bottom
up View
It can be noticed in this second Conceptual Model, a more decentralised approach to the
coordinating of IO tasks and missions was utilised. Likewise Conceptual Model 2.0 and its
subordinates were derived from the second Root Definition and the following CATWOE
elements as shown below and in Figure 8.11. Once again, attempts were made to be able to trace
the data directly from a specific interviewee to a final Conceptual Model. An example for
Conceptual Model 2.0 is shown below:
•
•

CM 2.1
CM 2.2

•
•

CM 2.3
CM 2.4

•

CM 2.5

Accept any and all IO goals conducted for the United States government
Develop a decentralised communications and networking procedures
utilizing IO personnel to execute and facilitate IO activity
Utilise a wide variety of IO training courses and instruction
Develop an IO policy and strategy broad enough to encompass all key
United States values
Provide resources and adequate funding by using all other personnel to
foster innovation in IO
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•

CM2.6

Develop a set of IO standards and structures that can be understood and
utilised by all organisations

Category

Clients
Actors
Transformation
Worldview
Owners
Environment

Element

All Others
Ove rail Goals
10 Policy

10 Structure
10 Training

Data Cells

Cl, C2, C3, CS, C6
Al, A3, A9, AlO
TlO, Tll, T12
W5, W6
01, 02, 06, 09
E2, E3, E13

CM

2.5
2.6
2.1
2.4
2.2
2.3

Table 8.3 - A Comparison of Conceptual Model 2.0 to Root Definition 2.0

This lack of centralisation or perhaps the input of more realism in the understanding of
how the federal bureaucracy actually operates, is also evident in the six sub-models of
Conceptual Model2.0 that follow. Instead of tr-ying to direct or coordinate IO tasks in an
overarching or coherent manner, the patticipants noted in their comments that the United States
should simply accept and take in, any IO missions conducted, whether these operations are pa1t
of a campaign or not. · This is a fairly radical idea and extremely opposite of what was proposed
by the advocates of Conceptual Model 1.0, but perhaps it also is more fiscally and politically
acceptable. Therefore in the next six tables, this flattened or open view will be examined, with
further details provided about how these tactical actions could be undertaken in a decentralised
fashion.
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10 Goals

Develop strategic
goals from the 10
actions conducted w/1
the United States

Use opinion polls
to determine US
strategic goals

Goals:
Attempts to tie together
in a bottom-up fashion
the plethora of 10
activities conducted by
the United States

Develop a decentralised
accounting mechanism
such as a portal, where 10
activities can be reported

Compare 10
actions to longstanding cultural
va lues of US

--~,

Utilise polls and reports from
the media to undestand
impact of 10 activities

Utilise academics and media
to analyse effectiveness of 10
campaigns wrt to targets

Targets:
A large variety of foreign
and domestic populations

Monitoring
system is simply
done by self
reporting and the
media

7

Figure 8.10 - Conceptual Mode12.1: Accept any and all 10 actions conducted for the
United States government
In this patticulat figure, the focus is on the use of any and all IO actions to develop a
series of goals for a system that simply tries accept the disparate conduct of IO in the United
States government. As to be expected, the f01mulation of a set of themes or issues based on a
number of organizations and agencies that are not coordinating will be difficult at best, but in
reality, it may offer an alternative view to a way ahead based on all participants'
weltanschauung. The particular tasks are laid out in no pa1ticular priority by the interviewees:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Use opinion polls to dete1mine United States strategic goals
Compare IO actions to long-standing cultural values of United States
Develop a decentralised accounting mechanism such as a portal, where IO activities can
be reported
Develop strategic goals from the IO actions conducted w/I the United States
Utilis'e polls and reports from the media to understand impact of IO activities
Utilise academics and media to analyse effectiveness of IO campaigns with regard to
targets
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As opposed to a centrally organised system, this approach attempts to tie together in a bottom-up
fashion, the plethora of IO activities conducted by the United States. It does this by targeting a
large variety of foreign and domestic populations, with a monitoring system is simply done by
self reporting and the media. This lack of an overarching methodology or process, was
mentioned by many as simply a realistic review of the current conditions that exist in today's
federal bureaucracy. This is seen primarily in the major CATWOE elements that were
emphasised in this sub-model of IO Goals as part of the Transformation CATWOE Category:
•
•
•

Tl 0
Tll
T12

Access to top leadership - overall guidance
What are the overall goals?
Set out top-level nodes and missions - goals and objectives

110 Structure

Develop a network bridge
or portal that can accept a
variety of communications
systems and networks

common standards

Attempt to foster a common
set of procedures for
reporting 10 activities

1---~,

Goals:
Real-time integrated 10
systems that are
coord inated both

Utilise compatible SW
and HW to communicate,
operate and plan

Systems should
provide metrics
for analysis
Monitoring
system that can
transfer data
seamlessly across
all organisations

Figure 8.1- Conceptual Model2.2: Develop a Decentralised Communications and
Networking Procedures to Execute and Facilitate 10 Activity
In the next sub-model, a decentralised coordinating system was advocated for the

communications and networking procedures to execute and facilitate IO activity. This lack of
key or essential government organisation components was not deemed as crucial by the
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participants of this thesis. Theybelieved and stated on numerous occasions that in order to
effectively conduct an 10 campaign, that it was more important to have all participants involved,
whether or not they utilised similar themes, ideas, methods, etc. Many thesis participants did not
believe that that was needed to develop a centralised coordinating system, because other
processes were instead available, as shown below:
•.
•
•
•
•
•

Advocate similar and common standards
Pursue a common commercial off the shelf functionality of systems for all
Attempt to foster a common set of procedures for reporting 10 activities
Develop a network bridge or portal that can accept a variety of communications systems
and networks
Utilise compatible software and hardware to communicate, operate and plan
Systems should provide metrics for analysis

These interviewees felt that real-time integrated 10 systems that are coordinated both vertically
and horizontally across the interagency could be achieved by instilling an overall belief of the
accuracy of the data no matter what the source. Coherence could be achieved by the transfer of
data seamlessly across all organizations, due to the use of common standards. This is seen
primarily in the major CATWOE elements that were emphasised in this sub-model of
as part of the Owners CATWOE Category:
•

01

•
•

02
06

•

09

Interagency to include the Department of State, Department ofDefense, National
Security Council and White House- need more coordination?
Two Policy Coordinating Committees are redundant
Department of Defense is building public diplomacy capability because it believes
State is not doing enough
State needs a bigger role - bring back

In addition, there were other CATWOE Elements in this category that were scattered throughout
the data that also alluded to the need to understand whether the system was oriented to 10
Structure themes:
•
•
•
•

Al3
E6
E7
E15

Do we need a surge capability?
Interagency bureaucracies - will org change work?
24/7 capability? Model campaign headquarters? Around the world
Top to bottom or bottom to top?
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10 Training

Attempt to develop an
understanding of the
many different users
needs and desires

Analyse strategic goals
of different groups

Develop tests to track level
and competence of 10 users

Develop a blended
method of 10 instruction
that utilises a number of
academic techniques

Ensure training
is available in a
number of
·different venues

Goals:
Ensure users training
needs are met

Targets:
Users who need to
conduct 10 activities

Develop feedback
mechanisms to
evaluate training

Figure 8.12- Conceptual Model2.3: Utilise a Wide Variety of 10 Training Courses and
· Instruction
Training and execution are considered by all participants to be key to the execution of IO
within the United States government, but in this sub-model, the participants that provided data
expressed the belief that in order to be successful, a wide variety of IO courses and methods of
instruction must be utilized. These interviewees felt construct a coherent series of overarching
curricula could not be constructed and instead, the federal bureaucracy should instead allow
courses to exist as they are today. Downsides to this approach include duplication, lack of
standardisation and gaps in certain skill sets. However this group of IO experts also believed
that realistically, this may be the only viable alternative due to costs and political considerations.
The specific taskers needed for this rationalisation from the research participants are shown
below:
•
•

Analyse strategic goals of different groups
Develop a blended method of IO instruction that utilises a number of academic
techniques
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•
•
•
•

Develop tests to track level and competence of IO users
Attempt to develop an understanding of the many different users needs and desires
Ensure training is available in a number of different venues
Develop feedback mechanisms to evaluate training

Realism about overall goals to ensure that users training needs are met, by existing courses and
curricula were key themes by the interviewees. This sub-model targets the users who needed to
conduct IO activities, with a monitoring system that utilised a bottom up feedback through the
students themselves as well anecdotal evidence. This is seen
. primarily in the major. CATWOE
elements that were emphasised in this sub-model of IO Training as part of the Environment
CATWOE Category:
•
Ell

o

E2
E3
E 13

Key United States values - freedom, Declaration of Independence, a land of
immigrants, Constitution
Information is like terrain, cannot leave unoccupied
Training or lack of is badly needed for public diplomacy

In addition, there were other CATWOE Elements in this category that were scattered throughout
the data that also alluded to the need to understand whether the system was oriented to IO
Training themes:

•

A4
A14
T6

o

T9.

•

W2
05

o
o

Ell

How many actors have been trained in IO?
Senior level United States government training & awareness is needed
We need continuous training and education
IO Road Map- major recommendations for training
Many practitioners do not understand IO
How many of the above have been trained in IO?
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l1o Policy I

Develop an 10 architecture
broad enough to cover all
US strategic goals

Tie together disparate
10 strategies and policy
with doctrine that
stresses key US values

Goals:
Develop 10 policies,
strategies and doctrine
and can encompass all
key US values and 10
activities

Make training
opportunities
available to all
10 users

Ensure that these
broad themes are
promulgated to all
10 users

1---~~

Develop good horizontal
communications among
key 10 policy makers

Enlist the academic
community to
evaluate 10 efforts
wrt key US values

Monitoring
system using
polls, surveys, the
media and
academic reports

Figure 8.13 -Conceptual Model2.4: Develop an 10 Policy and Strategy Broad Enough to
Encompass all Key United States Values
Unlike in the first Conceptual Model, where you saw descriptions of the need for a series
of overarching and comprehensive set ofiOpolicies, which describe how this mission area
would be conducted across the federal government, this next sub-model follows a different
approach. While many of the participants agreed that in theory, this would be good, many
understood as well that the chance of getting this accomplished was slim. Instead some of the
interviewees believed that instead to be successful, the practitioners of 10 should just develop an
10 strategy that was broad enough to accomplish all key United States objectives. To do this, the
10 policies in use should be incorporated into a broader plan, with the following features:
•
o

•
•
•

Tie together disparate 10 strategies and policy with doctrine that stresses key United
States values
Ensure that these broad themes are promulgated to all 10 users
Make training opportunities available to all 10 users
Develop an 10 architecture broad enough to cover all United States strategic goals
Develop good horizontal communications among key 10 policy makers
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0

Enlist the academic community to evaluate IO efforts with respect to key United States
values

This approach to developing IO strategies and doctrine, is an alternative methodology from the
typical process, and in doing so, the key focus is to utilise current policies that can encompass all
key United States values and IO activities. The thesis participants were targeting foreign and
domestic populations with these IO strategies, and felt that a monitoring system based on polls,
surveys, the media and academic reports, would sufficient in this process. This is seen primarily
in the major CATWOE elements that were emphasised in this sub-model of

-~as

part of

the Weltanschauung CATWOE Category:
0

o

W5
W6

Do we need a National Information Policy?
Or should we just update the National Security Strategy?

In addition, there were other CATWOE Elements in this category that were scattered throughout
the data that also alluded to the need to understand whether the system was oriented to IO Policy
themes:
o
o

T13
Ell

Cyber Security and public diplomacy related?
Information Warfare- psychological operations not good terms for interagency,
IO, strategic communications and effects based operations- better?
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All Others

Develop a high level of
understanding in the
US of the value of 10

Survey US population
towards attitudes on
10 and key values

Foster a spirit of
cooperation toward
the funding of 10
activities in the US

Promulgate a series of
articles and reports of
how the art of warfare
has changed

Develop reporting and
accounting mechanisms
to keep track of
disparate 10 activities

Develop a set of
goals that the
various 10 activities
can strive for

Targets: Groups and
organisations that
fund 10 activities

Monitoring
system common
databases and
reports

Figure 8.14 - Conceptual Model 2.5: Provide Resources and Adequate Funding to Foster
Innovation in 10
Instead of a set of centralised funding, in this alternative model, the participants
advocated cooperative and innovative methods of resourcing the conduct of IO by the federal
government. The interviewees did not feel that IO could cortunand the large budget or
discretionary spending of say a major weapons system and instead suggested the fostering of
·collaborative efforts to ensure that these programs would get the money that they needed to
conduct their mission. This was done by the following means:
•

•
•
•
•
•

Survey key portions of the United States population (that is, personnel and staff that are
familiar with these concepts or deal with these issues) towards attitudes on IO and key
values
Foster a spirit of cooperation toward the funding ofiO activities in the United States
Promulgate a series of articles and reports of how the art of warfare has changed
Develop a high level of understanding in the United States of the value of IO
Develop reporting and accounting mechanisms to keep track of disparate IO activities
Develop a set of goals that the various IO activities can strive for
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The major goal of this sub-model was to ensure that the respective IO activities in the federal
government were resourced adequately, especially targeting the groups and organisations that
conduct IO activities. This was done by utilising a set of common databases and repmis as a
standard monitoring system. This is seen primarily in the major CATWOE elements that were
emphasised in this sub-model of All Other Personnel as part of the Client CATWOE Category:

•
•

..•
•

Cl
C2
C3
C5
C6

Foreign Audiences
Key decision makers (foreign and domestic) .
United States Citizens (general public) .
Academia (foreign and domestic)
Media including Hollywood

Attempt to link 10 standards to
policy, doctrine and strategy
used by the various la
activities in the US

standards that can be
utilised by all 10 activities

Determine if there
are metrjcs that can
be utilised by all
organisations

Utilise global media
and academia to
measure 10 plans
and strategy

Goals:
Commonality among
10 groups towards
standards that are
utilised

Strive to integrate the
disparate methodologies for
10 organisations through
common processes

Analyse 10 training and 10
standards for commonality

Monitoring system
a decentralised that
colates standards,
policy, training and
10 activities

Figure 8.15 - Conceptual Model 2.6: Develop a set of 10 standards that can be understood
and utilised by all organisations
As was also mentioned in sub-model 1.6, the ability to measure and validate success was
considered a crucial metric in the performance of an IO task. While many participants advocated
a top-down approach with a strong internal feedback mechanism, other interviewees instead
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advocated a more decentralised methodology, which embraced any and all IO standards. This
bottom-up view utilises a more liberal process for collecting metrics that attempts to bring
together disparate activities into a collective force. To do this, data obtained as part of this
research project, was sorted in the following manner:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Determine if there are metrics that can be utilised by all organisations
Utilise global media and academia to measure IO plans and strategy
Attempt to link IO standards to policy, doctrine and strategy used by the various Io
activities in the United States
A comprehensive and decentralised set of standards that can be utilised by all IO
activities
Strive to integrate the disparate methodologies for IO organisations through common
processes
Analyse IO training and IO standard~ for commonality

The goal of this effort was to support commonality among IO groups towards a series of
standards to be utilised, by disparate IO organizations, to create a coherent but decentralised
monitoring system that collates standards, policy, training and IO activities. This is seen
primarily in the major CATWOE elements that were emphasised in this sub-model of IO
Personnel as part of the Actor CATWOE Category:
•

Al

•
•

A3
A9

•

AlO

Media/Hollywood - reservists or liaison personnel needed?
The Rendon Group and consultants - volunteers aka like civil defense?
International IO - that is, corporate IO?
Clearances and language skills are essential

In addition, there were other CATWOE Elements in this category that were scattered throughout
the data that also alluded to the need to understand whether the system is oriented to IO
Personnel themes:

•

8.3

TS

Hiring practices for military civilians dated - industrial era

Analysis of the Conceptual Models
Outlined below again are the specific Conceptual Models, sub-models and an analysis of

the validity of these representation's based on the reality of the development of IO across the
United States government. In general, the first set of models, numbered 1.1 through 1.6 are more
of the top-down, enterprise-wide view, while the latter set, numbered 2.1 through 2.6, tend to
contain more of a bottom-up weltanshauung or worldview. A colour code will be used to show
how these conceptual ideas relate to the actual conduct ofiO, for each of the 12 sub-Conceptual
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Models'. Blue is considered exceptional and greatly above the standard, where the interviewees
believed that the United States government was making great progress in improving the conduct
of IO across the federal bureaucracy. Green is considered a little above average, while Yellow is
slightly below average and Red is poor in overall performance. This schema will be used
throughout this chapter to analyse the overall conduct of this warfare area as related by the
participants themselves in both the original interviews and the follow-up sessions.

8.3.1

Analysis of Conceptual Modell.l -Tactical vs. Strategic Goals for USG 10
Systems
This model is centred on the CATWOE Actor element, data cells A5, A8, A12, 04 and

E15, while focusing on the differences between Tactical vs. Strategic Concepts as discussed in
Chapter Eight. Key points from that section included:

•
•

CM 1.1.1
CM 1.1.2

•

CM 1.1.3

•

CM 1.1.4
CM 1.1.5
CM 1.1.6

•

•

Analyse government agencies plans with respect to IO
Develop similar type of IO plans and goals in each United States
government agency
Develop a centralised series of committees and groups to monitor, and
adjust plans as needed
Ensure strategic goals match interagency IO plans
Ensure that these IO plans are synchronised across the organizations
Match agency plans to strategic IO goals for United States government

If the information brought forth in this research project is then dissected further, it can be seen
that significant progress has been achieved in the development of a series of national goals and
standards. The sheer breadth of national policies with their interlocking strategies can be
epitomised by the IO Road Map and the new Joint Publication 3-13, both of which were released
in 2003. Major efforts have also been conducted to analyse these new policies to ensure that
they allowed for the ability to synchronise the actions and activities of these interagency units to
better conductIO. An example of this development of new IO training and planning courses can
be seen at the National Defense University and the Joint Forces Staff College. Other examples
of this enterprise-wide effort for the United States government can be seen in the promulgation
of new instructions such as the Department ofDefense Instruction 8570.1 which mandates the
training and education of the Information Assurance workforce, including the enforcement of
certifications, as an obvious reference to the understanding of the importance of standards.
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While there has been progress, in many ways, much work still needs to be done in this
specific CATWOE element. The early belief that these IO plans would be centralised, with
federated and matching goals is still not a realised goal. Feedback from the separate verification
and validation effmts reveal that more attention needs to be paid to matching the goals, from
agency to agency, in both the vertical and horizontal planes. In addition, the diverse plans that
are still originating across the Depa11ment of Defense and federal agencies have yet to embrace
common standards for the conduct ofiO, all of which point to the need to continue efforts in this
multifaceted warfare area. A nascent effort to start an IO Standards Working Group is
underway, but still needs time and funding to succeed.
Therefore this section is colour coded as shown below when comparing the conceptual
issues of CM 1.1 .1 through CM 1.1 .6, to the re~lity of IO in use today by the United States
govemment.
Table 8.4- Analysing Effectiveness of CM 1.1

These rankings came from a valiety of comments and observations of the thesis participants. In
pa11icular it was noted that while good work has been conducted on analysing and developing IO
plans across the federal agencies, that the ability to match strategic goals to these plans is poor.
Overall it still appears that many of the govemment organisations are still operating in a vacuum,
and not integrating well across both the tactical and strategic IO areas.

8.3.2

Conceptual Model 1.2 - Coordinating systems between White House,
Department of State and the Department of Defense
This model is centred on the CATWOE Transformation element, data cells Tl, T3, T4,

A2, A6, All, Wl and 03 which focused on the differences between Better Integration of IO
Actions as discussed in Chapter Eight. Key points from that section included:

•
•
•
•

CM
CM
CM
CM

•

CM 1.2.5
CM 1.2.6

•

1.2.1
1.2.2
1.2.3
1.2.4

Ensure coordinating systems utilise similar standards
Operations should be 24/7 - constant and continuous
Need buy-in, resources and commitment from top leadership
Develop a coherent and integrated set of coordinating systems between all
three organisations
Utilise same software and hardware to communicate, operate and plan
Systems should provide metrics for analysis
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This is an area that has not progressed as far as the development of new IO policy in the United
States government. The lack of acknowledged enterprise-wide standards, requirements and
mandates has hindered the development of dedicated hardware or software for coordinating
systems to conduct 10. This was evidently apparent in the disparate IO organisations, which to
date, have not required similar arcbitectures, definitions or rule sets. This lack of a coherent or
integrated set of coordinating systems, that utilise similar software or hardware to implement IO
was exceedingly obvious not only from the interviews, but in the review of changes in the
federal bureaucracy. Overall it was evident by the information gathered from the thesis
participants, that need for more and better integration ofiO systems was needed by the United
States government.
Therefore this section is colour coded as shown below when compa1ing the conceptual
issues of CM 1.2.1 through CM 1.2.6, to the reality of IO in use today by the United States
government.

l•

! 1.2.2 !1.2.3
1.2.4
!' i 1.2.6
Table 8.5- Analysing Effectiveness of CM 1.2

l t.2.t

These rankings came from a variety of comments and observations of the thesis participants. In
particular it was noted that while good work has been achieved in conducting 2417 operations
and getting top leadership buy-in required to ensure success. Less optimal was the use of the
same or compatible hardware and software to communicate across the federal bureaucracy.
Overall it still appears that many of the government organisations are not coordinating as well as
desired and that not only is technology hindering progress, the lack of enterprise wide standards
and systems are need to ensure better integration across these key agencies.

8.3.3

Conceptual Model1.3- Investigate Needs of Stakeholders
This model is centred on the CATWOE Owners element, data cells 07, 08, A7, Al5, E5,

and E8 which focused on the differences between Key-Decision

Mak~rs

as discussed in Chapter

Eight. Key points from that section included:
•
•
•
•

CM
CM
CM
CM

1.3.1
1.3.2
1.3.3
1.3.4

Define key decision makers in the United States government
Develop system to understand stakeholders needs and desires
Develop overall guidance for key United States government organisations
Ensure that key United States government agencies understand users
needs and desires
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•
•

CM 1.3.5
CM 1.3.6

Execute system on a consistent and repeatable basis
Measure the needs of stakeholders

This was an interesting process to investigate. It was obvious from the discussions involved in
this project, that the needs of the stakeholders were key elements to the ultimate success ofthis
effort. Tied into the need for more IO training, the lack of coherent policy, the need for more
and better integration, are all crucial to achieving success for IO in the United States
govemment. Many of the participants in this project, asked almost wistfully at times, for the key
decision-makers in certain bureaucratic organisations such as the Depmtment ofDefense, State
and the National Security Council to work together, to develop an enterprise-wide set of
requirements. In this case, these needs would in the interviewees opinions, very similar and this
would add incentives to collaborate across these disparate groups.
Unf01tunately, data and anecdotal evidence point to little to no sharing of IO
requirements across these key decision-makers or shareholders. The sheer breadth of disparate
policy, instructions, mandates and inshuctions, leads instead to a situation in which each ·
organization is operating in a vertical vacuum without the horizontal integration desired by the
pa1ticipants of this thesis. Much of this dichotomy is the result of the short te1ms of govemment
appointee's, the need to abide by different agency dynamics, and the lack of an over-riding need
to work together at a higher level.
Therefore this section is colour coded as shown below when compa1ing the conceptual
issues of CM 1.3 .1 through CM 1.3 .6, to the reality of IO in use today by the United States
government.
Table 8.6 - Analysing Effectiveness of CM 1.3
These rankings came from a variety of comments and observations of the thesis participants. In
particular it was noted that great progress in defining the key decision-makers in the federal
bureaucracy with regard to IO. Likewise, good progress was being made on developing
stakeholder's needs and desires, as well as passing this guidance down through the chain of
command. However, more development was desired to meet the needs ofboth the users and
stakeholders on a consistent and standardized basis. Overall it still appears that that there is a
significant gap around the power and capabilities inherent with regard to IO in the key decision
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makers understanding what IQ can and cannot accomplish with regard to their agencies and
personnel.

8.3.4

Conceptual Model1.4 - Set up an Interagency 10 Campaign Bureaucracy
This model is centred on the CATWQE Clients element, data cell C4 which focused on

the differences between US Government Clients as discussed in Chapter Eight. Key points· from
that section included:
411

CM 1.4.1

411

CM 1.4.2
CM 1.4.3

•

•
411

•

CM 1.4.4
CM 1.4.5
CM 1.4.6

Develop consistent IQ policy across the United States government
organisations
Develop IQ planning system for all of the United States government
Ensure adequate training of personnel across United States government to
man this bureaucracy
Ensure that IQ architecture is consistent, to execute a top-down system
Execute strategic IQ plans from single system
Use IQ standards recognised across United States government

The security constraints of major portions ofiQ, especially in the computer network defense and
cyber security arena, tend to lead to an environment, where the majority of the key personnel,
from an American viewpoint, tend to reside in United States government organisations or
agencies. Whether they are military, civil service or Department ofDefense contractors, these
people all represent the federal bureaucracy to some extent, and thus characterise a major portion
of the clients that actually 'utilise' IQ as a routine part of their operational capability.
What this view of course doesn't represent, is the incredible explosion in commercial and
industry capabilities with regard to the growth of computer, information technology, video and
bandwidth rates available to the average citizen around the world. The real key to IQ is that it
has transformed warfare and taken the power away from the sovereign nations and instead
pushed it down and out to the people. This is the revolutionary aspect ofiQ, because it allows
anyone to mount an IQ campaign, in essence bypassing the traditional centres of power which
include military, diplomatic and economic. Instead, the ability to conduct an information-based
campaign, from an individual's house or business has drastically altered the environment of the
21st century, which is only being recognized now. That is the weakness of this CATWQE
element, because it does not allow for the power of the individual.
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Therefore this section is colour coded as shown below when compa1ing the conceptual
issues of CM 1.4.1 through CM 1.4.6, to the reality of IO in use today by the United States
government.

Table 8. 7 - Analysing Effectiveness of CM 1.4
These rankings came from a variety of comments and observations of the thesis participants. In
particular it was noted that while good work has been conducted on developing consistent IO
policy and IO planning systems, with adequate training of personnel across United States
government, there was very little progress on use of an enterprise-wide set of IO standards.
Overall it still appears that the desire to set up an interagency IO campaign bureaucracy is still
too optimistic and it will take more time for the US govemment clients to achieve this goal.

8.3.5

Conceptual Model1.5 - Execute 10 Campaigns
This model is centred on the CATWOE Weltanschauung element, data cells W3, W4, E9,

E12 and E14 which focused on the differences in IO Themes as discussed in Chapter Eight. Key
points from that sec.tion included:

•

•

CM 1.5.1
CM 1.5.2

•

CM 1.5.3

•

CM 1.5.4

•

CM 1.5.5
CM 1.5.6

•

Ensure compatibility of interagency IO processes
Incorporate IO into Depa1tment ofDefense, National SecUlity Council and
DoS's, normal operational capability
·
Ensure United States government bureaucracy is capable of executing IO
plans and operations
Execute standard IO plans and operations 24/7 across the United States
government
Execute IO campaigns 24/7 around the world
Develop feedback mechanisms for IO campaigns

The successful execution ofiO campaigns was a core component of many interviewees' world
view or weltanschauung. The ability to integrate and operate across bureaucratic boundaries in a
seamless manner, to conduct worldwide IO campaigns, in a 24/7 manner was considered
essential. Policy enforcement, the utilization of enterprise-wide standards and adequate feedback
mechanisms were considered key to the conduct of these missions. Time·after time, in interview
after interview, it became apparent that the desires of the thesis pa1ticipants did not match with
the reality of how the United States govemment conducted IO campaigns. Disjointed tasks,
overlapping requirements and priorities, the lack of synchronisation and coordination of the
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disparate federal bureaucracies was instead very evident not only from the interviewees, but as
well from a review of updates to IO policy and organization changes that have occurred over the
last few years. Many reasons exist for this, but the lack of compelling reasons to cooperate,
whether fiscal, political or operational, are probably the major reason that the conduct of IO
campaigns has not been as successful as desired.
Therefore this section is colour coded as shown below when comparing the conceptual
issues of CM 1.5.1 through CM 1.5.6, to the reality of IO in use today by the United States
govermp_ent.

Table 8.8 - Analysing Effectiveness of CM 1.5
These rankings came from a variety of comments and observations of the thesis participants. In
particular it was noted the great progress in conducting IO operations 24 I 7 around the world, as
well as steady improvement in the ability to incorporate IO into Department ofDefense, National
Security Council and Depattment of State, normal operational capability, as well to ensure
United States government bureaucracy is capable of executing IO plans and operations on a daily
basis. However it still appears that the use of consistent and overarching IO Themes when
conducting IO campaigns needs more effort.

8.3.6

Conceptual Model1.6- Measure 10 Campaign' s Success
This model is centred on the CATWOE Environment element, data cells El, E4, E10, T2,

T7 and T8 which focused on the fact that IO is not a New Warfare Area as discussed in Chapter
Eight. Key points from that section included:

•
•

CM 1.6.1
CM 1.6.2

•

CM 1.6.3

•

CM 1.6.4

•
•

CM 1.6.5
CM 1.6.6

Develop metrics that can be utilised across United States government
Utilise global media and United States govemment to measure IO plans
and strategy
Ensure IO standards, policies and procedures are developed and adhered
to by the three key United States government agencies
A comprehensive and integrated set of measures of evaluate an IO
Campaign
Develop standard methodology to measure success of an IO campaign
Incorporate IO training, resources, planning and operations into one set of
metrics for United States govemment

The key to understanding this conceptual model is to truly understand that because IO is in fact
not a new warfare area, but instead a combination of ancient and recent technologies and warfare
,· _
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concepts, that in order to measure the success of an IO campaign, that a variety of methods and
measures must be used. This particular process centres around the top down process, in which
standardised policies, metrics, methodologies, tr·aining and education are all focused on
determining the success or failure of an IO operation or mission.
These stated desires are unfortunately not being implemented across the United States
govemment for a va1iety of reasons. The lack of adequate fiscal assets is a major factor, but
organization ineliia, .disinterested leadership, competing operational issues, infighting and the
general inability to achieve the overwhelming acceptance of this requirement. As noted by the
pa1iicipants, while the desire for an overall enterprise-wide IO capability in the federal
bureaucracy is sh·ong, the lack of coherent set ofmehics, plans, sh·ategy, standards, policies,
procedures, methodologies, h·aining and

educat~on

courses, all lead to a disorganised and an un-

coordinated function. In addition, even more tr·oublesome for IO is that because it is comp1ised
of multiple, often disparate warfare areas such as Electronic Warfare, Psychological Operations,
Deception, etc, which are sometimes not necessalily viewed as cooperative operational areas.
Therefore this section is colour coded as shown below when comparing the conceptual
issues of CM 1.6.1 through CM 1.6.6, to the reality of IO in use today by the United States
govemment.

Table 8.9 - Analysing Effectiveness of CM 1.6
These rankings came from a variety of comments and observations of the thesis participants. In
pmiicular it was noted that while good work has been conducted on developing metlics that can ·
utilised across United States government, as well as utilizing global media and United States
government to measure IO plans and strategy, there was still a severe lack of a comprehensive
and integrated set of measures of evaluate an IO Campaign. This inability to have the power to
measure an IO campaign's success, combined with the fact that IO is not a new warfare area, and
that these issues should have already been addressed, highlights even more, the current
deficiencies with respect to the conduct of IO within the United States government.

8.3.7
Conceptual Model2.1- Accept any and all 10 actions conducted for the
United States government
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This model is centred on the CATWOE Transfmmation element, data cells T10, T11 and
T12 which focused on the differences between IO Goals of the federal bureaucracy as discussed
in this chapter. Key points from that section included:

•
•
•

CM 2.1.1
CM 2.1.2
CM 2.1.3

•

. CM 2.1.4

•

CM 2.1.5

•

CM 2.1.6

Use opinion polls to determine United States strategic goals
Compare IO actions to long-standing cultural values of United States
Develop a decentralised accounting mechanism such as a pmtal, where IO
activities can be reported
Develop strategic goals from the IO actions conducted within the United
States
Utilise polls and reports from the media to understand impact of IO
activities
Utilise academics and media to analyse effectiveness of IO campaigns
with respect to targets

This second set of Conceptual Models (2. 1-2.6) were based on the interviewees, who felt that
while an overarching federal capability to conductIO was desired, in reality, the only way to
truly conduct this warfare area, was to do so on a dishibuted, and decentralized manner. This
approach was seen in this sub-model, in which any and all IO actions that are accept~d, as pati of
the development of goals in the federal bureaucracy.
Key to this bottom-up methodology was the realization that control all aspects of a set of
disparate organisations such as the White House, the State Department as well as the Depattment
of Defense cannot be controlled. The thesis participants who advocated this methodology felt
that the reliance on a wide-flung net of reports, polls, and other informational elements was the
best strategy, and perhaps only mechanism for detetmining the effectiveness of an IO campaign.
Part of this may have been cynicism on their pati, a realisation that the federal bureaucracy
would not at this time, consh·uct a comprehensive and elaborate global reporting shucture to
measure IO goals as desired to be most effective. Over and over, in comments as part of the
interviews, ideas were mentioned, that a more loose and collaborative environment was needed
to foster the patticipatory need of these different agencies and their respective needs.
Therefore this section is colour coded as shown below, when comparing the conceptual
issues of CM 2.1.1 through CM 2.1.6, to the reality of IO in use today by the United States
government.

Table 8.10- Analysing Effectiveness of CM 2.1
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These rankings came from a variety of comments and observations of the thes~s participants. In
particular it was noted that very good results were obtained from the use of opinion polls to
determine US strategic goals, and this helped to compare IO actions to long-standing American
cultural values, but the other areas in this issue area were all lacking solid improvement. In
particular, the inability to link these goals to IO actions, via the media or academia was of
concern. Overall it was felt from the participants of this project that the attainment ofiO goals
was still in need of more and dedicated support, especially while trying to accept any and all
actions as part of a broader IO effort in the United States.

8.3.8

Conceptual Model2.2 - Develop a Decentralised Communications and
·Networking Procedures to Execute and Facilitate 10 Activity
This model is centred on the CATWOE Owners element, data cells 01, 02, 06, 09,

A13, E6, E7 and El5 which focused on the differences in the IO Structure of the United States
government as discussed in Chapter Eight. Key points from that section included:

•
•

CM2.2.1
CM2.2.2

•
•

CM2.2.3
CM2.2.4

•

CM2.2.5

•

CM2.2.6

Advocate similar and common standards
Pursue a common Commercial off the Shelf functionality of systems for
all
Attempt to foster a common set of procedures for reporting IO activities
Develop a network bridge or portal that can accept a variety of
communications systems and networks
Utilise compatible software and hardware to communicate, operate and
plan
Systems should provide metrics for analysis

This Conceptual Model follows a similar theme as part of a bottom-up approach to conducting
IO in support of the United States government. The advocates who believed in these CATWOE
elements, acknowledged that overarching communications and network systems while nice to
have, would probably not berealised due to a variety of reasons and instead relied on a
patchwork of existing platforms.
Key to this methodology is the belief that a set of common or central standards,
procedures and metrics can overcome the use of disparate hardware and software for an
enterprise structure. It was understood by many participants that this method was not perhaps
optimal to manage the conduct ofiO operations by the federal bureaucracy, but most of these
interviewees with this weltanschauung, also expressed the opinion, that it may in fact be the only
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choice. Resistance to a comprehensive anangement, whether organisational or fiscal, has to
date, not allowed the development of a common IO network or an extensive communications
system, thereby forcing participants to rely on the existing mechanisms that exist today. Thus, it
was agreed by many of the thesis interviewees, that the current shucture ofiO within the United
States government, while flawed and not perfect, was probably the best composition and
configuration that they could expect at this time to conduct IO types of missions.
Therefore this section is colour coded as shown below when comparing the conceptual
issues of CM 2.2.1 through CM 2.2.6, to the real.ity of IO in use today by the United States
government.

Table 8.11 -Analysing Effectiveness of CM 2.2
These rankings came from a variety of comments and observations of the thesis participants. In
particular it was noted that the adoption and pursuit of common standards, systems and
procedures was ongoing and improving, but the development of hardware, software, networks
and systems to support the use ofbetter IO structures is still needed. Overall this sub-conceptual
model was seen as simply average among the 12 different views, which is interesting, because
the IO Shucture area of the CATWOE elements was cited many times (eight different data cells)
and was considered important to the interviewees. The lack of significant improvement in this
area is often athi.buted to the lack of a coherent focus by the federal bureaucracy on improving
IO communications and network systems across the United States government as part of an
enterprise or umbrella IO shucture.

8.3.9

Conceptual Model2.3- Utilise a Wide Variety ofiO Training Courses and
Instruction
This model is centred on the CATWOE Environment element, data cells E2, E3, E13,

A4, A14, T6, T9, W2 and 05 which focused on the need for integrated IO Training as discussed
in Chapter Eight. Key points from that section included:
•
•

CM 2.3.1
CM2.3.2

•
•

CM 2.3.3
CM 2.3.4

Anaiyse strategic goals of different groups
Develop a blended method of IO inshuction that utilises a number of
academic techniques
Develop tests to track level and competence of IO users
Attempt to develop an understanding of the many different users needs
and desires
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•
•

CM 2.3.5
CM 2.3.6

Ensure training is available in a number of different venues
Develop feedback mechanisms to evaluate training

The development of comprehensive and integrated training was mentioned and alluded to by
many of the thesis patticipants. While a top-down approach was advocated in Conceptual Model
One, a number of interviewees also advocated a more federated arrangement that understood the
disparate needs of the different agencies and organisations. For example, it is commonly cited
that in the United States Depattment ofDefense, there are over 70 different training courses that
touch on some portion ofiO. Cries for consolidation and amalgamation of the cunicula have
been heard, but also generally ignored because of competing requirements and mandates by the
respective diverse groups.
It was generally agreed by the interviewees that all IO training could help to improve the

conduct of this warfare area for the federal bureaucracy and that the development of new and
better themes would result, as more of the respective key government decision-makers
understood IO better, due to more and diverse IO cunicula. Thus while the interviewees agreed
that an integrated and coordinated approach to total IO training would have been nice, in reality,
.

.

these personnel also understood that competing and often conflicting directives, will often not
allow for a total merger of these disparate classes. A consensus among a number of these
research pmticipants was that the development of broad standards, metrics, tests and processes to
measure and track IO training and education, that is feasible and could accomplish many of the
same goals as a more direct enterprise-wide, mandated cuniculum.
Therefore this section is colour coded as shown below when comparing the conceptual
issues of CM 2.3 .1 through CM 2.3 .6, to the reality of IO in use today by the United States
government.

Table 8.12 - Analysing Effectiveness of CM 2.3
These rankings came from a variety of comments and observations of the thesis participants. In
particular it was noted as a good point that a large number of oppmtunities to participate in IO
training are available, that these classes took into account many different strategic goals, with a
blended method of instruction utilising a number of academic techniques. However progress
was still needed to insure that these instructional techniques were relevant and complete to meet
the needs of the IO users. The most often cited way to do this was through the use of feedback
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mechanisms that better understand the different user's requirements with regard to IO Training
in the United States government.

8.3.10

Conceptual Model 2.4 - Develop an 10 Policy and Strategy Broad Enough to
Encompass all Key United States Values
This model is centred on the CATWOE Weltanschaaung element, data cells W5, W6,

T13 and Ell which focused on the differences between

concepts as discussed in

Chapter Eight. Key points from that section included:
Et

CM 2.4.1

Et

CM 2.4.2
CM 2.4.3
CM2.4.4

Et
Et

•
•

CM2.4.5
CM2.4.6

Tie together disparate IO strategies and policy with doctrine that stresses
key US values
Ensure that these broad themes are promulgated to all IO users
Make training opportunities available to all IO users
Develop an IO architecture broad enough to cover all United States
strategic goals
Develop good horizontal communications among key IO policy makers
Enlist the academic community to evaluate IO efforts with respect to key
US values

This sub-Conceptual Model is very interesting because it is diametrically opposed to those in the
first set of procedures, where instead of advocating the development of a comprehensive IO
policy, instead what these themes seem to suggest, is that the United States, should simply tie
together what is already being conducted today. In essence this set of CATWOE elements
abandons the concept of trying to control the development of IO policy and instead advocates,
simply knowing what is being done, and trying to bring together the parts and pieces that are
most useful, and match the best themes, goals and training needs of the federal bureaucracy.
The key to understanding this model is to view the American government for what it
truly is, i.e. a diverse and incredibly complex organisation that no one can control, with
competing interests and needs, that cannot in the end ever be totally controlled. In this pragmatic
understanding of the situation, a solution can be obtained that perhaps works better by simply
trying to coordinate a number of different agencies, by loosely tying their policies and strategies
together, rather than mandating enterprise type actions. Likewise, the use of broad architectures,
structures, standards and a loose consortium of academics and government decision-makers,
working together to develop broad IO policy themes, was viewed by some interviewees as the
best methodology to move ahead in the conduct of IO missions.

237

Therefore this section is colour coded as shown below when comparing the conceptual
issues of CM 2.4.1 through CM 2.4.6, to the reality of 10 in use today by the United States
govemment.
12.4.1 I 2.4.2 I 2.4.3
I 2.4.4 I 2.4.s I 2.4.6
Table 8.13 - Analysing Effectiveness of CM 2.4
These rankings came from a variety ofcomments and observations of the thesis participants. In
particular it was noted that overall, the performance of the federal bureaucracy with regard to the
development of a coherent set of 10 policy was below average. There were no great efforts that
were brought forward that the participants believed strongly supported or felt that were
contributing greatly to this issue area. Overall it was suggested that much more work was
needed across the board in the development of 10 policy that was broad and coherent enough to
encompass the key American values with regards to the United States govemment and federal
bureaucracy.

8.3.11

Conceptual Model 2.5: Provide Resources and Adequate Funding to Foster
Innovation in 10
This model is centred on the CATWOE Client element, data cells Cl, C2, C3, CS and C6

was focused on the differences between All Other Personnel as discussed in Chapter Eight. Key
points from that section included:

•
•

CM 2.5.1
CM 2.5.2

•

CM2.5 .3

•

CM 2.5.4

•

CM2.5.5

•

CM 2.5.6

Survey United States population towards attitudes on 10 and key values
Foster a spirit of cooperation toward the funding of 10 activities in the
United States
Promulgate a series of articles and repmis of how the art of warfare has
changed
Develop a high level of understanding in the United States of the value of
10
Develop reporting and accounting mechanisms to keep track of disparate
10 activities
Develop a set of goals that the various IO activities can strive for

Likewise the pragmatic approach can be seen in this sub-model, where if all 10 actions cannot be
controlled then, instead, the govemment should serve as an instrument to foster innovation. The
ability to act as a catalyst was viewed as a crucial function to best support the development of a
better set of IO personnel across the federal bureaucracy.

238

Key to the success of this methodology, was the understanding of what were the main
values of the American population that should always be held as the core -namely the
Declaration of Independence, Bill of Rights, Constitution, etc. Likewise, an education campaign
was also seen as crucial to teach the disparate IO personnel on how best to protect and foster
these core values across the United States government. Features such as articles, conferences,
additional funding and a heightened awareness were all suggested as methods to support the
spirit of innovation in personnel, around the world that are affiliated with or are conducting some
aspect of IO. The most important facet to remember, and this was empha.sised by a number of
thesis participants, was that the points that the United States government must embrace and
spread are exactly these key values cited above. It is these aspects of Ametica that are so
chetished around the world that should be instead emphasised by all personnel when conducting
IO.
Therefore this section is colour coded as shown below when compating the conceptual
issues of CM 2.5.1 through CM 2.5.6, to the reality of IO in use today by the United States
govemment.
Table 8.14- Analysing Effectiveness of CM 2.5
These rankings came from a va1iety of comments and observations of the thesis participants. In
particular it was noted that great emphasis had been placed on building awareness among the
clients through articles and reports on the importance ofiO with regard to the United States.
These beliefs were also somewhat prevalent across the general Amedcan population, but that
was as far as the efforts appeared to have been conducted per the project participants. Notably
lacking was the ability to keep track of all of the disparate IO activities, as well as to gain
additional funding or a coherent set of goals across the federal bureaucracy. All together, it
appeared that the efforts to bring together the disparate personnel involved with 10, still needs
additional focus and exertion.

8.3.12

Conceptual Model 2.6: Develop a Set of IO Standards that can be
Understood and Utilised by all Organisations
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This model is centred on the CATWOE Actor element, data cells Al, A3, A9, AlO and
T5 which focused on the need for more and better IO Personnel as discussed in this chapter. Key
points from that section included:

Eil

CM 2.6.1
CM2.6.2
CM2.6.3

Eil

CM2.6.4

Eil

CM2.6.5

Eil

CM2.6.6

Eil
Eil

Determine if there are metrics that can be utilised by all organisations
Utilise global media and academia to measure IO plans and strategy
Attempt to link IO standards to policy, doctrine and strategy used by the
various IO activities in the United States .
A comprehensive and decentralised set of standards that can be utilised by
all IO activities
Strive to integrate the disparate methodologies for IO organisations
through common processes
Analyse IO training and IO standards for commonality

This was an interesting concept in that many of the interviewees believed that a more robust set
of standards would facilitate the better development of IO personnel within the global sense.
These participants felt that because the warfare areas of information warfare were so diverse, that
a set of standards could do more than any action to unify the actors conducting these types of
missions and the key to the successful development of these standards was to make them broad
and encompassing of all different arenas ofiO. This discussion by the participants was based on
the widely perceived need for a coherent set of IO Standards that are recognised across the
interagency and coalition organisations.
The problem is of course, that there are no recognised IO standards today, which are
crucial to the recognition of any course, and standards as well standards give credence or
relevance to a course. One of the reasons for this concern, and to understand why the need for
standards are so important, is that it must be understood that there are a lot of different IO or IO
related courses in existence today, of which most are unrelated and uncoordinated. Most of these
courses are stove-pipe or standalone entities, which do not entitle the student to any commonly
recognised qualification. The lack of standardisation in the IO training environment has
hampered efforts to develop interagency and coalition support. The key will be to utilise a wellrecognised standards development approach such as led by the National Security Agency
through its National Information Assurance Training and Education Centre. The latter is well
recognised throughout the United States government as a leader in standardisation efforts in the
Information Assurance realm, and this expertise could be translated to the 10 area to better
support the development of IO personnel.
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Therefore this section is colour coded as shown below when comparing the conceptual
issues of CM 2.6.1 through CM 2.6.6, to the reality of IO in use today by the United States
government.

Table 8.15 -Analysing Effectiveness of CM 2.6
These rankings came from a variety of comments and observations of the thesis pmiicipants. In
particular it was noted that the only area where the federal bureaucracy appeared to be
progressing with regards to the development of IO personnel in patiicular, was its disparate
attempts to link IO policy, doctrine and strategy together. Otherwise, most of the participants
had few good comments on this patiicular CATWOE element and in patiicular they felt that
comprehensive and decentralised set of standards and methodologies or processes that can be
utilised by all IO activities, was desperately needed. Of all of the 12 sub-conceptual

models~

this

one involving the need for a common set of IO standards was cited most often as to requiring the
greatest attention and need for improvement.

8.4

Bringing together tbe Disparate Conceptual Models with regard to the

CATWOE Elements
There are many ways to do this, but one method is to analyse the changes in the
Department of Defense organization with respect to perspective management, over the last
decade. Specifically a good place to start is actually a low point with the dismantling of the
United States Infmmation Agency in 1999 by the State Depatiment. For 40 years, the United
States Information Agency has served as the primary public diplomacy advocate and strategic
information within the United States government. Its task was to fight communism and to
highlight the benefits of democracy around world. And in a nutshell, the United States
Information Agency did its job very well, maybe too well, because some analysts believe that it
was these international information programs that played a major role in the demise of the Soviet
Union. The end of the Cold War has rendered obsolete much of the raisin d'etre for the United
States Information Agency, specifically regarding their programs affecting propaganda against
the Soviet Union. The United States Information Agency has always enjoyed an independent
status within the United States government since its founding in 1953. This lack of
accountability was a main theme found resonating in State Department personnel, and so it was
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only natural that any reform effort would focus on a clear command and control structure. From
a number of conversations with senior staffers from Senator Helm ' s office, it was in the end, the
influence of the domestic political agenda by the Republicans that probably more than any other
factor directly resulted in the Refmm and Restructming Act. It was felt from the data received
dming these interviews that the consolidation effmts at State were a direct result of elections of
1994, and the perceived need to reduce govemment bureaucracy.

8.4.1

A Comparison of Client CATWOE Elements
What this vignette shows is that the ability of the United States govemment to affect the

attitude of people around the world through the use of public diplomacy, a fmm of perception
management and IO has greatly diminished wit~in the federal organisations and agencies over
the last decade. As noted below in Table 8.16, the need to influence all other clients is extremely
important as cited throughout this research in five different data cells and by over 90% of the
interviewees. So here we have an expressed need for the ability of American bureaucracy to
have a capability with IO that has instead been taken away due to overt use of domestic politics.
This chatt shows the key IQ themes delineated earlier in Chapter Seven for the Clients
CATWOE elements, specifically US Govemment personnel and All Other staff that are reflected
in these changes expressed above.

Table 8.16- Clients: Concepts vs. Reality

8.4.2

A Comparison of Actors CATWOE Elements
Clients were not the only CATWOE element affected by this series of decisions. What

the demise of the United States Information Agency did for the United States govemrnent was to
drastically alter the overall perception management capabilities of the State Department, which
in retum, dramatically affected the principal actors conducting this type of IO. A key component
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of the Reform and Restructming Act was to maintain a credible public diplomacy capability
during the reorganisation plan by keeping the majority of the Foreign Service Officers intact as a
new "cone" within the overall State Depa1tment organization. It was recognised that public
diplomacy functioned more like a functional organisation than a regional bureau; therefore much
emphasis was placed on building a new bureau or department with the enlarged State
Depa1tment (John Dwyer, interview, 15 June 2001). This new division, which in reality was a
briefed up version of the pre-consolidated "I" branch, would now house key components of the
f01mer United States Inf01mation Agency, notably the Education and Cultural Affairs as well as
the International Inf01mation Programs branches plus the public affairs section. Probably the
most important feature of the consolidation effort in fact was development of this public
diplomacy "cone". Supported by senior level management, this new section was eventually to be
led by the new Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, whose main
goal was to give a larger focus on public diplomacy within the State Department. Feedback from
the interviewees repeatedly stated that these changes at the United States Information Agency
were very dehimental to the overall capability of the United States actors involved in IO to
conduct both public diplomacy and perception management. These actors noted themselves that
they were affected both at the tactical and strategic level with regard to these changes in IO
personnel. This cha1i shows the key IO themes delineated earlier in Chapter Seven for the
Actors CATWOE elements, specifically IO Personnel and the Tactical vs Strategic options, that
are reflected in these changes expressed above.
At

Table 8.17- Actors: Concepts vs. Reality

8.4.3

A Comparison of Transformation CATWOE Elements
As noted in Chapter Two, much of the early Department of Defense IO policy was in fact

very broad, with Joint Publication 3-13 in particular, trying to encompass a large section of
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warfare areas when it was originally published in 1998. For at once IO was everything, and
perhaps nothing, which in the end, meant that military planners and operators had difficulty
translating this somewhat academic theory into Department of Defense policy and operational
funding. This early Department ofDefense policy, was often more hyperbole or over the top in
its concepts, than that which is typically cited today. Part of this was due to the different
weltanschauung of the project participants. Statements such as an electronic Pearl Harbor, Cyber
Warfare, hackers taking down the Department ofDefense infrastructure, and others like this,
were thrown about with random dming this period of 1989- 2001. At the same time, there
tended to be more focus cenh·ed on the incredible advances in computer technology and anything
related to Cyber Warfare- whether it was computer network attack, exploitation, defense or
critical infrastructure protection, and there were a number of other areas of operations in this
arena, that all tended to be amplified in this early era. This dichotomy has been resolved with
more recent instructions and mandates such as the IO Road Map (IORM - 2003) and the new
Joint Publication 3-13 (2003) which possesses a much more restricted focus. These changes in
IO can be seen in the fact that current policy is more restricted and concentrated within the
arenas that tr·aditionally the Depa1iment ofDefense could conh·ol, such as electronic warfare,
deception, psychological operations, etc. These newest IO policies have not tried to be
everything to everybody, but instead these more recent policies have concenh·ated on warfare
areas that could be organized, trained and equipped for in a more typical military sense.

This

cha1i shows the key IO themes delineated earlier in Chapter Seven for the Transformation
CATWOE elements, specifically the IO Overall Goals and IO Integration that are reflected in
these changes expressed above.

Transformation
Overall Goals

11ntegrat1on

Table 8.18- Transformation: Concepts vs. Reality
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8.4.4

A Comparison of Weltanschauung CATWOE Elements
The differences between the desired IO structure and policy within the United States

govemment are in some cases significant as this research indicates. Key themes throughout the
data gathering and analysis phases featured the fact that in pa1ticular, one area of IO, namely
perception management, could have the potential to effect the changes to the United States
govemment as desired by the participants in this research project. That is attributed to a
somewhat general belief among these personnel, that perception management is different than
. other portions of IO, in.that it may be harder to conh·ol, because as the effmt is trying to affect
the mind, vice a pure technology fix. Many interviewees thought that if utilised conectly, the
potential of perception management as an element ofiO was in fact, much greater than other
more publicised areas of IO, such as computer network operations. However while this potential
IO element is still a desirable feature, it is probably not a feasible change for the federal
bureaucracy, because for much of the general public, there is still a reticence toward this subject,
with images of Goebbels or mind conh·ol. As alluded to earlier, many of the pa1ticipants in this
project stated that they believe that perception management is now much more effective as an
element ofiO - one that can reach out and touch the millions of people around the world who do
not have connectivity of the wired world. This cha1t shows the key IO themes delineated earlier
in Chapter Seven for the Weltanschauung CATWOE elements, specifically IO Policy and IO
Training that are reflected in these changes expressed above.
Weltanschauung
Policy
Training

Table 8.19 - Weltanschauung: Concepts vs. Reality

8.4.5

A Comparison of Owners CATWOE Elements
Likewise from an organisational aspect, the differences between the conceptual models

and real world have been interesting as well. Massive changes such as the establishment of the
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Department of Homeland Security which were scoffed at prior to the events of9/11, have in fact
occurred, while other suggested changes for the Department of Defense- that is, a Cyber
Command, have still not been fully realised. In reality, the organisational landscape of the
federal government is altered radically from a pre-September 11 111 , 2001 time frame with the
stand-up and evolution of commands such as the Joint Task Force Global Network Operations,
Joint Information Operations Warfare Command, Depattment of Homeland Security, as well as
numerous others which have been transformed as the full effects of IO upon the federal
government are realized. Areas such as computer network defen~e and critical

infrastruc~re

protection have grown as well because more integrated, institutionalising policies and
procedures, were becoming more effective in a defensive role. In essence, the organisational
emphasis before 9/11 concentrated on building awareness of the threats from IO, while afterward
the emphasis tends to concenh·ate more on integration and training, with specificity around the
use of standards. For what exists today in the United States is a series of federated organisations,
that suppott each other, with the cunent structure of IO agencies and commands that while better
than before, is still not fully evolved as the complete nature of the threat and capability evolve.
This can be seen for example in the constant change of reporting chains for the different military
computer emergency response teams or the services IO and information warfare centres. This
chart shows the key IO themes delineated earlier in Chapter Seven for the Owners CATWOE
elements, specifically IO Shucture and IO Decision Making that are reflected in these changes
expressed·above.
Owners

Structure
Dec1s1on Making

Table 8.20 - Owners: Concepts versus Reality

8.4.6

A Comparison of Environment CATWOE Elements
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In reality, the actual ability of these cyber attacks to cripple the United States government
and infrastructure is not as highly rated as originally envisioned. While these cyber assaults have
undoubtedly hurt a variety of Department of Defense commands and federal agencies, they have
not crippled the military and respective government organisations as predicted. A great example
of this is the massive electrical grid failure of the north-eastern portion of the United States on 7
August 2003, which many people initially thought to be the result of a possible terrorist attack,
was in fact this major critical infrastructure protection failure was simply that, an overwhelming
loss of power in a single Canadian station, that cascaded throughout the power grid, until much
of the United States were affected. It was not accomplished by any malignant worms or virus's,
but instead by the over use of electricity on a hot summer day. The most interesting aspect from
an IO perspective is that in fact, life still goes on, the world does not stop, and in this case, most
people just adapted for a day or so until power was regained. It was not a failure of computer
network defense or critical infrastructure protection, but instead a mechanical issue, one in which
a greater emphasis on policy and training with respect to IO and the United States government
may have helped to lessen the impact. This vignette poirits to another interesting fact about early
IO theorists as compared to the current reality of IO policy within: the United States government,
that is, mainly that not many of these early theorists have survived the transformation ofiO over
the last 15 years. Some of these initial concepts were considered just too radical or
revolutionary, where these early philosophers wanted to change everything. Unfortunately when
change did not occur fast enough for them, a segment of this group left the academic area, yet if
you examine IO closely, in reality change has indeed been very rapid, with less than 10 years
having passed from the initial date when the seminal IO publication for the Department of
Defense, namely Joint Publication 3-13 was issued (1998). The reality is in fact that change with
respect to IO in the federal government has been steady and can be measured, how IO has altered
the United States in this transformational environment. This chart shows the key IO themes
delineated earlier in Chapter Seven for the Environment CATWOE elements, specifically IO
Themes and the fact that IO is not New, that are reflected in these changes expressed above.
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Environment

Table 8.21 - Environment: Concepts versus Reality
The key to the synergy that was noted by the thesis patticipants was their willingness to
tie together IO policy and organisation changes to big themes, to show success and changes, for
what they wanted to happen and what really happened. These interviewees believed that
perception management is the key, that there was a lack of progress because in essence the real
issues is not involving zeros and ones but instead dealing with people's minds, which is always
much more difficult to resolve. Perception management for future research therefore needs
much work because it doesn 't have the policy and organisational structure of the computer
network defense and critical infrastructure protection portions ofiO, because of the need for
standards, which is a Depattment ofDefense Instruction 8570 counterpatt. Questions arise, such
as where does perception management fit? Is it targeting, or effects-based operations? Or is it
Public Affairs and Sh·ategic Communications? Actually perception management issues could fit
nearly anywhere, yet the lack of a sponsor or money, has stalled growth, for this IO area needs a
home that is more interagency in nature, but where? Some academics acknowledged that
computer network defense I critical infrash·ucture protection issues also cross multiple
organisational boundaties, yet they seem to work well? Why is this - perhaps because they are
defensive in nature. These same academics opined that perhaps perception management does not
work so well across boundaries, .maybe because it is different mediums, with different themes
and goals, different views, missions and technologies, all of which are offensive and not
defensive.

8.5

The Verification and Validation Process
The verification and validation process for the Conceptual Models was conducted in a

two-part fashion. The first test was a series of follow-on questions that were sent to a smaller,
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select group of the original project participants in February 2005. As mentioned earlier in this
thesis, additional requests were forwarded to all 40 of the interviewees, in which the data was
verified and validated, so that the author could ensure that he actually understood and conectly
translated their viewpoints into the Root Definitions and Conceptual Models. This stage's
ultimate goal was to most accurately ensure that the ideas or attributes that were part of the
original representation or interviews would be adequately represented in this thesis. This effort
was followed in July 2005, by a public verification and validation session at the 4th Annual
European Conference on International Warfare at the University of Glamorgan in Wales .. Using
a third-party independent group ofiO academics and professionals not associated with the
original interviewees, additional analysis was conducted to also analyse the Conceptual Models.
Together both of these verification and validation efforts were considered a very important part
of the Soft System Methodology procedure, because not only does it ensure a direct link by the
author to the theoretical construct, in addition, this approach also helped to ensure that the entire
procedure is conect from a methodology aspect.
For as mentioned previously in Chapter Five, the author made a very conscious attempt
to ensure the validity of the data throughout the interview process. ·Paper or electronic copies
were kept and referred to throughout this project, and the information from those conversations
ultimately found its way not only into the Root Definitions but to the Conceptual Models as well,
as seen in the matching of CATWOE elements to Categories as shown in this Chapter.
Dedicated efforts were made so that one could trace the data up and down the chain of evidence,
and the reader can see multiple examples where the data in the Root Definitions and Conceptual
Models can be traced directly to one or more thesis participants. Finally, it is in step six of the
Soft System Methodology process, in the verification and validation phase of the methodology,
where the data is reviewed a final time, where a series of recommendations were made that may
ultimately begin to answer the research questions and hypothesis of this thesis. So it is obvious
that the ability of this methodology to affect transformation depends of course on the accurate
input from all participants in the process, which is where the need for the next section is derived
in the form of constant feedback from the participants, to ensure the accuracy of the overall data.

8.5.1

Verification of the Original Data by the Project Interviewees
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Of the 40 original interviewees, all received letters that were mailed out in the February
2005 timeframe. A sizeable number of the participants returned the additional survey forms,
verifying and validating their comments.

These IO subject matter experts reviewed the

CATWOE data and agreed with the notes taken from the original interviews, that their comments
had been correctly interpreted and translated it to a series of 63 independent CATWOE
informational elements.

Subsequent follow-up and attempts to obtain additional feedback

resulted in more responses for a valid level of feedback from these respondents. In addition, on
13 July 2005, a two-hour discussion was lead by the author as part of the 4th Annual European
Conference on Information Warfare at the University of Glamorgan, in Pontypridd, Wales. Cohosted by Dr William Hutchinson of Edith Cowan University, a panel was seated which
consisted of IO subject matter experts from three different countries. In addition, in the audience
were over 40 delegates, speakers, conference leads and IO I IW specialists, from around the
world, which generated a healthy debate as the two main Conceptual Models were displayed and
reviewed.

As part of the conference dialogue, a series of questions were posed from the

chairman that then led a rathet spirited discussion on the merits of these particular concepts.
These questions were as follows: .
•
•
•
•
•

Which of these models includes your weltanschauung of the problem? Both, one or
neither?
Do the models portray feasible systems?
Are the proposed systems desirable?
Are the proposed systems viable?
Do you think anything is missing or needs to be deleted?

Individual and detailed comments are included in this chapter, in the next few sections, as an
overview of the conference validation process is conducted.

8.5.2

Conceptual Modell.O
During this verification and validation phase, there was a lack of consensus on the

validity of this model. Panellists thought that this model was in essence a top-down centralised
approach, and many of the audience felt that the United States government is inherently
fragmented, with little centralised control. Others felt the model was flawed because the United
States IO should not be targeting the American population. For example, a question was asked
on whether and how the domestic audience should be targeted. The United Kingdom central
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department equivalent designs information campaigns that are sent throughout the government,
yet in the United States, the Department ofDefense is the only organisation that is officially
authorised to conduct 10. Discussions ensued that alluded to the fact that more emphasis should
be placed on a National Information Strategy to include centralised 10 planning, which was a
concern of this discussion, with questions arising as to where 10 policy was coming from?
Concerns over political or social engineering were raised, and the lack of feedback loops, either
in the political or social realm was noted as well. Likewise, the fact that the major media is not
considered a satisfactory feedback mechanism, led to calls for additional feedbacl}: loops to be
added in addition to the mainstream media. A major discussion point in the first model revolved
around the best approach, that is should this process be centralised or decentralised?
Specifically, conference participants wondered which methodology could best be utilised as ail
objective to influence issues on a worldwide basis. From these talks at the 10 conference, it
appeared that a consensus arose from the panellists and audience that suggested the selection of
both models, with an emphasis on planning for Modell.O and implementation for Model 2.0. In
fact, one participant noted that you needed Model2.0 to make sense ofModell.O.

8.5.3

Conceptual Model 2.0
In this discussion, the methodology of centralised control and decentralised action was

advocated. This approach is symptomatic of the approach of the military and was noted as a
desirable blend of the two models, where implementation could be done by those at the
frontlines. A desire for strengthening of the feedback was expressed, with a thought that perhaps
a monitoring system could help. This group also recognised the need for a variety of
worldviews, and in addition, they believed that the media needs to be from various sources and
not just mainstream outlets.
A constant theme throughout the discussion at this conference was the need to emphasise
key American values, which although somewhat viewed as a losing proposition to implement
around the world, was still considered by many in the audience to be an action that should be
implemented to support the conduct of 10. It was felt that these campaigns should be done
where the people are, specifically that a narrow coordination system, needs a broader base and
more inclusive system for strategic goals and objectives. While this was considered feasible, the
comments from the symposium indicated that because of recent negative political input, that
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maybe while initially desirable, a proposed system that had a broader economic base, with a long
term view, was perhaps more viable. Likewise, the patticipants of the conference also suggested
that the Rich Pictures should include allies and adversaries, and that these diagrams should have
more political patticipants than the oliginal IO models. Likewise, the seminar attendees
recognised that the actions of the different United States organisations might be in conflict with
one another, but overall they should attempt to encompass all US values. Problems with the
Smith-Mundt Act indicated that these actions might be okay for intemal American population
but not perhaps for an extemal one. Heavy debate during the conference was also noted on the
use of US values or perhaps UN values that may need to be replaced by human values instead.
Overall, there was great discussion among the participants on these different Conceptual Models.
CM
M

CM
CM
CM
CM

1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6

Tactical vs Strategic
Coordinating Systems between White
Investigate needs of stakeholders
Set up an interagency 10 campaign bureaucracy
Execute 10 campaigns
Measure 10 campaign ' s successes
CM 2.5

CM 2.1
CM 2.2
CM 2.4
CM 1.4

CM2.6
CM 1.1
CM 1.2
CM 1.6

CM
CM
CM
CM
CM

8.6

2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5

CM 1.3
CM 1.5
CM2.3

Accept any and all IO actions
Develop a decenh·alised communications plan
Utilise a wide variety ofiO training courses
Develop a broad IO policy and strategy
Provide resources to foster innovation in IO
Key Themes from the Conceptual Models

In this next section, the data from the Rich Pictures, Root Definitions, Conceptual Models
as well as the verification and validation sessions were all analysed to determine the key themes
of this thesis. As noted earlier in this thesis, there were 40 different interviewees, who
participated in a total of 54 sessions over a multi-year period. From these meetings, 63
CATWOE elements were identified, that were spread over the six different CATWOE
categories, which were used to develop two Root Definitions and two Main Conceptual Models,
with 12 sub-models as a result. All weltanschauungs and interests were recognised with very
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divergent opinions expressed as part of the process, yet as part of this methodology, a number of
key themes and interests emerged across the board as part of this process. Shown on the
previous page is at chart, which articulates where each of the 12 Sub-Conceptual Models fits in
relation to each other, with respect to the interviewees, and their views on the progress across
the United States goveml1).ent on the development of these particular areas ofiO. As can be
noticed, there were three models that were considered more developed, namely CM 1.3, 1.5 and
2.3 than the other nine. While these three models still need to progress further, by the direct
questioning of the project participants, it was clear that in these areas, the state ofiO within the
United States govemment had progressed the most of any of the areas highlighted. Also, two
models were noted as progressing at least with respect to the conduct of IO in the United States
govemment. Specifically CM 2.6 and to a lesser extent CM 2.5 were the weakest issues that had
yet to be resolved within the federal bureaucracy.
The data from the different sub-conceptual models can also be viewed as a coherent unit,
when they are laid side by side together as shown below, in comparison with the CATWOE
elements.

Table 8.22 - Comparing CM's to Reality
The horizontal axis depicts the 12 sub-Conceptual models, and the vertical axis shows the six
CATWOE elements. In this analysis, it can be noticed there are five specific sub-issues (in blue)
that were rated by the interviewees as far exceeding expectations for development within the
United States govemment. Specifically these were:
•
•
•
•
•

CM 1.3.1
CM 1.5.5
CM 2.1.1
CM 2.3.5
CM 2.5.3

Define key decision makers in the United States govemment
Execute IO campaigns 24/7 around the world
Use opinion polls to determine United States strategic goals
Ensure training is available in a number of different venues
Promulgate a series of atiicles and reports of how the art of warfare has
changed

These data elements represent the five best areas of 10 development that were by consensus of
the interviewees conducting or in the process of being conducted at a superior level by the
253

federal bureaucracy. While there are no overriding linkages between these issues, it is
interesting that the execution of IO campaigns, opinion polls and conducting IO training classes
are all considered well in hand. These are often discrete tasks that do not require interagency
coordination, funding, and can be conducted in relative isolation, which could be a reason that
these issues tend to be more successful.
On the other hand, seven specific issues (as shown in red) , were cited as being
significant!y below expectations toward meeting the desires of the participants, as noted below:

•

•
•

CM
CM
CM
CM

•

CM2.5.5

•

CM2.6.4

•

CM2.6.5

•

1.1.4
1.2.5 ·
1.4.6
1.6.4

Ensure strategic goals match interagency IO plans
Utilise same software and hardware to communicate, operate and plan
Use IO standards recognised across United States government
A comprehensive and integrated set of measures of evaluate an IO
Campaign
Develop reporting and accounting mechanisms to keep track of disparate
IO activities
A comprehensive and decentralised set of standards that can be utilised by
all IO activities
Analyse IO training and IO standards for commonality

When these seven issues are reviewed and analysed, a series of common themes can be noticednamely the. desire for standardisation, enterprise activities, integrated systems, similar hardware
and software to conduct IO activities across all federal agencies. As expected, these tasks are
going to be much harder to conduct successfully because they require interagency coordination
and dedicated funding in addition to the political will in order to be successful.
Once the Conceptual Models were developed and analysed, the next step in the SSM was
to compare and contrast them to the reality of how IO is conducted in the United States. For
example, as continuously cited by the interviewees, the need for continued education and
awareness efforts to key decision-makers in the United States government was required, to
ensure that they understand the need for greater funding and integration of IO programs. The
participants of this project also emphasised over and over again, the need for continuous training
integrated with policy changes that are tied to the overall goals set out at the executive level.
This focus on top-down, coordinated and centralised training process was also very prevalent
among the interviewees. Likewise the data from virtually all of the participants also emphasised
that across the spectrum, most participants and practitioners do not understand IO and that more
training is needed. This near universal acknowledgement of the requirement for greater
education in the IO field, was a very distinct thread, and it figured very prominently among the
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participants in their responses. In addition, another common theme was the recognition that in ·
order to change the way in which IO is conducted by the federal bureaucracy, that needed to
affect or target the key decision-makers in the United States government.
Another key point from the analysis of the data, as pointed out by the participants was the
need for greater integration among the government organisations. There was a very heavy
emphasis on the need for a stronger State Department, with more trained officials in IO, as well
as the increased integration of the White House into IO as part of a foreign policy. All of these
. themes come together to give a sense that while the Department of Defense may be playing a
major role today with respect to the conduct ofiO in the federal government, a large majority of
the interviewees desire to bring back the capability to the State Department that was formerly
resident in the United States Information Agency, and to integrate that more tightly via the
interagency process with the White House. Finally, the interviewees also noted on a large
number of occasions, that the current organisational structure for conducting IO in the United
States was inadequate. Taken together, it can be seen that the key themes from the thesis
participants concentrated a heavy emphasis on decision making skills, integration, the fact that
IO is not new, an understanding ofthe environment, the importance oftraining and finally the
need to develop coherent IO themes that are tied together. All of these deficiencies will be
analysed in greater detail in this chapter as the changes in IO policy and organisational structure
are compared across the United States with the specific recommendations suggested by the
interviewees themselves in the next chapter.

8.7

Conclusion

In this section, a number of Conceptual Models were developed. These are considered as
frameworks or reference points that the participants built into their recommendations depending
on their particular weltanschauung, and while not based in, reality, they do offer particular views
on how in the interviewees minds, that these problems inherent with the conduct ofiO in the
United States can be mitigated. The two main Conceptual Models are widely divergent, offering
very different solutions to solving these issues and it will be in the next chapter, utilising the
verification and validation phase, where a comparison of these ideas with reality, will be
conducted in order to understand how changes to the system could be utilised to enhance
performance of this particular subject area.
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Chapter 9 - Research Findings and Results:
Applicability to Theory and Practice
In this section, a broad comparison will be conducted to evaluate the differences between
rhetoric and reality, especially in the evaluation of the employment of 10 across the federal
government. The hypothesis in Chapter One stated that in the United States, a significant gap
exists in regards to the conduct ofiO. While this warfare area is a relative newly defined
activity, it has the potential to transform the traditional uses of power as well as revolutionising
the manner in which war, diplomacy, business and a number of other areas are conducted. All
too often, hyperbole and unrealistic desires hamper actual progress of these concepts. The
analysis of this gap between the proposed capabilities and the actual conduct of 10 missions
operations is the main thrust of the research. Specifically, as part of this thesis, a number of
examples were surfaced during the interviews to validate the research hypothesis as well as to
provide new information regarding the usefulness 10 with respect to the United States
government.

9.1

Introduction- Why does IO matter?
One of the key goals of this research is to evaluate the delta between stated goals and

actual operations of 10 across the United States federal government by using a qualitative
interpretative approach through a systems process, specifically SSM. A total of 54 interviews
were conducted over a five year period with 40 participants, to produce two very divergent
Conceptual Models, which can be viewed as basically polar opposites of one another. This
dichotomy was discussed in Chapter Eight, with one school of participants advocating a topdown enterprise wide approach as the best method to conduct 10. Many of the interviewees
stridently disagreed, declaring that the only way to make any progress in this particular area was
via a bottom-up or decentralised route. This latter idea became a key point of this research,
primarily because a significant number of participants believed that they were simply echoing a
more 'realistic' view (weltanschauung) or understanding of what makes the power of
information so unique. For unlike the traditional loci of power (military, diplomacy and
economic), all of whose instruments the government normally controls, with regard to the power
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of information, this is simply not the case. Specifically the power of information lies with the
individual, as do the controls and tools. This is an extremely radical and a salient feature ofiO namely that the government can no longer control information· and instead this element of power
has now been disseminated down to the masses. This inability to control this element of power,
or to even understand that the government is no longer in control of information, is perhaps the
most important point in this whole research. For it was repeatedly shown in the interviews
responses that the enlightened government officials who understood this concept- namely that
they could only influence the flow of information, and not dominate it - were the organisations in
the federal bureaucracy that fared relatively well in this new environment. Also, it was
demonstrated that those federal agencies and staff that refused to acknowledge the seismic shift
that had occurred with regards to power and information- were ultimately the ones that
repeatedly were unable to compete in this rapidly advancing field.

9.2

An Analysis of the Key Areas of Deficiencies from the Soft System
Methodology CATWOE Elements, Root Definitions and Conceptual Models
It is these points, and their corollary functions, that are listed below, which will be

discussed and analysed in great detail with respect to their impact on the federal bureaucracy,
throughout this chapter. Specifically the fact that the power of information is distributed to the
masses in a decentralised manner, which results in a loss of control to the central governmental
organisations, combined with a much greater ease of entry and the great access to low cost IO
tools, all of which have come together to radically change the power of information. Isolated as
key areas in this thesis that were specifically derived from the SSM process, in addition there
were seven specific Sub-Conceptual Model issues that were singled out in Chapter Eight as
being particularly deficient in their current conduct of IO by the federal bureaucracy. In
addition, a number of other areas of deficiency were noted, in both the Root Definitions (Chapter
Seven) and Conceptual Models (Chapter Eight), specifically referring to areas where IO was not
conducted as well as it could be the United States government. Taken together, all of these data
points have been combined into four key themes as shown below, which are part of an overall
analysis of the major deficiencies that succinctly articulate not only why the aforementioned
delta in the performance of IO exists, but also what approaches could be useful in helping to
formulate a way ahead for more successful efforts in the future. These issues are noted below,
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and later in this chapter as well, where specific recommendations will be suggested, based on
input from the interviewees, to improve the overall conduct of IO:
11
11
11
111

Why is there no overall Strategic Theory in the United States for IO?
Is IO really the best term to describe these activities?
Why is Top-Down Approach to IO not working in the United States Government?
Why is there no rhyme or reason to the IO training and education curricula?
These four critical areas will become the main focus of the final analysis of research in

this chapter. For example, the first question, was derived from the deficiencies cited by the
interviewees during this research process, who were concerned about the lack of overarching
theoretical construct for IO. Some participants posited that if the Information Age is as truly as
radical as many suggest, shouldn't there be a more vigorous academic debate with a number of
theories vying for ascendancy in this new era. For to date, not one comprehensive theory on IO
has fallen into general acceptance across the United States government, and while much strategic
military IO policy and doctrine have been promulgated, it has mainly come from the Department
of Defense, without corresponding similar policy being developed across the other interagency
organisations. The second question arose from the same issue area, in that because the actual.
definition of IO is so broad and nebulous, as to be virtually all inclusive, in actuality it is still
very much vague and barely understandable, with some research participants believing that
harm is being imparted to IO as a concept by the broader academic, military and diplomatic
community. Information is and always has been a somewhat a vague term, but in this new era it
possesses a capability that is now considered crucial to the success of American national
security, and so the proper definition and taxonomy are crucial to success. Another question
came from that fact that in most cases, the actual conduct or approach of IO activities and
campaigns, are normally performed at a more tactical level, or in a bottom-up fashion vice in a
centralised or coordinated manner. However there are still many questions about the preferred
method in which to most successfully utilise this element of power to the best extent by the
United States government. Many of the interviewees noted this dichotomy in the fact that
because IO crosses so many boundaries within the interagency processes, it is often very difficult
to quantify exactly what constitutes an information campaign, and so success is often measured
in different ways. Finally, the last question arose from the sheer number and diverse quality of
IO training and education efforts across the federal bureaucracy which has led to much
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inefficiency, which corresponds to the inability of the United States to maintain a profession
corps of personnel. Specifically there is no coordination between these different schools of
thought, no standards, certifications or linking mechanisms to show a synergy of effort. This
lack of synchronisation acrossthe different agencies, commands and organisations is severely
hampering the overall ability of these groups to conduct 10. Thus to summarise, it is these four
concepts, that when taken together, continue to highlight the delta between higher level strategy
and operational reality as discussed in the hypothesis. The reasons for this gap have been
examined in previous sections, and specific factors will be noted as to why the federal
bureaucracy is unwilling or unable to make the transformational changes that are needed to best
utilise information as an element of power. It is hoped that these conclusions and
recommendations developed may be useful for future IO planners, as well as senior level
decision makers in the United States government.

9.2.1

Why is there no overall Strategic Theory in the United States for IO?
The problem is that without a strategic theory or academic model to serve as a basis to

explain the rise in power of information across the entire United States government that this lack
of an overall theoretical construct ultimately endangers the overall stability ofiO. Theory serves
as a foundation - a basis on which to build a model of a complex subject such as IO so that it can
be better understood. Yet with regard to this academic field, it appears that an overarching
academic theoretical construct on the order of realism or international liberalism, which can
explain IO with sufficient rigor, does not presently exist. That is not to say that there have not
been influential academics that have set forth theories for discussion and review, such as Soft

Power and Noopolitik, however to date, there has not been an overwhelming acceptance of either
of these constructs (Nye, 2004; Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1999). For example, as part of the
literature review in Chapter Two, the arguments regarding Soft Power as set forth in the seminal
book, Power and Interdependence, are described in detail (Keohane and Nye, 1989). These
academics portray how the use of information is changing the idea of what is looked for in the
power capabilities within the world political structure (Ibid, p. 23). Robert Nye also captured
the excitement and the power inherent in information in other books as well such as Bound to

Lead, and later amplified in other publications (Nye, 1990; Nye and Owens, 1996; Nye, 2004;

259

Nye, 2006). However none of these publications, set forth an overall academic theory that has
been accepted for IO.
This research is really about is a focus power, and its transformation as the world enters
the information age. It is in this chaotic early stage of a new era, when the disconnect between
theory and reality is perhaps greatest, and in particular the inability to match a strategic theory to
the changes in the power structure of the federal government are the most noticeable and very
evident in the United States. So while Soft Power and Noopolitik may have struck a chord within
the Department ofDefense and a number of federal agencies at some point, to date, none of these
attempts to develop an overall encompassing IO academic theory for what is happening with
regard to information has been formally adopted across the United States as a whole. Even the
authors of Noopolitik themselves - Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2007) note as much in a recap to their
book The Promise ofNoopolitik, published eight years after the original publication of their
seminal book .Their initial enthusiasm for this theoretical construct has been dampened
considerably not only be the events of9/11, Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi

Freedom, but also by the way the Internet and the intellectual community have evolved in the
last decade. The hopeful optimism of the 1990's with regard to the World Wide Web and the
Internet, has instead turned in the last few years to the awful realisation that given the power of
information, many individuals and groups have instead used this new technology to their
advantage, whether for their political; financial or social gain (Ibid). Likewise Arquilla and
Ronfeldt also admit in their postscript that the early promises of a global community are instead
overwhelmed by the day-to-day events, which tend to mitigate the promise of revolutionary
change. Although they still believe that Noopolitik is an idea for the future, and while they
remain optimistic, they are also dismayed as well by a number of trends as shown below that
have effectively mitigated much of the promised potential of this theoretical construct:
o
o
o
o

Notions like Noopolitik are gaining credibility, but all too slowly
Soft Power lies behind them all, but the concept needs further clarification
Activist Non-Governmental Organizations representing global civil society are major
practitioners ofNoopolitik, but the most effective may be the global network of jihadist
American public diplomacy would benefit from a course correction (Ibid)

So none of these concepts reviewed here can be properly considered a rigorous academic theory
on IO, but instead more of a series of ideas around similar topics that are attempting to define
this radical change in power. All of these arguments are very interesting, because as represented
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in the interviewee data, changes are occurring slowly in the development of overall theoretical
construct, definitions are not defined, and the federal government as a network is not that
responsive as desired, specifically because the United States government public diplomacy
efforts are considered insufficient. Perhaps an argument can be made that, in reality, a revolution
in warfare is occurring wi~h regard to IO, yet perhaps not at the rate initially desired - but instead
at a more evolutionary pace.
In this vein, a thread has emerged from the participants' data that the reason that no
overall IO theory has emerged, is because IO is a concept that supports so many different and
disparate academic areas -which makes it difficult to unify a community around a single
concept. The sheer diverseness of this transforming idea is easily seen at IO conferences where
the hard and soft topics are instantly separated into separate streams and only rarely touching
each other at the plenary sessions. Computer security, psychological operations, electronic
warfare, public affairs and the other portions of IO by themselves are all incredibly complex
areas, and to find a single comprehensive academic theory that can encompass the use of these
warfare areas and the others that comprise IO, is incredibly difficult as can be imagined.

9.2.1.1

Does Military Doctrine equal 10 Strategic Theory?
So while no overall academic theory has emerged to adequately explain the rising power

of information, the same cannot be set for the avalanche of policy that has been promulgated by
the Defertse Department. Military doctrine is different than academic theory, but for the
Department ofDefense, it serves much the same purpose- mainly to ground the operational
missions, in a series of overlapping policy and strategy. IO doctrine is no different, and was
developed over a number of years as part of a maturation process of theory in the United States.
The first of these policies, the Department ofDefense Directive TS3600.1, was published in
1992, and kept at the Top Secret level throughout its use, due to the restrictive nature of its
contents. So while this document was an attempt to start a dialogue on this new capability,
namely Information Warfare within the Department of Defense, its security classification in
general restrained a more rigorous doctrinal exchange. The need for a general theory or overall
strategy to fit these revolutions in technology still existed, which prompted a new concept
entitled Command and Control Warfare. Officially released as a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Memorandum of Policy 30 Command and Control Warfare on 8 March 1993, this
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document laid out for the first time in an unclassified format, the interaction of the previously
mentioned disciplines such as electronic warfare, operations security, deception, and
psychological operations, and was designed to give the American the war-fighters the advantage
in this new information environment. Interestingly enough, Command and Control Warfare is a
more restricted concept than Information Warfare, which means that the Department of Defense
backed down from their initial broader. strategy published in 1992 with regard to Information
Warfare and instead issued a more constrained policy in 1993. This change centred on those
core disciplines that the United States military were the most familiar with and had a greater
history of use. This pattern was to be repeated again a decade later in 2003 with the publication
of the IO Road Map.
IO doctrine also continued to be developed during this period, after the publication of the
original Command and Control Warfare doctrine in 1993. There was a concerted push for
declassification and better understanding of these concepts within the Defense Department,
which resulted in the publication ofDepartment ofDefense Directive S3600.1, Information
Operations on 9 December 1996. By downgrading this document to the Secret level, the
Depatiment ofDefense opened IO to an even wider audience. In a related effort, the Defense
Science Board also published its report on Information Warfare- Defense in November 1996.
Together these documents attempted to clarify the differences between the older doctrine and
introduced for the first time, the concept of computer network attack as an IO capability. There
were still however questions regarding IO definitions and lexicon that would not be fully
addressed until the release ofthe seminal publication, Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for
Information Operations on 9 October 1998. It is in this document, that for the first time, the
military had released an unclassified document that widely disseminated the doctrinal principles
involved in conducting IO. A key lesson learned from the release of this document was the
realisation that both the White House and Department of Defense staff needed to understand that
they needed better coordination. This is due to the fact that IQ efforts are often conducted long
before the traditional beginning of active hostilities, so the Pentagon may not always have the
lead in every operation. This early and sustained interaction between federal agencies within the
executive branch has also brought about a renewed emphasis on the IO organisational structure,
and in fact an entire section of this thesis, in Chapter Two, is dedicated to the intricate and
complicated relationships of the ever-evolving IO organisational structure.
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In addition, following the release of Joint Publication 3-13 in 1998, new military doctrine
continued to be published, with the IO Road Map released in a classified format in 2003. The
publication of the Secretary ofDefense's IO Road Map was five years after the release of the
Joint Publication 3-13, and was considered a major step forward in the development of this
warfare area within the Defense Department. This is because of the cumulative efforts during
this period of 1998-2003 to update and change the military's strategy on 10 based upon realworld operations and missions conducted by the services around the world. In doing so, the
resulting document, the IO Road Map, concentrated more on the traditional aspects ofiO
including and in many regards was seen as a revalidation of the old concept of Command and
Control Warfare. Subjects such as perception management, strategic communications, public
diplomacy and influence campaigns were Sl1bsequently minimised in the IO Road Map, and
instead this document developed a more tailored doctrine on 10. This latest policy in the form of
the IO Road Map also chose to concentrate more on the 'traditional' aspects of 10 including
electronic warfare, psychological operations and computer network operations, and to not try to
coordinate areas that the military did not control. This because the IO Road Map is an official
Department of Defense publication, and it is now probably in most aspects, the best official
document which broadly defines the American military strategic policy, sinc.e it concentrates
much more of the 'traditional' aspects ofiO. This document is also probably more
representative of the manner in which the Department ofDefense operates, thus in effect, the IO

Road Map may have in fact, really 'narrowed' the gap, between strategic theory and tactical 10
operations, by 'lowering' the expectations of higher level 10 policy for the United States.
Obviously this is a preliminary conclusion, but it will be interesting to see if over time, that the

IO Road Map leads to a greater understanding by the United States government as a whole,
about the overall power and capability of information as an element of power in this new era.
So while in one view, this new policy (the IO Road Map) could be considered a failure
because its more narrow focus on the traditional areas of 10, it also once again highlights the
huge mismatch between the strategic transformational promise of 10 doctrine and the operational
reality of how the Defense Department tactically conducts information activities and campaigns,
for in reality the IO Road Map may very well be the best pragmatic solution for the conduct of
10 by the United States military. The new Joint Doctrine for 10, Joint Publication 3-13, which
was published in 2006, also built on the changes inherent in the IO Road Map and is another
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major step forward, for it marked the growing comfort level with the embedded role of 10 within
basic military strategy and operations. The year 2006 may also come to be seen as the period
when every aspect of 10 in the national power structure moved forward. The information
assurance community also saw the publication of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan,
while the strategic communications arena saw the development of a long-awaited draft strategy,
all of which when combined with the 10 Road Map and the new Joint Publication 3-13, give the
military approved doctrine on which to base future 10 plans and operations. The real question of
course is whether this growing set of policy and guidance documents and proliferation of 10
related organizations, indicates a greater understanding by the United States government as a
whole and its constituent elements about the power and capability of 10 specifically and
information in general as an element of power in this new era.
The end of 2006 also saw the emergence of additional pieces of strategic guidance and
policy, one from the Department ofDefense and one at the interagency level, which could show
alignment with many of the major themes promulgated in this thesis. Specifically, in September
2006, the DoD released the Quadrennial Defense Review Execution Roadmap for Strategic

Communication, which briefly summarised the problem facing the Defense Department in this
operational area and laid out 55 tasks intended to remedy those problems. Strategic
communication was defined earlier in the 10 Road Map as "Focused US Government processes
and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen or preserve conditions
favourable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated
information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with other elements of national
power" (U.S. Department ofDefense, 2003). This new approach and definition was significantly
better than previous doctrine that emphasised the "transmission of themes and messages". The
new view also recognised that if there is a hope to have any likelihood of positively influencing
an audience, the first step must be listening to and understanding that audience, and thus
hopefully avoiding the widespread (and sometimes accurate) global perception that the United
States is so busy talking that it can't afford the time and effort to listen. Likewise the 10 Road

Map also stated that the United States military is not 'sufficiently organised, trained, or
equipped' to engage in full-spectrum strategic communication and that 'changes in the global
information environment' require a more coordinated and integrated effort. It emphasised the
importance of' credibility and trust', and noted that that all elements of the United States
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Government share the responsibility for this (Ibid). For not only is effective strategic
communications a government-wide responsibility, the Department ofDefense is by no means
the senior player in this effort, and in fact it must support the efforts of the State Department to
integrate these efforts. Within the Department of Defense however, several key capabilities
require improvement, most of which fall within the umbrella of IO in some way, including
public affairs, psychological operations and defense support to public diplomacy. The
Department ofDefense also defined three key objectives in this IO Road Map, that if met would
significantly improve its ability to conduct effective strategic communications. First, the
Defense Department needed to institutionalise a process through which goals and objectives in
this issue area which could be embedded within the development and execution of plans across
all operational levels. Next, the doctrine needed to be developed to clearly define the roles,
responsibilities and relationships for strategic communications and its constituent elements.
Finally, and not surprisingly, all of this would not happen if not properly resourced, and the
Military Departments (such as the Department of the Army, etc) and Combatant Commands (like
the Central Command) must be provided the means to organise, train and equip capabilities for
this (Quadrennial Defense Review, 25 September 2006).

9.2.1.2

Why is the State Department not issuing Strategic Guidance?
While the Strategic Communications Roadmap provided the Department of Defense with

authoritative guidance with which to shape capabilities and operations, the interagency
organisations had no such guidance, however there is hope, that eventually broader policy may
eventually be adopted. In the second of the major IO federal policies that was released in 2006,
the former Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Karen Hughes,
circulated for coordination a memo in October of that year entitled U.S. National Strategy for

Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, under her hand as chair of the Presidential
Coordinating Committee for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications. This was a much
longer and more strategic document that set forth three strategic imperatives to guide American
public diplomacy and strategic communications programs. The first of these initiatives was
stressing the importance of presenting a positive vision ofhope and opportunity, which would be
rooted in basic American values. Next was the need to isolate and undermine violent extremists,
while the final imperative was to nurture common interests and values while emphasising those
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that cross cultures, borders, and creeds. The draft strategy then went on to identify critical
influencers who are able to reach 'strategic audiences' and 'vulnerable populations'. The plan
also emphasised the need for interagency coordination, because every arm of the United States
Government has an urgent mission in this arena. Its 'action plan' was based on these three
strategic imperatives, and nearly 40% of the entire document was devoted to specific and
detailed plans and proposals. Finally, the draft strategy also examined several critical elements
of communication, such as broadcasting or public opinion analysis, that would be necessary
supports for a successful strategy, and it emphasised the need to be accountable for operations
and to gauge whether any specific plan or program was being successful ( U.S. National Strategy
for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, 18 October 2006).
This plan was broad and inclusive, a major step forward that went well beyond anything
that had existed previously. One major improvement over earlier efforts was that the
Presidential Coordinating Committee charged with developing this strategy was not 'eo-chaired'
as in previous incarnations and thus did not suffer from divided leadership. Instead this
interagency group was instead led by only one person - indeed the Presidential Coordinating
Committee was led by one of the most influential members of the Bush Administration, namely
Karen Hughes. Her unique power stemmed from her key relationship with the President and her
position as one of his key advisors, so that her guidance always had an 'ex cathedra' aspect to it.
It was thought at the time, that this initiative provided a unique 'window of opportunity' in

which perhaps real progress could be made before the pressures of the pending 2008 elections
and an administration changeover in 2009, regardless of which party was victorious, and would
bring efforts back from full speed. There were however weaknesses in the plan, and the first of
these were its insistent focus on the Moslem/Islamic world. While that was quite normal in one
regard, especially in its connection to the 'Global War on Terror', in other ways that emphasis
was unfortunate, because there were other areas of the world, Latin America, Asia, sub-Saharan
Africa, to name just three, in which America needs to be fully engaged in support of vital
national interests. Another area in which the plan was even more inadequate was the almost
perfunctory section on resources. Instead of a powerful and compelling call for greatly increased
resources with which to wage the 'war of ideas', and a detailed explanation of how those
resources would enable the United States to advance its interests, the strategy instead only
provided a weak one-liner about the need for "increased support". This is a fatal flaw, especially
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in a fiscal environment in which every dollar has several worthwhile programs calling for it.
Such a weak request has virtually no chance of actually gaining the needed resources, which to
date has unfortunately spelled a quick demise for this noble effort.
To summarise, there are many reasons why there is no strategic academic theory on IO
that has been developed over the last 15 years, all of which can probably be categorised into that
fact that most of the intellectual thinking on this topic area has resided within the Department of
Defense. While there have been books written and articles published from the academic
community, in general this issue area has not fully matured into its own discipline, which has
precluded intense focus on IO as a theoretical construct.

9.2.2

Is Information Operations the best term?
Not really. Information Operations is only the latest in a series of Department ofDefense

names for this concept which has existed for over 30 years, and it is too limiting because it tends
to be only associated with the military vice the entire United States government. Variously
called Information Operations, Information Warfare, Command and Control Warfare, Public
Diplomacy, International Public Information, Psychological Operations, Perception
Management, Net Centric Warfare, NetWar, Soft Power, Noopolitik and Strategic
Communications, all.ofthese terms are inadequate to explain the true breadth and depth of
transformation of power across the international community. The capabilities such as deception,
psychological operations and electronic warfare, which can all shape and influence the
information environment, have all existed as part of the military repertoire for a long time, but
the umbrella term ofiO is a relatively recent doctrinal definition, with much of the critical
thinking beginning in the mid-1970s. The first known use of the term 'Information Warfare' was
in a brief delivered by Dr Tom Rona, an analyst at Boeing Aircraft Corporation, for Andrew
Marshall, a senior Defense Department official in May 1976. Much of this concern came from
United States military analysts and planners who were looking at intelligence estimates of the
size ofthe former Soviet Union's military. From 1975-85, the former Union of Soviet
Socialist's Republic often outnumbered United States conventional forces 3:1, and, while the
United States may have had a qualitative advantage, there are still times when only sheer
numbets count. In the Pentagon, military strategists were looking for methods to cut down on
the former Soviet Union's advantage by attempting to counter traditional strengths with
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asymmetric non-nuclear attacks. In addition, these analysts noted that the former Soviet Union
relied heavily on electronic warfare or radioelectrionyaborba (Radio Electronic Combat) in
much of its doctrine, and there was a feeling that the United States must combat this threat as
well (Munro, 1991). It was also in this era, that some of the early ideas about IO and effectsbased planning began to evolve. Likewise, the demise of the Soviet threat to the United States in
1989 and the shift from bipolar to multi-polar political scenarios also seriously affected
American force structure and military doctrine. This combined with the huge technological
changes that have evolved over the last 20 years in computers, software, telecommunications,
networks, etc. have all revolutionised the way the United States conducts military operations, and
there has been a marked concentration on understanding the role of information in conflict. It
was becoming increasing clear during the late 1980s and early 1990s to the war-fighters and
policy makers in the Pentagon that the side that controlled and retained the ability to conduct
information campaigns accurately as well as to manipulate, use and disseminate information was
going to be victorious. Strategic planners at the Joint Chiefs of Staff began to think and write
new strategy, most of which was highly classified, that would utilise information as a warfighting tool. .The evolution of these different IO terms is laid out in the next few sections.

9.2.2.1

Problems with the use ofiO as a term
To begin with, the very term of IO was a compromise from Information Warfare. The

military understood Information Warfare to an extent, but just as quickly as that term started
gaining acceptance over Command and Control Warfare in the armed forces during the 1990s, a
newer term in the form ofiO was foisted on the Department ofDefense in 1998. The reason for
this was of course to broaden acceptance of this new form of warfare across the federal
government, where many agencies were anaemic to the term 'warfare' itself, and so new
language was needed which would 'soften' and allow this warfare area to be utilised across the
different federal interagency organisations. And so IO was adopted as a neutral label, one that
could be used by all government agencies in the United States involved in these types of
activities. The term IO ran into trouble right away, because it included the older Command and
Control Warfare areas such as operations security, psychological operations and electronic
warfare with corollary functions such as civil and public affairs. It is widely known that the
psychological operations and public affairs communities are very separate and distinct areas,

268

with disparate missions, which could make it unethical in many personnel's mind ofworking
together. Huge discussions and debates were conducted on how to separate these two activities
in an IO cell, and options including 'fire-walling' the respective groups, etc. No matter what was
suggested, the idea that any public affairs official would ever be involved in any operations that
conduct psychological operations, influence operations or perception management type activities
is anti-ethical to their whole mission which in many cases spelled disaster from the beginning. A
great example of this was mentioned earlier in this thesis with the demise of the Office of
Strategic Influence in February 2002, after the senior Department ofDefense Public Affairs
officer, Tori Clarke torpedoed the entire concept of this new organisation. It is exactly this area
of IO, namely perception management or the newest term of strategic communications, which
promises the most changes with regard to the power of information. The ability to use the latest
technology to influence people around the world is the form and articulation of power and
informational capabilities that grabs the attention of many proponents ofiO. So the correct label
is very important, as this new set of tools is the crux of the potential power ofiO.
However that is not always possible. Many military theorists contend that information
warfare is what you do when IO fails. That is one difference, but there are also subtleties
between these two warfare areas as well. The main distinction between
these. two doctrinal terms
.
is that information warfare contains six elements and is mostly involved with the conduct of
operations during actual combat, while IO on the other hand, includes these six capabilities and
two sometimes integrated or related activities (Joint Publication 3-13, 1998, p. I-9). Therefore
IO is much broader and comprehensive than information warfare, and is intended to be
conducted as a strategic campaign throughout the full spectrum of conflict from peace to war and
back to peace. It is in only IO that the full integration across government agencies and with
private industry can occur. Thus a common complaint about 10 is that because its definition is
so broad, at once it is everything and also nothing. The elements, capabilities and related
activities of information warfare and 10 are separate and discrete warfare elements. Most have
very old traditions and long-standing histories that do not necessarily mean that every action
conducted in these areas is always associated with IO. A Swedish information warfare academic
-relates, "While the activities gathered under the umbrella concept of 10 are not new in
themselves, the attempt to coordinate and integrate them into an overall strategy which utilizes
the rapid advances in information and communications technology ... " (Riegert, 2002, p. 79).
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For example, there are elements of destruction that are not part of an IO campaign, likewise not
every public affairs activity has to be tied to information operations. In reality, if done correctly,
all elements and their components of national power can be integrated into a satisfactorily
planned, designed and executed strategy to allow the United States to attain its national security
goals in the new millennium.

9.2.2.2

The Need for Taxonomy
Labels are incredibly
important. Portions of IO such as psychological
operations and
.
.

.

electronic warfare are distinctly military terms, yet functions very similar to these tasks such
diplomatic information activities or worldwide communications efforts such as Radio SAWA are
conducted routinely by other agencies in the United States. Thus we see the difficulties in
determining what exactly IO means and why changing labels have occurred so much in these
areas over the last two decades. For example, the term Command and Control Warfare, was
routinely accepted by the Department ofDefense in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The focus
was on nodes and connections, with an emphasis on physical items such as network operations
. centres, transformers, etc. This was a primary mission that the Department ofDefense could and
did excel in this warfare era; witness the triumph of the First Gulf War and the informational
components. The evolution to a warfare area beyond the limitations of the command and control
warfare label continues to vex the United States 15 years after the publication of the original
Department ofDefense 3600 series in 1993. That is because, the moment you move the military
beyond the traditional areas of operations security, electronic warfare, psychological operations,
etc and move to terms or mission areas that include components such as influence operations or
perception management- that is when the Defense Department begins to have difficulties with
the theoretical aspects ofiO. The broadening of Command and Control Warfare to Information
Warfare was the next logical step in the mid-1990s as the Revolution in Military Affairs was the
rage, and policy was formulated which ultimately resulted in the seminal doctrinal statement of
Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, in October 1998. This was supposed to be the
pre-eminent manual on how to conduct missions in this new era, where information reigned
supreme. The problem was that this publication was not a 'how to' manual, but instead an
attempt to redefine how the military conducted operations, a reach for a 'new' way of warfare.
And with all things revolutionary, it was a bridge too far, for not only did the various military
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services have trouble trying to implement this new military strategy, but also of organising,
training and equipping to it as well. Funding was also crucial, because it was very hard to fund
these nebulous concepts. All of these issues led to a realisation that the original Joint Publication
3-13 was an over reach in terms of military theory, and since that time, there has been a
concerted effort by the Department ofDefense to 'reign' in 10 policy and doctrine to mission
areas that are more traditionally focused on the respective armed services. Combine these ideas,
with the lack of a proper definition and taxonomy for 10, one's that centre more around the
information warfare concepts that are executable by the respective federal agencies, and runs into
problems implementing 10 across the United States government, and the realisation by many
interviewees, that the future of this transformational capability may never be fully realised.
Therefore what is truly needed is a comprehensive set of taxonomies, with an accompanying
ontology that is recognised by all practitioners of 10.

9.2.3

Why is Top-Down Approach to 10 not working in the United States
Government?
For while these incredible changes in technology are drastically changing the role of

information with respect to power, and many parts of the military and business communities
have embraced these changes, it still appears based on the interviews and literature reviews that
within the United States the executive branches and the State Department are still very slow to
understand the power inherent in information. The lack of a set of coherent theories or
overarching doctrine is creating a gap between the new changes that are occurring with the
tactical agencies, while there is still a need for a basic understanding at a more strategic level.
The fundamental fact is that the growth of information technology has accelerated the process of
transferring power down and away from a centralised authority, and into the lower levels of an
organisation. This decentralisation of power, command and control as well as decision-making
authority can be seen in many instances in new Department of Defense weapon systems such as
Future Combat System, where every Army infantryman will have more information at their
disposal than could have been fathomed a mere decade or two ago. The same can be seen in the
economic globalisation efforts, where the market is truly worldwide, and no longer is a business
confined to a local geographic area. The intemet and World Wide Web have forever broken
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down these barriers to communication and information transfer, bringing the power to groups
that formerly did not have access to these capabilities.

9.2.3.1

Is the Revolution in Military Affairs I Revolution in Diplomatic Affairs an
answer?
Is the Revolution in Military Affairs still a viable concept? How about the Revolution in

Diplomatic Affairs? Is the United States government really ready to radical change its
organisational structure to conduct operations in the Information Age? The answer to all of these
questions is probably not, for while everyone understands that nation-state to nation-state
communication will never be limited as in previous eras to pin-striped diplomats, cables,
message traffic or official communiques, it is not apparent from the data gained in this research
that the radical leap needed to transform the Department of Defense or State Department is
happening very quickly, especially in the area of strategic communications or perception
management. Unfortunately it appears that the United States has been very slow to take
advantages of this new technology and instead is relying on the tried and true communication
apparatus that has been the backbone of public diplomacy for the last 60 years. The demise of
the United States Information Agency and the incredible slowness of the States Department to
properly absorb the public diplomacy community, has also contributed immensely to this
incredible gap in the strategic capability of the American government to adequately project its
message as well attempt to influence people around the world. The Clinton and second Bush
Administration are to blame for this gap, because while they have repeatedly 'talked' the talk,
about the need for a 'beefed up' public diplomacy capability for the United States, their actions
(or inactions in the case of lack of funding), have contributed significantly to the drastic decline
in the ability for the State Department to 'project' its message. In this gap, the National Security
Council has 'tried' to do public diplomacy or strategic communications, and has finally given up
after the retirement of their main proponent in 2005, and in fact are quoted as stating that is no
longer a capability of that office anymore (Waller, 2007a, p. 389).
The diplomatic corps is also greatly at fault as well. It was a resentment by the traditional
segment of this federal agency toward the independence of the United States Information
Agencythat allowed it to be 'absorbed' in 1999, and while there is 'lip-service' to the
development of a public diplomacy core in the 'I' group, in reality in discussions with a number
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of Department ofDefense professionals, it rapidly becomes apparent, that public diplomacy is
not considered a fast-track to promotion. This apathetic attitude or indifference is telling in the
staffing of public diplomacy positions, the funding of public diplomacy initiatives, and even in
the leadership of public diplomacy within the State Department. The inability of the National
Security Council and Department of State to jointly lead a Presidential Coordinating Committee
in this very area since 9/11 is also very telling of the importance that these organisations put into
this capability. In addition, the protracted search for a leader of public diplomacy in-the State
Department, in the form of the Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs is also
very telling as well. First it was Charlotte Beers, a Texas advertising executive, who lasted less
than 18 months, followed by rumours of Margaret Tutweiller, a Bush Administration speech
writer, followed by a gap of two years with an acting official until the long heralded Karen
Hughes, a President Bush confidante and campaign manager took over the position in 2005 amid
much fanfare and hype. However only two years later she had left Washington for good, with
some changes made, but no continuity in the role. It is the belief of many of the interviewees in
this thesis, that the lack of a long term, dedicated 10 professional to coordinate this very
important role has damaged the ability of the federal government immensely in this area.

9.2.3.2

Why is the State Department failing in its Public Diplomacy Role?
This is mainly because the public diplomacy community is still embracing antiquated

tools to transmit their message. Little effort is made comparatively to understand and use new
avenues such as blogs, websites, intemet chat rooms, or instant messaging to pass information to
all segments of society. There are a variety of reasons for this, but one could be the loss of
control. The State Department has traditional preferred to centralise the 'message' that it
promulgates to other nations, and thus the use of media that are under their centralised control,
such as radio, TV shows, embassy visits, etc. The problem of course is that these methods while
laudable are not enough in today's technically savvy world. Adversaries and enemies of
America are filling these other mediums with hatred, lies and distortions of the truth that only
serve to hurt the United States. A vacuum is abhorrent to nature and once discovered will be
filled. That is exactly what is happening today with the effort by the American federal agencies
to 'spread' the word. Because the federal agencies are fighting the fight with one hand tied
behind their back due to the unwillingness to use the latest technological assets and archaic laws
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(the Smith-Mundt Act for example), the United States is losing in this war of ideas. And it is a
war, as stated by many IO experts (Waller, 2007b). Our enemies understand that they cannot
defeat the United States on a militarily or economic basis, but they can hobble this superpower
with a w;ell-run information campaign. It was done before in Vietnam, and many of these same
tactics are being utilised again, albeit this time with newer technology and communication paths.
Of course, it must be asked why is it that the Department of Defense can trust the latest
technology with its youngest recruits by the United States government and yet in particular the
State Department, is unwilling to trust the citizens of this great nation into spreading the words
and ideas of freedom and democracy. The awareness level of the intended recipients of these
messages from the American sources are often more savvy than assumed and nuances be better
understood than thought. That is the key to success in this war of words and the United States
must use all sources at its disposal to promulgate the message about freedom and democracy,
about the core values that make up America, and it is then and only then, that the tide will turn in
this battle, which currently it appears that the coalition is losing. We talk about a Revolution in
Military Affairs and a Revolution in Diplomatic Affairs -which are really the use of information
to transform these traditional forms ofpower - we talk about globalisation, which is really the
use of information to transform economic power, and yet there is no talk about Revolution in
Information Affairs, which of course asks the question - why not? Perhaps it is because
information is still not viewed as a source of power but instead only as an enabler- that is, it is
technology, specifically information technology that is seen as driving the Revolution in Military
Affairs, the Revolution in Diplomatic Affairs and the globalisation transformations. Yet is it also
not information and the flow of information as well?

9.2.4

Why is there no rhyme or reason to the 10 Training and Education
curricula?
When evaluating the sheer multitude of IO courses by the United States government, it

must be realised that the major problem is that none of these courses have any standards or
common learning objectives upon which to base their curriculum. These different classes are
normally based on different theories (service and agency), different skill levels of users
(beginners to advanced), different ranks or grades of the audience (enlisted to flag/ general
officer), as well as different foci (strategic, operational and tactical). So it should not be

274

surprising that there are over 70 10 courses in existence today, taught by a variety of United
States government organisations and commands, all of which have little to no interaction or
integration. For example, 10 training cannot be obtained in ohe service and then serve in a joint
organisation without needing additional specialised training. Additionally, there are no common
denominators or goals that translate well across the American armed forces with regard to 10
training and educational requirements. These and other standardisation issues have thwarted the
United States government and academia in moving toward the development of curricula
emphasising the power of information in general and 10 in particular.

9.2.4.1

Can Lessons be learned from the Information Assurance Community?
The participants of this project have noted this dichotomy between the Information

Assurance and 10 communities, and have presented this subject a number of times in
conferences around the world as well published their findings in a number of scholarly articles.
One good example of this was a sponsored collaborative discussion session among British,
American and Australian academics and military officers at the 2nd Annual 10 Conference
hosted in London (July 2003) .. During this daylong session, a tremendous amount of energy and
analysis was devoted towards finding a solution to help develop better access to 10 training and
education capabilities across the three nations. The figure below, is a synopsis of those efforts,
and reiterates what the participants of this project have been advocating for a long time, mainly
that any curriculum developed must be based on open and accessible standards and that a web or
internet based set of courseware was the best answer to deliver content globally.
IO.'educatiorfa.nd. Training Goats
Deliv~ of training must be chea_g_ and fast
Access must be worldwide and standard
Clear, concise, authoritative and readable
I nforrnation Battlespace
Planning Tool/Checklist
StucJy_ Real World Operations
Common 10 Definition/Language
Change Perceptions and generate interest
Parallel Play/Multiple Courses
Worldwide 10 Game
Standard 10 Training Material
Training must be standardized
Red Teaming must be incorporated

Means
Internet
Portal
Textbook
COP
Excel! App
Case Studies
Taxonomy
Exercises
Interfaces
Everquest?
CD-ROMs
Qualifications
VATeams

Table 9.1 -Options for Improving 10 Training and Education Goals
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While this matrix is not the sole answer to the problem, the authors believe that it may help to act
as a checklist or guide to focus the attention on possible solutions to these 10 education and
training goals. However, there is still a gap between the large number of military oriented 10
courses and the study of this academic concentration by civilian universities.

9.2.4.2

Issues that still exist with developing commonality with respect to the IO
Training and Education Situation
The dichotomy between increased emphasis by the American military on the conduct of

10 and the lack of corresponding academic programs within academia is not unprecedented.

Early work at National Information Assurance Training and Education Centre to develop a set of
standards, led to several industry professional standards, National Institute of Standards
publication 800-16 and the Committee for National Security Systems series of publications.
These standards, developed by the National Security Agency, are now widely recognised
throughout the Department ofDefense and interagency as the de facto baseline of tasks for
Information Assurance across the federal bureaucracy. In addition, the Committee for National
. Security Systems series has become widely used in academia, through National Security Agency
sponsored Information Assurance programs and curriculum. Together these .groups are a hub of
Information Assurance activity in which a tremendous amount of activity has occurred in the last
decade. An entire cadre of Information Assurance professionals has been trained and now
occupy key and influential positions within the federal government as a result of the education
that they received from these programs. The key component of this success has proven to be the
development ofthe Committee for National Security Systems standards, which are grouped into
six categories (4011 to 40 16). Updated on a regular basis, these serve as a baseline for all the
certifications and academic programs sponsored by the National Security Agency and National
Information Assurance Training and Education Program as well as the Information Assurance
academic community in general.
If the problem of developing academic interest in 10 is to be solved, several steps are
required. They can be modelled on the steps originally recommended for the Information
Assurance discipline, over a decade ago. The first is to build personnel capacity, for if 10 is to
become· a civilian academic field, there must be sufficient faculty. The main problem as noted in
this research is that are very few college professors are trained in 10 in the United States.
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Currently, the computer science, information assurance, or information systems programs in the
United States are able to adequately respond to the increased demand for IO courses. For the
long-term it will be necessary to increase faculty in all areas of information technology, not just
Information Assurance and IO. Current IO practitioners should be encouraged to enter the
professoriate by creating academic positions for professionally qualified individuals. In the
United States - and this is key - there. are currently no comprehensive IO curricula or graduate
programs in academia. Nascent master's curricula are underway at the National Defense
University as well as Norwich University, but more institutes and programs are needed to help
close this gap, if significant progress is to be made. Likewise, the role of industry also cannot be
overlooked in making faculty retention and development easier for the IO initiative. It is also
imperative to attract quality students to programs producing IO specialists. As demonstrated in
various information assurance initiatives, an undergraduate scholarship program has the largest
potential influence to solve the short-term problem. In the absence of some form of graduate
stipend program, there will probably still continued to be a dearth of individuals to become the
next generation professoriate and to fill governmental and industrial needs. Production of
master's and doctoral students is also essential. Finally traditional undergraduate and graduate
programs alone cannot meet the need for information operations professionals, and any
comprehensive solution must include ongoing professional education for the existing workforce.

9.3

Key Findings of this Thesis
Information has always been an element of power, but is often seen as an enabler or

supporting component, and not as the decisive factor in conducting operations. The very nature
of modern day operations, with its persuasive and never ending 24 I 7 global media coverage, has
shown over and over the need to utilise all the tools or elements of power at one's disposal.
Information is a key component of any sort of influence type of operations, and its effectiveness
has been demonstrated repeatedly, especially over the last two decades, with the rise in
technological capabilities. However the very factors that make information useful as an element
of power, are also adding to the difficulties for nation-states and in this case, America, to conduct
information campaigns, or IO, on a successful basis. The shifting of power away from a
centralised authority, the loss of control from the federal bureaucracy and the low cost as well as
ease of entry, into this domain, all have combined together to signal a revolutionary and radical
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shift in the manner that information is utilised around the world. Therefore it is not surprising
that non-governmental organisations, non-state actors, corporations, terrorists and individuals
have all benefited from this shift in power, due to the advent of new information technology
capabilities.
It is also not surprising that the federal bureaucracy of the United States is struggling to
come to grips with the ramification of these changes. Specifically the flow, content and
communication paths of information, as well as the loss of control have all radically altered the
method in which the administration and other branches of the federal government interact with
their counterparts around the world. Combined with the heightened expectations of the increased
capabilities inherent in 10, the lack of a coherent theoretical construct, definition or taxonomy,
and a virtual smorgasbord of training classes, with varying curriculum and content, none of
which are integrated or coordinated, have all combined together to spell disaster for the success
of IO in the United States. Too much is expected, and too much has been promised, and with no
radical changes in funding across the federal agencies, progress has overall been disappointing.
Many of the same organisations that were doing Command and Control Warfare over 15 years
ago, are still the key agencies conducting 10, just renamed and slightly expanded, but with no
true increase in scope and capability. Therefore it is not surprising that in many aspects, the
Defense Department is moving backwards with regard to strategy, capabilities and scope. The
inability of the military forces to organise, train and equip to the nebulous original Joint
Publication 3-13 directive of 1998, have instead pushed the Defense Department to revert back
to an instruction, in the form of the 10 Road Map in 2003, that more closely resembles the
original Command and Control Warfare doctrine of 10 years earlier. This was because it is
precisely these latter capabilities incorporated in electronic warfare, deception, operations
security, psychological operations and physical destruction, are all ones that the military has total
control over, as opposed to more nebulous related IO warfare areas such as perception
management, strategic communications, etc. This 'boxing' in of the Department ofDefense, is
actually a sound strategy, because it concentrates success on these issues, and to what units and
personnel are under its control. Taken together then, the specific key findings that align with this
assessment include the following areas:
11
11

IO needs to be limited in its scope to be effective- a lessening of expectations
Only the Department of Defense will continue to have IO Policy and Doctrine
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11
11

IO Training I Education are useless unless tied to taxonomy and standards
IO Metrics are key to future success and acceptance .

All of these issues will be addressed below, as part of an overall plan to provide a way forward
with regard to the more efficient conduct of IQ by the United States government.

9.4

Suggestions for Improvement Based on the Soft System Methodology and
Literature Review
From this analysis, a number of specific recommendations were made that were both

feasible and desirable from the data collected. These suggestions are listed over the next few
pages and represent the collection of several years of interviews, conferences and workshops, in
an attempt to ensure that the specific recommendations of this research met all of the criteria of
the participants. For as many academics have tried to articulate, this new emphasis on the use of
information, is an attempt by the United States to develop a strategy to better control all of its
power capabilities, in order to affect the many issues that it must deal with in the post Cold War
era. Federal officials in the United States have come to the realisation that militarily, the
government could not solve all of its problems through kinetic means. 10 is therefore an attempt
to bring these different facets of power to bear on an adversary, whether it is a nation-state,
terrorist group or individual. Thus, the real key to making the management of information
effective is to ensure that the horizontal integration and coordination of the interagency
organisations are conducted early on, that is in the peacetime environment vice waiting until
hostilities start. As mentioned earlier, 10 can be a very effective tool for shaping the
environment in the pre-hostilities phase, so that the actual need for hostilities may actually be
avoided or minimised. So while the publication of Joint Publication 3-13 was lauded in the late
1990s with its attempt to define everything as 10, in fact it's very overstretch could actually be
responsible for the lack of understanding and the eventual withdrawal of this strategy into a more
manageable set ofiO doctrine five years later with the promulgation of the 10 Road Map.
This latter argument is a key point of this thesis -namely that in trying to be everything
for everybody, 10 as defined in the original Joint Publication 3-13, has in effect became nothing.
Over and over, participants emphasised that in order to be successful, 10 needs to be more
strictly defined and standardised, with a series of overarching policy, taxonomy, certification and
methodologies that are recognised and understood by all practitioners. In order to do this, many
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interviews recommended that a limiting of the 10 definition must occur, one in which a more
realistic view must occur, in which goals and capabilities are attainable. It was stated repeatedly
by the participants in this research project, that a nebulous set of policies and the desire to
include all warfare areas into 10, have actually hobbled the ability ofthe United States
government to organise, train and equip its forces in a practical manner to conduct these
operations.

9.4.1

Suggestions and a Plan to Develop an Overarching 10 Theory
10 is not a part of the liberalism or realism theoretical academic theories. It is something

that is in between, as noted in Chapter Two, because it is much more oriented around power. It
has its own language such as virus's or worms, that is somewhat medical in nature. It also can
be very technical, especially when concerned with information assurance or cyber security
issues. This dichotomy of needs and requirements has hampered the ability to develop an
overarching 10 theoretical constmct, and yet many comments from this research project
interviewees, centred on the desire for more progress to occur, especially in the areas ofiO
standards, training, and integration. The use of 10 policy and themes are very different across
United States government, particularly in the perception management arena, while computer
network defense and critical infrastructure protection are considered more uniform in nature.
Concerns were raised in this thesis about why is 10 so easy to visualise and so hard to
accomplish? It is the 'softer areas' ofiO, as referenced by the participants, mainly the concepts
that involved efforts to affect the mind, in the form of perception management and strategic
communications, that the United States was having the most difficulty in conducting operations.
These skill sets are considered an art, with many of the interviewees believing that the long view
needs top be taken for success in this area, and yet these same participants also noted that in the
United States, federal organisations often wanted to rely on technology to answer the questions,
to overwhelm the adversary quickly. These interviewees commented often sadly, that in reality,
the fast results are not successful, and instead history should be explored to understand that quick
answers are not the norm and instead understanding of how the military actors in the past have
really succeeded should be obtained. For example, was the bombing really effective in Kosovo
in 1999, or was the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation coalition just making rubble bounce, and
not really understanding how to really affect the hearts and minds of a populace? For many of
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the research interviewees, IO is not that radical, and in fact, some that instead it should just really
be entitled as "Operations in the Information Age". But that idea doesn't solve the need for an
overarching construct, and developing new academic theory often hinges on radical concepts
such as those espoused in the Third Wave or Noopolitik (Toffler, 1984; Arquilla and Rand,
1999). These concepts along with Soft Power are perhaps the best examples of academics that
have successfully crossed the theoretical construct boundary into Department ofDefense policy
(Nye, 1990).
So in this aspect, there is a huge dichotomy in the goals of these two policy attempts at
developing strategic IO academic theory, with the more pragmatic Department ofDefense (The

10 Road Map) and the State Department (Defense Science Board Report on Strategic
Communications), documents. But in another view, these mandates are also entirely
representative of the way in which IO is conducted today throughout the federal bureaucracy.
Because the 10 Road Map has a much narrower focus than the mandate from the Defense
Science Board, it tends to highlight the huge mismatch between the strategic transformational
promise of IO doctrine, with the operational reality of how the Defense Department tactically
conducts information activities and campaigns. So in reality, the 10 Road Map may very well be
just the pragmatic solution needed to solve the difficulties in trying to conduct these types of
information campaigns on a day-to-day basis. This as opposed to the lofty and somewhat more
ambitious goals of the Defense Science Board report, which while utterly correct from a
perception management perspective, may in fact never occur due to political and fiscal reality.
The 10 Road Map and to a lesser extent the new Joint Publication 3-13 (2006) are not the
only way ahead for the federal bureaucracy with respect to the future of IO, within the United
States. In September 2004, a new Defense Science Board Task Force of the Report on Strategic

Communications was released, as a follow-on effort to an earlier study by the Defense Science
Board in October 2001. Many critics felt the first study was overshadowed by the tragic events
of September 11th, 2001 and the opening campaign of Operation Enduring Freedom in
Afghanistan. So a primary duty of this new Report on Strategic Communications, was to not
only look at the changes that had failed to occur since the original report, but also to reflect on
the prior publication to see if its recommendations were still valid. While the author could
paraphrase the document, the opening statement is so crystal clear, that it is worth repeating for
verbatim, so as to not lose any of its effectiveness.
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This Task Force concludes that U.S. strategic communication must be
transformed. America's negative image in world opinion and diminished ability to
persuade are consequences of factors other than failure to implement communications
strategies. Interests collide. Leadership counts. Policies matter. Mistakes dismay our
friends and provide enemies with unintentional assistance. Strategic communication is
not the problem, but it is a problem (Defense Science Board Task Force of the Report on
Strategic Communications, 2004, p.l ).
The report went on to cite seven key factors for success with regards to strategic communications
by the United States.· All of these areas were important, but without an Administration and
federal bureaucracy that understands the problem, leads by example and encourages a strong ·
Government-Private Sector partnership, this Defense Science Board report saw little chance of
success for strategic communications, notwithstanding its recommendations which are laid out
below:
e

•

•
•
•
•
•

Issue a National Policy Security Directive on Strategic Communications from the
National Security Council
Establish a permanent strategic communication structure within the National Security
Council to include a Deputy National Security Advisor and a Strategic Communication
Committee
The creation of an independent, non-profit and non-partisan Centre for
Strategic Communication to support the National Security Council
Redefine the role and responsibility of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy
and Public Affairs to be both policy advisor and manager for public diplomacy
The public diplomacy office directors in the Department of State should be at the level of
deputy assistant secretary or senior advisor to the Assistant Secretary
The Under Secretary ofDefense for Policy should act as the Department ofDefense focal
point for strategic communication
The Under Secretary ofDefense for Policy and the Joint Command Staff ensure that all
military plans and operations have appropriate strategic communication components
(Ibid, p.l 0)

What is very interesting from an academic standpoint is that many of the personnel interviewed
for this Defense Science Board project, also participated in this thesis research, and many of the
recommendations of this report, in this author's opinion mirror the overall tone of this
dissertation. In addition, all the key interviewees of the Defense Science Board worked at one
time or are still associated with the public diplomacy, strategic communications or international
public information community, which in many aspects validated their findings. Therefore in a
manner, this Defense Science Board also serves as a verification of sorts with respect to the
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research conducted as part of this thesis, to confirm that the assumptions are on track with
regards to the needs and deficiencies of IO within the United States government.
Thus, the way ahead with regard to developing a strategic IO theory will have to involve
the academic community, yet unfortunately as mentioned earlier, there are very few American
university professors who expressed interest or expertise in IO, so the ability to house this effort
solely in a United States based academic venue is probably not going to happen. However an
academic IO theory does not have to be developed by an American, to be useful. A tremendous
amount of talented and innovative research on IO is being conducted outside of the United States
and so a collaborative approach is suggested, where the three main IO and information warfare
academic conferences are utilised as the backbone for this effort. Entitled the European
Conference on Information Warfare (ECIW), the Australian Information Warfare Conference
(AIWC) and the International Conference on Information Warfare (ICIW), these three gatherings
are held annually. Typically, they have many of the same participates attend from around the
world, which supports a good atmosphere to allow a vigorous debate, in which a number of
aspects and options to developing a strategic IO theoretical construct are analysed with sufficient
academic rigor.·

9.4.2

A Model to Establish a Taxonomy and set of Definitions for 10
Ultimately the lack of a standardised nomenclature or taxonomy also hurts the ability to

conduct IQ by the United States government. Basic questions are raised, including those of a
semantic nature, such as why could not other United States government agencies agree on a
common taxonomy, or a set of terms, such as information warfare? Was it too warlike, hence the
switch to IO? Maybe so, but even the latter term is still not routinely adopted across the federal
bureaucracy, and there are no common terms in other organizations for IO, or its different subthemes like perception management, international public information, public affairs, strategic
communications, etc.
So it is suggested as part of this thesis that a set of definitive definitions and taxonomy
needs to be developed to support the entire federal bureaucracy with regard to IO. A top-down
approach has been suggested as part of the interviewee process as well as shown in section 9.4.2,
specifically that the use of the three main IO and information warfare academic conferences
could offer a way forward in solving this issue. Specifically, at these latter venues, streams
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should be set up to develop an ontology, taxonomy and a lmowledge base ofiO, based on the
author's role on the editorial staff of these conference committees. Ontology is a hierarchy of
what you lmow and understand about a subject. A lmowledge base is a web of relationships
among the items in the ontology. This web of items and how they are related defines this
lmowledge base. As part of this effort, it is also suggested from interviewees that a portal should
be developed or at the least, a web service, that academics can use to access this lmowledge base,
ontology and taxonomy. It is proposed that the following items will also need to be addressed at
these academic conferences, and then be included in this web application as it is developed:
1111

111

1111

111

111

9.4.3

A clear definition of what IO is and how it works
A glossary ofiO, Information Assurance, Information Warfare and other terms, by the
user
A mind map of important things of all sorts related to IQ and how they are related is
multiple ways. - discuss these relationships connections in the mind map indicate a
variety of relationships among the items on the mind map.
A components list (that is part of and is contained by) breakdown ofiO things, (that is,
methods, processes, who uses them, what they are, how they relate to action statesoffense, defense, and collaboration).
A mental model of how IO is used, by whom, where appropriate, all players, info, data
and lmowledge common among them

An Analysis of which Approaches and Processes work best to support 10
What all these policy developments and organisational changes have recommended

and attempted to explain is a much greater emphasis on the use of the information environment
across the spectrum of national security activities, from perception management capabilities by
the federal bureaucracy to engage in strategic operations in the Global War on Terrorism to
securing critical information infrastructures against terrorist attack to. military employment of the
full range ofiO's core competencies. The participants were also very vocal and adamant in their
desires for changes to be made in the conduct of 10 by the United States government, of which
most of these changes can be grouped into the offensive IO category. Questions were asked
repeatedly such as- 'Can offensive IO succeed'? 'Should we try to do offensive IO'? 'Does
offensive perception management work better when done naturally'? These questions and other
suggestions were noted as part of this research so much so that the interviewees believed that
there might be methods to allow IO to become more of a useful weapon for the United States. In
addition, some participants also noted, that more emphasis should be placed on the publicising of
key American documents such as the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Bill of
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Rights, etc, all of which should be emphasised more in these type of IO missions. The key to
success in offensive perception management as opined by a number of participants was to keep it
simple, to use a small number of common themes and goals, that recap the lessons learned over
and over, and to do it across all the federal government organisations in a consistent manner. In
order to succeed, these same participants also noted, top level buy in was needed and then to go
out and preach as well teach at all levels, with freedom and democracy as constant themes.
Success in this kind of approach was considered more of a long term approach, not something
that can be ~onsidered an overnight success. A good example of this kind of methodology as
mentioned earlier was the United States Information Agency, which at its peak, concentrated on
the economy, social and diplomatic areas in their effort to combat communism, instead of the
military missions. These efforts were considered as huge successes with regard to perception
management, where the federal government let other organisations lead the effort, vice the
Department of Defense.
This research was conducted over a long time period, with preliminary research
beginning before the horrific events of9/11, and continued throughout the Operation Enduring
Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom campaigns. Early on the research focused more on
computer network attack, computer network defense and critical infrastructure protection, all of
which are more computer centric issues that were considered key to success in the conduct of IO,
because of the enormous changes that were foreseen with the rise of the Internet at that time. As
the research continued however, it became clear that while the information assurance, computer
network defense and critical infrastructure protection issues are still very important and vital
areas to conduct research, they are all to an extent in the federal government, under some sort of
control. There are organisations in the United States government, around which IO policy and
personnel are in place to handle or coordinate many of these defensive issues, and while these
areas may not be totally solved, at least to some extent there are a series of standard operating
procedures, methodologies and processes at work. The same cannot be said for IO issue areas
such as perception management, strategic communications, etc. Therefore the thrust of this
research is also to examine the different methods that work well for different parts of IO namely that a top down approach on defensive options in the computer network defense and
critical infrastructure protection areas may work better, as opposed to a more bottom up
approach that centres around perception management and strategic communications. Overall,
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the participants also agreed that one methodology is not the best for all areas ofiO. There were
many reasons for this, but perhaps the easiest to explain is that because 10 is such a complex
operational area, combining multiple diverse and time honoured warfare areas such as electronic
warfare, psychological operations, deception, etc with new and complex capabilities such as
computer network defense, critical infrastructure protection, computer network attack, etc., all of
which have their own traditions and histories. Into this mix, IO is laid as an umbrella type
concept and it is no wonder that one single approach to conduct will not succeed and instead, and
that a more varied methodology is probably required. Therefore in order to continue moving
ahead with respect to IO in the United States government, it is suggested per the interviewee data
that a combination of techniques, methodologies and processes must be utilised by the federal
bureaucracy.
If the new Joint Publication 3-13 and the 10 Road Map published in 2006 and 2003 are
now considered the pre-eminent Department of Defense policies on the power of information, it
has to be wondered if they really are the ultimate solution to the problems affecting the federal
government with regard to the operational capabilities ofiO. Or are they as some interviewees
have suggested instead, a series of compromises by the military services and an attempt to
publish a more 'realistic' answer to 'operationalising' IQ across the Depattrnent ofDefense?
This 'narrowing' of the 10 policy is in opposition to what many of the interviewees
recommended, for as noted throughout this section per the interviewee data as well as in a large
number of documents in the literature review, a much greater emphasis on the use of perception
management capabilities by the federal bureaucracy was suggested to engage in strategic
operations in the global war on terrorism. For example, the IO Road Map which was
promulgated by the Department of Defense in 2003, does not appear to follow these
recommendations as suggested by the participants, and instead appears to 'consolidate' 10 into
more 'discrete' military warfare areas, more aligned to the older command and control warfare
policy. Thus the recommendation for this key theme of this research is to fund and promote
understanding of where the true changes in 10 will probably come in a decentralised manner, or
as one interviewee stated, "that change occurs best at the edges" (Rendon, 2003). Opportunities
to evolve policy, organisations, training and tools, in small but significant areas, should be
viewed as a good approach to follow for the conduct of IO across the federal bureaucracy, with
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the understanding that they offer the most hope in the near term, to eventually produce the
revolutionary effects, that were envisioned from IO nearly 15 years ago.

9.4.4

Establish an International Standards Effort with respect to 10 Training and
Education
Based on the interviewee data, a suggestion has arisen that involves the establishment of·

an international based IO Standards Working Group to conduct the following activities:
•
•
•
•

Creation of the IO Standards Working Group manifesto
Creation of relationships with the Police, the Military, professional bodies, other defence
agencies, and the corporate world, in the participating countries
Coordination of a series of International Information Operations Standards for
Information Operations workshops
Development and publication of Information Operations standards for Information
Operations

Specifically after a recent International Conference on Information Warfare that was held in the
Naval Post-Graduate School in Monterey, California (March 2007), the following deficiencies in
IO were identified:
•
•

•

•

Information Operations is a field that has no current standards.
After the recent technological developments, the stakeholders of the Information
Operations are not just nation states and military groups any more, but commercial and
governmental organisations that are members ofthe Critical National Infrastructure of a
nation.
Information Operations is a cross disciplinary discipline that brings together specialists in
computer science, sociology, psychology, communications international relations and
military science.
There is a need for the aforementioned parties to be able to cooperate and collaborate for
producing standards and defining the science ofiO.

The first step to mitigate these issues is proposed the creation of a virtual community, bringing
together the members of the working group for identifying and producing a course of action. It
is suggested that this steering group will utilise a web site, creating a series of mailing lists, and
the use of existing scientific conferences for disseminating results. The steering committee of
the Information Operations Working Group will be expected to promote the principles of
Information Operations in their respective countries and identify and establish relationships with
stakeholders: the academia, professional bodies, the corporate world, the military forces, other
defence agencies, and law enforcement. This involves organising a series of meetings, organising
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workshops and disseminating results following traditional publication approaches. At this stage it
is considered that one annual workshop will be adequate.
The second milestone is the development of the group's manifesto. Once the steering
committee of the Information Operations Standards Working Group is established it will produce
a manifesto, and the future actions of the Group will be dictated by it. The group will develop a
collaborative set of Information Operations standards that will be disseminated via journal
papers, conferences, workshops and press-releases. The third milestone is the creation of
relationships with the European Network & Information SecurityAgency, the United States
Department ofDefense, the United Kingdom and Finnish Ministry of Defence, and the Research
Network for a Secure Australia. Ultimately, the main outcome will be the creation of
international Information Operations standards that will be released, possibly two sets, one for
military operations and one for the public. It is hoped that the establishment of this IO Standards
Working Group will greatly improve the capabilities of a set of IO standards, especially across
the United States and its federal bureaucracy.
Developing standards alone will not meet all of the needs for IO training, and there is no
fast and simple solution. By encouraging and increasing the capacity of current programs, there
will be an immediate, increase in flow created by accelerating the progress of students currently
in the programs. Currently the production of IO graduates of training and education courses has
been increased to a few hundred a year. Experience with the IA scholarship program indicates
that de novo programs take as long as 4 - 5 years to produce the first individuals with
baccalaureate degrees focusing on information operations. To produce individuals at the masters
level takes an additional year and a half and yet an additional 2 - 3 years to produce a PhD. The
foregoing discussion provides investment solutions that initiate and rapidly build an IO
educational infrastructure for the long term national interest. It involves:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Investing in undergraduate and graduate students to encourage them to enter the
profession
Investing in current faculty to keep them in academia
Investing in converting faculty to support information operations initiatives
Investing in research to maintain the state of the art and advance the profession
Aiding in the development of information operations as a recognized discipline in
conjunction with information assurance
Aiding faculty in professional development and publication of research results
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The following nine-point program would establish an integrated academic infrastructure
dedicated to providing the education and training required to support the using 10 to protect of
elements of the critical national information infrastmcture. Specific actions proposed include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Creation of a scholarship program to encourage both undergraduate and graduate
students to enter the profession
Creation of distinguished professorships and associated stipends to encourage faculty
both to join and to remain in the academic ranks
Creation of joint research opportunities with government
Creation of mechanisms to maintain currency of teaching and research facilities
Encouragement of government, industry and academic personnel interchanges
Encouragement of joint academic - industry research consortia to address current
needs
Creation of an information operations training program to increase the number of
faculty teaching and researching in the area
Creation of joint education and training programs to keep current practitioners
current
Encouragement of the creation of innovative research outlets for faculty

The emphasis of this push to upgrade the 10 training and education curricula is to help support
the attraction of qualified personnel and students to the profession, with the development of a
sufficiently large and well-informed faculty to guide education, training, and research programs.
for these personnel and students. In addition improved infrastmcture is needed to support such
programs, as well as strengthening ties between industry, government, and academia through
joint education, training, and research initiatives and opportunities. Finally as has been
emphasised in Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008, the use ofCyber Warfare tactics are
becoming more prevalent. Training and education in lA and 10 capabilities, with the
development of appropriate standards could also help to alleviate some of these risks and
vulnerabilities.

9.5

Areas for Future Research
All of the areas addressed above are considered as key findings, and if extended, could

also be logical areas to conduct additional research in the future, with specific focus areas to
include the following suggested topics:
11
111
111

11

The reasons why the Department of Defense limited its 10 policy
The reasons for the lack of a strategic academic 10 theory
Research attempts to link 10 Training and Education to taxonomy and st~ndards
The use and success of metrics in 10 missions
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In addition, since this research was primarily conducted in the United States, opportunities exist
to research similar test cases outside of America. Likewise, this paper also emphasised the fact
that no longer will it require a large organisations to execute this element of power, but instead it
will be the nimble and smaller activities and agencies that will succeed in this new era. Future
research could also be conducted on the optimal size of an agency or group that is best in this
new informational environment. Likewise other academic issues that are available for research
could revolve around which organisational structure can be used to best maximise their
capabilities in the information age, whether it is at the strategic, operational or tactical level. Or
additional research could be conducted in the key features that were mentioned in the first
chapter section, namely wide open communication links, little censorship, truthfulness of
information and whether strengthening networks will decide the future of the world's political
structure. Finally in this thesis, definitions and models were developed that articulate not only
why this divide between strategic theory and tactical operational missions exists, but also
specific strategies for utilising IO in a manner that best optimises the inherent capabilities of this
element of power. Taken together, all of these areas mentioned above could be lucrative source
for research by academics in the future, because of the incredible change that is occurring within
this issue area.

9.6

Summary of 10 Changes with Desired Recommendations of Participants
In conclusion, what all of the interviewees emphasise and acknowledge, which is also

alluded in the books, articles, conferences and reports that make up this thesis, is that in essence
a drastic change in the conduct and use of power has occurred during the Information Age. In
this research project, these changes in the evolution of power were discussed with a large number
of personnel as part of this research, and focus sed not only on the changing nature of power with
respect to information, but also on the growing power of information itself. In addition, analysis
of how these recommendations gathered from the data gathered compares to the actual
development of IO by the United States government was also attempted. Likewise, this research
also compared the changes recommended in the Conceptual Models, to other literature on this
subject, to analyse if other authors agreed with the research participants as the way ahead to
further the progress ofiO, as compared to those that did not. With regard to the literature itself,
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some of these books and articles were prescient and seminal, while others were less useful and
have quickly faded into obscurity. There are many reasons for this, but as the author's
hypothesis suggests, 10 policy often does not readily translate into the tactical operations.
Therefore what the literature review in Chapter Two and its analysis in that section have
attempted to do, is to reiterate and show the gaps in literature between strategic doctrine and the
day-to-daY.reality of this new warfare area, and how this research intends to fill that void.
Finally, an attempt of this research, was to show the gap in knowledge that exists today, not only
from a literature analysis prospective, but also by comparing it to the requirements for the
continuing development ofiO, with an extensive series of interviews over a multi-year period.
In conclusion, what all of these texts as well as the interviewees recognise is that there is
a new role for information as an element of power. It is understood that it is the fungibility of
information which makes it so truly useful, and this dissertation has attempted to emphasise that
the ability to transform information, to move it or display its capability, all relates directly to its
power. This is the concept of strategic 10 that quickly captures the minds of so many because of
its great potential. Many of these texts also point to a more realistic appraisal of the current
capabilities of the United States government, and often suggest a more pragmatic approach of
continuation and maturation of the 10 process within the federal bureaucracy as the best way
forward. The challenge of this research therefore has been an attempt to analyse the delta
between the strategic concepts of the power of information envisioned by the United States and
how 10 is actually conducted by the government, to help formulate a plan to lessen the gap based
on the suggestions of the interviewees.
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Appendix A - Interview Schedule
The primary methodology of this research has been active interViews combined with Soft System
Methodology. 100 interviews were conducted since 1999 in which the researcher repeatedly met
with a variety of government officials to discuss the role and evolution of 10 within the United
States government. Of these interviews, 40 key participants were selected for the final analysis
of this study, due to their positional and institutional knowledge, breadth of information and
willingness to undergo repeated interviews.
# First Interview Second Interview
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

19-Feb-03
19-Feb-03
14-Apr-03
15-Apr-03
16-Apr-03
16-Apr-03
16-Apr-03
17-Apr-03
17-Apr-03
18-Apr-03
21-Apr-03
21-Apr-03
21-Apr-03
22-Apr-03
22-Apr-03
22-Apr-03
23-Apr-03
23-Apr-03
24-Apr-03
25-Apr-03
13-May-03
10-Jun-03
10-Jun-03
10-Jun-03
10-Jun-03
10-Jun-03
2-Jul-03
2-Jul-03
3-Jul-03
3-Jul-03
3-Jul-03
4-Jul-03
4-Jul-03
4-Jul-03
4-Jul-03
6-Aug-03
7-Aug-03
12-Aug-03
13-Aug-03
13-Aug-03

26-Apr-04

24-Nov-03
25-Mar-04
25-Mar-04
1-Apr-04

31-Mar-04
1-Apr-04

1-Apr-04

1-Apr-04

19-Nov-03
1-Apr-04
24-Mar-04

Affiliation
NPGS
NPGS
Aerobureau Corp
DoD
CFR
Highlands Forum
26-Mar-04 State Department
Consultant
Consultant
The Rendon Group
RAND Institute
Ctr Naval Analysis
Consultant
NDU
RAND Institute
State D~_artment
DoD
GWU
OGC
RAND Institute
RAND Institute
DoD
State Department
DoD
DoD
GWU
TRC
FCO
University of Leeds
Consultant
SNDC
ADF
Deacon University
Kings College
NDU
Monash University
JFSC
23-Apr-04
C4ISR
NSC
State Department

Third Interview
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Appendix B - Rich Pictures
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Appendix C- CATWOE Elements
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Appendix D ~ Root Definitions
Initial Root Definitions
1. Information Operations in the United States government is coordinated by the planners and
operators under the centralised control of three key organisations (White House, State
Department and the Department ofDefense), to achieve a strategic Information Operations
campaign to key decision makers in both foreign and domestic populations, including the global
media, which promulgates the United States political/military weltanschauung within the
constraints ofreal-time, 24/7 operations.
System - Information Operations in the United States government
11

Client

ill

Actors
Transformation
Worldview
Owners

ill
lil
Ill!

11

Environment

key decision makers in both foreign and domestic popuhitions,
Including the global media
planners and opei·ators
strategic Information Operations campaigns
political/military
three key organizations (White House, State Department and the
Department of Defense)
real-time, 24/7 operations

2. Information Operations in the United States government is achieved in an ad-hoc fashion by a
variety of operators; both international and corporate planners, as well as the global media, for
the American public, to facilitate a bottom-up IO campaign to target to key decision makers in
both foreign and domestic populations, which promulgates the United States academic/civilian
weltanschauung within the constraints of resources and key American values.
System- Information Operations in the United States government
Ill!
Ill

11
11
11
Ill!

Client
Actors
Transformation
Worldview
Owners
Environment

Target audiences include both foreign and domestic populations
International and Corporate operators, including the global media
bottom up Information Operations campaigns
academic/civilian
American public
resource constraints and key American values
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Final Root Definitions
The two final Root Definitions are shown below. The same format will be followed for each of
the draft Root definitions, with each of the CATWOE elements utilized as part of an attempt to
develop a coherent statement of the data derived from the interviewees.

Information Operations in the United States government needs to be differentiated between the
tactical and strategic operations by key decision makers of the United States government for
· better integration and more IO training across the interagency spectrum,·in an understanding that
IO is not a new phenomenon.

System
Client
Actors
Transformation
Worldview
Owners
Environment

Information Operations in the United States government
United States government
Tactical versus Strategic
Better Integration
More IO Training
Key decision makers
IO is not New

The second final Root Definition is shown below:
Information Operations in the United States government needs personnel and a better
organisational infrastructure, to reach overall IO goals, focused at coordinated themes towards its
targeted audience with coherent IO policy.
System
Client
Actors
Transformation
Worldview
Owners
Environment

Information Operations in the United States government
All Others
Personnel
Overall Goals
IO Policy
Better IO structure needed
IO Themes
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Appendix E - Conceptual Models

CM 1.2 ·Set up
coordinating systems
between WH, DoS and DoD

Goals:
Develops a
coordinated and
integrated strategic
USG 10 campaign

1

Targets:
Improved perception
of US policies by
USG personnel

CM 1.3 - Investigate
needs of
stakeholders

succesa

Information Operations in the United States government is derived from the perspective
of the overall 10 themes to produce better integration implemented and run by tactical
versus strategic 10 personnel for the benefit of the USG and under the control of key
decision makers within the constraints of the fact that 10 is not a new warfare area.
Clients
Actors
Transformation 10 Integration

Weltanschauung 10 Themes
Owners
Decision Makers
Environment
IOisnotNew

Conceptual Model 1.0- IO in the United States govemment: A Top Down (Centralised) View

298

Ensure strategic
goals match
interagency 10 plans

Goals:
Ensu res a top-down ,
cen trally executed plan
that is integrated across
the USG

Develop a centralised series
of committees a nd groups to
monitor and adjust plans as
needed

Ensure that th ese 10 plans
a re synchronised across the
organisations

Develop similar
type of 10 plans
and goals in each
USG agency

Match agency plans
to strategic 10 goals
for USG

Conceptual Model 1.1: Tactical vs. Strategic Goals for US govemment IO Systems

Better Integration of 10 Actions

Develop a coheren t and
integrated set of coordinating
systems between all three
organisations

Ensure coordinating
systems utilise simlar
standards

Need buy-in, resources and
commilment from top
leadership

Operations
should be 2417 constant and
continuous

- - - - -1

Utilise same SW and
HW to communica te,
opera te and plan

Goals:
Real-time integrated 10
systems that are
coordinated both
vertically and horizontally
across the interagency

Targets:
Instill a belief in
effectiveness of USG
10 plans, systems and
operations

Systems should
provide metrics
for analysis
Monitoring
system that can
transfer data
seamessly across
all levels of USG

Conceptual Model 1.2: Coordinating systems between White House, Department of State and
Department of Defense
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Key Decision Makers

Ensure that key USG
agencies understand
users needs and desires

Develop overall gu idance
for key USG organisations

needs a re met

. Execute system on a
ccnsistent and
repeatable basis

Develop system to
understand
stakeholders
needs and desires

personnel and key
decision makers

Measure th e
needs of
stakeholders

Conceptual Model 1.3: Investigate Needs of Stakeholders

Ensure adequate training of
personnel across USG to
man this bureaucracy

Develop 10
planning
system for all
of the USG

Execute strategic
10 plans from
single system

Goals:
Ensure all USG personnel
are we ll trained and know
the policy and system
developed to conduct
strategic 10.

Targets:
The staffs of the three
key agencies plus
other key USG
decision makers

Use 10 standards
recognised across
USG

Conceptual Model 1.4: Set up an Interagency IO Campaign Bureaucracy

300

!10 Themes

I

Ensure USG bureaucracy is
capable of executing 10
plans and operations

Conceptual Model 1.5: Execute IO Campaigns

A comprehensive and
integrated set of
measures of evaluate an
10 Campaign

Ensure 10 standards, policies
and procedures are developed
and adhered to by the three
key USG agencies

Develop standard
methodology to measure
success of an 10
campaign

Goals:
Match strategic 10
plans to resources
and capabilities

Targets:
Key USG decision
makers and

1

Incorporate 10 training, resources,
planning and operations into one set
of metrics for USG
Monitoring system
a comprehensive
system using
feedback from a
multitude of sources

Conceptual Model 1.6: Measure IO Campaign's Success
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CM 2.1 - Accept any and all
CM 2.2 ·Utilise a wide
10 actions conducted for the ~ ~--' variety of 10 training
United States government
courses and instruction

CM 2.3 - Develop an
10 policy broad
enough to encompass
all key US values

CM 2.4 - Develop a
decentralised
communications and
networking procedures
to facilitate 10

Goals:
Conduct 10 in a
decentrali sed
envi ronment

CM 2.5 - Provide

Information Operations in the United States government from the perspective of the
development of 10 Policy to produce overa/110 goals implemented and run by 10
Personnel for the benefit of all other personnel that are affected by 10 under the need for
a better 10 structure within the constraints of the overa/110 training available.
Weltanschauung 10 Policy
Owners
10 Structure
Environment
10 Training

Conceptual Model 2.0: IO in the United States Government, A Bottom Up View
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10 Goals

Devel op strategic
goals from the 10
actions conducted w/1
th e United States

Compare 10
actions to longstand ing cu ltural
valu es of US

Develop a decentralise d
accounting mechanism
such as a portal , where 10
ac tivities ca n be reported

Utilis e polls and reports from
th e media to undes tand
_ ___ ,, impact of 10 activities

Goals :
Atlempts to ti e toge th er
in a bottom-up fashion
the plethora of 10
activities conducted by
the United States

Targets :
A large va ri ety of foreign
and domestic populations

Utilise acad emics and media
to analyse effectiveness of 10
ca mpaigns wrt to targets

Conceptual Model 2.1: Accept any and all IO actions conducted for the United States
government

l1o Structure I

Develop a ne~'ork bridge
or portal tha t ca n accept a
va riety of comm.Jnica tions
systems and neworks

Attempt to foster a common
set of procedu res for
reporting 10 activities

Goals:
Real-time integrated 10
systems that are
coordinated both
ve rti ca ll y and horizonta lly
across the interagency

Conceptual Model2.2: Develop a Decentralised Communications and Networking Procedures to
Execute and Facilitate IO Activity
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10 Training

Develop tesls to track level
and competence of 10 users

Develop a blended
method of 10 instruction
that utilises a number of
academic techniques

Ensure trainin g
is available in a
number of
different venues

Goals:
Ensure users training
needs are met

c9nduct 10 activities

Conceptual Model2.3: Utilise a Wide Variety ofiO Training Courses and Instruction
10 Policy

Make training
opportunities
available to all
10 users

Goals:
Develop 10 policies,
stra tegies an d doctrine
and can encompass all
key US val ues and 10
activities

1

Ensure that th ese
broad themes are
promulgated to all
10 users

Enlist the academic
community to
evaluate 10 efforts
wrt key US values

Conceptual Model 2.4: Develop an IO Policy and Strategy Broad Enough to Encompass all Key
United States Values
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All Others

Promulgate a series of
artides and reports of
how the art of warfare
has changed

Develop reporting and
accounting mechani Sms
to keep tra ck of
disparate 10 activities

Fqster a spiri t of
cooperation toward
the funding of 10
activities in the US

Conceptual Model 2.5: Provide Resources and Adequate Funding to Foster Innovation in IO

Attempt to link 10 standards to
policy, doctrine and strategy
used by the vari ous la
activi ties in the US

Utilise global media
and aca demia to
measure 10 plans
and stra tegy

-

-

Strive to integrate the
disparate methodologies for
- " 10 organisations through
common processes

Goals:
Commcnality among
10 groups towards
standards th at are
utilised

Targets :
Disparate la
organisations

Analyse 10 training and 10
standards for commonality

Conceptual Model 2.6: Develop a Set of IO Standards that can be Understood and Utilised by all
Organisations
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